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Whose Money Funds African Peace Operations?

Negotiating Influence and Autonomy with External Partners

David Ambrosetti and Romain Esmenjaud

Introduction

The present chapter addresses the financial dimension of African peace operations. Its objective is to identify the different forms of financial arrangements that make African peace operations possible, and to raise some of the main political issues associated with each of them. Four types of such arrangements will be discussed: 1. when African states deploy military missions with their own financial resources; 2. when financial support is offered on a voluntary and *ad hoc* basis by non-African partners, not only through bilateral channels, but also through multilateral mechanisms set by regional organisations like the European Union (EU); 3. when African-led operations are funded by the assessed-contributions to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping budget; and 4. when African troops contributing countries are given the institutional and financial cover of a formal UN-commanded peace operation.

This taxonomy is the result of an inductive method, founded on an exploratory, inevitably selective, investigation among case studies – some very recent, others less – that the authors have worked on. While it does not pretend to cover all the imaginable options, this taxonomy does allow us to address the most vivacious debates in relation to the funding of peace operations. The question of African ownership is one of the controversies which are of concern to both practitioners and academics. Indeed, one cannot miss the situation of dependency, which characterizes the African peace and security architecture, as well as the

consequences of this situation on the limited freedom of action African states and organizations have in their endeavours.¹

Going beyond the idea of a mere opposition between two categories of actors (Africans vs. non-Africans) trying to claim ownership over the management of peace missions, this chapter analyzes the contextual negotiations, involving both African (be they regional organisations or states) and external actors, which have given rise to the existing funding arrangements. Importantly, the result of these discussions is always unpredictable, which means the division of labour between organisations is not based on their comparative advantages,² but rather on the basis of compromises made on a case-by-case basis.

At first glance, our fourfold taxonomy fails to offer well-cut, exclusive categories that avoid mutual overlapping. For instance, one may ask why funding by regional multilateral institutions on a voluntary and *ad hoc* basis is distinguished from funding by the UN, which, after all, is just another multilateral institution? Is it the regional nature of the first that is making the difference here? Or is it that the support through the EU may allow some European states to gather support for particular African states, whereas the UN does not offer this kind of multilateral institutional cover for state-to-state relations? In fact, each of the mechanisms offers varying rooms of manoeuvre to the parties involved. For instance, when an external donor state opts for financial support on a bilateral basis, it can suspend it or refuse to

¹ R. Esmenjaud, *L'africanisation et l'appropriation africaine des opérations de paix: Etude politique et historique à travers les missions africaines au Tchad (1979-1982), en RCA (1997 à nos jours) et au Darfour (2004 à nos jours)*, PhD thesis, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2012; P.A. Kasaija, 'The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of "African solutions to African problems"', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, 2013, pp. 117-138; B. Franke and S. Gänzle, 'How "African" Is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and Practical Constraints of Regional Security Cooperation in Africa', *African Security* 5, 2012, pp. 88-104.

² For instance, the UN is said to be more efficient in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding, compared to regional organizations, which are often considered more able as far as peace imposition is concerned.

renew it later on. Alternatively, when the UN budget is mobilized to take charge of the funding of others' peace operations (here, an African regional organization), it is seriously reducing the donors' leverage on the mission. In the end, organizations shall here be thought of as providers of resources, be they political (legitimacy) or financial, to states wishing to deploy peace missions.

Throughout our empirical investigation, we have met some – rare – instances where African states have themselves funded their peace operations. By starting with a discussion around those examples, we will be able to better understand the conditions under which African states have displayed readiness to mobilize their own resources and a desire to act autonomously. But the situations where African actors find it more interesting or valuable to resort to the UN or external partners are much more common, despite the calls from the big donors for a stronger African financial contribution. This contradicts the idea of African ownership, which implies African funding for African missions ('he who pays the piper calls the tune', as practitioners say).

Why, in most cases, African actors show no interest in financial ownership by relying on the resources of others is the question policy-makers keep asking every time a new mission is established. It is assumed that our discussion on those four types of financial arrangements offer some useful insight to deal with this question. Examining each of these types successively will shed light on some underlying political stakes for the different actors involved.

African Operations Funded by African Actors

This first model refers to cases when African actors have funded their own peace interventions, or those of their 'brothers' from the continent. This unusual scenario mainly took place in a context where African regional powers were exposed to the risk of

destabilization in their vicinity and, more precisely, under the threat of interferences by rival powers (be they African or extra-African).

