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## Introduction

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## INTRODUCTION

Is phenomenology of any use for architects? Does it provide either a standpoint or a tool to address what is at stake in the work of architects? This collection of essays constitutes an attempt to give a positive answer to these two questions.

There is at least one potentially decisive objection that can be raised against a phenomenological approach to architecture: the fact that the essence of architecture is itself already phenomenological, and thus a phenomenological treatment for the subject is in fact superfluous. Is there any discipline more fundamentally phenomenological in its approach than architecture? Thus, the objection states, the manner in which architects apprehend reality does not require the method and aims of phenomenology as it is already intrinsically phenomenological. In *Eye and Mind*, Merleau-Ponty concluded his analysis of vision by saying that painters have an intuitive knowledge of what the phenomenologist is aiming to understand by the use of concepts: “Painters always knew this.”<sup>1</sup> Why should this “silent science”<sup>2</sup> of vision, immanent to the act of painting, not be said to belong—in a different but no less radical fashion—to architects?

Le Corbusier once suggested that: “the basic materials of city planning are sun, sky, trees, steel and cement, in that strict order of importance.”<sup>3</sup> This comment is particularly pertinent in the current context. This list of elements in fact spells out a program that pertains to all architecture as such; it is Le Corbusier’s attempt at enunciating a hierarchy of materials that expresses the very essence of architecture. Only by firmly taking a stand on the ground of the most elementary of things will the architect be in

a position to elaborate and realize their own artifacts. Hence the presence of “cement” in the hierarchy of elements can be seen as both literal, in terms of cement as a material, and also symbolic of architectural work in general. What Le Corbusier teaches us, and which forms the “silent science” of the architect, is that cement cannot be consolidated in form as a building unless it rests on the solid soil of what Husserl calls the “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*). What is here referred to as sun, sky—or space—and tree is, in Husserlian terms: “the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable—our everyday life-world.”<sup>4</sup> This means that the architect necessarily deals with the reality of our living experience, because what they create emerges *from the things themselves*.

Why should the *things* that architects encounter in the course of their work be considered any different from those which one experiences through the phenomenological gaze? It is well known that the mode of thinking inaugurated by Husserl in the last years of the nineteenth century, which he termed “phenomenology,” presents itself from the outset as a move “back to the things themselves” (*zu den Sachen selbst*).<sup>5</sup> In its original context, this motto was above all else designed to oppose the dominant paradigms of positivism and naturalist psychology, whose naive conceptions of the nature of “fact” and “experience” were directly conducive to the articulation of any number of “absurd theories.”<sup>6</sup> In its later manifestations, phenomenology traveled even further along the path of the investigation concerning the nature of the *thing*. There were very good reasons for this development. Indeed, the move *back* that Husserl intended to promote was in no sense a mere consideration of the perceived thing—if by this one understands that *this* thing, be it stone, book, table or tree, constitutes in itself an absolute and unquestionable *fact*. On the contrary, Husserl’s revolutionary idea was to conceive of the

thing as being itself “constituted” by the human mind, and therefore as requiring a specific procedure—which he called “reduction”—in order to be grasped in all its reality. Husserlian phenomenology suggests that the ultimate ground on which reality is to be encountered can be reached only by means of a thorough investigation bearing on the acts of consciousness. Once all prior theories, conceptions or bias of any kind have been “reduced,” the *thing* discloses itself on the field of consciousness as a pure mental content (*Erlebnis*). The task of phenomenology thus consists in identifying the diverse guises of “intentionality” giving rise to the appearance of the thing as *phenomenon*. It is on the basis of this phenomenological life of ours that the “life-world” can be apprehended anew. Modern science and its mathematization of nature only succeeds in elaborating the “garb of ideas”<sup>7</sup> that covers the reality beneath.

### **Phenomenological approach of architecture**

From this standpoint, it can be assumed that architecture, as it essentially deals with things *as phenomena*, always stands on the ground of the life-world, and thus already *knows* what the phenomenologist is seeking to explore.

