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Chapter 3. High school students' reactions to the 2015 Paris attacks

Jean-François Mignot

In some French schools, students challenged the minute's silence in tribute to the victims of the attack on Charlie Hebdo, thus revealing divisions whose extent and motivations remain poorly studied. With the necessary caution, our survey shows that high school students who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the 2015 Paris attacks and/or who did not feel concerned by the minute's silence are not distinctive in terms of their family or socio-economic situation, nor in terms of their feelings of being discriminated against on ethno-religious grounds. On the other hand, they are more often tolerant of deviance and violence in social life, are more frequently of foreign origin and are more numerous among young people of the Muslim faith. From what these students have to say, it appears that many of them are challenging the freedom to show disrespect for Islam and some of its dogmas. A lesser feeling of belonging to the national community also reduces their empathy towards the victims.

The Islamist attacks in the Paris region in January 2015, and then again in November, stunned many French people. Not only were these attacks the deadliest in France for more than half a century: they were also committed by French people, born in France and educated in public schools, in the name of an undemocratic, anti-liberal and anti-western politico-religious project. According to a minimal estimate by the French Ministry of Education, several hundred students challenged the minute's silence organized in schools in tribute to the victims of the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*, revealing acute ideological divisions, but whose motives remain poorly studied. What is the "size of the 'halo' that can surround the most determined jihadists" (Galland 2015)? Who are the high school students who have dissociated themselves from these ceremonies and why did they react in this way?

Despite the richness of the academic literature on the reactions of the French to the 2015 Paris attacks, it does not provide answers to such questions. On the one hand, the studies that were carried out did not ask the French to what extent they condemned the terrorists, perhaps because it was self-evidently believed that the total condemnation of terrorists would be unanimous. On the other hand, no survey has collected the opinions of those young people most likely to have dissociated themselves from the minutes of silence. While we might know with considerable precision the reactions of French people to the 2015 attacks, "the taking into account of society as a whole, and especially of those of its segments [...] reluctant to embrace any sense of 'national unity', remains for the moment out of reach" (Audoin-Rouzeau 2017, p. 12).

In this context, our survey provides a better understanding of young people's attitudes and reactions to the 2015 attacks. How many students say they do *not* fully condemn the attacks and did *not* feel concerned by the minutes of silence? What are their opinions and also their emotions about the 2015 attacks, and what do they have to say about them?

1. The French in the face of the 2015 attacks: a literature review

The attacks of 7-9 January 2015

On 7 January 2015, two brothers aged 32 and 34 claiming to be members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula murdered a policeman and eleven people during the editorial board meeting of the newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, which had been threatened for several years for publishing satirical cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. The first massacre of an entire editorial staff in France and perhaps in the world (Ory, 2015), this attack stupefied most French people, even though it occurred in a context where the terrorist threat in France was already assessed as "high" by 80% of the population, the highest rate since 2001 (Fourquet and Mergier 2016, p. 19). Beginning from 7 January, dozens of rallies were held to honour the victims and support freedom of expression. That same day, on the Twitter social network the hashtag #jesuischarlie was used 3.5 million times; the hashtag #jesuiskouachi (named after the terrorists) was used nearly 50,000 times, but apart from a few dozens or hundreds of messages that approved of the attacks, it seems that most users of this hashtag were indignant about the support for terrorism (Badouard 2016). On the following day and two days later, on 8 and 9 January, a 32-year-old man related to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria murdered a policewoman and four customers at a kosher supermarket in Paris. These attacks of January 2015, the deadliest in France since the Algerian war, also left many people injured and traumatized (Goodwin et al. 2016, Vandentorren et al. 2017). Targeting policemen, Jews (Ernst-Vintila and Macovei 2015) and journalists whom the terrorists see as "blasphemers", these attacks were aiming through them at symbols and values, foremost among which is the freedom of expression (Pelletier and Drozda-Senkowska 2016). In this context, on 11 January 2015 forty-four foreign heads of state accompanied the French President, François Hollande, for a so-called republican march in Paris. Above all, the 10 and 11 January were the biggest gatherings in France since the Liberation from Nazi rule: "Four million people in the streets is not a lot [6%] compared to the sixty-seven million French, but it's huge compared to all other national gatherings. Never seen before" (Nora 2015, p. 5). "For the French who took to the streets chanting "Je suis Charlie" on 7 and 11 January 2015, it was a matter of saying in the first person about their willingness to defend freedom of speech and tone, and their rejection of violence as a means of settling conflicts of values" (Badouard 2016, p. 217).

Box 1. Who participated in the "Republican marches" on 10 and 11 January 2015?

