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POWER2YOUTH

Governing Youth, Managing Society: A Comparative Overview of Six Country Case Studies (Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Tunisia and Turkey)

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Myriam Catusse and Blandine Destremau¹

Abstract

This paper offers a comparative overview of both country and issue-based case studies prepared for the Power2Youth Work Package dedicated to analysis of policy/institutional factors of youth exclusion/inclusion in the South East of the Mediterranean. It begins by clarifying the theoretical and methodological presuppositions mobilized to address the concepts of 'youth' and public action. Next it reviews the four sectoral policy fields selected for the research, namely: employment, migration, family and spatial planning. Finally, it analyses governmental techniques at work in the six country case studies (Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Tunisia and Turkey).

Keywords: Youth | Domestic policy | Employment | Family | Migration | Egypt | Lebanon | Morocco | Palestine | Tunisia | Turkey

1. INTRODUCTION: FRAMEWORK, CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

The Power2Youth collaborative research project questions the governance of “youth issues” in light of the 2011 uprisings, identified as “youth movements” (Alhassen and Shihab-Eldin 2012, Khalaf and Khalaf 2011). The 2011 revolutions have been interpreted as alarm indicators raising the binary issue of the “problems of youth” and “youth as a problem.” The “problems of youth” pertain to issues associated with the condition of being young, whilst “youth as a problem” represents the problems that youth as a group pose to society at large. Regardless of warning signals, the six country studies - which survey a range of contexts including examples such as the regime change in Tunisia or the ephemeral experience of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt - demonstrate that five years after the first uprisings no major changes have come about in public action. Instead, the studies often highlight a reinforcement of previous trends as well as certain forms of “institutional stickiness” (Crouch and Farrel 2004:5). We examine these results because they call into question a central explanatory principle of *path dependence* evoked by neo-institutionalist theory: if institutions and public policies targeting youth appear stable and seem to resist political change in a paradoxical policy lock-in at the height of political crisis, it is unlikely that this solidity stems primarily from the effect of “increasing returns” of these policies (Palier and Boloni 1999:415). We highlight changes arising in the margins, although not necessarily those that might be expected in the wake of popular and revolutionary youth movements. The transformations we are witnessing and that are traced in the studies that comprise the Power2Youth Work Package dedicated to macro-level analysis do not reflect fundamental changes. Rather, they are nuanced

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variations, and often occurring “despite the youth” (Loncle 2003). Even in the context of the internationalization of these policies, namely the growing investment of international actors, or at least non-nationals, in their development and implementation (Somi 2016), they show trends that indicate a strengthening of governance by means of control and the public construction of deviance.

The social upheavals experienced in the MENA region have commonly been associated with generational movements or simply explained as a demographic fact of a youth bulge. Legions of men and women are entering the workforce at a historic moment in which opportunities are limited and public policy is constrained by the reduction of its scope of intervention due to structural adjustments on the one hand, and the economic crisis on the other. MENA is the second youngest region in the world, following sub-Saharan Africa, but has major disparities between its countries.² Young people in the region today are more educated and more urban than their elders. These young cohorts of men and women do not merely embody generational differences; they are also actors generating conflicts, exacerbated by the rapid economic, social and anthropological transformations experienced by these societies. Not only are they facing a radical unemployment crisis, they must also contend with high rates of urbanization (e-Geopolis 2011), changes in education (Hoel 2014) such as the feminization of the university system (Kucuk 2013), changes in the age of marriage (Rashad et al. 2005) and its decline, etc. The patriarchal system that accompanied the population explosion is crumbling with the demographic transition, and with it so are inter-family relations as well as certain political foundations (Fargues 2000). While some may see this as a major argument against culturalist interpretations of the clash of civilizations - the demographic transition proves a far more convincing explanatory power of observable social and political dynamics (Courbage and Todd 2011) - others conclude that the “youth” of the region are the new “dangerous classes of globalization.”³ We deconstruct this hypothesis and demonstrate how the category of “youth,” far from stemming from nature and biology, is in fact derived from the construction of a public issue focused on youth, feeding on fantasy and representation, and pegged to sectorial policies. This is observed in both grey literature and in public policies.

1.1 Two Knowledges Turning Their Back to Each Other

We begin with a longitudinal review of the grey literature in order to understand how the term “young Arab” has developed around two very different visions. One approach dates back at least 20 years (Bennani-Chraïbi 1994), and attempts to trace and analyse the political, historical and social construction of the category and its various uses (Meijer 2000, Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag 2007, Khalaf and Khalaf 2011, Bonnefoy and Catusse 2013). The other, more normative, is constituted primarily of public policy documents, and focuses on the “evils of youth,” drawing an ambivalent yet unnuanced portrait of a generation usually thought of as a “youth peril” in relation to issues of employment, migration or political radicalism. This literature rarely questions or explores the effects of intersectionality, playing out beyond generational inequalities, i.e., the combination of multiple factors of discrimination (gender, social, resources, training, geographical origin; see Salih et al. 2016). This duality in the literature is confirmed and continues in the post-2011 production.

² Almost half of Yemen’s population is under the age of sixteen while almost the same proportion of Qatar’s population is under thirty.

³ Regarding the construction of this image see Bennani-Chraïbi (2007:147 et seq.).

The sources that accompany public policies, and upon which they are formed, are generally policy oriented, and although at times they are critical, they constitute forms of discourse which contribute to the building of a specific object, i.e., youth. A review of the sources that underlie the studies included in this work package is illuminating. They concentrate on public youth policies and the studies accompanying such policies. As Musleh (2016) points out in her paper on Palestine, militant knowledge on experience is virtually non-existent. In Lebanon, Harb (2016:10) notes, policy-led discourse focuses on unemployment and migration. "Job creation, income inequality, knowledge production, gender discrimination, civil rights, political rights, rights to public space and leisure" are silenced issues. The same conclusions are shared by all of the Power2Youth macro-level studies. Developing knowledge "about" helps to build categories of "youth" *from afar* in such a way that some young people become recipients of this or that public action. In legitimizing their contours and in a performative or action-oriented way, policy documents seem to build concrete social groups. They highlight certain phenomena, building figures or types (e.g., the "unemployed graduate") by obscuring others such as the "active young woman" or "housewife." These narratives are heard, accepted and adopted. They build a hegemonic version of the "youth problem" and "youth as a problem." As we shall see, this helps subalternize, hide, silence discordant voices (young or not young) that were nonetheless voiced during the social movements.

1.2 A "Group" Constructed by Public Policies

Our subsequent, and perhaps more significant area of interest and analysis, is the level of public policies. We examine the way they inform the concept of "youth" as related to "a problem," and how they articulate with youth problems. Generally, these low-impact policies find their expression in programmes launched or supported by international donors, i.e., European, UN and to a lesser extent Arab (for instance, regarding migratory policies), where the "2011 effect" is particularly salient. In so doing they reinforce a "youth question" which existed well before 2011 and was already at the heart of security and migration concerns regarding young men and women in search of a better future. Power2Youth, like other European and UN programmes, bears witness to this state of affairs. The simple fact that the European Union has advertised a research fund on youth in the Mediterranean is significant of the impact of the "Arab revolutions" on raising awareness about instability fostered by this "problem generation." The same could be said about the research scopes that were initially suggested: unemployment and political participation.

Contextualizing our work therefore requires that our survey of these policies begin well before 2011. An historical perspective of the construction of schemes targeting "youth" brings us a greater understanding of their effects on institutions, as well as political and even anthropological representations, which underlie more recent changes. It is an inherent approach to the critical and constructivist posture that we adopt in this research.

We begin by clarifying the theoretical and methodological presuppositions mobilized to address the concepts of "youth" and public action. Next we review the four sectoral policy fields selected for this study, namely: employment, migration, family and spatial planning. Finally, we analyse governmental techniques at work in the six countries.

2. METHOD AND THEORETICAL STANDPOINT


2.1 Youth - Did You Say "Youth"? A Critical and Constructivist Approach

The first area of discourse about "youth" in the region is that of the "youth bulge." Yet images speak a thousand words and a simple comparison of the population pyramids shown in Figure 1 attests to the variety of age ranges in the region, calling dramatically into question the idea that demographically speaking this generation is a menace for economic and social stability. The demographic perspective of the rhythms of transition in the countries studied calls for a serious review of the notion of a youth bulge.

Regardless of its constitution, the image of the youth bulge remains instrumental for explaining youth problems in public discourse. Far from being purely demographic, it is a sociological and a political construct. It is considered negatively only because youth are conceived of as a burden and a problem, not a resource. In Lebanon, the youth bulge narrative is associated primarily with Muslim (especially Shia) fertility. Christians tend to emigrate more and so pose less of a problem, whereas the influx of Syrian refugees since 2011 has reinforced this discourse. In Egypt, in the 1990s, the regime attributed social problems such as unemployment, inequalities, informal settlements and lower quality opportunities to high fertility rates. Contrastingly, in Turkey youth is assessed as a demographic advantage for development, an opportunity due to its contribution to the labour force and a potential for population increase. It is a demographic opportunity with its reproductive contribution.