However strong this architectural objection to phenomenology may appear, it is nonetheless also possible to counter with the suggestion that in fact in its recent history architecture seems to have deserted its own phenomenological ground. This orientation—which characterizes modernity<sup>8</sup>—gave way to constructions whose reference was at best purely theoretical, without any particular respect for the phenomenal content. At its worst modern architectural design may be seen as short-sighted in its attempt to satisfy purely practical purposes. If one considers the bulk of contemporary cities worldwide, the buildings in which most people are forced to live, dwell and work provide concrete

evidence in favor of the claim that the phenomenological core of architecture has too often been forgotten or even lost entirely.

Is it always *so* obvious to architects that “to it, the world of actually experiencing intuition, belongs the form of space-time together with all the bodily [*körperlich*] shapes incorporated in it; it is in this world that we ourselves live, in accord with our bodily [*leiblich*], personal way of being”?<sup>9</sup> Husserl’s remark, which he considered as important but nonetheless “trivial,” may not be as self-evident as it appears at first sight for contemporary architects. If it can be established that the formula of human presence to things and world is always at risk of fading into oblivion or neglect, such phenomenological work might well not be considered so superfluous to architects.

A glimpse at the work of Heidegger will help us take a step further towards the elucidation of this suspicion harbored by architects towards phenomenological analysis. The issue of the thing remained the constant theme of phenomenological thought. Heidegger never renounced this Husserlian injunction; rather he extended it and extrapolated to its ultimate philosophical conclusions. It is possible to say that, with Heidegger, what had until then been an *issue* acquired the status of a true *question*. Relying on the double meaning of the German word “*Sache*,” Heidegger claims that the *thing* is itself the *task*. In the first pages of *Being and Time*, the necessity of going “back to the things themselves” is straightforwardly considered as providing a proper preliminary definition of phenomenology.<sup>10</sup> However, unlike other sciences or disciplines, phenomenology is characterized by the fact that it is *not* in possession of the “thing content” (*Sachhaltigkeit*) of its object: “‘Phenomenology’ does not name the object of its research, nor characterizes the title of its content as things.”<sup>11</sup> The content of the thing as such is the very object of phenomenology, which therefore turns its investigation in the direction of the “how” (*das Wie*) of the thing, the way it is given

to us as thing, and consequently its reality inasmuch as it is present to us. There is thus nothing surprising about the fact that, in his later works, deliberately switching from the plural to the singular form—from *Sachen* to *Sache*—, Heidegger emphasized the concept of thing in such a way that it became a synonym for the task and end of thinking itself.<sup>12</sup> Once it has been integrated into the question of Being (*Seinsfrage*), the thinking of things (*Sachen*) finally resolves into the thing—or task (*Sache*)—of thinking.

If architecture itself can lose its footing on the ground of the things themselves, it has to be assumed that the phenomenological reality of things is not to be taken for granted in the work of architects. This phenomenological reality is thus best considered a goal to be achieved for the architect rather than an already secured base. To put it differently, one may say that the ground of architectural practice is in fact the goal itself: architecture must pursue the task of securing its own possibility by longing for the thing. It is in this sense that phenomenology makes a valuable contribution to the work of architects, providing them with a means to recover the things themselves, on the ground of which rests the possibility of the discipline of “architecture.” Phenomenology does not merely offer another “theory,” nor a “philosophy” of architecture, but rather deals directly with the genuine and essential meaning of architecture. Far from imposing its own thesis, phenomenology brings out the primordial “thetic” act that is at the bottom of all architectural practice. Indeed, the “thing” is less a graspable entity than a *question*, which always needs to be heard and answered anew, because it expresses the most original bond that links human beings to the world. Properly understood, the *question of the thing* is none other than the *question of the world*. Architecture takes its stand from the things themselves, that is, it springs from the encounter between the human and things, which itself assumes the form of

an injunction: man has to dwell. The question of the world, first articulated by phenomenology, albeit in a veiled manner, constitutes both the ground and the horizon of all architectural practice. More than any other human activity, architecture receives as its task to “make world”—the Heideggerian “*welt-bilden*”—by inserting human presence into the whole of phenomena.