The first mission ever deployed by an African organization took place in Chad in late 1981,³ where the sending of troops from Zaïre, Senegal and Nigeria was largely funded by France and the United States (US). But this experience was preceded by two others, much less dependent on Western partners, and much less addressed in the literature. First, in March 1979, Nigerian troops were sent to Ndjamená to supervise a truce between the Chadian parties signed in Kano the same month. Through this initiative, Lagos hoped to stabilize the situation in this neighbour country and pave the way for the withdrawal of the French troops, which had been present in the country since independence. Refusing some of the aid offered by France, Lagos displayed a true willingness to remain independent. After Nigerian troops had to withdraw on the request of Chadian authorities, Nigeria, together with Libya, pushed for the sending of another operation comprising troops from Guinea, Togo and Congo, whose main objective was again to replace French soldiers. Only Congolese troops were deployed thanks to Algerian air transportation support. Those troops, which never went out of their barracks and were lacking all kinds of resources including funding, withdrew as soon as the fighting broke out again in early 1980.

The history of the project of an all-African Defence force was also largely shaped by such reactive postures. Among the many proposals to establish such an intervention capacity, one can mention Kwame N'Krumah's famous projects of a Defence Force in the early 1960s, Sierra Leone's African Defence Organisation (1965), Nigeria's African Defence System (1970), or the project of a Defence Force of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

³ By mistake, the 1978 interventions in Shaba are sometimes associated with the OAU. For Chad, see T. Mays, *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982*, Westport: Praeger, 2002.

discussed between 1978 and 1981.⁴ It must be emphasised, however, that most of these projects were put forward as a reaction to initiatives by external actors. For instance, attempts at destabilizing African countries by Portugal, both in 1970 and 1974, were followed by discussions to reinforce pan-African cooperation.⁵ Likewise, in the late 1970s and early 1980s – when the OAU probably moved closest to the creation of such a force⁶ – debates followed the April 1978 Franco-African Summit, where Senegalese President Leopold Sédar Senghor was given the mandate to study the possibility of establishing an African multilateral intervention capacity.⁷ In the end, none of these projects was translated into reality. Beyond opposition around the very role such a force should play – whether it should defend the regimes in power or, rather, the states of Africa as a whole⁸ – not only the required resources, but also the political will to mobilize them, were missing. Many of the projects actually resembled ‘window-dressing’ initiatives through which their promoters could get pan-African credentials. While being reluctant to publicly challenge the relevance of such a tool, many states were actually comfortable with relying on the support from their external patrons, most often their former colonial master.

⁴ B. Franke, ‘A Pan-African Army: The Evolution of an Idea and its Eventual Realisation in the African Standby Force’, *African Security Review* 15, 2006, pp. 1-16.

⁵ In 1971, Portugal supported a coup attempt against Guinean President Sekou Touré and, in 1974, it attacked the freshly-independent state of Guinea-Bissau.

⁶ In July 1979, the OAU Heads of states endorsed the principle of the creation of a pan-African force, and in April 1981, the Defence Commission endorsed a ‘Protocol establishing an African Defence Force’.

⁷ This initiative aimed at giving a formal institutional cover to initiatives like the African interventions in Shaba (1978), which received strong support from France and the US.

⁸ R. Esmenjaud, ‘Africa’s Conception of Security in Transition: The Continent’s Approach to Multilateral Interventions, from N’Krumah to the African Standby Force’, in Tim Murithi (ed.), *Handbook of Africa’s International Relations*, London: Routledge, 2013 (forthcoming).

The recent turn towards African regional organisations has partly changed the face of these experiences of autonomy, yet the major features – presence of a regional power interested in maintaining the status quo in a context of regional competition – remain. These cases are still, however, the exception. During the 1990s, Nigeria followed a strategy of regional military activism in Liberia and Sierra Leone under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and with the implicit support of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The United Kingdom (UK) and the US offered financial and technical assistance to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the military force created by Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Sierra Leone – when the crisis was still confined to Liberia. Initially close to the two regimes and hostile to the ‘revisionist’ forces led by Charles Taylor (in Liberia) and Foday Sankoh (in Sierra Leone), Nigeria assumed for eight years the bulk of the financial (and political) costs of this mission. This was so until 2000/2001, when the UN headquarters in New York and the UK took a firmer lead on the new UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, created in 1999). The latter also benefited from a massive deployment of the Guinean army against the insurgent elements. Two concomitant dynamics drove to the above Nigerian military involvement. First, the Nigerian authorities felt they were challenged by these rebellions that intended to topple political friends (Liberian President Samuel Doe and Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh were close to Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida), and that were suspected to receive support from rival neighbours (from Muammar Gadhafi of Libya, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire). Second, Nigerian partners within the UNSC were encouraging initiatives from sub-regional powers aimed at preserving stability and political status quo. At that time sending peace missions in internal conflicts was not (yet) the ‘normal’ thing to do in most UN members’ views, and decision-makers in Washington were anxious to

avoid an inflation of the UN budget that would have deepened their contribution arrears to the organization.⁹ Abuja progressively worked at demonstrating it could assume the role of a credible peacekeeping force in the region, particularly when President Sani Abacha was denounced by human rights organisations for having executed the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa.¹⁰

More recently, Nigeria again displayed its capacity to induce ECOWAS into action by sending troops to Guinea-Bissau. In June 2012, breaking with the organization's inertia vis-à-vis the crisis in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso sent about 550 troops to participate in the reform of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces. The sending of this force, whose presence is funded autonomously with the exception of external transportation support, again represents a reaction to the infringement of a rival power in Nigeria's backyard. The ECOWAS troops indeed replaced soldiers from Angola, which had been deployed in Guinea-Bissau under the umbrella of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.