We started from the hypotheses that "age is a biological datum, socially manipulated and manipulable" and that "merely talking about the 'young' as a social unit, a constituted group, with common interests, relating these interests to a biologically defined age, is in itself an obvious manipulation" (Bourdieu 1993:95). Membership in a particular age group is in fact irrelevant in defining a social category. These epistemological constraints, however, should not prevent us from addressing the social realities that engage the concepts of youth and young people. To this effect we have adopted a constructivist posture with respect to the categories of "youth" and "young people." It would be helpful, relevant even, to employ the term "youths" in its plural form as is possible in French, even when it might be grammatically incorrect. Indeed, as shown by the numerous studies on youths, these generic categories contain as many inequalities regarding situation, position and resources as they attempt to present a unified view, laden with representations of a generation of individuals sharing common problems and perspectives. In fact, a comparison of the six country surveys identifies both tautological and contradictory uses of the definition of "youth." For example, does a 20-year-old, employed, married father or mother still belong to the "youth" category, regarding public policy and research? By questioning the practical construction and highly political nature of various intervention methods and institutions, we reveal that age barriers used to define the contours of this generation not only strongly differ from one country to another, but also between institutions within a country, as well as between national and international institutions. The confusion is even greater if we include for instance minimum age required to be elected or appointed to some political positions, which is assumed to correspond to the transition to adulthood.

Figure 1 | Population pyramids 2015



Source: UNDESA (2015).

We can see these inconsistencies in the production of statistical discourse: for example, in Turkey, TurkStat adopts a “UN definition” to describe youth as aged 15 to 24, whereas the National Youth and Sports Policy (NYSP) document considers youth to be between the ages of 14 and 29 (Yurttagüler 2016:6, 9). In Lebanon, Harb (2016:22) states that “The ‘youth’ category is defined legally by the Ministry of Youth and Sports as those between the age of 15 and 25. Scholars and policy makers disagree and expand this age bracket to 15-29 years and sometimes to 18-35.” Other examples can be observed in terms of access to rights: in Morocco access to loans co-financed by the State and private credit institutions is attributed to “youth” who are 20-45 years old. In Tunisia “young entrepreneurs” must be under 40 to have access to financial assistance granted by the French Agency for Development and SOTUGAR. Also in Tunisia, the MicroMed Programme (BEI/Luxembourg) attributes micro-credits to youth aged between 15 and 24.

Finally, these incongruities are also observable in anthropological terms: if sexual awakening, or university access, can, for example, signify the “entrance” into the world of youth, it does so differently for girls and boys. Entering into marriage, obtaining a job or the prospect of autonomy is about leaving certain roles behind. These are milestones that indicate at once a term - the ending of childhood, the transition to the adult world - but also a projection - to a preferred, or a fear-inducing future (Bonney and Catusse 2013).

Questioning these anthropological transitions demonstrates how variable and sometimes how contradictory political and social constructions of youth can be. Military recruitment and/or voluntary enlisting in militias exemplify certain inconsistencies. Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag (2007:13) note that Arab youth first appear in liaison with armed struggles for independence and suggest a link between the emergence of the term *shabb* (youth) and national movements. The famous generation of Palestinian “*shabab al-intifada*” or the youth of the first Intifada (Larzillière 2004) were perceived “as protectors of the society as a result of their active participation in the national movement” (Musleh 2016:3) and this continues to be the case in the armed conflicts throughout the region. Here it is more the social function than the biological age which determines the group, but it is a social function that has, so to speak, been put on the shelf. As Musleh (2016:3) states, in Palestine, far from remaining “protectors,” youth have been identified in public policy as “a group in need of empowerment.” In a different domain, marriage is often, and some would argue excessively,⁴ considered to be a rite of passage for youth to enter adulthood. Yet the changes in the structures of marriage and family that can be observed in the region render the representations of youth even more complex. In Lebanon, for instance, most marriages and families are established under religious jurisdiction.⁵ Religious laws bind marriage age, where each sect sets a legal age for males and females to marry. In Muslim law, this allows girls to marry at the age of 9, and boys to marry at 14. However, in practice, matters differ drastically. The average age of first marriage

⁴ Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag (2007:25) highlight this situation: “When housing shortages are an impediment to leaving the parental home at the time of marriage, when the intensity of intergenerational transfer in both directions is so strong that it weighs upon both the young and the older generation, how can we define autonomy? What criteria can be stated for coming of age? [...] Qualifying and classifying age brackets is a complex issue. If the physiological capacity to marry determines an ‘in-between’ period, becoming an adult remains profoundly tied to a conception of social and political order. Moreover, this is expressed differently depending on the sex of the individual” (our translation).

⁵ The same holds true for Palestine (Musleh 2016:14).

among young women in Lebanon has risen to 29 in 2012, from 23 before the Lebanese civil war in 1974. These numbers among young men are respectively 29 and 32 (Harb 2016:16). In Morocco, men marry today between 30 and 34 years old, and women between 24 and 29 (Paciello et al. 2016a:12), whereas in the oPt, the age at first marriage increased for both males and females between the years 1997-2013. In the oPt for males it increased from 23 to 25.4 years and for females it increased from 18 to 21.1 years (Musleh 2016:15). In Tunisia, the legal age for marriage is 18, whereas in Morocco the legal marriage age for women was raised from 16 to 18. This was one of the most controversial changes imposed by the 2003 reform of the *Mudawwana* (code of personal status). But legal age is not the sole regulator of marriage conditions. The rise of *'urfi* or traditional marriages studied in Egypt (Dhillon and Yousef 2009), but also present in segments of Tunisian society (Paciello et al. 2016b:11), is viewed as a remedy to high wedding costs and premarital sex. This has serious consequences on the development of early marriages. In Egypt 33 percent of women are married before the age of 18, and this is particularly the case in rural areas (Sika 2016:16). This also has an impact on the idea that marriage is a stage in life. It is one of the reasons why contemporary Arab youth have been called the "generation in waiting" (Singerman 2007, Dhillon and Yousef 2009).

The "generation in waiting" is well illustrated in Ghada Abdel Aal's blog *Ayza atagawiz* ("Wanna Be a Bride"). This single, thirty-something Egyptian pharmacist describes a situation in which single young women wait for marriage in order to have children of their own, which would confirm their social role as women, wives and mothers. But waitness is not reserved for young women. The social construction of masculinity depends on professional, political and family participation and waitness for young men reduces them to powerlessness (Singerman 2007).

The well-known Algerian neologism "hittiste" (literally: one who holds up the wall) describes this generation of young men, waiting. They are waiting for things that may not lead to anything much: not to satisfactory professional integration fulfilling the promises of a university degree and the expectations of marriage, and not to recognition from the elder generations. They must also contend with the expectations of their aging relatives for care and support given the absence of adequate social protection. This is what Paciello et al. (2016b:9) state (even in the case of Tunisia, where the social security system is more protective than in other countries): "family allowances saw a decline and were only provided to members belonging to the social security system, thus excluding poor families with dependents. At the same time, the growing importance of the family of origin in youth transition to adulthood provides a minimum safety-net, and allows authoritarian regimes to preserve the status quo and exercise control over young people by containing their anger against the regimes." The expectations, the disappointments and the waiting seem to hold youth in a sort of void producing what Murphy (2012) has called a "generational narrative of systemic failure."

Thus, youth appears, more than any other time of life, to be a period of transition. However, as we have observed, this transition is extending and the time to start a family is being pushed back, the duration of studies is lengthened and the experience of unemployment - not necessarily formalized in an administrative sense - is becoming the norm, at the same time that the use of weapons is spreading. Does a young person who advances in age ever manage to exit this problematic period simply thanks to an increase of his or her biological age? Another peculiarity in contemporary representations of this "transition" for youth in

the region is that it is more of a “moratory” (Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag 2007:44) than a “probationary” period (Breviglieri and Cicchelli 2007) in the sense that it relates to waiting. It seems more passive than active, although this representation was brutally contradicted by the Arab uprisings.