Accordingly, apprehending the “things themselves” does not primarily mean to focus on the sensible data of things. Such a return, in itself, does not even require phenomenology.<sup>13</sup> Rather, it must be made clear that the sensible qualities of materials—environment, shapes, spaces and volumes—which are of such great importance to architects, are only single and particular aspects of the broader *question of the world*. This is the reason why the philosopher Merleau-Ponty has always been popular with architects, inspired by his analysis of perception. Despite its irreducible singularity, the work of Merleau-Ponty is in perfect continuity with Husserl’s ambition. For the French philosopher, the ideal of access “to the things themselves” emerges as the very definition of philosophy itself: “It is at the same time true that the world is *what we see* and that, nonetheless, we must learn to see it.... It is the things themselves, from the depths of their silence, that it (i.e., philosophy) wishes to bring to expression.”<sup>14</sup> The paradoxical task of philosophy is thus to conquer the soil of perceptual evidence, which always presents itself to our eyes as a plain and evident fact. “We see the things themselves, the world is what we see,”<sup>15</sup> and yet, there is something that we constantly and tacitly put aside while experiencing the world as evident through perception: the world as such, that is, “the problem of our access to the world”<sup>16</sup> and the “perceptual faith” by which it is given to us. Though accessible to us via the tactile and visual senses, the thing itself remains nevertheless veiled because our perceptual life does not manifest itself as such in all that it reveals;

thus we are led to an interpretation of things via reflection. Every reader of the *Phenomenology of Perception* knows this critique of the “philosophy of reflection” (*philosophie réflexive*), and of the naive attitude upon which it rests, and which it intellectualizes. But such a critical move attains its full dimension and its true meaning only when integrated into a broader attempt designed to overcome the terms of classical ontology. In the writings of his last period, the issue of perception is replaced by a more fundamental concern: taking up the full range of the Heideggerian questions, Merleau-Ponty now directly addresses the issue of being and aims at providing a new intelligibility to the “there is” (*il y a*) conceived as primary openness to the world. It is only within this new framework that the question of the “thing itself” can be raised, and the radical consequences of this philosophical emphasis on the body explicated. If based on Merleau-Pontian premises, a phenomenological approach will permit a broad-ranging reconsideration of the perceptual content of architecture.

This brief outline of the three major figures of phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty), and of their attitude toward (the) *thing(s)*, provides a roadmap to the philosophical perspectives predominant in this book. However, the phenomenological tradition was not the only factor that influenced the original conception of this collection of essays. Indeed, one may better refer to “context,” in the most meaningful sense of the term, as opposed to “influence” or “philosophical choice.” This “context” refers to the fact that this book was edited and published in Kyoto; and in a more profound way, Japan constituted the cultural landscape in which problems with the work at every stage were addressed.



Fujimori Terunobu, Teahouse Tetsu 徹, Yamanashi prefecture, 2005.  
Photograph by Masuda Akihisa

## **Architecture in relation with cultural, social, and physical milieus**

In recent history, one of the main factors linking phenomenology to Japan is the influence of the Kyoto school of philosophy, led by Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), and followed by a generation of philosophers. Unlike Nishida himself, this next generation traveled to Europe, meeting key figures on the European scene, such as Husserl and Heidegger, Bergson, and Sartre. One of Nishida's aims was to create a “world philosophy”: a genuine philosophy that could be considered a bridge between Western philosophy and Asian thought that goes beyond mere assimilation of western concepts. Instead Nishida sought to create a dialogue between western philosophy and the insights of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.<sup>17</sup> By doing so, Kyoto philosophers have reexamined Hegel's standpoint on the course of History as moving from East to West, the idea of the *Orient* as founded on an “immediate consciousness”<sup>18</sup> of the world, and a non distanciation between the subject and the object. As Deleuze and Guatari stated: “The Orient is unaware of the concept because it is content to put the most abstract void and the most trivial being in a relationship of coexistence without any mediation.”<sup>19</sup> This relative absence of concept, an anti-metaphysical and anti-positivist attitude, and the return to the primordial experience of reality, is a perspective that has much in common with the fundamentals of phenomenology itself.<sup>20</sup>