Apart from the action of other 'regional powers' like South Africa, which intervened in Lesotho in 1998 without requesting any external support, examples of genuine African funding ownership are therefore very scarce.

One can note that in January 2013, the AU has for the first time decided to participate in the funding of an African mission through its own budget. However, the US\$ 50 million of promised aid to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) only cover a small part of the budget of the mission (assessed to be close to US\$ 1 billion). Besides, this

⁹ This context is notably depicted by J. Woods, 'US Decision-making During Operations in Somalia', in W. Clarke and J. Herbst (eds.), *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Boulder: Westview, 1997, p. 152, quoting Herman Cohen, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1989-1993).

¹⁰ F.Olonisakin, *Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 142, 160-164; F. Olonisakin, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008, pp. 29-31.

promised contribution shall be partly mobilized by recovering arrears from AU member states.¹¹ In the same vein, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is funding only about 30 percent of the mission deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) (*Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique – MICOPAX*).¹²

In this context, it should be questioned whether African states are simply not interested in gaining real ownership over their operations. One common argument to justify Africa's dependence on external actors, regularly referred to by African leaders in particular, is resource scarcity. For instance, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, justified the initiative of her country to ask for UN financial support to AU operations on the basis of the existing gap between the commitments made by the organization and the resources at its disposal.¹³ Indeed, even resource-rich Nigeria found it very difficult to sustain its military engagement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which has cost some US\$ 4 billion to the government in Abuja.¹⁴ However, the mobilisation of resources is also the result of political will and choices. As an example, Ethiopia has been able to intervene in Somalia in several instances outside the framework of any regional or international organization. As we have seen with Nigeria in Chad, then in Liberia and Sierra Leone, or with Ethiopia in Somalia, specific contexts of regional competition affecting an African power may have created a context conducive to African financial ownership in military interventions.

¹¹ In the end, the transformation of the African mission in Mali into a UN mission may make this contribution unnecessary.

¹² Interview with an EU official, Paris, January 2013.

¹³ UN, S/PV.6092, 18 March 2009, p. 9.

¹⁴ F. Olonisakin, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, op. cit.*, p. 44.

Otherwise, the limitation of Africa's financial contributions to peace operations is better understood when keeping in mind that most peace missions are called for by external actors as much as by Africans themselves. This is the object of our second section.

African Operations Financially Supported by External Actors

When African troops are not part of a UN mission, their presence in peace operations has been most often funded by the voluntary contributions of external donors. We have identified this model, for instances, in Chad (1981-1982), the CAR (1997-1998; 2002 until today), Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2004), Burundi (2003-2004), Darfur (2004-2007) and Somalia (2007 until today). Here, we first retrace the forms taken by this kind of partnership, before addressing the question of its political implications (who depends on whom and with which political effects?).

African Peace Operations as Division of Labour between Africans and Donors

External support may be provided directly to the troop contributors or to the regional or sub-regional organizations in charge of the operation. In the context of the OAU mission in Chad, out of fear that direct aid to the organization may compromise its independence, donors (i.e. France and the US) were asked to offer support to the participating states on a bilateral basis. Today, while bilateral aid remains significant when it comes to the material and logistical requirements, financial support is generally managed at the level of the mandating organization, which can thus assert its control over the operation. In recent operations (CAR and Mali), *ad hoc* financial cells have been established to channel the aid to the operation. Such units, which include representatives of the donors, also allow for more transparency in

the administration of support; thereby helping to overcome the suspicions of mismanagement (or corruption), which have emerged in the operations in Darfur and the CAR.¹⁵

While aid from individual states was predominant in the past, most contributions nowadays are channelled through regional organisations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, offered logistical support to the AU operation in Darfur (2005-2007), while the EU has become the main (financial) partner of African organizations. Through the African Peace Facility (APF), an instrument of the European Development Fund, the EU has been taking charge of the greatest share of the budget of the missions in the CAR, Darfur, Somalia and Mali.¹⁶ For some time, Western countries have tried to encourage other donors to participate in the funding of African operations, with very little success. At this stage, only Turkey has responded to the call to support the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Moreover, the Turkish US\$ 1 million contribution remains relatively small given the needs of the operation, which has become the largest ever deployed by an African organization (17,000 soldiers), and to which the EU contributes no less than €19 million a month.¹⁷

