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
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Olivier Bouquet

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, together with the other early Kemalist leaders, as well as their supporters, promoted a radically republican ideology that has increasingly come under scholarly scrutiny in the past decades. One new way of looking at this revolutionary era emphasizes the importance of social evolutions from the final Ottoman period and the beginning of the republican era, processes of change that took place at a slower pace and are less easy to perceive than the violent and spectacular events surrounding the Turkish national struggle for independence. True, the new order in Turkey effectively propagated equality and social mobility, organizing the transition from an ancien régime order to a meritocratic society based on a new national bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Kemalist officers who set up the new regime in the aftermath of the independence war (1919–22) were openly hostile to the prominent senior dignitaries who had served the sultan. As a result, they forced them to retire and to give up their administrative positions. However, the clear disruption of the bureaucratic apparatus did not necessarily imply the complete eradication of the previous official state nobility, since none had really existed under Ottoman rule. This had been imperial policy, which depended on the sultans for both dynastical continuity and territorial integrity. Practically, the Sublime Porte had tolerated, maintained, or even promoted pre-Ottoman nobilities into the eighteenth century, before launching their integration into the new Tanzimat administration (1839–78). Benefiting from this Ottomanization policy, prominent notables navigated the reforms in such a way that they could secure official positions in Istanbul for their sons and grandsons. Moreover, insofar as the imperial state was unchallenged in supervising the ongoing changes affecting the organization of socioprofessional activities, that is, the emergence of journalists, lawyers, or academics as elements of the new elite, old established families used their positions to organize their reconversion at the margins of the classical administrative sphere. As a result, when the republican regime was set up, they were seen as traditional political elites (keepers of the *adab*, culture nurtured through informal education and training) as well as specialists in strategic branches connected with scientific and technical evolutions. Some of them had organized excellent educational opportunities in European universities for their heirs. In libraries and clubs, Ottoman gentlemen were offered profitable knowledge, in particular proficiency in French, English, or German.

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When they eventually returned to Istanbul, they had excellent credentials, beyond those of most of the new bureaucrats. Consequently, far from being rejected for civil service as ostracized dignitaries had been initially, they were promoted through the new official apparatus as diplomats, professors, or even politicians. Even if the Kemalists never admitted it officially, the new system was in fact based partly on the co-optation of existing elites, who maintained their social privileges. Some decades later, with the beginning of the multiparty era, some members of old Ottoman families became deputies in the regions their ancestors had ruled in the previous centuries. Interestingly enough, the republican regime sustained two opposing tendencies: a declared antipathy toward Ottoman bureaucratic elites and the effective use of their heirs to organize the state.

The Ottomans:

Dynasty, Aristocracies, Nobilities

The Ottoman state was embedded in dynastic continuity to such an extent that it officially opposed transferring official ranks and state privileges from father to son. The highest ranks and titles (such as vizier and pasha) were considered inalienable, since they were conferred *intuitu personae* by the sultan. True, some old nobilities persisted: Sharifian families and their representatives (the *nakibüleşraf*); traditional Romanian lords (boyars), who had been maintained after the conquest of Rumelia; and Phanariot families, who claimed prestigious Byzantine origins. None of them could legitimately claim any sort of territorial control within Ottoman domains. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was indivisible. From this perspective, the official institution of the Khedivial dynasty in Egypt marked a watershed, when the Sublime Porte acknowledged the hereditary control of Mehmet Ali's family over the province of Egypt in 1841. This was partly the result of a process in which some prominent, albeit unofficial, dynasties in the

eighteenth century had progressively emerged all over the empire, benefiting from the decreasing financial and political control of the central state over its territories. Suffice it to mention here that the Baban ruled a large frontier area in Iraq, the Bedirhan ensured their supremacy over a great part of eastern Anatolia, and the Çapanzâde had extended their influence over a large territory from central Anatolia to the Mediterranean coast.

Even if the Tanzimat centralization policy put an end to dynastic powers, some families maintained their local influence and their social prestige. The same was true in Istanbul, where the state practically encouraged nepotism, albeit official decisions were put forward to restrain it. At least 86 percent of the grand muftis originated from ulema families; most of the civil servants had a father who served the state; and more than one-quarter of the pashas were pashas' sons.¹ Officially, the title "pasha" was considered a personal reward and was given to career officials as much as it was offered as a testimony of gratitude to notables who had proved their loyalty to the imperial dynasty. In part, it had become a family honor characterized by high levels of intermarriage: if a state official married a pasha's daughter, it was likely that he himself would be honored with the title. However, such outstanding sociopolitical reproduction rates did not pave the way for the emergence of any kind of state nobility: not only could most families hardly count pashas beyond two or three successive generations, but a grand vizier of humble or even unknown origins (such as Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha in the first case and İbrahim Edhem Pasha in the second) was far more likely to be honored with a prestigious rank than the son of a vizier who had just reached the position of governor was. Within the Ottoman state, there were no privileges or long-consolidated familial prestige that the sultan could not put to a resolute end if he deemed it necessary. Conversely, if an English

1. The figure for the grand muftis is from Norman Itzkowitz and Joel Shinder, "The Office of Şeyh ül-Islam and the Tanzimat: A Prosopographic Enquiry," *Middle Eastern Studies* 7 (1972): 98. See also Madeleine Zilfi, "Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of the Economy and Social History of the Orient* 26 (1983): 320, 326–27.