The mobilisation rate in France (number of demonstrators per 100 inhabitants) ranged from 2% or 3% in Hénin-Beaumont, Lens and Le Havre to 71% in Grenoble and Rodez (Fourquet and Mergier 2015, p. 11-17). An in-depth study shows that the more the inhabitants of a city espoused xenophobic attitudes before the attacks – these attitudes were measured in thirty-five cities from 2007 to 2014 by a method designed to detect *implicit* negative attitudes to Arab names (implicit association test) – the fewer they were to demonstrate on 10 and 11 January (Zerhouni et al. 2016). A substantial proportion of the National Front voters considered that these marches with consensual slogans masked the main issue, namely the Islamist threat (Fourquet and Mergier 2015).

According to a survey conducted in March 2015, those people (declaring to have been) present at the events of 11 January were younger and more urban, educated, left-wing and tolerant towards immigrants than the average population in France (Mayer and Tiberj 2016, see also Rouban 2015). Contrary to what was claimed in a book with strong media coverage (Todd 2015), far from being elderly and xenophobic Catholics, the participants in the 10 and 11 January marches were more tolerant than non-participants (Nugier and Guimond 2016, Ifop 2016a, 2016b). These protesters have in fact the usual socio-demographic profile of

people mobilized on post-materialist issues such as freedom of expression. In contrast, the individuals who participated the least in the 11 January gatherings were women, suburban residents of large cities, Muslims and practicing Catholics (Mayer and Tiberj 2016). This may give some credence to the claims that although "the Muslim authorities and some brave imams denounced the attacks against the Charlie Hebdo team, against the police and against the Hypercacher", "there was a marked absence of Muslims in the demonstrations of 11 January" (Nora 2015, p. 8). In our survey, 22% of high school students and 28% of young people in the control sample report having participated in the "I am Charlie" marches. The participation rates of high school students vary little according to their socio-demographic or school characteristics or according to their political or religious attitudes.

The minute's silence held on 8 January in tribute to the victims of the Charlie Hebdo attack was the cause of incidents (provocations, insults and threats) in a number of schools. A July 2015 report to the Senate Speaker states: "Compared to the tens of thousands of schools and classes where the minute of silence [of 8 January 2015] was conducted with dignity and without any disturbances, the number of such incidents has been limited, even though the Ministry of National Education is unable to quantify them accurately: several hundred almost certainly, and perhaps more than a thousand, which is both rather few and far too many. [...] And while most of the incidents recorded during the minute's silence had nothing to do with the jihadist threat, they nevertheless showed that in 2015 [...] a not insignificant proportion of students in French schools do not adhere fully - and sometimes not at all - to certain values that underlie our Republic "(Grosperin and Laborde 2015, pp. 7-8).

In some of the high schools where we conducted our research, the hostility of some students to the minute's silence in tribute to the assassinated cartoonists was such that it was not possible to organize it collectively, bringing together all the students in the school playground. According to the interviews we conducted from April to June 2016 with some heads of these high schools, some teachers preferred not to organize the minute's silence in their class, and among those who chose to organize it some had to face hostile reactions: some students refused to participate, others said "they had asked for it", "it is not right to insult the Prophet", "hands-off religion", etc. Other students asked: "if we hold a minute's silence for victims of attacks in France, why not for victims of attacks in other countries as well?"

The attacks of 13 November 2015

On 13 November 2015, nine jihadists between the ages of 20 and 31 and claiming to be members of the Islamic State killed 130 people and injured more than 400 in the 10th and 11th arrondissements of Paris, most of whom were at a concert in the Bataclan concert hall, or on the terraces of cafes and restaurants nearby. These attacks, the most deadly in France since the Second World War, were aimed at random civilian targets and were therefore perceived less as an attack on values (Pelletier and Drozda-Senkowska 2016) than as a threat against France, the security and the way of life of the French (Fourquet and Mergier 2016, pp. 148-150), and especially against the confident sociability of "democratic public spaces" (Gayet-Viaud 2015). The attacks of November 2015 have had the greatest impact on the French since the year 2000 (80%), more than the attacks of January 2015 (59%) and those of 11 September 2001 (53%) (Brice et al. 2016). While the declaration of the state of emergency on 14 November 2015 banned most gatherings, "the rallies organized after 13 November in various communes of the suburbs counted many more participants than those in January" (Ifop 2016c, p. 10). This observation tends to give credence to the idea that the reprobation of blasphemy - or at least of the satirical cartoons against Muhammad - were a reason not to participate in the January gatherings. Moreover, if in January the minute's silence decreed on the 7th and scheduled for the 8th at noon "had been insufficiently prepared by the authorities", "in November, based on

this past experience, better preparations for the minute's silence were carried out upstream, as illustrated by the sending of a letter to all teachers by the Minister of National Education, the setting aside of time to talk to pupils before getting them together for the assembly, and the provision of on-line media on the ministry's website designed to help and support teachers in this process" (Boussaguet 2016, pp. 5-6). In high schools where January's minute of silence had been held in a non-consensual or hostile climate, the November minute's silence was generally not a problem: it could be organized collectively in the courtyard and took place in silence - a silence which, according to some high school heads whom we interviewed, could in particular come from the fear expressed by some students of being associated with terrorists: "we are looked upon as bad", "things will be even harder after this", etc.