African peace operations are therefore most often the result of a specific division of labour between African and non-African, in fact Western, actors, where the former provide the human resources and the latter the financial, technical and material (equipment) ones. Without this external voluntary funding, the AU could not have become such a big player in peace operations. Yet, this direction was not obvious when the AU undertook its first full-fledged peacekeeping mission in Burundi (African Mission in Burundi, AMIB) in 2003. At that time, the AU did not respond to a strong lobbying from external donors. The initiative came from inside, from South Africa. It stemmed from Nelson Mandela's appointment as

¹⁵ 'Des euros "évaporés" par millions au Darfour', *Libération*, 16 July 2007.

¹⁶ For instance, the EU is paying 70 percent of the MICOPAX budget.

¹⁷ Interview with an EU official, Paris, January 2013.

facilitator to the Arusha peace negotiation (1999-2000) and the subsequent deployment of a South African Protection Support Detachment to this country in October 2001. Burundi would eventually become a test for the AU in the eyes of Pretoria. The UK then directly supported Ethiopia as an AMIB contributing country, while South Africa bilaterally supported Mozambique and, as leading nation, delivered the logistic support needed by the force as a whole. Then the EU used its new APF to cover the allowances paid by the AU to the troops. It was the first time partners offered direct support to the AU's peace and security activities.¹⁸

The situation repeated itself with the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS), established in 2004. However, external actors, mainly Western countries, exerted intensive lobbying to get the AU to deploy the operation. Their support included the prospect of takeover by the UN, despite Khartoum's hostility. These partners would also become providers of funding. The most spectacular contribution came from the APF, which alone brought € 305 million to the AMIS funding, out of € 440 million dedicated to the Facility between 2004 and 2007.¹⁹ The US, the UK and Canada also provided AMIS with important contributions, while African financial support remained insignificant.²⁰

A noticeable limitation of the EU Peace Facility is that it cannot, in principle, fund expenditures with clear military aims (military training and equipment, etc.). Like in Burundi, in Darfur the main part went to fund AMIS soldiers' allowances. Bilateral contributions by

¹⁸ Interview with a senior officer of the Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) within the Department for Peace and Security of the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, October 2008. This military officer was in charge of the Darfur dossier since the beginning in 2004.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16 and 26.

²⁰ Like the other AU missions thus far, AMIS could not count on the AU member states' contributions to the Peace Fund, which the organisation had created in 2004 to fund its peace missions. N. Pirozzi, *EU Support to African Security Architecture: Funding and Training Components*, Occasional Paper, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2009.

other partners – including EU states – then complemented the APF support by providing war-fighting capacity-building, ammunitions and weapons. Significantly, partners did not rely on the permanent structures in charge of logistical support for peace operations (Peace Support Operations Division), and opted for the creation of a Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) as an *ad hoc* transmission belt (including funding) between them and the AU Department for Peace and Security. Interestingly though, the DITF office was placed in Addis Ababa outside the AU headquarters (at Adams Pavilion, a few meters away from it).

These levels of funding did not help turn AMIS into a success. They revealed the structural weaknesses of the AU support services for peace operations, their low ability to absorb an important, but irregular, flux of financial support and to transform it into operational efficiency.²¹ Beyond the Darfuri situation, the deficiencies have more generally concerned staffing and logistics within the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission, and the inefficient Military Staff Committee.²² These shortcomings were identified by an external audit commanded by the AU in December 2007 on the staff resources of the organization. It drove the AU and its partners to launch projects of large

²¹ J. Cilliers, 'Force africaine en attente: État des progrès accomplis dans sa mise en place', Institut d'études de sécurité / Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), Article 160, March 2008, pp. 13-14. These difficulties are clearly demonstrated through the case study of the AU in Darfur, according to C. Guicherd, *L'UA au Soudan: Enseignements pour la force africaine en attente*, New York: International Peace Academy, March 2007, pp. 16-19; and A. Ekengard, *The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned*, FOI Report, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division of Defence Analysis, Stockholm, August 2008, notably pp. 36-39 and 40-41.

²² Audit of the AU, submitted by the High Level Panel to the President of the AU, 27 December 2007.

recruitment for the AU Department for Peace and Security, with the contribution of external experts and consultants.²³

AMIS also reflected the negative impact of too direct a dependency on external voluntary contributions, which followed their own tempos, and often overlapped with one another. In the end, the AU suffered from the political sensitivity of Western governments – particularly during electoral periods in the US and the UK – to well-organised lobbies calling for more robust intervention in Darfur or, at least, for a takeover by a UN mission even without Khartoum’s approval.²⁴ Eventually, Sudan, the AU and UN leaderships, as well as external partners, agreed in November 2006 on a UN-AU joint mission, UNAMID.