The target groups of youth-based policies are construed to be more characteristic of presumed problems, expectations, types of resources, and social roles, than a cohort of individuals sharing the same biological age. They reflect a shift, a form of evolution, a “silent revolution” –silent because it is a revolution of values (Inglehart 1977). This evolution expresses itself in the transformation of traditional rites of passage, and in the perimeters and demarcation of the groups concerned by youth problems. The contours of “youth” targeted by public policies are often exclusionary. In contexts such as Lebanon where immigration is intensive, nationality is not necessarily identified as an issue yet as Harb (2016:22) observes, “Youth means *Lebanese* youth and is exclusive of the large numbers of other non-Lebanese youth in Lebanese cities and towns”. In other words, this excludes Palestinian, Syrian and other non-Lebanese youth, who compose a significant proportion of society. In terms of gender, several studies demonstrate how sports policies, which include the construction of infrastructure, have historically been oriented towards young men. Boutaleb (2007) show that in the case of Egyptian youth centres the question does not even arise: it goes without saying that these spaces are destined for males. Similarly, Herrera (2007) shows that the question of “Islamic identity” in sports only arises when it is a “girl’s game.” Studies on spatial planning arrive at similar conclusions when planning for youth: the categories of middle class, urban and men hold more weight than those of women, upper or even disadvantaged classes,⁶ leaving another problematic category, that of poverty, entirely by the wayside (Destremau et al. 2004).

Not only are youth not a homogeneous social group, their sociological profile is changing: in fact, young people today are more educated, more socialized by school, and they grow up with fewer siblings than previous generations (De Bel-Air 2016a). They are the children of a historical period of development during which State intervention was strong. It built specific expectations, and a form of citizenship that is historically situated.

The deprivation experienced by these young people is “relative” to their expectations, as illustrated by the two-lane tunnel parable articulated by the economist Hirschman (1973): expectations affect tolerance to inequality. Optimism is generated as the train in the next lane starts to move, as families invest in education and raise hope for a better future, as regional regimes and their financial partners make fictional claims for economic growth (Hibou 1999). But when one’s own train never sets in motion, when one’s university degree does not give access to hoped-for employment, when economic insecurity grows instead of prosperity, the individual feels excluded, betrayed even, and hope turns to anger. From this perspective, social suffering and a sense of outrage in the face of injustice can lead to rebellion (Gurr 1970). These experiences are not correlated with absolute standards such as biological age, poverty, job level etc., but are thought of as positional misery, which expresses a gap between socially constructed expectations and perceptions of the present.

⁶ The term “class” is understood here as based on socio-economic criteria, education, social and symbolic capital, place of residency and the possibility of making choices.

Yet, in regard to the construction of “youth issues,” deprivation is not exclusively reserved for youth watching the train leave without them. Other generations may not view youth as victims expressing their problems, but rather as disrupters of the enchanted development and advent-of-universal-welfare stories (Rist 2007). The perspectives, expectations and standards imposed on them change with advancing generations. Over the last few decades, and with the exception of the “revolutionary parenthesis,” many young men once viewed as heralds of change and heroes of nationalism in past generations are seen today as killjoys, refusing the pleasures of a “happy globalization” that liberates from the chains of communitarianism. Viewed as potential criminals or terrorists - under the archetypical guise of an unemployed, unmarried graduate 35-year-old man or woman - these urban men and women are frightening because they are angry and frustrated by economic, political and social crises. Conversely the model or the image promoted and disseminated by national and international public policies is a portrait of well-bred and positive young men as forward-looking, proactive, productive consumers and investors. For young women, the ideal picture is more social-class dependent with some integrating into the labour market and experiencing professional achievement whilst others tend to the family. When reality does not correspond to the image, public action is used to contain the spills (Catusse et al. 2009). Those who are incompatible are made invisible through a range of political systems that include speeches, statistics and policies of “containment” resembling the walls erected along the streets of Moroccan cities to hide the slums. The formula of poverty eradication is widely used in public policies and by international partners. And alternating views of youth as victims or as ideal members of society allows for a polite disregard of the problem of social cleavages, which include intergenerational divides. Further, it denies and depoliticizes more decisive social fractures in terms of access to economic, social or cultural resources.

In sum, the various surveys present in this research programme demonstrate, on the one hand, how “youth” does not exist as such, and on the other how public policy is not destined for all youth, but rather, as we shall see below, reserved for certain categories.

2.2 Considering Public Action as Instituting

One of the central questions we asked in our research is the extent to which the “Arab Spring” changed representations in the cognitive and reference frameworks reflected in public policies. Far from being the result of a concatenation of technical decisions, these policies give evidence of how society, or at least those in charge of public policies, represent or allow themselves to understand and act on reality as they perceive it (Muller 2000). Are youth too many, too needy? How do the policies in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon or Turkey reveal the problems posed or lived by youth? What do they say about the problem analysis they reflect, their own normative foundations, the value they bear and their performative effects? What is the “good youth” behind the policies, not only in terms of economic development and entrepreneurship, but also in terms of political participation or the ideal family, depending on time and place: for example, as early as 1960 Tunisia committed to a birth control policy via an active family planning policy; whereas in Palestine increasing the birth-rate remains a form of resistance to the Israeli occupation. In Turkey, with the arrival of the AKP family policies have seen important changes. Families are now encouraged to reproduce (“having at least three children,” Yurttagüler 2016:18).

Our constructivist approach allows us to examine the assumption that public policies (including international organization programmes) are powerless in the face of youth problems. In this view, public policies are seen, at best, as ineffective in correcting, counteracting or compensating for exclusion mechanisms since the origins of exclusion lie in behaviour and “market imperfections” that are outside of their control. This postulate proceeds from a representation that understands the State as being outside society (and not “in society,” Migdal 1988), and public action as corrective and not constitutive of society. However, we demonstrate that both in cases where the State is regarded as weak, such as Lebanon or Palestine, or as strong, as is the case of Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia or Egypt, public action is not helpless. It is at once instituted and instituting. Instituted by the balance of power and governance plans; instituting social representations and norms, redistribution of resources and controlling schemes. This does not contradict the structural adjustment and “neoliberal” economic policies in place in the region. On the contrary, as Paciello et al. (2016a) demonstrate in Morocco, these policies can be at once interventionist, *de facto* exclusionary and market-oriented, spreading the ideal of individual entrepreneurship.

We share the hypothesis that State policies are never youth neutral, in the same way that they are not gender or socioeconomically neutral. They can be intentional: policies explicitly targeted to categories of young people, with one of the most eloquent examples here being the case of “unemployed graduates” (Tourné 2005, Emperador Badimon 2009). Morocco in particular combines its response to a contestatory movement dating back to the 90s with a policy which attempts to transform the demands for employment and a suitable education system into a problem belonging to unemployed youth, with the unexpected development that advocacy groups are sometimes transformed into unofficial employment agencies proposing candidates for civil service jobs. Policies targeting young entrepreneurs in Tunisia (Cassarino 2000) resemble those of Morocco in 1990/2000, in that both contributed, in the name of promoting private enterprise, to silencing nascent reflections on solidarity and social security. They also can be non-explicitly intentional, e.g., policies aiming at enhancing political participation (Allal 2011). But we also need to consider the various forms of public action and State policies in contexts where the accent is often put on the “weakness” of the Arab State or, more precisely, on neo-authoritarian adjustments that undermine the welfare State *vis-à-vis* balances of power, and that contribute to fragmented and polycentric policies (Guazzone and Pioppi 2009).

Complexities of public action are far from being connected exclusively to top-down agents or agencies of stakeholders and government institutions. This invites us to examine the plurality of actors and resources mobilized at the macro-level, and to question the issue of political participation. Is it individuals or groups (i.e., constituencies) that elaborate and implement these policies? As we can see in the case of educational policies in Morocco and Egypt studied by Kohstall (2012), educational institutions are becoming more internationalized and privatized. Consequently, they are more intertwined with market concerns and values. On the other hand, while public educational systems are going through deep crises (Herrera and Torres 2006), private education is costly and political instability in several countries generates “lost years,” which lead to erratic schooling paths, becoming longer and longer (and thus extending the duration of youth) and articulating in various ways to employment and labour market policies.

The definition of public problems associated with “youth” can be identified with what Migdal (1988:241) calls an issue of “State-in-society,” affirming that “the structure of society has an important indirect effect on policy implementation” and vice versa. The results of our research confirm our initial hypothesis: the co-construction of the categories of action (e.g., unemployed graduates, young entrepreneurs, young *harraga*, young *hittiste*, street kids, unmarried mothers, young terrorists and soldiers, etc.) with social actors and international partners results in public policy producing differentiating and marginalizing mechanisms. It creates different categories of youth and attributes unequal shares to the different groups. Public policies produce and reproduce programmes for the distribution of public resources, attributing funds, positions, status, recognition, social protection, legalization, scholarships, public facilities, etc. which are reinforced by the construction of a visible, public problem contained within the category of youth. This can be seen for example with the “young unemployed graduate” or the “slum youth” in the context of policies of the “fight against slums” found in the Cities Without Slums programme in Morocco (Paciello et al. 2016a:18-19). Public concerns with respect to particular categories of youth such as those related to employment or to the very visible and sometimes unsavoury presence in the public spaces of young men in general, and immigrants and refugees in particular, obscure other more pressing problems.