On the fathers of civil servants, see Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Changes in the Recruitment Patterns and Career Lines of Ottoman Provincial Administrators during the Nineteenth Century," in *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975), 279.

family, as depicted by Somerset Maugham, had to wait at least three generations before its new status was acknowledged, high social consideration was an immediate possibility for someone honored with imperial distinction. Privilege in the Ottoman world was not a question of time and patience; it was a consequence of sultanic support and professional success.²

The imperial reluctance to create a central state nobility was accompanied by a pragmatic attitude to the integration of local notables. The Sublime Porte was willing to recruit well-qualified notables throughout Ottoman domains in order that they in turn encourage loyalty to the sultan within their own networks. As a result, this Ottomanization process encouraged some prominent families to nurture a specific culture of civil service based both on the valorization of linguistic abilities and on the acquisition of new and specialized disciplines, such as economics, political science, or law. This was especially true for diplomats. Etienne and Paul Musurus benefited greatly from the education that their father (Constantin Musurus [1807–91], ambassador in London) had provided them. Because they had studied both French and English in prestigious European universities, they had acquired what the Sublime Porte considered excellent credentials. This family capital associated with their father's influence helped them acquire their respective positions of first and second secretary at the London embassy.³

As revealed by the careful examination of biographical questionnaires submitted to the Sicill-i Ahval Commission created in 1879, state employees were careful to mention educational experience as much as they were their ancestors who had held imperial positions. The information they provided to the commission was

submitted as criteria of merit and loyalty to the sultan.⁴ As a matter of fact, the central administration did not see any contradiction in encouraging both personal abilities among newcomers and inherited cultural dispositions. In other words, the Ottoman state was less ideologically organized by a strong opposition between meritocracy and nepotism than it was oriented toward the use of competences, whoever might embody them, in the context of a shortage of human resources. This partly explains why the Young Turk leaders, who adamantly claimed that they would destroy the ancien régime, took into account less the distinction between sons of pashas and recently promoted employees than the degree of loyalty both had previously manifested to the sultan. What was to be swept was addressed not as official nobility but as an imperial clique.

Impact of the Revolution of 1908, Effects of the Independence War

The Young Turks leaders of the upheaval of 1908, as well as the bureaucrats who organized the subsequent administrative purges, modeled themselves on prominent figures of the French Revolution. Those among them who were acquainted with the works of Louis Antoine de Saint-Just or Nicolas de Condorcet often compared the Turkish army to the *nation en armes*, at a time when the “Marseillaise” (the French national anthem) could be heard in the streets of Istanbul.⁵ Mustafa Kemal himself was well versed in French history to such an extent that he could easily deliver a speech on the revolution of 1789, making a great impression on the French delegation gathered at a feast for 14 July.⁶ At the very beginning of the revolution of 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress acted exactly like a vigilance committee. It had

2. Olivier Bouquet, *Les pachas du sultan: Essai sur les agents supérieurs de l'État ottoman (1839–1909)* (Louvain: Peeters, 2007); Bouquet, “All the Sultan's Pashas: Ottoman Civil Officials and the Imperial State,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 14, nos. 1–2 (2008): 25–45.

3. Olivier Bouquet, “Être Prince de Samos: Désir de légation, imaginaire dynastique et ordre de la carrière chez Étienne et Constantin Musurus,” in *Insularités ottomanes*, ed. Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2004), 277–93.

4. Olivier Bouquet, “L'autobiographie par l'État sous les derniers Ottomans,” *Turcica* 38 (2006): 251–79.

5. Hamit Bozarslan, “Révolution française et Jeunes Turcs (1908–1914),” *Revue du Monde musulman et de la Méditerranée*, nos. 52–53 (1989): 160–72; Bozarslan, “Les Courants de pensée dans l'Empire ottoman, 1908–1918” (PhD diss., École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1992), 148–50; François Georgeon, “Ahmed Ağaoğlu, un intellectuel turc admirateur des Lumières et de la Révolution,” *Revue du Monde musulman et de la Méditerranée*, nos. 52–53 (1989): 186–97.

6. Paul Dumont and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *La Turquie et la France à l'époque d'Atatürk* (Paris: French Institute of Anatolian Studies, 1981), 99–102.

a number of ministers arrested, as well as principal members of the palace staff. The committee intended to avoid further escapes such as those of Selim Melhame and İzzet Pasha and other old regime pashas; the minister of war, Ali Rıza, was admonished by the people gathered around his mansion (*konak*); Memduh Pasha, the minister of the interior, was asked publicly in the pages of the *Tanin*, the pro-Unionist newspaper, whether he had any right to collect his salary; and Zeki Pasha, who owned many houses, office buildings, and storehouses in Istanbul, tried to buy his freedom by offering to pay back part of what he had obtained in the past.⁷ These cases were not isolated; the data show that more than two-thirds of the ambassadors were relieved of their duties.⁸ Presumably, those who remained in their positions were not prominent enough to be identified and charged as strong supporters of the “red sultan.”⁹

However, diplomatic relationships with European nations were too important a matter to be taken up by inexperienced civil servants. As a result, the newly appointed ambassadors were mostly diplomats who had been educated in imperial schools (the School of Public Administration in the case of Mehmed Rifat Pasha or İbrahim Hakki Pasha) and had pursued careers under the tutelage of recently dismissed diplomats (respectively, Turhan Pasha in St. Petersburg, Tefvik Pasha in Berlin). Moreover, after the purges of 1909 had expelled large segments from the imperial administration, some prominent pashas organized a comeback. This was the case not only for those who had been expelled under Abdülhamid II (such as Ahmed Muhtar Pasha or Mehmed Kâmil Pasha). Some major Hamidian ministers also regained high positions: Mehmed Said Pasha became grand vizier, and Ahmed Tefvik Pasha was promoted to be ambassador in London.