In 2016, the vast majority of people aged 18-30 (89%) said that the attacks of 13 November had changed at least one thing for them: they increased their feelings of insecurity and mistrust and, although they limited their freedom, they also strengthened their feelings of patriotism and solidarity (Adelghi et al. 2016, pp. 16-17). In terms of what are seen as the main causes of the attacks of 13 November 2015, the French mention "religious and cultural tensions in French society" (43% of respondents believe that this is one of the two main causes of the attacks), then "We must not look for reasons for the attacks, they are the acts of deranged people" (39%) and finally "The foreign policy of France" (31%) (Brice et al. 2016). We will examine some of these hypotheses.

The divided French? Anti-Muslim acts and xenophobic attitudes

The strategy of jihadists consists in committing terrorist acts not only to "stupefy" the enemy (Truc 2016) and to break his political will, but also to "divide" his population, that is to say to provoke anti-Muslim reprisals and trigger a civil war dynamic in Europe conducive to the victory of political Islam in the world (Kepel and Jardin 2015). In fact, between 2014 and 2015, the number of anti-Muslim acts recorded in France rose from 128 to 429, this tripling being particularly marked immediately after the attacks in January (178) and, to a lesser extent, following those of November (74) (Ifop 2016c, Mayer et al. 2016). According to Ifop, "the November attacks, which killed many more people than the January attacks, resulted in fewer anti-Muslim acts than in January, as if the religious basis for the November attacks and the link with Islam were somewhat less obvious than at the time of Charlie" (Ifop 2016c, 10). However, "the year 2016 seems to have normalized, returning to a trend close to that of the years preceding the wave of attacks in 2015" (CNCDDH 2017, pp. 192-193), except for the month of July 2016, which was also marked by a particularly deadly Islamist attack in Nice.

As for the degree of xenophobia of the French population as measured in opinion surveys, it does not seem to have increased following the attacks, in fact quite the opposite. From 2014 to 2016, the "longitudinal tolerance index" increased from 56 to 65 points over the maximum of 100 (Mayer et al. 2017, pp. 88-95). The attacks of 2015 increased the demand for security and triggered, especially among women, a reflex of closure against the refugees but "far from decreasing, the acceptance of minorities living in France, including the Muslim minority, has increased overall" from 2013 to 2016 (Mayer et al. 2016, 357). Tolerance is increasing among individuals of all ages and all levels of education, among both right- and left-wing as well as centrist individuals. It also increased in the direction of all minorities: Muslims, North Africans, Jews, Blacks, Roma and Travellers (Mayer et al. 2017, pp. 88-95). Following the January attacks, there actually was a surge of negative attitudes towards immigrants and North Africans, but this effect lasted only for the fortnight immediately following these attacks (Cohu et al. 2016). Perhaps the call by a large number of elected officials for national unity and the republican principle of equality among citizens have helped to offset the effects of the sense of threat. This may have served to serve as a "psychological shield against terror" (Nugier et al. 2016, p. 77) and contributed to defeat the "enterprise of

disunity of the national body" (Audoin-Rouzeau 2017, p. 19), as had already happened in the United States following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Wike 2015). Contrary to one of the objectives of the jihadists, the attacks of 2015 do not seem to have lastingly increased the number of anti-Muslim acts nor the hostility toward Muslims.

The divided French? "Rally round the flag", worry and anger

The 2015 attacks had several measurable effects on the political opinions of the French. Since the Credoc survey on the "living conditions and aspirations" of the population was conducted partly before and after the attacks of January 2015, it is possible to assess the impact of the attacks on various attitudes among the French population. Thus, "since the attacks in Paris in early January [2015], [our fellow citizens] are much less severe with regard to institutions and rulers. The psychological shock of the attacks seems to have revived the project of creating more social cohesion; our fellow citizens also show a greater interest in political debate and civic life, while the attitude towards immigrants and people experiencing poverty is less harsh" (Bigot et al. 2015, p. 1). Another survey indicates that following the attacks in January 2015, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in France has increased (from 27% to 39%) (Brouard and Foucault 2015, p. 3). January's attacks temporarily increased public confidence in the French head of state by 8 points and the attacks of November, perceived as even more threatening, increased the same rating by 20 points (Kantar TNS 2017). In response to the terrorist attacks, many French people adopted a patriotic attitude conducive to the support of the Head of State (the "rally round the flag" effect). Similarly, the attacks greatly increased the number of applications to the army, police and gendarmerie (Fourquet and Mergier 2016, p. 30). Civil society used unifying symbols and solidarity rituals, especially in the form of spontaneous memorials for victims (Bazin 2017). According to Laurie Boussaguet and Florence Faucher (2016), "symbols are [...] at the heart of political and governmental reactions in January and November 2015, whether we think of national mourning, the minute's silence, the use of the flag, the Marseillaise or tributes to the victims" (see also Laurentin 2017). Some high school students in this state of mind testified to the fact that following the minutes of silence "we felt more French", "we were together", "we all shared something", because "they attacked our country". One high school student said: "We did not say we were French. We said: "I am Algerian, I am Ivorian, I am ... and I was born in France." [...] Now... then, after the attacks, we now say... we say instead: I'm French."