The studies herewith demonstrate that the mechanisms of governing youth are definitely embedded in *ad hoc* institutions (1) but are not the exclusive domain of these institutions specializing in youth policy and action (2).

1) The first among the institutions explicitly dedicated to youth are the ministries of Youth and Sports (or the Supreme Council for Youth and Sport in Egypt, 1979-1999). In Turkey for example (although the same thing can be said in other cases, with the notable exception of Lebanon which belatedly registered the “youth” policy in its agenda), the ministry has the pivotal role since it defines itself as “the main responsible agency for providing services to meet the needs of young people and also as the main coordinating agency among youth-related institutions” (Yurttagüler 2016:3). Created in 1956, the year of independence in Tunisia, or in 1993 in the oPt, the year when the Palestinian Authority was established, the action of these ministries is primarily concerned with developing policies for youth management and care, and their programmes are principally intended for boys and young men.

In parallel with the creation of these ministries, various social services and agencies for integration have been established. For example, in Tunisia in the 1960s, with a model inspired by both the French model of the “houses of culture” and the socialist “youth centres,” the “Houses for Youth” were designed as popular education centres with managers trained in a national school for managers of youth, and became the Higher Institute for Youth and Culture in 1995 (ISAJC). In Morocco, the National Council for Youth and the Future (CNJA) was created in 1991. It introduces a new dimension in these policies, hitherto primarily driven by a modernizing narrative, i.e., youth support the development of tomorrow. With the CNJA the problem of graduate unemployment became a formal concern for the government. Despite the limited impact of its activities, it “was used as a tool to supervise and control the political activities of the surveyed group of unemployed graduates” (Paciello et al. 2016a:4).

These public agencies, explicitly adopting “youth” as their target and reason for being, experienced a notable increase and change across the region at the turn of the millennium. Under the pressure of the effects of economic policies, and the advocacy and mobilization or protests such as the *Kifaya* movement in Egypt,⁷ many organizations appeared. For example, Lebanon created its Ministry of Youth and Sports in the year 2000 as well as a “national youth policy,” funded by the Swedish agency AIDS (facilitated by UNESCO and UNICEF). Indeed in 2004, UNESCO and UNICEF have established a youth taskforce, bringing in UNDP and ILO. In Tunisia a National Youth Observatory was created in 2002; in 1999 Egypt set up a Ministry of Youth and Sports, which led a National Youth Policy launched in 2003-04. In other words, in contrast with the orientation of the post-independence years, the 2000s recorded a paradigm shift in youth public policy, making it an economic problem, with jobs and integration (a euphemism implying possible disruption to economics and politics) as a solution.

After 2011 a new adjustment can be traced, with increased institutionalization of a “youth problem,” maintaining the ambiguity we have emphasized, regarding the meaning of youth and its problems. The role of international organizations is important here, as are the concerns of national governments, alarmed by the uprisings. Somi (2016) demonstrates this in his study about the turn in youth policies taken in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution. Similarly, the Moroccan Ministry of Youth and Sports launched an “Integrated National Strategy for Youth” in 2012, with the help of the World Bank and the Centre for Mediterranean integration in Marseille. We should note however that this is not necessarily new behaviour. Harb (2016) shows the intensive involvement of international organizations in Lebanon during the period of transitions in the 2000s.

The various studies we have undertaken in the Power2Youth Work Package dedicated to macro-level analysis reveal a paradox. From a bird’s eye view, the public policy discourse on youth and the “youth problem” is abundant and sometimes excessive. Despite the institutions founded at the establishment of the regimes and dedicated to youth (except in the case of Lebanon) and the installation of the youth problem as a major concern, a closer look brings to light the fact that concrete data and information about youth are often sparse and not always reliable. These institutions and concrete mechanisms for implementing policies are, in reality, not very significant. More often than not, they are empty shells, heavily politicized but with little means.

2) “Governing youth” is also, and perhaps more profoundly, influenced by policies and institutions whose actions are not specifically aimed at young people, yet have an effect on them in the same way that they affect other groups of society. The ministries of health, education, as well as population, family and filiation policies are examples of these policy-making organizations. However youth-neutral they may appear, all institutions intersect and affect life trajectories, influencing the conditions for becoming and being young in domains that regulate the legal status of persons, kinship, conditions of marriage, divorce, widowhood and motherhood. However formalized or apparently informal may they be, institutions set standards, rules and practices regulating access to education, health services, information, employment, urban areas and public spaces, transportation, respect and recognition, etc.

⁷ See the Power2Youth work package dedicated to meso-level analysis.

Formal or informal, these institutions produce, structure and institute society as it is, with its territories, inequalities, aspirations and expectations, and let it evolve or not.

These results reflect a theoretical position on the role of public policy in relation to the market. Far from being reduced to a facilitating role for the development of the market (what some call the “twilight of the State”), public action shapes how, in order to access resources, people and groups resort to the market, clientelist relationships, privileges, etc. (Pioppi and Guazzone 2009). Public action is therefore not only *instituted*, but *instituting*, and in our case in the construction of the “youth problem.” It governs youth in the sense that it distributes them places, roles, resources and forms of recognition; it implements a “police” as described by Rancière (1995) and it attempts to order space, as we will review under the four areas of public action.

Public policy invests intensively in the areas of coaching, framing and control (sports, military, law enforcement, etc.), and of family, which are meant to contain the young generation within its assigned intergenerational and gender (as well as confessional, class, etc.) relations. Migration and remittances management are also ways to govern youth, as workers, framed by solidarity networks and productive, household or local development projects. Policies are often “discharged” policies, i.e., delegated to private actors such as associations, firms, micro-credit banks, etc. and are characterized by a growing marketization and an overwhelming concern for security issues. The interventions of multilateral and bilateral partners, international organizations and NGOs, have not changed the basic framework of public policies and institutional structures (in the broad sense of norms and standards, patterns and practices) on which they are based. Instead they seek to “pacify” the scene and to reduce social and generational conflicts. By producing depoliticized analyses and responses, they attempt to silence voices of discontent and opposition. Moreover, as emphasized in the conclusion, their modes of action have not changed significantly in the wake of the “Arab revolutions.”

3. PUBLIC ACTION IN FOUR DOMAINS: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The four domains reviewed hereunder are not necessarily labelled “youth policies.” To our question “is there a youth policy as such?” this does appear to be the case in countries where youth has become a politicized issue, for instance under the guise of youth centres such as in Egypt and Tunisia. Yet, less so in countries where youth is subsumed under sectoral issues, e.g., in employment, migration, or more typically sports, or under a national cause as is the case in Palestine.

Our research bears on four domains of “youth policies” with concerns relative to employment and political participation. We have purposely chosen domains that have come to light with recent political developments in some of the countries under study, but are hardly mentioned as public issues in others. The first two, employment policies and family policies, explicitly target youth and, one might suggest, even produce and institute the category. Whereas the latter two, migration policies and spatial planning policies, appear in a more subtle way in youth policies. None is “youth neutral,” and the research aims to uncover how these domains affect - and are affected by - youth, debates fostered around them, discourse constructed about their problems, etc.

3.1 Employment Policies and Labour Market Management

Employment policies are present in all of the countries studied. This is a domain of significant public action where the authorities find considerable visibility and opportunities for publicizing and disseminating political agendas. Yet, governments and their institutions are not the unique presence in this domain; it is also one of the favourite political arenas for international and European organizations. Government discourse develops and maintains high expectations with regard to its scope of action, and foreign institutions see the domain of youth employment policies as a way to limit emigration. It remains the case that public policies are relatively ineffective in “job creation” since the public sector - once the main employer in the region - absorbs fewer and fewer new workers entering the marketplace. Nor is the private sector a solution as it also struggles to incorporate young graduates and unskilled workers. The education-employment nexus is consistent with the neoliberal economic agenda, and is prone to depoliticization and reduction of labour market problems to an issue of youth skills. Recurring debates about the efficiency of education policies revolve around the idea that education system does not train youth in the skills required by the marketplace. Discourse on informal labour, understood as entrepreneurship, also tends to push aside issues surrounding social protection for workers and their families. Job quality and stability, necessary for accessing adult autonomy, are also absent from the debate.

For young men, being unemployed is closely associated with the image of radicalized troublemakers, illegal migrants, delinquents, etc. This perception is so prevalent that it tends to shadow other categories such as women, rural youth and marginalized groups. Moreover, employment is still seen as the main producer of status and social position. The issue supersedes most other youth-related problems including structural impasses and other social justice issues such as taxation, redistribution, public services, social policy, etc. Young women are virtually invisible in employment policies. They are largely ignored for any number of possible reasons including competition with men, gendered priorities or a conservative turn. Additionally, unemployment statistics, particularly those relating to women, rarely if ever consider inactive populations who have given up their job search out of discouragement, and those involved in irregular or partial activity, which does not necessarily suit their needs.