In comparison, the independence war had a greater impact on the recruitment of administrative and political elites. Almost no Otto-

man minister regained any equivalent position under the republic. Prominent dignitaries were forced to retire or were exiled or even executed, depending on the extent to which they were implicated in implementing previous anti-Kemalist measures. On 4 November 1922 the dignitary Ali Kemal Bey was kidnapped in Istanbul and sent to Izmit, where Nurettin Pasha had transferred his headquarters as commander of the first army; the commander pushed the captive into the arms of a howling mob, which lynched him. Indeed, Ali Kemal was the perfect target: he had continually acted to destroy the national movement, and he had criticized extensively the Committee of Union and Progress and personally attacked Mustafa Kemal in his newspaper, *Peyam-i Sabah*. More than anyone, Ali Kemal represented the ancien régime apparatus: he had been interior minister in a government of Damad Ferid Pasha, a sultan’s son-in-law who had been accused of propitiating the victorious allies to save the Ottoman throne. Ali Kemal was himself a son-in-law of one of Abdülhamid II’s most influential ministers, Zeki Pasha, the commander of the imperial arsenal. Having studied in Paris and fluent in French, Ali Kemal embodied the privileged palace clique member, as opposed to the popular and provincial culture on which the Kemalist leaders claimed to model themselves.¹⁰

Indeed, Mustafa Kemal proved more radical in his vision than the Unionists: he considered the Ottoman polity to be no more than personal rule (*saltanat-i şashiye*). Republican equality was the best way to put an end to the intrinsically unequal political society on which the imperial regime was built and to establish the peoples’ state (*halkın devleti*). In December 1921 he proclaimed that the “government of the people” should be founded entirely on a “clear sociological base” comprising all social classes of the nation.¹¹ In 1924 the constitution instituted into law the principle of the equality of all Turks. In a clear rejection of the Marxist no-

7. Ahmet Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 130–33.

8. Proportion calculated by using the data provided by Sinan Kunalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839–1922) (The Dignitaries and High Officials of the Late Ottoman Times [1839–1909])* (Istanbul: İsis, 1999), 45–48.

9. So was called Sultan Abdülhamid II in Western Europe after the intercommunal massacres in Bulgaria in 1876 that he was blamed for by statesmen such as Gladstone.

10. On this opposition, see Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11 (1969): 270.

11. Bernard Lewis, *Islam et laïcité: La naissance de la Turquie moderne* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 407.

tion of social classes, the economic sovereignty of the nation was to rely on the positive interaction among four social segments: merchants, craftspeople, workers, and peasants.¹²

In this context, the old bureaucratic elites were the first targets, and their immediate dismissal was put forward as a prerequisite for building the new nation. Indeed, Mustafa Kemal had a deep distrust of the civil bureaucracy as a whole; he was convinced that civil servants considered themselves to be emanations of the sultan's person and acted to safeguard their own petty interests. Surely, retired governors such as Mazhar Müfit (Kansu) or Bekir Sami (Kunduh) or former ambassadors such as Alfred Rüstem had followed him since the very beginning of the national movement. However, these were exceptions. During the initial stages of the independence war, Mustafa Kemal constantly informed the Istanbul government that the civil bureaucrats were not only indifferent to the national efforts but were actually actively undermining them.¹³

Consequently, once the war was over, he convinced the National Assembly to pass a law enacted on 1 October 1922 rendering all civil functionaries of the new state temporarily jobless. The law stipulated that each ministry could select from among its former civil functionaries a new cadre of civil bureaucrats. This law was followed by the establishment of various "liquidation" (*tasfiye*) boards. All the palace officials were dismissed at once and without exception. Later on, other radical measures were implemented: in 1924 a list (*yüzellilikler listesi*) was drawn up naming approximately 150 people who were charged with passing intelligence to the enemy and, consequently, sentenced to exile, and in November 1934 ancien régime titles such as pasha were suppressed and family names instituted. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, general of the Ottoman Empire, became Mustafa Kemal

Atatürk, president of the Turkish Republic. In 1936 the School of Public Administration was transferred from Istanbul to Ankara.

The *tabula rasa ottomana*: Ideological Expressions and Reconfiguration of Elites

This Ottoman *tabula rasa*, far from affected solely by military resistance, originated from an ideological consideration elaborated before the First World War. As Şerif Mardin puts it, nationalist intellectuals were sincerely convinced that the chances for upward occupational mobility were limited in Ottoman society, that it was almost impossible for humble peasants and rank-and-file soldiers to rise to the highest government positions, and that the provincial administration was dominated by hereditary and cosmopolitan bureaucratic elites.¹⁴ Prominent nationalist intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) and Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) depicted the ruling elite as far too fascinated by Western standards and not interested in serving the nation. Istanbul regularly fell under Mizancı Murad's harsh criticism as a declining city regrettably ruled by a corrupt clique. Earnest reformers described it as "the Byzantine whore" and accused it of sucking the resources of poor but honest Anatolia.¹⁵ The time had come to replace old bureaucrats with vigorous Anatolian elites who would take charge and benefit the nation's future.¹⁶

No doubt, the administration was to be based officially on popular self-rule, but the prospect of a democratic agenda was not desirable for most intellectuals and the military. The prominent nationalist ideologues with social roots in the provincial middle classes were deeply reluctant to support any kind of popular representation. Indeed, they feared such an experience would result in a dangerous upheaval and would therefore jeopardize the new regime. Moreover, Gökalp had traced a clear opposition

12. *Ibid.*, 409.

13. Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate, UK: Eothen, 1985), 53–55.

14. Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895–1908* (*The Political Ideas of the Young Turks, 1895–1908*), 6th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999). See also Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 5.