Are African Actors Not Interested in Autonomy?

In most cases mentioned above, African operations have resembled sub-contracted interventions or actions by proxies. African peace operations have often resulted from the initiative of non-African powers unwilling to intervene themselves, but eager to get a stabilizing force deployed. From the outset, they have then encouraged African states to contribute troops by promising them financial and material support. France has displayed its ability to induce African allies to participate in peace operations on several occasions, either as a way to replace her own soldiers, for instance in 1997 in the CAR, or as a complement to her own action, for instance in Mali.²⁵

²³ Interviews with two officers of the EU delegation following the activities of the partner group for peace and security matters, and with the team leader of the UN DPKO / AU Peacekeeping Support Team in Addis Abeba, November 2008.

²⁴ D. Lanz, ‘Why Darfur? The Responsibility to Protect as a Rallying Cry for Transnational Advocacy Groups’, *Global Responsibility to Protect* 3, 2011, pp. 223–247.

²⁵ The *Mission de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui* (MISAB) was deployed in the Central African Republic in 1997. Its presence allowed the French troops to withdraw in 1998.

Of course, such a division of labour has political implications so that African troop contributors are not in a position to act autonomously. In particular, the level and nature of external support largely shapes the characteristics of peace missions (size, mandate, duration, etc). For instance, the AU has for a long time asked for an increase in AMISOM's number of troops, claiming as early as October 2010 that 20,000 personnel were needed. This request was only – partly – accepted in February 2012, after the UNSC adopted resolution 2036 authorizing the deployment of 17,000 troops, and donors (the EU in particular) accepted to increase their support.²⁶

But this is only part of the story. Decisions are usually taken through a lengthy and difficult dialogue between all, in which Africans still keep strong leverage. Aware that their action fits into the agenda of Western states and of the donors' unwillingness to intervene themselves, the actors of the continent can manipulate their partners through some kind of blackmailing ('if you don't pay, we will withdraw and create a security vacuum'). In this way, African actors have sometimes decided to intervene on their own, and later 'send the bill' to their traditional backers. In January/February 2013, the rapid and autonomous deployment of Chadian forces to Mali through Niger was greeted by the international community. Later President Déby made it clear, however, that he expected his country to be reimbursed for its action.

Beyond this, African contributing countries can also find immediate benefits to this division of labour. First and foremost, contributing troops gives access to a sort of 'geopolitical rent', as the case of AMISOM illustrates. Through an analysis of Uganda's involvement in this operation, Jonathan Fisher allows us to support the claim that the funding of African operations reflects what we would call a pattern of extraversion. By developing an

²⁶ European Commission, 'More EU funding to increase AMISOM troop strength', 23 February 2012, http://brussels.cta.int/index.php?searchword=Rondos&option=com_k2&view=itemlist&Itemid=54, accessed on 12 January 2013.

image of regional peacemaker in Somalia, Uganda has increased its leverage on the international scene and thereby succeeded in nuancing the diplomatic condemnations of its destabilising military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1998.²⁷ In this sense, Museveni follows the path of other regimes that have bet on their relations with Western partners (Meles' Ethiopia and Kagame's Rwanda), primarily in Washington and London, to ensure their consolidation as sub-regional powers.

The calculations made by the regimes in Burundi and Kenya, whose troops joined the Ugandan units in late 2007 and mid-2012 respectively, are similar. It has been pointed out that Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza has gained, if not a reputation of a peacemaker (like his predecessor Pierre Buyoya), at least international indulgence regarding the management of Burundi's internal affairs, while his democratic credentials have been recently put into question by non-governmental organizations.²⁸ Suspicions on Burundian acquisitions of military equipment with (EU-funded) soldiers' allowances also shed light on the potential financial advantages associated with the participation in peace missions. Besides this controversial point, some donors in Bujumbura were recently feeling that the Ministry of National Defence was getting used to the millions of dollars it was receiving from AMISOM sponsors, and counted on them for its regular functioning as a structural rent rather than as a temporary, contextual, situation that would require anticipation.²⁹ More broadly, for the national armies of war-torn states, contributing to a peace operation offers access to training programmes and equipment that may help enhance their professionalism, efficiency and

²⁷ J. Fisher, 'Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda's 2007 Intervention in Somalia', *African Affairs* 111, 2012, pp. 404-423. Concerning the extraversion of African rulers, we refer to J.-F. Bayart, 'Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion', *African Affairs* 99, 2000, pp. 217-67.

²⁸ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis*, Africa Report 185, 21 March 2012.