Our purpose here is not to demonstrate the links that could be drawn between Eastern and Western thought; ideas travel almost as fast as beings, as illustrated by the first stirrings of global philosophy in the encounter between the Chinese and the Jesuits missions in the sixteenth century—when Master Kong, Kongfuzi, became universally known through his Latinized name Confucius (551–479 BC).<sup>21</sup> Rather, we aim to highlight some

examples of phenomenological reflection on architecture grounded in a specific context, what we may call Japanese spatiality.

The roots of architecture are naturally deeply related to the cultural, social and physical milieus in which the architectural work is grounded, and we cannot ignore these influences on the conception of architecture. Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) is perhaps the Kyoto philosopher who considered most deeply the question of space and the influence of “milieu” (*fūdo* 風土) on the production of space. Much like his Kyoto school colleagues, Watsuji both studied and practiced Zen meditation, and a year before attending Heidegger’s lectures in Freiburg published the first philosophical study of Japanese Zen Master Dōgen (1200–1253).<sup>22</sup> Watsuji’s interests, as with most Japanese intelligentsia of the time, was divided between both Japanese and European culture. He relates that it was while living in Germany in 1927 that he first thought about the essence of milieu in relation to human existence. He was then reading Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, and felt that the question of time should also have been related to the issue of space, “for time not linked with space is not time in the true sense.”<sup>23</sup> In his book *Fūdo*, he focuses on the influence of the natural and social milieus on the structure of beings in space and time. For example, in the first chapter, on the “phenomena of climate,” he analyzes the “phenomenon of cold”; one is tempted to suggest these insights were perhaps prompted by the experience of winter in an old Japanese house, where the winter chill enters from each articulation of the building.

A winter spent in a “cold” traditional Kyoto house perhaps has little in common with the experience related by Gaston Bachelard’s *The Poetics of Space*. In this book, Bachelard comments on Baudelaire’s description of Thomas de Quincey’s *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* (1821), where the French

poet presents the following scenario: “our hero” is retired “far, very far away from Oxford, . . . buried in the depths of the mountains. . . . He has been studying German metaphysics; he reads Kant, Fichte, Schelling.”<sup>24</sup> Quincey’s delight is a “true contentment of the scholar and solitary man who cherishes his *comfort*: a charming cottage, a handsome library, . . . with winter raging without.”<sup>25</sup> Baudelaire asks: “Does not an attractive home render winter more poetic, and does not winter augment the poetry of the home?”<sup>26</sup> Bachelard adds: “we feel warm *because* it is cold out-of-doors.”<sup>27</sup> The colder outside, the warmer inside: this “contradiction” enhances the impression of comfort (Baudelaire uses the English word) in the house. Lost in a Welsh valley surrounded by mountains—or anywhere else outside the mundane world—this literary depiction of a dreamed landscape speaks to us. Bachelard explains that we can re-fashion our image of this description in our imagination, and thus personalize it and make it our own, stating that: “well-determined centers of reverie are means of communication between men who dream as surely as well-defined concepts are means of communication between men who think.”<sup>28</sup> It is the task of the writer, the poet, the artist, the architect, to create this place of reverie where one can universally enter into contact with the essence of his intention.

The issue is not to contrast one form of dwelling with another; we agree that everyone, everywhere, dwells poetically and forges symbolic relationships between their interior world (their mind) and the exterior world in which we live. Let us return to our previous example of the Japanese house, in particular the famous style of the Kyoto urban house (*machiya* 町屋). This dwelling, while giving the impression of separation from the street, hidden behind a wooden louver, is actually directly connected to the exterior and the natural environment. The feeling of cold felt in the house in winter connects us immediately to the natural coldness of the exterior. According to Watsuji, this subjective

experience (the feeling of cold) establishes a relationship with a transcendental object (“coldness” or “cold”). He states that:

When we feel the cold, it is not the “feeling of cold” that we feel, but the “coldness of the air” or the “cold.” In other words, the cold felt in intentional experience is not subjective but objective.... When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness of the outside air. That we come into relation with the cold means that we are outside in the cold. In this sense, our state is characterized by “ex-sistere” [to have gone outside] as Heidegger emphasizes, or in our term, by “intentionality.”<sup>29</sup>

### **The poetics of Japanese space**

In a situation, where the outside cold is felt inside the house, as if we had gone outside, one could suggest that this represents a certain failure on behalf of the architect. Nevertheless, there are places and circumstances where one could, consciously or not, appreciate the surprise generated by an architectural device. In his famous essay *In Praise of Shadows*, Tanizaki Junichirō starts by explicating the difficulties faced in building a traditional Japanese house which includes all the necessities of modern life: heating, electric lighting and sanitary facilities. Whilst critical of some aspects of modernization, Tanizaki explains that it should be possible to re-create some of the synesthetic feelings inherent in traditional architecture without sacrificing certain modern necessities. For instance, he describes the pleasure felt in the Japanese traditional toilet, as it stands “apart from the main building, at the end of a corridor, in a grove fragrant with leaves and moss.” He sees it as a place of “spiritual repose,” and (quoting the words of Natsume Sōseki) a “physiological delight”:

[T]here one can listen with such a sense of intimacy to the rain-drops falling from the eaves and the trees, seeping into the earth as

they wash over the base of a stone lantern and freshen the moss about the stepping stones. And the toilet is the perfect place to listen to the chirping of insects or the song of the birds, to view the moon, or to enjoy any of those poignant moments that mark the change of the seasons. Here, I suspect, is where haiku poets over the ages have come by a great many of their ideas.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the possibility of catching a winter cold, Tanizaki suggests that: “our forebears, *making poetry of everything in their lives*, transformed what by rights should be the most unsanitary room into a place of unsurpassed elegance.”<sup>31</sup> At several points in this essay, Tanizaki emphasizes the fact that our ancestors—“our” here could be of universal value—have always tried to find poetic value in their dwelling. Creating the opportunity for the poetic interpretation of space can be considered the root of architectural creation.

In architecture, there are several types of construction that can be conceived of as a privileged place for a spiritual experience or gathering: temples, churches, museums, the main function of all of which is to create a particular experience of space. In Japan, the narrow space of the tearoom (*chashitsu* 茶室) has always been referred to as a concentration of a peculiar spatial experience. Tanizaki, in a provocative stance, deliberately avoids this example, which he considers too remote from his concern with mundane daily life: “For the solitary eccentrics it is another matter, he can ignore the blessings of scientific civilization and retreat to some forsaken corner of the countryside.”<sup>32</sup> What the English translation does not really show is that for “eccentric” Tanizaki refers to the “man of tea” (*chajin* 茶人), usually a scholar, a man of letters, who desires to retreat from the world to a type of hermitage—a “thatched hut” (*sōan* 草庵)—inside nature. Tanizaki is not attempting to advocate a return to nature or to the architecture of the past, but rather to find inside ordinary life places that can

satisfy both his cultural and aesthetic senses. He then points out that in a Nara or Kyoto temple, “the *tearoom* [*cha no ma* 茶の間] may have its charms, but the Japanese toilet is truly a place of spiritual repose.”<sup>33</sup> This association may seem surreal, but an architect can learn from this perspective that each space of the house, whatever its function may be, should add to the pleasure of dwelling. If not everyone can have a tearoom, at least more ordinary spaces should also be conceived with sensitivity.