Ultimately, youth employment policies are mainly aimed at educated youth and are instrumental in pacifying youth political dissent. Most employability programmes strive to enhance self-employment or auto-entrepreneurship rather than acting upon labour markets structures.

In Lebanon, disconnection between educational policies and concern for unemployment produces high inequalities and marginalization for less affluent youth. The private sector emphasizes entrepreneurship, business and competitiveness. Unemployment is a major policy issue and youth are the main targets of sectarian political parties. They tend to find employment in areas that increase their visibility in public spaces such as the army, militias, security firms and the police, as substitutes for other jobs. In Morocco, due to the structural adjustment policies of the 80s and 90s, educated unemployed males became a central category and a political policy priority. Conversely this produced sectorialization, instrumentalization and depoliticization associated with control and repression. In 2004 a

labour code reform seeking a more market-friendly environment restricting State commitment to employ educated youth was implemented. Youth employment policies targeting educated graduates intensified in the 2000s, as well as vocational training and microcredit programmes aimed at improving employability, promoting self-employment and responding to the alleged market needs, but these produced low quality employment. The neoliberal economic context allowing public authorities to focus on youth responsibility and agency further deteriorated the situation. In Tunisia, the social pact of the 50s-60s was based on the State's commitment to full employment for educated youth. It contributed to limiting social conflicts and youth political dissent. In exchange for loyalty to the regime, youth were provided with education, employment opportunities and social mobility. But there was a change of economic policies in the 1970s, structural adjustment policies in the 1980s and acceleration of economic liberalization policies in the 2000s, which led to increases in unemployment, in employment instability, in low calibre jobs, as well as growing regional and social inequalities. Job creation became a priority starting in the mid 1990s, promoting market- and business-friendly patterns, using supply and demand imbalances and education gap rhetoric. Since then, national tools and institutions in charge of job creation programmes have proliferated, aiming at diminishing unemployment statistics, providing new modalities of control as alternatives to youth political party sections and producing regime loyalty. They generate mainly low paying, precarious jobs and tolerant attitudes towards informal labour, since it plays a key role in absorbing unemployed labour. In Turkey, labour market problems particularly affect young people, with strong differences between male and female and between rural and urban. Employability and employment policies stand out as pioneer solutions for social inclusion, along with extending social services. Social inclusion is associated with economic and social participation, and education is especially emphasized for young people.

In Egypt, vocational training developed in the 1980s, and initially had a positive effect on youth employment, but it was marked with low female participation, and often depended on outdated technology. Vocational programmes decreased in 2007-08 while secondary school attendance increased, but graduates made up the bulk of the unemployed. Education policies in 2007-08 also saw an increase in access to primary education but privatization of universities came to exclude poor, rural and lower class Egyptian youth, leading to high enrolment gaps and discrepancies. In 2000 the National Action Plan on Youth Employment was instituted, but investments were concentrated on low labour intensity sectors, and neoliberal economic policies, which remain the major force of youth exclusion. Palestine presents an even more dramatic profile: youth are perceived within a deficit model and when they are out of the labour market they are considered a threat to social stability and its capacity to develop. The Palestinian Authority (PA) considered employment as part of its strategic plan yet there is not a clear policy to work with youth to increase their employment level. The role of international organizations and NGOs is major in shaping the type of interventions working on youth employment. Donor organizations have the upper hand in deciding the type of programmes as they own and control financial resources. Youth organizations, similar to other organizations in the development field, have limited space to challenge the models presented due to being stuck in a process of NGOization. NGO, PA and donor organization interventions are mainly related to developing soft skills and the creation of SMEs; so far there have been no interventions that address the structural barriers that hinder youth participation in the labour market. Providing opportunities for work and improving the labour market remains limited in the Palestinian context. Policies are helpless in mitigating the impact of colonization

on the Palestinian economy, and development under colonization is transformed into an act of steadfastness rather than fitting the regular notion of development. This is particularly true due to the high dependency of the Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy, a scenario in which the PA and NGOs are both donor dependent.

3.2 Migration Policies

Many of the studies in the Power2Youth macro-level analysis, and De Bel-Air's study (2016a) in particular, support the notion that emigration policies are two-pronged, as are immigration policies in Lebanon, Tunisia or Morocco that today receive increasing numbers of young African migrants.

On the one hand migratory policies are economic in nature, attempting not only to export social tensions abroad and to curtail domestic youth unemployment, but also to import emigrant revenues in the form of remittances. From this perspective, these policies are destined to reinforce ties with citizens living abroad with the objective of facilitating the transfer of remittances, which represent a major source of foreign currency. In Lebanon these policies are associated with maintaining an ongoing political debate about the vote whereas in Tunisia or in Morocco mechanisms are established so that these citizens may vote abroad. This is one of the reasons that in 1993 Morocco created a special Ministry for the Moroccan community residing abroad. From 2008-12 it focused on establishing a Mobilization Strategy in Favour of Moroccan Residents Living Abroad. The authors of the Morocco report (Paciello et al. 2016a) highlight that although many emigrants are youth at the time of their departure, the action plan devised by this ministry does not involve the Ministry of Youth and Sport.

On the other hand, these policies are concerned with security and border control. They are conducted with European partners, including the Frontex Agency and/or the Arabian Peninsula regimes that traditionally import Arab workers. In this case their collaboration entails containing migration coming from sub-Saharan Africa or the Mediterranean countries.

Migration policies in this respect are particularly prescriptive and produce inequality and exclusion among the youth of the region. In Tunisia, the share of the 15-29 year-olds willing to emigrate jumped from 22 percent in 1995 to 76 percent in 2005. In 2008 one third of young Lebanese graduates were willing to leave their country. In Morocco, 42 percent of the population between 18 and 50 expressed the intention of migrating (De Bel-Air 2016a:8-9). The demands of this generation and the limited opportunities make social mobility highly differentiated. They accentuate labour market fragmentation, social cleavages, discrimination and stereotypes, as well as the construction of differentiated identities. De Bel-Air (2016a) describes this as "subordinate" inclusion: the ability to have access to mobility provided one agrees to the terms of the host country. A skilled workforce is desirable but some nationalities or confessions are more acceptable than others.⁸ Some elements as fundamental as traffic conditions in the Palestinian Territories, combined with the population policy enforced by the Israeli regime, further multiply the social statutes, and inequalities for candidates for migration at the start of their journey (or, as is the case in Palestine, the return).

⁸ See for example the recent expulsion of Shiite workers in Saudi Arabia.

3.3 Family and Personal Status Policies

It can be difficult to determine the precise scope of “family policies,” but with regard to this project we understand them as population policies (pro-birth, or birth control), personal status laws that represent a major framework for gender policies, as well as social policies that assign dependencies and solidarity bonds between generations, kin, spouses. Social policies may *de facto* preserve normative patterns of regular practices, customs or traditions, for example the dependence of girls and wives upon the menfolk of the family; but they may also introduce innovative schemes protecting new subjects, such as single mothers or national women married to foreigners. It is clear from the studies presented here that many countries are seeing a conservative turn since the 2000s (especially with an Islamic agenda) that strengthens the heterosexual family norm, based on radical gender differences (described as complementarities). Sometimes accompanied by a natalist policy to defend nationalist interests, attacks have multiplied on females’ reproductive rights, while age at marriage and ensuing earlier start in fertility tend to decrease. These tendencies are “fraught with paradoxes” and family structures demonstrate a growing heterogeneity (De Bel-Air 2016b:3).

If the idea of a “modern family” differs between social classes and sometimes confessional affiliations, it is marked with a seal of necessity. Family acts as a form of social security at different life stages for young people in search of autonomy. Youth benefit from family ties and protection but so do the elderly, who are cared for by their adult children, or other relatives, in times of hardship, disability, unemployment, etc. Many young adults continue to reside with their parents, often for lack of alternatives, and help care for grandparents and other elderly family members. Economic and political insecurity hinder youth emancipation from family dependency, especially in the lower classes. The lack of social rights restricts individual autonomy and reproduces dependency on family welfare. Often family becomes a trap. In this context, policy plays a determining and sometimes contradictory role for youth to become adult men and women.