In terms of political priorities in the eyes of the French, security and defence have become "the most important problem" instead of unemployment, something that had not happened since 2001-2002; these topics became priorities for the French in January but even more so in November (Brouard 2016, Grossman and Magni Berton 2015). According to Sylvain Brouard and Martial Foucault (2015), "the almost unanimous, not to say uncontested, framing of events as a security problem provoked by descendants of Muslim immigrants had a stronger effect on the section of the population - the electorate of the left - in which these issues were considered less important and attitudes were the most tolerant" (p. 12). Left-wing voters have certainly regained confidence in democracy and its representatives, but they "have, at the same time, moved on security and migration issues to the right, both in terms of the importance of these issues and attitudes about them" (p. 13). Following the 2015 attacks, left-wing people were therefore the ones who demonstrated the most in January and those who revised their political positions the most during the course of the year.

While the perceived threat and the feelings of vulnerability following the January 2015 attacks appear to have increased the degree of authoritarianism of most individuals, this took place through two distinct mechanisms: the less authoritarian individuals have become more authoritarian out of *concern*, while the more authoritarian individuals have become even more authoritarian out of *anger* (Vasilopoulos et al. 2015). In fact, qualitative interviews conducted

in January and February 2015 with people from working-class backgrounds who were considering voting for the National Front or had already done so only once indicate that, for them, "the attacks of January 2015 were connected to the ideas that they already had about the world. [...] The most important thing in the attacks is that they show that the situation is the one they imagined and that the course of events has developed in the (negative and disturbing) direction they had been perceiving for a long time" (Fourquet and Mergier 2015, p. 23).

The reactions of the French to the 2015 attacks are therefore quite well known, but what about those of high school students?

2. Who are the young people who do not fully condemn terrorists?

Our survey asked high school students two questions: one on their opinion about the perpetrators of the attacks, and the other on their degree of emotional involvement in the minutes of silence organized in tribute to the victims (Table 1).

Among the young people in the control sample of 15-17 year olds, only 1% do not "condemn" the perpetrators of the attacks. If one adds on the one hand those who condemn the perpetrators of the attacks but "share some of their motivations", and on the other hand those who say that the perpetrators of the attacks leave them "indifferent", it is in total 7% of young people who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the January attacks, and 5% who do not fully condemn those of November. In addition, 9% of these young people say they felt "not very much" or "not at all" concerned by the minute of silence organized following the attacks in January (6% for those in November). Therefore, between 5% to 9% of 15-17 year olds do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks or did not feel concerned by the minutes of silence.

Table 1. Attitudes of young people in the control sample and of students in our high school sample about the January and November 2015 attacks

		Control sample (N = 1,805)		High school sample (N = 6,828)	
		Attacks of		Attacks of	
		January 2015	November 2015	January 2015	November 2015
When you think about the perpetrators of these attacks, what is your reaction?	You fully condemn them	93	95	68	79
	You condemn them but you share some of their motivations	3	2	10	4
	You do not condemn them	1	1	5	3
	It leaves you indifferent	3	2	9	6
	Non response	-	-	8	8
	<i>Total</i>	<i>100 %</i>	<i>100 %</i>	<i>100 %</i>	<i>100 %</i>
As a result of these events, a minute of silence was organized in schools. Did you feel concerned by it?	Very concerned	56	63	36	42
	Fairly concerned	34	31	33	32
	Not very concerned	6	4	14	11
	Not at all concerned	3	2	10	8
	Non response	1	-	6	7
	<i>Total</i>	<i>100 %</i>	<i>100 %</i>	<i>100 %</i>	<i>100 %</i>

Interpretation: if asked what they think of the perpetrators of the January 2015 attacks, 93% of young people in the control sample condemn them fully.

The students in our high school sample are between two and four times more likely than in the control sample not to fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks and not to have felt concerned by the minutes' silence (Table 1): 24% do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the January attacks and 13% do not fully condemn the perpetrators of those of November, and 8% did not wish to state their response. Compared to the control sample, high school students are nearly three times more likely not to have felt concerned by the minute's silence: 24% for the minute's silence in January and 19% for that of November.

Among the high school students in our sample as well as among the young people in the control sample, the lack of total condemnation is higher in regard to the perpetrators of the January attacks than those of November. The fact of not having felt concerned by the minute's silence is also more frequent in relation to the January attacks than those of November. This may support the idea that a number of students feel less supportive of January's victims than of November's, as the January attack is associated with a lack of respect for the Muslim religion. However, the differences are far from substantial between the students' responses to the January and November attacks.