²⁹ Interviews with two top managers of Security Sector Reform programs in Burundi, Bujumbura, December 2011 and November 2012.

discipline. In the eyes of political elites, it may provide soldiers with a well-paid occupation that may retain them from interfering in national politics.³⁰

Regarding Kenya, participation in AMISOM resulted from the integration of the soldiers that intervened in Somalia in October 2011. Through this move, and as Kenyans are still largely acting autonomously, Nairobi was able to externalize the funding of its military presence in Somalia, though its intervention actually reflected a purely national decision. Following the kidnapping of Westerners in northern Kenya, earlier in 2011, *Operation Linda Shi* ('Protect the nation') was undertaken to create a buffer zone between the two countries, so as to prevent the spread of Somalia's instability towards the south.³¹

Examining the motivations of contributors in other missions does not challenge such patterns of extraversion. The case of Kenya in Somalia can indeed be paralleled with that of Chad in the CAR. By placing its troops under the (theoretical) authority of MICOPAX, Ndjamena was able to get funding and legitimacy for its action in this country. The disorder in this neighbouring state has threatened to spread into the southern part of Chad, where its oil fields are located. Rwanda's contribution to the operation in Darfur offers another case worth mentioning. As argued by Danielle Beswick, "while Rwanda's contribution to peacekeeping may be altruistic, it also serves to reinforce the present regime by highlighting its moral authority and 'saviour' role in recent Rwandan history".³² Kigali's leverage has become so great that it could even threaten to withdraw its troops from the AU/UN mission in Darfur as

³⁰ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

³¹ International Crisis Group, *The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia*, Africa Report 184, 15 February 2012. p. 3.

³² D. Beswick, 'Peacekeeping, Regime Security and "African Solutions to African Problems": Exploring Motivations for Rwanda's Involvement in Darfur', *Third World Quarterly* 31, 2010, p. 752.

the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was to issue, in 2010, a report on the human costs of Rwandan involvement in Eastern Congo.³³

This section has presented some of the forms taken by *ad hoc* external support to African troop contributing countries and thereby shed light on some of the political interests bringing African states to accept institutional arrangements that make them rely on the goodwill of donor countries. The patent limits observed in the efficiency of this model – described both above and below – has led to the establishment of two alternative options. Both are introduced below.

African Operations Funded by the UN: A Model Gaining Ground

Complaining about the lack of predictability of the aid brought on a voluntary basis, African states and organizations have for a long time asked for the support of the UN, and in particular its peacekeeping budget. They consider such aid would only be fair considering that their interventions are made on behalf of the ‘international community’ as a whole.

In 2008, South Africa, then a non-permanent member of the UNSC, put the issue of UN support to African operations on the agenda of the Security Council. The report issued by the so-called ‘Prodi panel’ (December 2008), created following South Africa’s initiative, endorsed the idea of funding African peace operations through UN assessed-contributions, though in very strict conditions. With the explicit approval of the UNSC, UN member states contributions could be mobilized for a period of up to six months, after which the UN would take over the mission.³⁴ Large contributors to the UN budget, like Japan and many Western states, including UNSC permanent members, opposed this idea on the grounds that it would

³³ Eventually, Rwanda could not prevent the publication of the report, but it obtained the right to insert in the very report its own responses and interpretations on the incriminated facts.

³⁴ UN, *Report of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations*, S/2008/813, 31 December 2008.

explicitly allow the UN to finance an operation, which is not under its control. The creation of a voluntary Trust Fund aiming at reinforcing the capacity of African organizations – another option put forward in the report – was then deemed more appropriate.³⁵

Contextual calculations by Western states have, however, brought them to trump their own doctrinal preferences, i.e. their refusal to mobilize the UN budget for operations which would not be under UN command. The recommendation of the Prodi Report regarding the resort to assessed contributions to the UN budget to fund African operations have then been put into practice in several cases – sometimes even in a more extensive way. UN support was first mobilized in the transition period between AMIS and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). ‘The logistical support package’ put in place for AMISOM, created in March 2009 and enlarged in several instances,³⁶ constitutes a valuable complement to bilateral support that covers military equipment and the payment of soldiers’ allowances by the APF. Like in Darfur, the package was initially conceived as a strictly transitory measure. During the transition period from the Bush to the Obama administration (late 2008, early 2009), the US State Department showed – for a short period of time – some flexibility on the possibility of having UN blue helmets in Somalia. Other UNSC members endorsed this package as a way to alleviate the pressure of the AU regarding the immediate deployment of a full-fledged UN mission.³⁷ In the end, given the lack of consensus on the creation of a UN operation, the package is, as of April 2013, still offering crucial support to AMISOM.

³⁵ For instance, see the statement of the French Permanent Representative to the UN in UN, S/PV.6092, 18 March 2009, p. 25.

³⁶ The package covers the costs of various elements (oil, air transportation, water, etc.) and, since March 2012, helicopters, arms and vehicles.