In Lebanon, a heteronormative, gender-biased and sectarian-based legal framework prevails, and produces wide exclusion. Lebanese women cannot pass their nationality to their foreign spouse and children. They suffer discrimination in case of divorce, child custody and legal procedures. There is no civil marriage and the matrimonial institution is in crisis, expressed by significant delays in marrying age: 47 percent of 25-29-year-old women are single, as are 30 percent of 30-34-year-olds (De Bel-Air 2016b:7). Family is the main institution for social security, and its patterns are changing, especially in the middle and upper classes (mother’s participation in decision-making, identification with youth peer groups). In Morocco, the deteriorating labour market conditions, increasing cost of living, protraction of education and new behaviours also generate delay in family formation. Young people remain under supervision and dependent on family for longer periods, while society pushes for more individualistic behaviours. Family is shaped by heteronormative frameworks and legal sexuality is supposed to take place only within marriage, but increasing tensions lead to “sexual disorders.” *Mudawwana* reform reduces male-female inequalities, as well as the 2007 reform of the nationality code, which allows women to pass their nationality to their children. Amended in 2011, the Constitution prescribes masculine and feminine legal equality, but there is a wide gap between public discourse and action, which is stuck in a patriarchal conservative framework. Tunisia presents a similar picture: the increasing difficulty of finding a stable

and well-paid job contributes to delays in marriage and family formation, and questions the normative model of family and adulthood. The economic dimension is central in explaining postponement of marriage and the prolonging of youth status until 30 and beyond, along with the prolonging of dependency of youth on their family of origin, especially for poor families. Family acts as a safety net or social security reinforced by economic insecurity, which contributes to preserving the social status quo and exercises control over young people. But it exacerbates frustration and intergenerational resentment, increasing illegal migration and drug abuse. It also produces social marginalization (e.g., of unmarried women, single mothers), due to a growing gap between sexual practices and legal frameworks, in spite of *'urfi* marriage.

In Turkey prolonged youth family dependency is also a major issue. The family remains the core unit in society and individuals are always considered as members of family: services to youth are mediated by their family. Family also acts as a safety net for young people, which hinders their capacity to escape dependency and act as autonomous individuals. Family is seen as a resource and a solution to youth problems and problematic youth. Marriage emancipates youth from family (emotional and sexual) supervision, and makes them adults and no longer youth. Lower socio-economic status seems to go along with more age difference between spouses, lower literacy levels and higher fertility rates. A recent return to a pro-natal stance with the AKP party has produced policies favouring earlier marriage, extension of parental leave for women, financial support to women for every birth, child care, and care policies which include a small monthly care "salary" for care-giving women: care turns to a paid service.

Egyptian family policies mainly revolved around population control until the 1990s. Then starting in 2000 a turn towards family rights and gender equality was witnessed: a new personal status law was enacted (*khul'*, facilitated access to courts, new marriage contract, divorce rights), whose implementation, however, is distorted against women. There too, high living costs have a negative impact on transition to adulthood and encourage waithood.

In Palestine, customary, civil and religious laws intersect in deciding the access to rights in Palestinian society. Family law is based on religious laws that vary between Christian, Muslim and Jewish precepts. Civil marriage is not legal in the oPt, and accordingly all family challenges are managed within the religious system and not the civil system. The religious system does not offer women and men equal rights, especially with issues regarding divorce and child custody, and it restricts inter-religious marriages. The Palestinian law does not allow for inheritance and/or custody of children across religions. Amendments of family policies - whether in family law, penal law or inheritance law - have all been led by feminist and human rights organizations. Despite efforts to have a single civil family law that can represent all religions, this initiative has failed and the feminist movements have dropped the issue as national unity has become the important issue for various political actors in the PA. Family laws and policies in the oPt are discussed and framed as part of women's rights. They are not issues that are usually discussed with youth. As the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza government are competing on religiosity, women's rights have become one of the issues negotiated among various powers. Family matters, however, are complicated by restrictions on mobility, non-clarity of family and residency status and feelings of insecurity, which affect the daily details of the life of every member of these families. The exposure to

political violence leads to more challenges in families when dealing with children and youth. Family policy remains youth-blind, and continues to be built on the traditional perspective of patriarchal dominance.

3.4 Spatial Planning and Management Policies

Some of the causes of the 2011 outbreak and those of the following years have been attributed to urban problems, and/or inequalities produced by spatial planning which exhibit differences from country to country. For example, in Egypt, the 2011 uprisings appeared to be more “urban” than in Tunisia. However, statements such as “expressions of social inequality” (Bennafla 2013:11), the revenge of “forgotten territories,” “situated struggles,” and “exhaust[ed] development models mostly based on the capture of land rent by economic elites” (Stadnicki et al. 2014:7) are not new. As can be seen over the last decade in Morocco (Catusse and Vairel 2010), these claims and demands for correct public service and functioning utilities did not wait for 2011 to be heard. In fact, territorial development, and especially the spatial planning of cities in North Africa and the Near East, has been viewed for decades under a falsely paradoxical double angle, reminiscent of the political ambivalence we have seen with regard to youth. On the one hand there is a showcase policy with “modern” and “globalized” cities. On the other, as if pushed backstage, are slums such as the *karian* in Morocco, the *ashwaiyyat* in Egypt, or the *gecekondur* in Turkey. To which can be added the former Palestinian refugee camps, and those of Syrian, Iraqi and other refugees today - all of which seem to preclude planning. The showcased cityscapes are served by development plans and policies for major projects; whereas the slums, although located in the midst of regular and standardized modes of urban production in the region (Signoles 1999), act as negative descriptors of the city, showing its faults in a distorting mirror: “illegal,” “irregular” or “informal.” This is exacerbated not only by the rapid and radical transformations of cities whose “centres” become gentrified while their “peripheries” expand around projects for new cities or just for lack of other choice, but also by the destruction engendered by the wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen or Libya, and as is the case in Palestine and Lebanon, in our study.

In this context, spatial planning and development policies have a direct impact on “youth” in terms of mobility, access to housing, (gendered) possibilities for occupying public space, for public speaking, leisure or consumerism. Finally, spatial planning affects youth in terms of “containment policies” - one of the more inglorious examples being the construction of universities outside of city centres in Morocco and Tunisia. Casablanca’s Ring Road was built soon after the 1981 “youth riots” with the purpose of containing dispute within the city’s “dangerous peripheries” and to prevent contagion in the Kingdom. Additionally, the studies in the Power2Youth macro-level Work Package highlight that although territorial planning policies have a significant impact on the younger generations, they are not presented or targeted as populations within these policies. In fact, youth are rarely, if ever, taken into account.

Transportation and housing issues are crucial to young people. Many, even when married, still live with their parents owing to lack of resources. They find it difficult to access a first home and this renders their claim to autonomy impossible. “The observed lack of affordable housing might reveal an underlying demand of ‘governance’ and control with which States entrust families. Hence, families of origin are called upon to absorb the socioeconomic cost of

prolonged youth unemployment and 'unmarriageability' while cushioning youth frustration at their prolonged dependent status" (Salih et al. 2016:16).

In Turkey, aside from maintaining this generation in a state of perpetual waiting, this reinforces inter-generational social divisions: "the socio-economic status of their families is a determining factor about where young people live. Lower class youth establish their lives on the outskirts of the city with limited (mostly no) access and/or opportunities to cultural, sport and/or social activities. Twenty-five percent of young people cannot participate in a sport and/or cultural activity due to economic reasons or they cannot obtain permission from their family" (Yurttagüler 2016:24). Social housing programmes launched in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia (but not in Lebanon or in the oPt) are largely insufficient to remedy these problems.

Policies that combat slums and inadequate housing demonstrate and sometimes reinforce the limitations described above. The Moroccan Cities Without Slums programme or those planned by the new Egyptian Ministry of State for Urban Slum Reform created in 2014 vividly demonstrate what Paciello et al. (2016a:18) describe in the Morocco report: "It is precisely around the necessity of controlling and 'including' the urban poor in the market economy, and especially the young between them, that another important line of public discourse and action was developed during the last decade. The urban setting, in fact, it is not only the privileged site to attract investments and for capital accumulation, but also the actual and potential site of social conflicts, riots and violence. Moroccan cities, as other Arab cities, have been hit several times by suicide attacks and bombings. As the young people responsible for the attacks came from the slums around the city of Casablanca, slums or bidonvilles were increasingly stigmatized as breeding grounds for extremism and young men as the most 'vulnerable' category. As a result, the official discourse on slums changed significantly and the authorities started to implement new strategies for development so that the 'root causes of terrorism' - identified as poverty and socio-economic exclusion - could be overcome."

In Tunisia also, and perhaps more than elsewhere, "spatial inequalities came to the spotlight thanks to the popular revolts of 2010-11 that originated precisely - as other protest cycles before them - from the poorest interior regions before reaching the capital" (Paciello et al. 2016b:21). This underscores two issues: "relative frustration" in the way territories and spaces are unequally developed, and the haunting security problem throbbing just below the surface. "Following the revolts, the discourse on spatial inequalities as the main driver of revolts became mainstream in the public debate and in the broader production of knowledge. The 'revolution' was also unanimously proclaimed as a youth-led re-appropriation of the public space. Many accounts of the days of the revolution underlined both a re-appropriation of the public sphere with the end of 'fear', which permeated the life of ordinary Tunisian citizens under Ben Ali, and also the feeling of unity and equality in the liberating side-by-side presence in the street of people from different backgrounds converging to the central boulevards of Tunis from the poor interior region, informal and popular urban areas and upper-middle class neighbourhoods" (Paciello et al. 2016b:21).