Differences between the January and November 2015 attacks

The qualitative survey allowed us to gather the comments of high school students and to better understand the wide range of their reactions to the attacks. Several recurring themes emerged, especially when we proposed comparisons between the attacks of November 2015 and those of January 2015. One student said: "In my opinion, it's the same because in both there were deaths, in both there were victims. And a victim, whatever she did, she's still a victim." For another, "there were more deaths in the Bataclan than in *Charlie Hebdo*. So that's why it's more shocking." But the most common expression uttered by students is that, in contrast to the victims of the November attacks, the cartoonists of *Charlie Hebdo* had "asked for it" or "provoked" what happened to them. By using these expressions, students seem to be supporting at least two different theses.

As the excerpts (1 to 3) below indicate, students point to an objective difference between some of the victims in January and those of November: only the cartoonists had deliberately taken action - the publication of Muhammad cartoons - which they knew might put them in danger. These students seem to be saying that although no attack is acceptable, the one against *Charlie Hebdo* seemed to have targeted victims against whom a specific grievance can be imagined, while those in November had targeted victims chosen at random.

<p>Excerpt 1, Dijon Academy <u>High school boy</u>: At <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> they were asking for it, a bit... to some extent. You can't say they were asking to be attacked, but they did provoke it a little. While at the Bataclan they... <u>High school girl A</u>: Yes, they weren't doing anything. <u>High school boy B</u>: Yes, at <i>Charlie Hebdo</i>, there was a... kind of a little reason... well, there was a reason why it angered them. At the Bataclan... there was nothing. <u>High school girl A</u>: They weren't bothering anybody there. <u>High school girl</u>: Like they came here and killed us all. We didn't do anything.</p>	<p>Excerpt 2, Créteil academy <u>High school girl A</u>: In fact the difference is... For me, it's already... November 13, well it was a bombing really. And... While at <i>Charlie Hebdo</i>, they did provoke it a bit. <u>High school girl B</u>: They're still doing it. <u>High school girl A</u>: That's it. That's the difference at <i>Charlie Hebdo</i>, they were asking for it, whereas on November 13, they were not asking for it. It was really an attack.</p> <p>Excerpt 3, Aix-Marseille Academy <u>High school boy</u>: Well, it's not the same, because at <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> they provoked it. [...] While at the Bataclan, there was... well it's not... they did not trouble people.</p>
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By claiming that Charlie Hebdo's cartoonists "asked for it", had "provoked" or "had been rude", many students are morally condemning the publication of cartoons of Mohammed as a form of disrespect towards believers, their identity and their sensitivity (Box 2, excerpts 4 to 9). When we asked them if one could laugh about religion, a significant number of students answered that "it's not something that is done" and that religion "must be respected". According to one student, *Charlie Hebdo* journalists "can criticize the state. They can criticize everything, which everyone can criticize," but not go so far as to criticize religions. Another says, "I do not like people who make fun of religion. The comedians. They're not even men. They're nothing." Criticism or mockery of a person's religion is a "lack of respect": making fun of religion "It's like attacking us. Our personality"; "judging a religion," one student told us, "is like making fun of someone's body." These attitudes seem to be linked to a conception of Islam according to which the criticism of religion, its beliefs or practices shows a lack of respect for the believers themselves, as if irreverence towards religion was an assault on the believers' self-esteem. In other words, for many students "one must not go beyond the limits", that is to say, we must not cross the limit of respect and offense, otherwise one cannot complain about provoking an over-reaction. For one of them, "That's the freedom of expression, actually. Being free to say what you want without hurting other people."

Not many students ask themselves whether the publication of cartoons of Muhammad is legal, or in keeping with the French tradition of religious satire, or even whether it could contribute to a wider debate of general interest about freedom of expression. Basically, many students we met seem to be saying: if no attack is acceptable, neither is the publication of the cartoons representing Muhammad. As far as they were concerned, the cartoonists behaved in a morally unacceptable way. This idea that everyone, whether believer or not, must respect religious dogmas is one of the dimensions of religious absolutism that we investigate further below. Even rarer are the students who go so far as to justify the threats against the newspaper:

"I do not think we can fully condemn [the attacks against Charlie Hebdo]... Well, of course, they killed people, and that's not the solution when we don't like a cartoon, one can make a more attractive one but... in fact I think that... Charlie Hebdo were being provocative because... what has not necessarily been disclosed, which is never disclosed elsewhere when there is an attack, is that before the attack, in general there is prevention. Of the sort, "Do not publish it, there will be repercussions, we do not like it, it's against our religion", etc. And after, there are attacks. So I start from this principle, if there is provocation it is normal that there are repercussions that result from it."