The tearoom is a space created for the awakening of both the senses and the mind. From the early beginning of Zen Buddhism, in the twelfth century, tea drinking has been used as a medium for meditation, with the first tearooms built in Kyoto by Zen monks at the end of the fifteenth century.<sup>34</sup> Based on the model of the hermitage, the tearoom built inside a town would ideally allow “living in town as if living in the country” (*shichū sankyo* 市中山居). The hermitage is described as an impermanent construction, a shelter for one night, built by the scholar himself.<sup>35</sup> A tearoom can be built for a special occasion; it emphasizes the ideas of immediateness, “here and now,” and the intensity of an instant, an encounter that can only happen “once in one’s life.”<sup>36</sup> This place condenses both time and space around the art of tea in order to enjoy each instant as if it were the last: it shows both an ethical obligation and an esthetic appreciation of the impermanent values of space and time. The materiality of the tearoom, the natural essence of materials but also the naturalness of their use, also corresponds to this phenomenological approach to space. Everything is made of natural materials, and materials that express a natural essence. The visitor enters a narrow space (from 2 to 4.5 tatami mats: 3.3 to 7.3 m<sup>2</sup>) via a low entrance by walking on their knees (*nijiri-guchi* 躡り口) symbolic of a return to childhood, an abandonment of all their past experience in order to facilitate the new.

Kyoto Zen Buddhist temples always incorporate teahouses that seem to embody both the religious and philosophical experience of the world. Regarding the possibility of a phenomenological approach to Zen, Algis Mickunas points out that: “Phenomenology and Zen seem to agree on one common theme: unobstructed vision, a direct seeing prior to divisions into spiritual and sensory.”<sup>37</sup> Enlightenment (*satori* 悟り) is reached in Zen practice through meditation on a *kōan* (公案, literally translated as “public proposal”), a process that could plausibly be compared to a phenomenological reduction; both are attempts at discovering the “essence” of things through an immediate and intuitive, rather than intellectually constructed, method. This radical approach to the essence of things is also the starting point of architectural work.

### **Five approaches relating architecture and phenomenology**

The following texts exemplify the diversity of approaches relating architecture to phenomenology, and vice-versa. The book proceeds on the basis of five perspectives, combining both philosophical and architectural approaches : (1) *Atmospheres*; (2) *Matters*; (3) *Bodies*; (4) *Cultures*; (5) *Unfoldings*.

The first section, entitled “Atmospheres,” considers architectural spaces as given through sensation and feeling—that is to say, this section focuses on the impressions and meanings transmitted by architectural spaces to the person who is a part of that space. Architecture embodies an experience that is neither reducible to straightforward spatial perception, nor to a series of functions, but calls for the wholeness of our *being-in-the-world*. From the perspective of this fundamental idea, it is thus possible to take into account the “Matters” (or Materials) used by the architect. Such materials are not treated from a technical point of view, but rather in relation to architectural phenomena as such—

as it is perceived, felt, and experienced. This leads logically to a consideration of the “Bodies” that experience the materials. These bodies are multiple (perceiving body, feeling body, thinking body, individual or collective, etc.) and consequently need to be spoken of in the plural. Architecture, through its singular creations, reveals both the power and true dimensions latent in these bodies. Far from being detached from any kind of concrete place or history, these three aspects (Atmospheres, Matters, Bodies) are, on the contrary, always a part of specific “Cultures,” the next section of the book. What is culture, indeed, if not a proper mode of inhabiting reality, the giving of a concrete, singular form to human experience? Finally, the book leads us towards its “Unfoldings,” the opening of new perspectives for phenomenology.

Throughout these five chapters, through a large array of architectural realizations—from ancient Greek temples, Chinese and Japanese gardens, to the work of contemporary architects such as Tange Kenzō—architecture is considered from the phenomenological standpoint as a human practice providing elementary data—such as space, volume, place, time, matter and body—with a *meaning*; that is to say, the realization of this data as an *experience*. To the philosopher, the book provides a precise analysis of concrete cases, thus permitting a testing of the relevance and effectiveness of the salient concepts, both esthetical and ethical. The architect on the other hand is presented with a reflexive gaze on everyday work, as well as the tools with which to rethink the reality of architectural practice.

Benoît Jacquet and Vincent Giraud

## Notes

1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *L'œil et l'esprit* (Paris: Gallimard, 2010 [1964]), 81; English trans.: *Eye and Mind*, in Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception and other Essays*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 186.