³⁷ The AU requested the deployment of a UN mission from the very creation of AMISOM. In January 2007 (Ugandan troops were deployed in March only), the Peace and Security Council requests the UNSC to consider

If UNSC members underlined that the mechanism in Somalia had been established on “an exceptional basis and owing to the unique character of the mission”,³⁸ latest events have confirmed that decisions are actually taken on a case-by-case basis, depending on punctual political and financial interests. In the early 1980s, France, which was recently the most vocal opponent to the establishment of a ‘support package’ in Somalia, endeavoured in vain to obtain UN support to the OAU operation in Chad.³⁹ Even more interestingly, Paris recently asked for the reproduction of this model in Mali, where it has been opposed by the US.

In the end, this section tells us two things. First, it illustrates – once more – the fact that funding arrangements and inter-institutional cooperation mechanisms result from political negotiations rather than doctrinal or ideological concerns. Secondly, it makes clear that African states are gradually increasing their leverage in their relations with donors. Of course, Western states still keep the upper hand on decisions regarding the mobilization of UN resources since the mechanism described above is no way automatic. But with the multiplication of precedents, donors are put in an increasingly difficult situation to refuse its reproduction.

UN Takeover: Rewarding Troop Contributing Countries and Sharing the Burden

The previous section has showed that funding arrangements may take a particular form in the context of a transition from an African-led to a UN-led operation. The latter manifestly stands high in the scale of legitimacy, for it gives the political responsibility of the operation to the universal international organisation mandated to ensure peace and security worldwide. But is a UN-operation then still an African operation? In principle, the answer is negative. A

the sending of a UN force after the expiration of the six months mandate granted to AMISOM. AU, *Peace and Security Council Communique*, PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), 19 January 2007, op. 14.

³⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 2036, New York, 22 February 2012, S/RES/2036, op. 6.

³⁹ R. Esmenjaud, *L’africanisation et l’appropriation africaine des opérations de paix*, op. cit.

takeover by the UN formally means a shift in the political chain of command to the benefit of the UN Secretariat and the UNSC.

In practice, it depends on how influential African actors remain within the UN Secretariat. No one would seriously suggest that a UN peace mission in Africa can result from an exclusively African initiative to the sole benefit of particular African states, considering the weak positions African members hold in the UNSC.⁴⁰ Yet, a UN takeover does not induce a complete loss of control from these contributing states' military chiefs of staff. They usually keep a firm grip on operational and tactical choices of their national contingent. Notably, the UN Secretariat's political ability to command depends not only on the UNSC members' political support, but also largely on who holds the leading UN positions in the field (Special Representative of the Secretary-General, SRSG; Force Commander; and their deputies). The Secretariat is thus inclined to appoint a SRSG and/or a Force Commander who belong to the main troop contributing countries of the operation.

What is important here is not to assess the degree of 'Africanity' or African ownership of UN operations on the continent, but rather to better understand the politics behind the transformation of African operations with African contingents into UN missions, which gives the African troops already deployed in the field a new institutional envelope. Indeed, through this takeover solution, partners provide African troop contributing countries with new opportunities. Intervening states are offered new logistical conditions for their soldiers, an actual financial rent through the distribution of UN-funded troops' allowances, constancy and predictability in the funding of the operation, training and material support for the national armies concerned, and a new legitimacy (a UN mandate and a larger international diplomatic

⁴⁰ These weak positions are due to their in-existent weight in the UNDPKO budget, the predominance of the P-5 (or even the Western P-3) in the drafting of the UNSC resolutions (which yet concern Africa in some 65 to 70 percent of the cases), and to the lack of military liaison officers, civil staff, and institutional memory in many African permanent missions to the UN.

support). In this sense, the re-hatting with blue helmets gives external partners an original instrument to ensure high-quality financial support for African troop contributing countries.

When is the UN to take over an African operation? In 2004, the ‘Burundi model’ formalised a quite efficient division of labour between the stakeholders, according to which the UN was to take over after the situation has been stabilized by a regional organization. Many other UN operations in Africa since the end of the 1990s have followed this scheme. This includes MINUAR (French acronym for the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda) in 1993, MINURCA (French acronym for the *Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine*) in 1998, UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone) in 1999, UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) in 2007, UNAMID (Darfur) in 2007 and, most recently, MINUSMA (French acronym for the *Mission Intégrée des Nations Unies pour le Stabilisation du Mali*) As suggested above, the takeover often leans on a special relationship between African contributing countries and influential members of the UNSC. Regarding Darfur, one can mention the strong involvement of Washington and London in 2006 in order to obtain the transformation of the AU mission into a UN operation, and the diplomatic support they have granted to Kigali as a major troop contributor to these two missions. The position of lead country, acknowledged and sanctioned by UN diplomats and bureaucrats, offers a good empirical entrance for those who try to grasp the relationship between partners and African contributing countries from a sociological perspective. It shows that success in peace operations also lies in a large number of tasks, routine practices and informal norms that need to be assumed by a member state in a rather consensual way.⁴¹