Box 2. Excerpts from interviews with students in our high school sample about the differences between the January and November 2015 attacks, in which students morally condemn blasphemy as disrespect

<p>Excerpt 4, Créteil Academy <u>Researcher</u>: It's still serious what happened, right? To kill someone, a group of people... <u>High school student</u>: Yes, but you have to tell the truth. At Charlie Hebdo, they were asking for it. <u>Investigator</u>: But they were... They were killed. <u>High school student</u>: Yes but... But it's the same, it's not good what they did. It's not good. But they were asking for it. I would not have killed them, I wouldn't have taken it as seriously as that. But it's not done what they did.</p> <p>Excerpt 5, Créteil Academy <u>High school student A</u>: Charlie Hebdo should not have made caricatures of God when they know very well that this is forbidden in some religions. <u>Researcher</u>: You, too, agree with that? That is, "they should not have done it"? Why should they not have done it? <u>High school student B</u>: Because there is a certain amount of freedom of expression, but they have gone beyond the limits. <u>High school student A</u>: Yeah. There is a certain level anyway. <u>High school student C</u>: They went overboard, but we should not kill them for that. [...] It's not... We, we normally judge, when we are Muslims, when people, they do that, we... It's God who takes care of them when we all die, normally we do not have the right to kill them like that. Those who did that are not Muslims.</p> <p>Excerpt 6, Créteil academy "I do not condone what they did. I'm a Muslim too. And I feel offended by what they did. Then I'm not saying it justifies the acts of the terrorists. But, I... In fact if you want, I do not endorse either of them. [...] I do not endorse it, nor do I endorse Charlie Hebdo. I do not support the cause of Charlie Hebdo or the cause of the terrorists. I support the cause of the victims. They are dead. There you go. We must respect them. They are dead. [...] These people, they did not deserve to die. They just did their job. But after that, they sure hurt some of them. They offended some people. But going from there to deserving death, I... I do not think so. "</p>	<p>Excerpt 7, Aix-Marseille Academy <u>High school student</u>: Personally, Charlie Hebdo, frankly that... I was not shocked since Charlie Hebdo were asking for it anyway. They're the ones who were asking for it and ... it's not, it's not ... you don't hide behind freedom of expression to say things like that. It affected them, the Islamists... the... what is it, the Islamics?</p> <p>Excerpt 8, Lille Academy <u>High school student A</u>: Well, it's not that I understand, but on Charlie Hebdo I have something to say about this, it is that, well, they were looking for it, I think. In the end, I know very well that death is horrible. But the people who were at Charlie Hebdo, and seeing what it was they were writing, they were looking for it anyway. Not to be killed, not to this point, but they had been asking for something to happen. Because what they wrote was not very tolerant. And then, they could take it the wrong way... Well, I'm not going to say it was normal either, but for me, they were looking for it in one sense. But those who were at the Bataclan and all that... by contrast I find that inadmissible. <u>High school student B</u>: But the problem for Charlie Hebdo, it's true that in France we have freedoms and we have rights but they abused the freedom. [...] <u>High school student A</u>: Actually, I agree with what he says but in fact in social networks, there were people already complaining about what was happening at Charlie Hebdo, except that [...] they didn't care, they continued doing it. And so they asked for it. Well, even if it's bad that they tried to be killed, but there were people on social networks who asked that they stop, that they stop... And then they didn't stop. And then, there you are, they asked for it.</p> <p>Excerpt 9, Dijon Academy <u>Female high school student A</u>: There is freedom of expression, but there is the limit of respect. <u>Female high school student B</u>: Yes there is freedom of expression, but there is something called respect, that's it.</p>
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The emotions felt after 13 November

A significant proportion of high school students do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the November attacks (13%) and did not feel concerned by the November minutes silence (19%) (Table 1). To understand these reactions, we asked the students an open question: "Can you name one word that expresses what you felt after the November attacks?" A summary analysis of the many different answers to this question indicates that the most frequent answer is "sadness" (13%), far ahead of "fear" (5%), "disgust" (4%), "hate " (4%), "anger" (4%), "shock" (4%) and "horror" (3%). In an experimental survey conducted in 2016 (Mayer et al. 2017, pp. 85-86), the most common emotion in response to photos or images related to the 2015 attacks was anger; in our sample of high school students, anger comes far behind sadness. To go further in the analysis of student responses we randomly selected 150 responses from among those students who "fully condemn" the perpetrators of the attacks of November 13 (79%), and also from among those who condemn them but "share some of their motivations" (4%), among those who "do not condemn" them (3%) and among those who remain "indifferent" to them (6%) (Table 2).