Regarding access to public space, both metaphorical and physical, Musleh (2016:20) focuses on the issue of youth participation in local government: "Twenty-one youth shadow councils established with the support of local NGOs were invited to engage youth with local governance

planning, yet the establishment of the shadow councils was insufficient to integrate youth in the cycle and culture of municipalities. The active engagement of youth was expected in the [Strategic Development Investment Plan] process. Yet youth participation remains limited, and municipal councils still do not see the assets that young people bring into the process. As a result, youth interests have been neglected in the planning process.”

In sum, the studies included in the framework of the macro-level Work Package show that in the spatial planning policies of the six countries considered, “youth as a problem” far outweighs “youth’s problems.” First, because young people only marginally participate in the development of these policies. Second, since regarding social and security issues that spatial planning attempts to tackle, youth are first and foremost attributed the role of “dangerous people.”

Finally, if revolutions metaphorically (and sometimes fleetingly) have given the younger generations of these countries access to public space, it remains the case that winners and losers emerge with the conquest of this public space, and inequalities are reinforced, starting with those of gender (Salih et al. 2016). The reality behind the popularized myth of young men and women from diverse social backgrounds coming together to bring down unjust regimes, has brought to light several forms of exclusion.⁹ Among the more striking examples is the limited participation of women, exacerbated by violent forms of sexual harassment in Egypt. Additionally, the majority of armed struggle found in the cities at war in the region is predominantly masculine.

4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS: CONSTRUCTING AND GOVERNING “THE PROBLEM OF YOUTH” RATHER THAN SOLVING “YOUTH’S PROBLEMS”

4.1 Dividing and Fragmenting: A “Police” of Social Places

As we argued in the introduction, the construction of the “problems of youth” or “youth as a problem” is crucial to the political arena that it comes to occupy legitimately, to the institution of borders, and to associations and dissociations between social and political issues. Our work shows a strong performativity of “youth” as it is constructed (both as a reality, and as a problem): it focalizes and makes some issues visible, while hiding other major political problems. In addition to proactive communication, which contributes to forging and disseminating social images of youth which are rarely questioned, since alternative sources are often under surveillance and rendered powerless, constructing the problem remains exclusive to the political realm, i.e., statistics, programmes, measures.

First, “youth” as framed by public policy discourses is particularly dualistic in the representation it constructs: on the one hand as resources for the future, creativity and modernity; on the other hand, as a political and security threat, a social and economic burden. To a large extent, this strong cleavage reflects (but dichotomizes and simplifies) real differences, inequalities and modes of integration, especially between social classes and places of residency (urban centres versus slums and rural areas). In Turkey, young people are seen on the one hand as

⁹ See the Power2Youth work package dedicated to meso-level analysis.

the development force of the country, a dynamic power, expected to sacrifice themselves; but also, on the other hand, as “vulnerable” to criminalization and deviance (potential victims or potential criminals), in need of adult guidance and control. Thus, youth are included so that they can play their development role. Being disadvantaged is matched with living in a disadvantaged area (east or south east of the country) but not precisely defined. In Lebanon, Harb (2016) opposes highly educated and skilled “marketable” youth to “useless” dangerous youth, mirrored in a highly segmented labour market that contrasts a lost generation of migrated youth with the burden of youth who stay at home unemployed, unmarried, radicalized, etc. In Morocco, youth problems are embodied in those unable to benefit from neoliberal economic policies, which fuels their discontent. In Tunisia, in the post-2011 Constitution, youth is depicted as resources for Tunisian development but parallel to a discourse of “lost-in-transition” youth, unable to conform to normative patterns of becoming adults and integrating socially (finding a job, starting a family), leading to youth extremism and excluded youth being potential terrorists and calling for repression. This cleavage is strongly echoed in Egypt, where two types of youth stand out as ideal-types. The first type obeys the authoritarian regime and wants to work within it. This youth can be co-opted, is liable to benefit from policies regulating political, social and economic participation, belongs to political parties, accepts the boundaries of State laws and agrees to work within them. The second type is “radical” youth involved with the Muslim Brotherhood or student movements, that the regime tries to exclude, represents “untolerated” political opposition, is coerced by direct force and is “outcast.” Sika (2016) points to the passive exclusion of rural youth, women and the poor. She states that public policies produce a façade of inclusionary policies: youth policies are directed at non-radical, pro-regime youth, and focused on urban educated young men, while active exclusion of young activists and encroachment of the Ministry of Interior in university campuses, students’ unions and youth clubs still prevail. In Palestine, youth were defined initially by their role as protectors of the society as a result of their active participation in the national movement all the way through the First Intifada: moving into adulthood meant the confrontation with the colonization power. This definition of youth changed in the post-Oslo period in which Palestinian society moved from an active generation to an age group earmarked with special characteristics, apprehended in terms of individuals who are in need of support and empowerment. Far from being part of building a political structure or State, youth has become another population group targeted by developmental efforts. In the end, youth policy seems mainly to aim at developing legitimization through different institutions.

Second, governing the “problem of youth” mobilizes tools that produce segmentation, intersections and fragmentations. There seems to be a triple matrix determining public action schemes: a) gender, b) obedience/security and c) employment/marketization/commodification.

Partitioning social categories allows for partial overlap, while it euphemizes “real” social groups that are governed by what appears to be a police of positions. Instead of reducing the socio-economic inequalities, it seems today that public action reproduces the class, gender and geographic inequalities that structure society and are found at all levels of youth groups. In Egypt, although national youth policy established in 2003-04 encompasses employment, political participation, health, population, media, sports, environment, social welfare, social activities and voluntarism, studies and research, it targets unemployed youth, young women, youth with special needs and rural youth. It is in this context that new institutions arise, and

national and international programmes to support youth in the region proliferate.

One of the outstanding cleavages concerns gender, intersecting with strong biases of class, place of residency and nationality. Conflictive or appeasing, most youth policies contribute to a gender order that intersects with a police of social positions within neopatriarchal, neoauthoritarian and growingly neoliberal frameworks. The construction of masculinity and femininity, the maintaining of heterosexual norms and the monitoring of family formation appear more than ever as highly politicized issues (De Bel-Air 2016b). As mentioned above, sports programmes, institutions and initiatives generally appear as strongly biased in favour of young men. On the other hand, top-down or gender-led, gender-inclusive policies may euphemize, render invisible and depoliticize inequalities of class, nationality, origin and religion. They may also contribute to making women's demands invisible, accommodate conservative positions and trap women in contradictory expectancies (market/family). They do not manage to fundamentally alter inequalities and discrimination: employment policies often leave women behind, general policies may ignore young women, and a conservative turn tends to push women back to their traditional roles, away from labour markets.

So if most young people are affected by one policy or another, according to their specific characteristics (gender, place of residence, education, standard of living, etc.), integration and framing schemes grant them differentiated positions according to explicit or implicit processes of positive and negative selection. Examples of this include: security and control schemes (among them sports), vocational training, support for employment and micro-credit, enrolment in the combat forces (army, militias, etc.), police surveillance and repression, market integration (labour, consumption, investment, land), supervision by moral standards, religious, family and sexual, and migration. Public policies contribute in this way to consolidating and rigidifying rather than streamlining a fragmented or fractured cartography of youth. Beyond, their influence is not limited to youth but touches all of society, justifying the places allocated by situations of greater or lesser marginalization or poverty, which they tend to assist in reproducing. This petrification of life courses, which contrasts with the aspirations to development, fuels frustrations that lead to strategies of "voice" or "exit" (Hirschman 1970).

4.2 Managing Time and Generating Order ... The Potential for Dissent

A second question regarding the governing of "youth problems" is the management of time, promises, waiting and expectations. Waiting for success, for adulthood, a job, a marriage, housing are all signs of social recognition attached to being adult men and women. These expectations are constructed over a particular period of national and international history. Today's youth are the children of an older generation of youth who participated in the development of national social services. Even when they were not personally invested in creating and developing these services, they are the heirs of the expectations for welfare and consumerism that ensued. They are the children of globalization and information technology, of the Cold War and its conflicts that still have not ceased. Their expectations for welfare, security and individual fulfilment within an imaginary middle class are largely directed at the State and public services, but also toward donors, NGOs and inter-State cooperation. These expectations for the most part end in deprivation.