In the eyes of external partners, proposing a UN takeover is often considered as a way to propose a new funding model for the operation. Not only does it satisfy African actors’

⁴¹ D. Ambrosetti, ‘The Diplomatic Lead in the United Nations Security Council and Local Actors’ Violence: The Changing Terms of a Social Position’, *African Security* 5, 2012, pp. 63-87.

request for regular and predictable funding, but it can also alleviate their own financial responsibility. Among donors, the case of the US may be considered apart, given the extent of its assessed contributions to the UN budget for peace operations (27 percent). But when a ‘middle power’ like France or the UK obtains the takeover of an African mission, which they were funding bilaterally or through regional mechanisms like the APF, they can significantly reduce their share of the burden. For instance, France’s assessed contribution reaches 19.5 percent of the APF, compared to 7.56 percent in the UN peacekeeping budget. Even if UN peace operations are known to be more expensive than African-led missions, the transformation into a UN mission then still means money savings for Paris or London at the expense of the other major contributors to UN operations (particularly the UNSC permanent members, Japan, the Western European countries – notably Germany, Italy and Spain –, Canada and South Korea). In these circumstances, one understands better why France pushed for a UN takeover in Mali as it did in 1998 in CAR.

When the takeover of an African operation by the UN is under discussion, such financial concerns are of course balanced with other considerations, including doctrinal ones. In particular, out of fear of putting the credibility of the UN at risk,⁴² it remains difficult for states, especially UNSC members, to send blue helmets to theatres where they do not have high chances of success. The so-called ‘Brahimi report’ made clear that UN operations should be sent when certain conditions are met, including the existence of a ceasefire (i.e. a peace to keep), and of a political process which the soldiers shall support. But in times of budget restrictions, it is more likely than ever that financial considerations trump such doctrinal concerns. In this way, France is suspected to have described the security situation in Mali in a

⁴² M. Barnett, ‘The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda’, *Cultural Anthropology* 12, 1997, pp. 551-578.

rather ‘rosy’ way so as to facilitate the creation of a UN operation and thereby a partial withdrawal of its troops.

Conclusion

African governments have rarely displayed any promptness to invest financial resources into integrated political-military arrangements that would allow Africa to reach the ‘security kingdom’⁴³ its member states pretend to be aiming at. Financial ownership – or lack thereof – has certainly much to do with material means available. However, African authorities taking the initiative to call for military operations and raise external funds have not been, as far as we could assess, much more frequent than African pledges for direct financial contribution to such operations. What is also lacking, many would argue, is political will. This question is probably where donors nurture their main disappointments vis-à-vis the African political class and constitutes the crux of the problem. This is the question we have intended to address through an examination of the existing financial arrangements that exonerate African actors from funding their own mechanisms for peace and security governance.

Demonstrations of political will have existed and still exist, though. Several African operations have been initiated by actors of the continent. In the early ages of the OAU, assertiveness by African actors largely stemmed from a wish to demonstrate pan-Africanist ambitions and gain anti-imperialistic credits, with little operational follow-up. Political will was also displayed by particular sub-regional powers concerned by a foreign military presence in their vicinity (Nigeria with French presence in Chad), or by insurrectional movements affecting the stability of their spheres of influence (Nigeria with Liberia and Sierra Leone). South Africa’s and Uganda’s leadership roles in Burundi and Somalia respectively offer more recent examples of African assertiveness.

⁴³ A. Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War*, London: Hurst and Co., 2010.

Lack of political will, however, transpires in the weaknesses of the institutional arrangements that African states have created, or rather not created, to offer planning and visibility in the logistical and funding dimensions of their operations. When they have not themselves initiated the creation of the mission, external actors have been requested to bring their financial and material support so as to fill the gaps left by African actors. The UN aid, in particular, is called for by the leaders of the continent, for to their eyes it does not present the same level of sensitivity as the direct financial involvements of foreign states into their business. In this context, many African rulers demand closer connexion between the UN and the African regional organisations in matters of logistical and financial support.

Understanding the existing financial arrangements underlying African peace operations – as this chapter has argued – can only be done by looking at the political relationship between external donors and troop-contributing countries, and more precisely by examining the patterns of extraversion shaping the policies of African states. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the participation of African actors in peace operations, as it is developing today, can hardly be seen as favouring African ownership, since it is most often based on some sort of geopolitical rent, or even purely financial motivations. Some may argue that such an extraversion strategy might play a constructive role on the long term, by facilitating the emergence of strong African states disposing of efficient military capabilities. One shall wonder, however, whose security such states are likely to promote.