While the question asked was intended to clarify the emotions students might have "felt" after the attacks in November, students who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of these attacks were more likely than others not to answer the question (27% to 32% non-response in the last three columns of Table 2 versus 17% in the first column). These students are also more likely to respond by mentioning the facts, their causes or their consequences rather than mentioning their own emotions (6% to 9% versus 2%). Some also use obscene language but it is difficult to determine if their comments are being directed at the terrorists, the victims, or us as the researchers. High school students who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks mention indifference about four times more (from 14% to 31% against 5%: "nothing", "nothing at all", etc.), and often especially in a dismissive and offensive manner: "I don't give a fuck," "I couldn't care less" and so on. They also mention almost half as much sadness (15% to 17% as against 27%), three times less fear and horror as well as disgust, and five times less anger and hatred (1% to 4% versus 12%). In other words, these students are not only distinguished by their *cognitive* refusal to fully condemn the perpetrators of the November attacks, but also by coherent *emotions*, including less empathy for the victims and much less anger towards the terrorists. However, even among students who do not fully condemn the attacks, few suggest that they approve of these attacks (1% to 3%: "Allahu Akbar", "bravo", etc.) or who claim to have felt joy after 13 November (1% to 2%). Of the 6,828 students in our sample, we would estimate that around twenty students (0.3%) declare that they approve of the November attacks. One could of course think that some students brag about it, but these attitudes are observed only among students who do not fully condemn the November attacks.

In total, compared to the 79% of students in our sample who fully condemn the perpetrators of the November 2015 attacks, the 13% of students who do not fully condemn them seem to distinguish themselves above all by the frequency of their feelings of indifference towards the terrorists and their acts, as well as their lack of empathy and emotional distance towards the victims, with whom they feel little solidarity. Students who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks of November also report relatively often that it leaves them "indifferent", while those who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks in January more often declare that they "share some of their motivations" (Table 1). By their *sometimes ostentatious refusal to sympathize* or show solidarity with the victims, students who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the November attacks seem to indicate that they do not identify with the national community being attacked. That is what we will be examining.

Table 2. Responses from students in our high school sample to the open-ended question: "Can you name one word that expresses what you felt after the November attacks [2015]?"

		Students who "fully condemn" the perpetrators of the 13 November attacks N = 150 / 5,415	Students who condemn the perpetrators of the 13 November attacks but "share some of their motivations" N = 150 / 243	Students who "do not condemn" the perpetrators of the 13 November attacks N = 150 / 182	Students who are left "indifferent" by the perpetrators of the 13 November attacks N = 150 / 395
EMOTION	Sadness	Sadness, despair, grief, sorrow, pain, empathy, depression, condolences, support [41]	Sadness, mischief, pain, emotion [26]	Sadness, despair, empathy, sorrow, pity [22]	Sadness, pain, compassion, tragedy, emotion, misfortune, pity, condolences, RIP France, my peace [22]
	Shame	Shame [2]	Shame, dishonour [2]	[0]	Shame [1]
	Fear, horror	Fear, horror, terror, anguish, nightmare [23]	Fear, horror [10]	Fear, horror, anguish, terror [9]	Fear, horror, anguish [4]
	Disgust	Disgust [10]	Disgust [4]	Disgust [5]	Disgust [2]
	Anger, hatred	Anger, hatred, revolt [18]	Hatred, revenge [3]	Hatred, revenge [6]	[1]
	Shock	Shock, again, desolation [6]	Shock [5]	Shock, hallucination, not surprised [6]	Shock, surprise, <i>starfoullah</i> (I beg for God's pardon), expected [7]
	Indifference	Nothing, not concerned, indifference, well, I don't give a fuck, I don't give a shit [8]	Nothing, what the fuck, indifference, insensitive, not concerned, it's life, oops, sleep, [other] [24]	Nothing, nothing at all, couldn't care less, what the fuck, indifference, sex, quiet, France-Germany 2-0, rough sex [21]	Nothing, I don't care, indifference, what the fuck, impassibility, neutrality, not concerned, not interested, neither hot nor cold, chill, too bad, [others] [47]
	Joy	[0]	Enjoyment [1]	Joy, laugh, dying of laughter [3]	Joy [1]
JUDGEMENT	Disapproval	Injustice, disappointment, abnormal, unacceptable, unforgivable, evil, fuckers [12]	Injustice, disappointment, not good, it shouldn't happen, inadmissible, no, son of a bitch, I am neither Charlie nor terrorist [9]	Injustice, bad, barbarous, they do not deserve it, arseholes [10]	Injustice, indignation, disappointment, it's not good, bad [5]
	Incomprehension	Why [1]	Misunderstanding, why [2]	Misunderstanding, why [2]	Doubt, perplexity [2]
	Approval	[0]	Allahu akbar, agree [2]	Bravo, they were asking for it, well done, OK [4]	OK, Allahu akbar, good for Daesh let's have more attacks please [5]
Facts, causes and consequences		Assassination, destruction; Nonsense [3]	War, kalash, death, violence, provocation; Mischief, racism, religion, intervention in Syria; Danger, non freedom, confusion, choice, determination [14]	Attack on life; Stupidity, bullshit, racism, arrogance, Charlie Hebdo, shitty government, France is weak; islamophobia [9]	Death, life, vendetta; Debility, stupidity, racism, politics; State of emergency, disaster, change, uselessness [11]
Obscenities		Asshole [1]	You big son of a bitch, fuck, [other] [3]	Motherfucker [3 versions], shit, bastard [5]	Idiot, motherfucker [2]
No response		[25]	[45]	[48]	[40]

Interpretation: Among the 150 answers randomly drawn from the 5,415 students who "fully condemn" the perpetrators of the 13 November attacks (column 1), 41 mention sadness or a related emotion (1st line): from the most frequent to the least frequent their responses are "sadness", "despair", "grief", etc.