15. Mardin, *Jön*, 109–35; Bozarslan, "Les courants," 255.

16. Bozarslan, "Les courants," 155–56.

between the working classes to be united in the new nation and the republican elites that would take charge of ruling the state.¹⁷ Between these two categories, it was hoped that an indigenous merchant and industrial bourgeoisie (*milli burjuvazi*) would gradually emerge to boost the national economy and help Turkey attain full economic independence.¹⁸

In this agenda, there was no role for old bureaucrats. Held responsible for letting in the Allied powers in November 1918, they had hastened to disavow the nationalists. They had signed the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, causing the split of the empire. Altogether they were epitomized in the figure of Grand Vizier Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, who as minister of foreign affairs (1895–1908) was satirized as “ministre étranger aux affaires” and who was, by 1922, an old and impotent man, symbol of an obsolete ancien régime society. In comparison, intellectuals and journalists were engaged by the military to glorify the new national heroes. As a matter of fact, the Kemalist commanders emerged from the war as unrivaled leaders. According to the nationalist press, they had fulfilled their mission remarkably, fighting for the embattled nation for almost eight years. The most prestigious of them, Mustafa Kemal, had shown great courage in the Dardanelles battle before becoming a charismatic and unchallenged leader. His lieutenant, İsmet Pasha, had tenaciously fought at Lausanne in 1923 and had demonstrated how a soldier could also be a tough and successful diplomat. However, this military hegemony over the political scene, far from being the sole emanation of the national movement, built on a process started at least half a century earlier.

During the Tanzimat and the Hamidian era, higher administrative offices (ministers, governors-general, and ambassadors) were monopolized by civil bureaucrats. The precise study of their education and formation reveals that they were so entangled in traditional scribal training and tasks that they unfortunately

neglected to acquire technical and scientific skills introduced by industrial and commercial changes. In contrast, military officers extended their traditional monopoly over the activities of pacification and repression to include modern disciplines such as cartography and engineering.¹⁹ As a result, they both enlarged and diversified their positions within the state apparatus. Presumably, this new polyvalence paved the way for their political leadership between June 1913 and October 1918; that two of the most powerful leaders (Enver and Cemal Pashas) of this period were generals proved that technical specialization had prepared military officers to assume bureaucratic functions.²⁰ Moreover, military pashas were seen by most Turkish citizens as more connected with the new meritocratic republican ideology than the civil administrators themselves were. Certainly, the revolution of 1908 had been characterized as a demonstration by middle-rank officers. Specific examples cited to bolster claims of great social mobility were often selected from among military figures: Atatürk’s father was a petty official, and Enver Pasha’s a bridge keeper. The other members of the Young Turk triumvirate—Talat and Cemal Pashas—were also of humble origin. As far as I know, no quantitative study exists to establish whether the early republican literature was correct in drawing such an opposition in terms of social mobility between military and civil servants. However, the evidence shows that two major evolutions took place at this time.

First, the drafting of military figures into politics proved effective as far as it was encouraged by the new republican power. Mustafa Kemal wanted a clear distinction to be established between the state and the nation. Since the former was essentially embodied by the military and the latter by elected deputies, he insisted on keeping the army out of politics and forced the commanders who had entered the Grand National Assembly and had subsequently embarked on a political career to give up their

17. Mardin, “Power,” 277.

18. Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de Ekonomi ve Toplum (1908–1950): Milli İktisat-Milli Burjuvazi (Economy and Society in Turkey [1908–1950]: National Economy—National Bourgeoisie)* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 12–13.

19. Bouquet, *Les pachas*, 107–43.

20. For an analysis of the factors that prompted soldiers to enter the political arena during this period, see Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Military,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow and Robert E. Ward (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 352–88.

military functions. On 19 December 1923 a law to end military involvement in politics was voted by the assembly and affected all commanders, even prominent leaders such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Kâzım Karabekir, who abandoned their military commands. Atatürk himself was seen only once in uniform, and İsmet İnönü, who applied for his retirement from the army in 1927, never.²¹ A second evolution occurred where the tabula rasa planned against Ottoman bureaucrats, far from being a matter of principle, eventually resulted in the destruction of the imperial state nobility.

The Pashas of the Republic

As a matter of fact, the republic put an end to the mechanisms of reproduction at work under the empire. However, the new regime did not really initiate an open class society. As George S. Harris has shown for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the disruption of the old apparatus was limited, because “new men” were added very slowly and during Atatürk’s lifetime and hardly at all in the upper ranks of the ministry. Indeed, this ministry remained a closely knit elite corps in which the system of school, family, and elite solidarity continued to operate.²² However, the overall republican administrative elites came from much more diverse provincial backgrounds. While half of the Hamidian pashas were born in Istanbul, less than one-quarter of the governors-general (*valis*) appointed between 1923 and 1938 were born there.²³ A few decades later, the geographical domination of Istanbul had decreased even further: in 1954 only 10 percent of the potential administrators studying either at the Faculty of Political Sciences or at the Faculty of Law, both located in Ankara, were born in Istanbul; in the first half of the 1960s, one-third of the highest-ranking officials originated from Istanbul, Ankara, or Izmir.²⁴ By and large, the republican senior bureaucrats were more representative of the nation in terms

of geographical background than the Ottoman higher civil servants, who had failed to previously embody the social diversity of the empire. As the sociological data show, the changes do not reveal a dramatic break with the past; true, the sons of high officials were more and more attracted by professional activities such as law, medicine, trade, or banking, and the state officials themselves were partly recruited from families of other professional backgrounds, as data provided by Ali G. Baltaoğlu for *valis* demonstrates (see table 1).²⁵

Table 1. The sociological diversity of the Republican elites (1923–38)

Occupations of <i>valis</i> ’ fathers	%
Territorial civil officials	9.1
Lawyers and judiciary employees	20.5
Military and military employees	14.4
Financial employees	14.4
Religious	6.0
Teachers	2.3
Mayors	2.3
Notables	11.3
Craftsmen and merchants	8.4
Peasants and farmers	3.8
Other	7.5

Source: Ali G. Baltaoğlu, *Atatürk*, 115–17.