2. Ibid.

3. “Les matériaux de l’urbanisme sont le soleil, l’espace, les arbres, l’acier et le ciment armé, dans cet ordre et dans cette hiérarchie.” Le Corbusier, *CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne)*, Athens, 1933.

4. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 48–9. Will subsequently be referred to as *Crisis*.

5. See Edmund Husserl’s introduction to *Logische Untersuchungen [Logical Investigations]*, *Husserliana*, vol. XVIII (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1975), 6: “Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen.” See also *Husserliana*, vol. XIX, 10: “Wir wollen uns schlechterdings nicht mit ‘blossen Worten’... zufriedengeben.... Wir wollen auf ‘die Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen.” And *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft [Philosophy as a Rigorous Science]*, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 21: “Weg mit den hohlen Wortanalysen. Die Sachen selbst müssen wir befragen. Zurück zur Erfahrung, zur Anschauung, die unseren Worten allein Sinn und vernünftiges Recht Geben kann. Ganz trefflich! Aber was sind denn die Sachen, und was ist das für eine Erfahrung, auf welche wir in der Psychologie zurückgehen müssen?”

6. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §24.

7. Husserl, *Crisis*, 51.

8. See Hilde Heinen, *Architecture and Modernity: A Critique* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

9. Husserl, *Crisis*, 50.

10. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit [Being and Time]*, §7, 27–28: “Der Titel ‘Phänomenologie’ drückt eine Maxime aus, die also formuliert werden kann: ‘zu den Sachen selbst!’—entgegen allen freischwebenden Konstruktionen, zufälligen Funden, entgegen der Übernahme von nur scheinbar ausgewiesenen Begriffen, entgegen den Scheinfragen, die sich oft Generationen hindurch als ‘Probleme’ breitmachen.”

11. Ibid., 34–35 Editors’ translation.

12. Martin Heidegger, “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des

Denkens,” in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1968); “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” trans. Joan Stambough in *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 61 sq.

13. See, for example, Mark Paterson, “More than visual approaches to architecture. Vision, touch, technique,” *Social & Cultural Geography* 12: 3 (2011): 263–81.

14. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 2010 [1964]), 18; *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 4.

15. *Ibid.*, 3 (*Le visible et l'invisible*, 17). It is the first sentence of the book.

16. *Ibid.*, 5 (*Le visible et l'invisible*, 20).

17. On the “orientation” of the Kyoto school see James Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2001), 3–26.

18. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* [*Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*]; French trans.: *Leçons sur la philosophie de l'histoire*, trans. J. Gibelin, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1963), 83.

19. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatari, *What is philosophy?*, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), 94. Original: *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1991), 90.

20. See the basic characteristics of phenomenological philosophies and inquiries as summarized in: Yoshiro Nitta, Hirotaka Tatematsu, and Eiichi Shimomissé, “Phenomenology and Philosophy in Japan,” in *Japanese Phenomenology. Phenomenology as the Trans-cultural Philosophical Approach*, ed. Yoshihiro Nitta and Hirotaka Tatematsu (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, Analecta Husserlania, vol. 8, 1979), 4.

21. For a history of Chinese thought, and especially Confucianism see Anne Cheng, *Histoire de la pensée chinoise* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), chapter 2 (63).

22. Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎, *Shamon Dōgen* 沙門道元 [The monk Dōgen] (1926), in *Watsuji Tetsurō shū* 和辻哲郎集 [Collection of essays by Watsuji Tetsurō] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1974), 3–69. English trans.: *Purifying Zen: Watsuji Tetsurō's Shamon Dōgen*, trans. Steve Bein (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011).

23. Watsuji Tetsurō, *Fūdo : ningengakuteki kōsatsu* 風土：人間學の考察 [Milieu: an inquiry of human sciences] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1935;

Iwanami bunko, 1979), 4. English trans.: *Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study*, trans. Geoffrey Bownas (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Printing Bureau, Japanese Government, 1961; Yushodo, 1988). French trans.: *Fûdo: le milieu humain*, trans. Augustin Berque (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2011), 36.