Thinking in terms of generation results from a constructed imaginary: individual life courses are entangled with the trajectories of one's contemporaries as well as with those of both older and younger people. What is striking in the work presented here is the recurring contrast between former youth (particularly those who took part in the struggles for independence and nation building) and today's youth, as if public policies were suffering from double blindness: a loss of national continuity both in time and society (aging vs. young revolutionaries). In Morocco, the nationalist youth of the 1930s are represented as modern and creative educated males, turned to victims of discontent threatening youth after independence, whereas today's youth are epitomized as figures that prefer their status of unemployed graduates and young males threatening security. This is especially true after the 2003 Casablanca attacks, when youth living in marginalized areas became equated with Islamism and extremism. In Tunisia as well, there is a strong contrast between post-independence youth moved by a spirit of modernization and social progress embedded in the nation-building project, especially educated urban youth; and today's youth that has come to be synonymous with "the marginalized." In Turkey again, youth is a reminder of a political and anonymous actor in the history of the Turkish Republic in the second part of the nineteenth century: Young Turks, in 1923, acted as saviours of the country. Not much of this heroic role is left in the constructed representation of youth today.

We propose an intergenerational analysis of the social, economic and political blocks in the present studies as well as a highlighting of the injustices that they contain and maintain. Invoking justice to examine the relations between generations requires that we incorporate a moral issue. This is a two-pronged question: on the one hand we need to qualify the relations between the generations and on the other we must consider them in light of moral principles.

From a political and macroscopic point of view, the studies in this work package demonstrate strong competition in intergenerational relations. Norms, regulations and resources appear to be in the power of one or two generations that seem to be in competition, supported by the legitimacy of their fight against colonization, the construction of an independent State, the establishment of development institutions as well as those destined for welfare, education and health. It is true that youth today inherit a state of wellbeing incomparable to that of their grandparents. However, their parents' employment systems, opportunities for migration, school and health systems were far better than those of youth today, whose paths are blocked by structural adjustments and waves of liberalism. From a microscopic point of view, which is not the purpose of our research, we know that family solidarity presents a different portrait: that of intergenerational and inter-generational social protection. Parents do their best to equip their children for adult life and accompany their young adults in their process to become autonomous, but in return they expect income provision, in the case of migration, and care in their elder years. Again, these considerations make little sense if we do not introduce socio-economic and gender variables (Salih et al. 2016).

Intergenerational relations are marked by an inherent asymmetry. Established generations have power over emerging generations. This power makes changing existing conditions difficult and expensive, especially when it involves redistributing power and/or wellbeing from the established to the younger generations. It can also produce a lasting deterioration in the living conditions of emerging or future generations in terms of the environment, natural resources, public resources, debt, etc. The regimes studied here are characteristic of

creating or maintaining political barriers, which limit access to the type of social mobility that formerly enabled the expansion of welfare development. In some respects, youth continue to challenge the progressive disintegration of established rights and continue to claim the right to employment, education and health. However, youth integration is largely subordinated and subject to competition between generations for access to political and economic power. It is also subject to national and community demands for youth contribution to warfare or to collective interest. Ultimately, youth are also supposed to respond to the needs for social security of their parents and grandparents, as a delayed reciprocity for the protection they themselves received during their childhood. These expectations for material support and care, again, address differently young men and women.

Well beyond the relationship between generations, these barriers appear as methods of managing competition *within* emerging generations. They are a way of negotiating for groups in globalized, competitive environments, where State intervention is reduced and private investment provides services and employment not according to the greatest number of basic rights but to the requirements and capabilities of the market. What in the case of the “Arab revolutions” is understood as an intergenerational conflict only has meaning when observed within a multidimensional perspective. This multidimensional prism must include generation, class, gender and territorial issues, which engender moral aspects of political and social justice. Public policies arbitrate and adjust their plans in competitive milieus by opening and closing gates and barriers that give access to resources. Groups in power negotiate the best conditions for their own children, in order to reproduce their dominant position. In so doing, they reproduce and rigidify the same mechanisms of exclusion and inequality that are at the foundation of their own position. The modes of construction and governing of “youth as problem” rather than considering “youth issues” or the “problems of youth” are intended to, or at least make it possible to, circumvent this key issue.

4.3 Repression in the Control of Voice and Visibility

Far from being resolved, the “youth issues” of those who are not selected by public policies are rendered invisible and inaudible. They are pushed aside from the spheres of legitimate expression, except in established frameworks such as “unemployed graduates.”

The first level of government control consists of a regulatory framework. It appears clearly in the domains of family, gender and sexual norms, which intersect the area of employment. In particular women’s employment can be understood as improper and discouraged, or desired and necessary. Yet in both cases it contradicts the standards of honour and can create tension regarding family obligations. Thus in Lebanon, discrimination against married women in the labour market, gender discrimination in pay against women and their concentration in the service sector are the rule. In Turkey, Egypt and Palestine, the studies note a conservative turn, by which women are encouraged to dedicate themselves to care work, and submitted to very restrictive norms of behaviour. Palestine exemplifies a situation where “women’s issues” are a problem of religious competition between the Palestinian authority and the Gaza authority, and where women’s issues are totally subsumed under national unity and struggle.

The second level is the institutional framework where sports policies, “civil society” and “development” (euphemisms for a liberal vision of self-realization), entrepreneurship and consumerism occupy a prominent place. In Morocco, Paciello et al. (2016a) show that the opening of “civil society” in the 2000s was a tool to penetrate society and control youth politicization: encouragement of cultural alternatives to militant Islam and multiplication of programmes related to the labour market contributed to integrating marginalized disadvantaged youth in the system, mainly in social policy frameworks. In Turkey, Yurttagüler (2016) highlights that youth are seen as needing protection and custody: family is at once the main supporter and controller of youth. Palestine is a very powerful illustration of how “development” becomes a device for management and control: it strongly contributes to a shift from a collective self-help approach to a liberal approach that is mostly based on enhancing individual capacity and not the collective.

Finally, governing “youth” must be seen unmasked as police repression and militarized intervention: multiple initiatives and social movements are subdued by force; young artists, journalists, bloggers or those claiming alternative forms of freedom - sexual, cultural, anti-religious such as the “*dé-jeuneurs*” or the breakers of the fast of Ramadan in Morocco - find themselves exposed to outright violence from the authorities. These multiple loci of opposition (Ben Néfissa and Destremau 2011) reflect a growing tension between social transformation and power structures. In Palestine, security policies are very forceful with regard to youth. During the Second Intifada the Israeli colonization increased restrictions on movement through checkpoints, curfews, invasions, and construction of the wall, restrictions of residency rights of people especially in Jerusalem, and Israeli permits policy. These factors impacted the ability of the Palestinian society to function. Many organizations had to find new arrangements for their staff, especially those with mobility restrictions. These restrictions had high impact on families and especially women. Families living with such conditions faced difficulties that increased the interference of the extended family in their affairs, and not having the proper documents led to depriving individuals of their economic, social and political rights. In Egypt, since the 1970s, the government has deployed violent and repressive strategies to contain and imprison “radical” youth who refuse to cooperate with the regime, and one cannot but note a very strong presence of police and repression on campuses.

The 2011 uprisings have opened a Pandora’s box which our research does not propose to analyse, as there are many works devoted to the subject. In the cases of Turkey, Morocco and to a lesser extent Lebanon (where the consociational system is subject to ongoing power struggles among competing parties which include the use of weapons), it is rather the “outrage movements” that spurred public expression of dissatisfaction. We wondered if these social movements, qualified as “youth,” had in any way modified the public policies that addressed them. The six country studies presented here show that, in the wake of the revolutions or social movements of indignation, public modes of action have not significantly changed. They show more continuity than disruption, transformation or evolution. There is no noticeable alteration in public policy following the “events” or social mobilizations, but rather a tension that produces and reproduces a fragmented social landscape riddled with inequality, frustration and possible social conflict.

It appears that “governing youth” is actually governing society by means of youth. It is not limited to managing and containing the dissatisfaction of a single generation perceived of

- concurrently or alternately - as victim and threat. Governing youth attempts to curb the social dissatisfaction that challenges the balance of powers and compromises, and that has been voiced across Arab countries, well beyond the six countries studied here. By governing youth, public policies produce and reproduce a social order that concerns - and rules - all of society.

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POWER2YOUTH is a research project aimed at offering a critical understanding of youth in the South East Mediterranean (SEM) region through a comprehensive interdisciplinary, multi-level and gender sensitive approach. By combining the economic, political and socio-cultural spheres and a macro (policy/institutional), meso (organizational) and micro (individual) level analysis, POWER2YOUTH explores the root causes and complex dynamics of the processes of youth exclusion and inclusion in the labour market and civic/political life, while investigating the potentially transformative effect of youth collective and individual agency. The project has a cross-national comparative design with the case studies of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories and Turkey. POWER2YOUTH's participants are 13 research and academic institutions based in the EU member states, Norway, Switzerland and South East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. The project is mainly funded under the European Union's 7th Framework Programme.

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