On the one hand, less than 10 percent of the *valis* had a father who had served as a provincial administrator under the Ottomans but never as an imperial *vali* himself; only four of them were sons of governors, and five of them sons of pashas.²⁶ On the other hand, the evidence indicates that the replacement of the old bureaucratic elite was far from complete: not only had more than half of the *valis* had a public service background, but most of them had previously been Ottoman civil officials. Noticeably enough, the new sociology of the republican

21. Andrew Mango, *Atatürk*, 2nd paperback ed. (London: John Murray, 2004), 400.

22. George S. Harris, “Bureaucratic Reform: Atatürk and the Turkish Foreign Service,” *Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization* 1 (1980–81): 39–51.

23. Ali G. Baltaoğlu, *Atatürk Dönemi Valileri (29 Ekim 1923–10 Kasım 1938) (The Governors General during the Atatürk Era [29 October 1923–10 November 1938])* (Ankara: Ocak Yayınları, 1988), 57.

24. For 1954, see A. T. J. Matthews, *Emergent Turkish Administrators* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1955), 18. On the 1960s, see Clement H. Dodd, “The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 2 (1965): 273.

25. On sons of high officials, see Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 140. On state officials, see Dodd, “Social and Educational Background,” 272.

26. Baltaoğlu, *Atatürk*, 106, 109.

state did not correspond at all to the *sociological base* Atatürk had officially put forward: only 12.2 percent of the *valis* had a father who was a merchant, craftsman, worker, or peasant.²⁷ Indeed, the majority of the republican territorial leaders derived from the Ottoman civil officialdom. This reproduction of bureaucratic elites revealed similarities with the composition of the National Assembly. According to Frederick W. Frey, nearly three-quarters of the deputies elected between 1920 and 1957 were in the same occupations as their fathers and 51 percent of the officials had fathers who were officials (in the government, the military, or the educational establishment). In contrast, only 12 percent of the “professionals” (in law, medicine, etc.) had fathers who were professionals, partly because these occupations were not as well represented at the end of the Ottoman period as they were in the first decades of the republic. However, the confusion of political power and administrative functions that had previously characterized the Ottoman civil officialdom was progressively decreasing: whereas government employees represented 23 percent of the deputies of the first assembly in 1920, they constituted only 9 percent of those elected in 1954.²⁸

**Continuous Ottoman Realities:
Careers, Names, and Titles**

The imperial order had not completely disappeared, even if intensive efforts had been made continuously to ruin it. The professional ranks of low- or middle-level administrators had never really been broken. A close scrutiny of biographical data gathered by Baltaoğlu helps establish to what degree the vast majority of the governors-general who had been promoted in the first years of the regime were long-trained Ottoman administrators. About 30 of the 174 *valis* in service between 1923 and 1938 had even attained the rank of governor (*mutasarrıf*) during the decade following the revolution of 1908.²⁹ Certainly, some of them were promoted because they had been unquestioning followers of Mustafa Kemal during the independence war. Others, however, had not shown any particular

loyalty or sympathy to the nationalist cause or had waited a long time before joining it. However, they eventually crept back into the service after the massive purges of 1922. Such continuity had specific administrative causes. A large number of the experienced Ottoman dignitaries were seen as competent civil servants: 80 percent of the aforementioned *valis* had graduated either from the School of Public Administration (62 percent) or the Faculty of Law (18 percent), whereas only 5 percent of them had not had any academic training. In any case, the republic had no effective means to recruit or train a new generation of bureaucrats who would replace the previous one within a limited amount of time. Last, the very nature of administrative activities did not require any turnover of staff.

True, modernity and Westernization were proclaimed. True, too, the bureaucrats had to move to Ankara and give up wearing the fez. Yet whatever the regime, the traditional administrative environment remained the same: the offices were similarly organized around repetitive tasks, and the functionaries continued to devote their lives to document-producing routines with little room for individual initiative as they played the role of investigating clerks and enjoyed the cultural value granted to literacy and scribal skills. References to the imperial past still permeated daily administrative life. The title of pasha, for instance, continued to be used despite Atatürk’s stated willingness to suppress the title, as the following encounter demonstrates: “One evening Atatürk rounded on a minister and scolded him for using it. ‘You will please not call me Pasha any more. Is that clear?’ To which the minister replied: ‘I promise not to do it again, Pasha.’”³⁰

Indeed, the title survived until the pashas were all dead. Even as late as 1963, Ambassador Zeki Kunalalp still called the most prestigious of them, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, “my pasha” (*paşam*).³¹ Coupled with family names and various social distinctions, it delineated a clear symbolic distance from the rest of Turkish republican society. For instance, the author Sezai, a son of Sami Pasha, was still known as Sami

27. *Ibid.*, 115–16.

28. Frey, *Turkish Political Elite*, 181.

29. Baltaoğlu, *Atatürk*, 289–352.

30. Lord Kinross, *Atatürk, the Rebirth of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Nicosia, Cyprus: K. Rustem and Brother, 1981), 473n2.