24. “Charles Baudelaire, “An Opium-Eater,” in *Artificial Paradises*, trans. Stacy Diamond (New York: A Citadel Press Book, 1996), 110. Original: “Loin, bien loin d’Oxford, . . . , enfermé dans une retraite au fond des montagnes. . . . Il étudie la métaphysique allemande; il lit Kant, Fichte, Schelling.” Baudelaire, “Un mangeur d’opium,” *Les Paradis artificiels*, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Claude Pichois (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1975), 471–2.

25. *Ibid.*, 113. Original: “... vrai bonheur de savant et de solitaire amoureux du *comfort*: un charmant cottage, une belle bibliothèque, . . . , et l’hiver faisant rage dans la montagne.” Italics are from Baudelaire, *ibid.*, 474–5.

26. *Ibid.* Original: “Une jolie habitation ne rend-elle pas l’hiver plus poétique, et l’hiver n’augmente-t-il pas la poésie de l’habitation?” *Ibid.*, 475.

27. Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994 [Orion Press, 1964]), 39. Italics are from Bachelard. Original: “Et nous avons bien chaud *parce qu’il fait froid dehors*.” *La poétique de l’espace* (Paris: PUF, 1958), 52.

28. *Ibid.*, 39–40. Original: “... les centres de rêverie bien déterminés sont des moyens de communication entre les hommes du songe avec la même sûreté que les concepts bien définis sont des moyens de communication entre les hommes de pensée.” *Ibid.*

29. Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, 2–3 (*Fûdo*, 11–12). See also Augustin Berque’s interpretation of this phenomenology of cold in “Milieu et architecture,” foreword of Yann Nussaume, *Tadao Andô et la question du milieu: Réflexions sur l’architecture et le paysage* (Paris: Le Moniteur, 1999), 16–19.

30. Tanizaki Junichirō 谷崎潤一郎 published the essay *In Praise of shadows* in the journal *Keizai ōrai* in December 1933 and January 1934. See English trans.: *In Praise of Shadows*, trans. Thomas J. Harper and Edward G. Seidensticker (London: Vintage, 2001), 9–10. Original: “In’ei raisan,” 陰翳禮讚 [In praise of shadows] *Keizai ōrai* 経済往来 (December 1933): 119.

31. Ibid., 10. Editors' italics. "In'ei raisan": 116.

32. Ibid.

33. Instead of "tearoom" the English translation uses "parlor," see *ibid.*, 9. Editors' italics. "In'ei raisan": 118.

34. See Fujimori Terunobu 藤森照信, "The Development of the Tearoom and its Meaning in Architecture," in *The Contemporary Tea House: Japan's Top Architects Redefine a Tradition*, ed. Isozaki Arata 磯崎新, Andō Tadao 安藤忠雄 and Fujimori Terunobu (Tokyo, Kodansha International, 2007), 7–25.

35. In his *Notes*, Kamo no Chōmei 鴨長明 describes his hermitage as a nomad's "one night shelter" (*hitoyo no yado* 一夜の宿) in *Hōjō-ki* (1212) 方丈記 [Notes from the monk's hermitage], ed. Ichiko Teiji 市古貞次 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, Iwanami bunko, 1989), 28, 98–99, see also the similar idea in Yoshishige no Yasutane 慶滋保胤, *Chitei-ki* (982) 池亭記 [Notes from the pond's pavilion], in *ibid.*, 47.

36. This expression, literally "one moment one encounter" (*ichigo ichie* 一期一会) derives from the *Notes* of the tea master Yamanoue Sōji 山上宗二, "meeting one time in one's life" (*ichigo ni ichido no sankai* 一期に一度の参会), in *Yamanoue Sōji-ki* 山上宗二記 (1588) [Notes of Yamanoue Sōji], ed. Kumakura Isao 熊倉功夫 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, Iwanami bunko, 2006), 95, 294.

37. Algis Mickunas, "Phenomenology of Zen," in *Japanese and Western Phenomenology*, ed. Philip Blosser, Eichi Shimomissé, Lester Embree and Hiroshi Kojima (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Contributions to Phenomenology, vol. 12, 1993), 264.