31. Zeki Kunalalp, *Sadece Diplomat (Simply Diplomat)* (Istanbul: Isis, 1999), 22.

paşa-zâde Sezai (Sezai, son of Sami Pasha).³² True, when the reform of family names was implemented in 1934, references to pasha ancestors were automatically suppressed. However, since the *paşa-zâde* (Pasha-descendants) had reconverted their imperial privileges into meritocratic dispositions, they found a profitable way to show to what extent they were sincerely willing to be part of the nation by preferring Turkish names.

In doing so, they did not abandon the enduring social prestige associated with their names. In fact, they were offered a wide range of diversified onomastic choices. They could appropriate either the name of the father (e.g., Ali Haydar Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha; Cevad Şakir, son of Şakir Pasha; or Asaf Derviş, son of Derviş Pasha) or a name prevalent in the family (Fuad adopted a name—Köprülü—borne by his so-called ancestors, that is, the grand viziers Mehmed and Ahmed Köprülü). Some major local dynasties, such as the Baban, the Bedirhan, the Menemencioglu, and the Karaosmanoğlu, did likewise. A second onomastic choice to consider, albeit less easy to perceive, was distinctive as well. Following a trend begun in the previous century, particularly in the family of the khedive, it consisted in attributing the same name along successive generations, such as Zeki among the descendants of Mustafa Zeki Pasha, Muhtar among those of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar, or Midhat among those of the aforementioned Ahmed Midhat. The less popular the name (for instance Edhem), the more it served to evoke a famous dignitary (Grand Vizier İbrahim Edhem Pasha) and was a mark of distinction (see fig. 1).

Serving the Republic

While civil servants were exchanging the comfort of Istanbul for the continental austerity of Ankara, the pashas did not willingly leave the imperial city. Even if those among them who had shown deep loyalty to the banished imperial family had no other choice but to leave the country, most of the old and prestigious Otto-

man families continued to pass their days in their mansions.³³ There they continued their social habits and favorite occupations. For instance, Mehmed Abdülhalim, a son of former grand vizier Mehmed Said Halim Pasha and a member of the Egyptian dynasty, was a devoted collector of rare books and played a variety of musical instruments. His cousins and others constituted a distinguished and closed society, consisting of a limited number of aristocratic households in which a specific class consciousness crystallized. However, they were not exclusively involved in a life of card games and evening receptions. Certainly, many prominent senior dignitaries were pushed aside by the new regime. Yet when they felt that the nationalist ground was no longer shifting under their feet, they invested more energy in helping their sons follow in their footsteps. They cautiously cultivated their networks and nurtured and transformed their abilities into a set of diversified and valuable skills. In these families, officials were gradually turning into intellectuals, scientists, doctors, and artists. One might recall, for example, that Abidin Dino and Nazım Hikmet, the most important poets of their time, were both descendants of pashas.³⁴ One might also note the professional conversion patterns of those who had had access to Western literature and arts when studying in European schools. Among the numerous examples of these pasha-descendants were the Ahmed Tevfik Pasha-zâde, who successfully embarked on engineering activities; the Şakir Pasha-zâde, who counted various talented novelists and painters among their ranks; and the aforementioned İbrahim Edhem Pasha-zâde, who nurtured as many writers and artists in the first half of the twentieth century as they had produced competent administrators during the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras.

One of İbrahim Edhem's sons, Osman Hamdi Bey (1842–1910), had even paved the way for this slow-pace reconversion. After long years of study in Paris and a short career as a civil administrator, he was offered the opportu-


32. İbrahim Alâettin Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of Famous Turks)* (Istanbul, Yedigün Neşriyatı, 1946), 354; Ekrem Çakıroğlu, ed., *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of the Ottomans, with Their Lives and Works)*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 2:501.

33. Murat Belge, *Boğaziçi'nde Yalılar, İnsanlar (Mansions and People on the Bosphorus)* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997).

34. Many other examples could be given, such as the journalist and caricaturist Sermet Muhtar Alus, son of Muhtar Pasha; the poet Şüküfe Nihal Başar, grand-

daughter of Dr. Emin Pasha; Dr. Safiye Ali, daughter of Ali Kırat Pasha; Safiye Hüseyin Elbi, daughter of Admiral Ahmed Pasha; and the painter Sabiha Bozcalı, daughter of Admiral Rüştü Pasha.

Figure 1. Onomastic reproduction of Ottoman families. The descendants of Grand Vizier İbrahim Edhem Pasha



Source: Genealogical tree constituted with the help of Edhem Eldem.

nity to learn about ancient sculpture and was subsequently recruited to supervise the creation of the Ottoman Museum and of the School of Fine Arts.³⁵ His engagement with the preservation of the unique archaeological heritage spread over the Ottoman domains established his scientific reputation. He was so successful in this activity that he was honored as a member of the Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres in Paris and received the title *doctor honoris causa* from the universities of Oxford and London. Later on, many of his nephews and nieces followed a similar path: they studied in Europe, became far more involved in arts than in politics, and contributed to the cultural diversification of the family by writing poetry or music. After receiving an excellent education at the Conservatory of Paris, Cemal Reşit Rey became an important conductor and composer, and his sister Semine Argeşo distinguished herself as a violinist. The family also specialized in academics, particularly history (İsmail Galib), archeology (Halil Edhem, Edhem Hamdi, Mübarek Galib), and architecture (Sedad Eldem).³⁶

Old, established families not only were offered valuable opportunities to pursue other careers, but some also kept positions within the

state apparatus. Numan Menemencioğlu, who had started his diplomatic career as third secretary in Vienna in 1914, just after his graduation from Lausanne University, became an ambassador in 1933 and minister of foreign affairs between 1942 and 1944.³⁷ Hilmi Kâmil Bayur and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, the son and grandson of Grand Vizier Mehmed Kâmil Pasha, also attained major diplomatic positions. Even the members of ostracized families were allowed to reintegrate themselves into the bureaucracy. Less than twenty years after the assassination of the aforementioned Ali Kemal, İsmet İnönü did not consider it a problem to recruit his son to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obviously, the Turkish president did not have reason to regret his choice, for Zeki Kuneralp became one of Turkey's most successful and best-loved diplomats and served two terms as ambassador in London. Similarly, İsmail Hakkı Okday, a sultan's son-in-law and a son of the aforementioned grand vizier Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, transformed his imperial allegiance into republican loyalty. He had secretly ventured out of the palace to join the fighting nationalists and displayed excellent linguistic abilities among other credentials, all of which gained him easy admission

35. On Osman Hamdi Bey's career, see Edhem Eldem, "An Ottoman Archaeologist Caught between Two Worlds: Osman Hamdi Bey (1842–1910)," in *Archaeology, Anthropology, and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F. W. Hasluck, 1878–1920*, ed. David Shankland (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004), 1:121–49.

36. On Sedad Eldem's career, see Edhem Eldem, Bülent Tanju, and Uğur Tanyeli, ed., *Sedad Hakkı Eldem I. Gençlik Yılları (Sedad Hakkı Eldem I: The Early Years)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası, 2008).

37. Yücel Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of the Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu* (Ankara: Grafiker, 2002).

into the republic's diplomatic service, where he served at the rank of consul general.³⁸

Indeed, diplomacy afforded a significant opportunity for families of the old bureaucracy to convert themselves into part of the new administration. Most of their members were fluent in at least one European language and were closely connected with European aristocrats whom they had previously met in universities in Bern, Lausanne, Berlin, Paris, or London. It is doubtful whether students educated in Turkish university faculties had comparable social and linguistic fluency or were part of similar networks.³⁹ Moreover, the republican meritocratic ideology had a limited impact on the recruitment process. The Kemalist administration had so many international challenges to deal with (e.g., the question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and the settlement of the Turkish claims over Mosul and Hatay) that it had no choice but to rely on trained Ottoman gentlemen when setting up its diplomatic apparatus.⁴⁰ Pragmatically, the Turkish state used the old established families in the same way Ottoman diplomacy had used Greek families during the second half of the eighteenth century.⁴¹

As in Ottoman times, these families saw matrimonial alliances as a useful way to regain their positions within the state apparatus. Prominent dignitaries who had been forced to retire might propose that their daughters marry influential officials or politicians. Makbûle, a daughter of the aforementioned Mehmed Kâmil Pasha, married a military official who finished his career as a divisional general. Notably, her own daughter also married a military official, who was a candidate for the elected president of the Senate.⁴² In the same way, Hatice Saadet, a granddaughter of Ahmed Zühtü Pasha, minister of education and minister of finances during the reign of Abdülhamid II, married Şükrü

Saraçoğlu, the Turkish prime minister between 1942 and 1946.⁴³ Indeed, matrimonial exchange played an important role in the emergence of a new state nobility, mixing the social prestige cultivated by the former with the political prominence acquired by the latter.

Back to Politics:

Arts and Literature as Republican Credentials

The various strategies discussed above were not the only means by which members of the old official elites could recover positions. People with talents in scientific, academic, or artistic fields not only contributed to the building of the nation and regained elite positions; their abilities also led to political power. Eventually, some old Ottomans were considered too important to be ignored. Consequently, they were offered official positions. Abdülhak Hamid (1852–1937) was typical of those who returned to politics in this way. The son of an ambassador in Tehran and also well versed in historiography, he followed both bureaucratic and literary careers, first, as an embassy diplomat in Brussels in 1908, and second, as a prolific poet and a playwright. He was known for the new verse styles he introduced and for a Western way of looking at Turkish poetry. He became a senator in 1914, at a time when his most famous theater works were being staged in Istanbul. In 1922 the Senate was suppressed and he left the country. In 1928, however, he returned to Istanbul, where he was elected to the parliament and maintained his post there until the end of his life in 1937. When he died, the regime offered him a special tribute by organizing a national funeral.

In a similar way, the Ottoman administrators who had attained academic tenure or enjoyed artistic fame in the last years of the empire did not wait long before considering

38. See Şefik Okday, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e: Padişah Yaveri İki Sadrazam oğlu anlatıyor (From the Ottomans to the Republic: The Explanations of Two Aides-de-camps of the Emperor and Sons of Grand Vizier)* (Istanbul: n.p., 1988).

39. Baltaoğlu, *Atatürk*, 208. On the first students who were funded by the Turkish government, see Kansu Şarman, *Türk Prometheus'ler: Cumhuriyet'in Öğrencileri Avrupa'da (1925–1945) (The Turkish Prometheus: The Students of the Republic in Europe [1925–1945])* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası), 2005.

40. As an example of this continuity, see Esat Cemal Paker, *Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları (Forty Years of Foreign Memoirs in Our Political History)*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000).

41. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 91.

42. Yılmaz Öztuna, *Devletler ve Hânedanlar: Türkiye (1074–1990) (States and Dynasties: Turkey [1074–1990])*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1996), 711.

43. Müfid Edkal, *Bizans Metropolünde İlk Türk Köyü Kadiköy (Kadiköy, First Turkish Village in the Byzantine Metropolis)* (Istanbul: Kadiköy Belediye, 1996), 297.

opportunities to enter politics under the republic. Among these families, the Köprülüs and the Karaosmanoğlus remarkably embodied this transition. Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966) and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889–1974), who pursued outstanding careers in education and journalism, respectively, represented a particularly qualified and talented generation. They earned their reputations not by boasting of the fame of their families but by contributing to the development of modern Turkish scholarship. Köprülü was appointed professor of literature at Istanbul University in 1913. In 1924 he founded the Institute of Turcology, before becoming the head of the Turkish History Committee in 1928. He taught the history of civilization at the Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts and became distinguished professor in 1929. Meanwhile, he established a new theory according to which the military-political expansion of medieval Anatolian frontiers was primarily the result of the demographic pressure of Turkish tribes. To Köprülü, the Ottoman state was essentially a Turkish state. This original interpretation of the Ottoman conquest was considered by prominent historians such as Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch to be such an innovation that Köprülü was invited to lecture at conferences in major European universities. Karaosmanoğlu did not enjoy similar international fame. However, in his own country he was considered one of its most important novelists and was also a republican ideologist. As a result of his support for the Kemalists during the independence war, he became deputy from 1923 to 1934, during which time he also wrote his most important novels.

True, the impressive pedigrees of these *héritiers* (heirs) still represented serious drawbacks in the view of some radical republicans; it was a well-known fact that the Köprülüs had produced five grand viziers under the Ottomans and that the Karaosmanoğlus had extended their influence in a large area around Manisa at the end of the seventeenth century. Subsequently, however, their families did not attain such prominent positions under the last sultans. Nor did they join the palace clique that gath-

ered around the “red sultan.” During the early republican period, their social reputation did not prevent them from nurturing special abilities and gaining increasing influence. In 1924 Fuad Köprülü was made undersecretary of state at the Ministry of National Education. In 1934 he was elected deputy. In the same year, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu started a diplomatic career that took him to embassies in Tehran, Prague, The Hague, and Bern.⁴⁴ Both Köprülü and Karaosmanoğlu did so well in their respective fields that when Turkey started experimenting with multiparty politics after World War II, the new political leaders seriously believed that these prominent figures had a positive role to play in the post-Kemalist state. On 7 June 1945 Köprülü was one of the four deputies who submitted a memorandum to the parliamentary party demanding that multiparty politics be implemented. In 1950 he was chosen minister of foreign affairs. Meanwhile, Karaosmanoğlu continued his diplomatic career, but after the military takeover of May 1960, he became a member of the Constituent Assembly before reentering the National Assembly.

In the same way that Köprülü’s and Karaosmanoğlu’s scientific and artistic reputations had launched their administrative careers, two decades later their newly acquired prominence in the state apparatus contributed to the reconversion of their Ottoman local prestige into democratic power; it was no coincidence that Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu (1900–1978) were elected deputies in the regions where their family had previously established a strong influence. Election after election, some major notable families regained the local positions they had lost either under the Ottomans or during the Kemalist era. In doing so, they acquired renewed prestige. Among local elites were İsmail Hakkı Mumcu in Amasya, Mehmet Âtîf Tüzün in Rize, and Mehmet Nazif Ergin in Sivas.⁴⁵ Indeed, the establishment of democracy in Turkey, far from being solely conducted by republican meritocrats, also resulted from the work of reestablished Ottoman notables.⁴⁶

44. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat (Strained Diplomat)* (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1955).

45. Baltaoğlu, *Atatürk*, 310, 313, 319.

46. I am referring here to Albert Hourani’s seminal essay “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,”

in *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, ed. William Roe Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41–68.

Conclusion

Certainly, the Ottoman bureaucracy was nothing like the imperial aristocracies instituted in Austria, Prussia, or Russia, since official titles could not be transmitted from father to son. Moreover, the prominent Hamidian dignitaries were viewed by the fathers of the Turkish nation as a privileged nobility to be erased to facilitate the building of the republican state. This is one reason why the imperial family had to wait years before being allowed back into Turkey: 1952 for the female members and 1974 for the male members.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the old established bureaucrats, or a majority of them, had to retire, but without suffering compulsory exile. They did not fade away but maintained themselves among the elites, partly because they had progressively taken up valuable new activities under the last sultans. Noticeably, this pattern was successfully organized at the margins of the bureaucracy; the Ottoman state—in a way similar to that adopted later by the republican administration—played a decisive economic and social role to such an extent that it could easily extend its own authority into fields apparently outside of its direct control.

True, the Kemalist administration was established as part of a radical revolutionary ideology. Yet the generals who ventured into politics were as pragmatic in running the administration as the previous Ottomans bureaucrats who had taught them how to exercise power were. Ideologically and practically, the Turkish state had nothing to do with totalitarianism; far from deeming it necessary to destroy a complete segment of the society as a prerequisite for establishing full control over the masses, the republicans vested old families with the right to explore their competences and make use of their abilities. As a result, the families who promoted the Kemalist project were acknowledged as loyal to the regime; they were even generously compensated by recovering official positions and political functions. To adopt a larger historical perspective, within a century, notable families both

assimilated themselves into republican elites and cultivated their imperial past as a source of social prestige. Later on, in the 1980s, they even started to become involved in the renewal of Ottoman history, either as publishers or as academicians. Today, few of them nostalgically look back to old times, although they know to what degree their ancestors ruled the empire, and they sometimes display great erudition when questioned about the sultan's pashas. S

47. Sami N. Özdemir, *Atatürk Devrimi Kronolojisi (Chronology of the Atatürk Revolution)* (Ankara: Çankaya Belediyesi, 1996), 138–39. See also Osman Selaheddin Osmanoğlu, ed., *Ali Vâsib Efendi: Bir Şehzadenin Hâtîrâtı (Ali Vâsib Efendi: Memoirs of a Prince)* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2004).