3. Why do these high school students react like that?

As we saw in the first chapters, several factors are sometimes mentioned to explain why some individuals approve of the use of religious violence. In our opinion, these same explanatory hypotheses can also be useful to explain the reactions of students to the attacks. To test these hypotheses and disentangle the web of causalities, we conducted regression analyses to understand why some students do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the January and November 2015 attacks (rather than condemning them fully), and why they did not feel concerned by the minute's silence (rather than feeling concerned) (Table 4 in the appendix). We estimate nested logistic regression models on our high school sample (but linear regressions give the same results), by introducing: firstly, demographic or socioeconomic explanatory variables; then a further test of the hypothesis of a feeling of economic exclusion; then a test of the hypotheses of feelings of ethno-religious discrimination as well as tolerance of deviance and violence in social life; and finally, a test of the hypothesis relating to religion and religious absolutism.

The main results of these analyses are as follows. The students who are most likely not to condemn fully the perpetrators of the attacks and not to have felt concerned by the minute's silence are the students who declare themselves tolerant to deviance and violence in social life, of foreign origin and Muslims, especially if they are religiously absolutist. None of the explanatory factors considered in this chapter allow these links to be cancelled. In our sample, 24% of students do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the January 2015 attacks and 13% those of November, but these proportions are much higher among the students who are most tolerant of deviance and violence (58% and 34%), among students born abroad (41% and 21%) and among Muslim students (45% and 24%).

Of the six explanatory hypotheses considered, three would seem to have to be rejected. This is the case of the hypothesis of the *feeling of economic exclusion*, since the fact of not fully condemning the perpetrators of the attacks or of not having felt concerned by the minute's silence does not depend on the standard of living of the student's family, nor on his subjective chances of finding a job at the end of his studies. Similarly, students' attitudes are not related to thinking that their situation will be worse than that of their parents. Finally, the rate of non-condemnation of the perpetrators of attacks does not depend on the curriculum being followed by students (general-technological, vocational or other), or their repetition or grades. The hypothesis of the feeling of economic exclusion thus seems to fail to explain students' attitudes.

The same holds for the hypothesis concerning the *family context*, as the attitudes of the students are not related to living in a non-nuclear household (often without a father) rather than in a nuclear household. In addition, students in conflict with their parents (or students who consider that their father or mother has not been generally successful in his/her family or occupational life, or students who absolutely do not want to do the same job as them) are not more likely to not fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks.

Finally, the link between high school students' attitudes and their *feeling of ethno-religious discrimination* is not systematic and disappears when their religion is taken into account. The attitudes of the students towards the attacks do not depend on a feeling of ethno-religious discrimination, that is to say the feeling of undergoing various injustices because of their place of residence, their origins or their religion.

The other three explanatory hypotheses considered are more promising. First of all, the fact of not fully condemning the perpetrators of the attacks and not having felt concerned by the minutes' silence seems linked to *tolerance of deviance and violence in social life*, or in other words, considering various offenses as acceptable in some cases and having already personally committed violence. This link is systematic and robust: a one-point increment on the tolerance of deviance and violence scale (from 1 to 10) tends to multiply by 1.1 the risk of not fully condemning the perpetrators of the attacks and of not feeling concerned by the minutes of silence (Table 4).

Secondly, being born abroad (immigrant), or being born in France of at least one parent born abroad (immigrant child), increases the chances of not fully condemning the perpetrators of the attacks and not to have been concerned by the minutes' silence. This result confirms the hypothesis of the existence of an *identity distance vis-à-vis the victims* of the attacks, and more broadly vis-à-vis France. Feeling part of a minority or feeling collectively rejected, not feeling fully part of the national community, would reduce empathy for out-group members and may moderate the disapproval of acts of violence committed by members claiming to be the in-group. A student from the Créteil academy told us: "So, frankly, I say to myself: I am French. I was born in France. I speak French. I even have my ID card on me here. I am French. But then when I see how France is trying to... put me down like that, I think to myself: in fact, France does not want me." In fact, immigrant high school students or children of immigrants are more likely not to fully condemn the perpetrators of the November attacks (21% and 19%, against 7% of students born in France of two parents born in France). The link between students' attitudes towards attacks and their foreign origins is robust, that is, it resists the inclusion of other explanatory variables, including religion. In addition, the link between students' attitudes towards attacks and their foreign origin is partly diminished by feeling more "from another background" (or "both French and of another background") than "French" (models not shown). That said, the connection between student attitudes and being of foreign origin may not be reduced to a weak identification with the national community. In our interviews with students, one of them tells us: "I feel French. But if we talk about the country of origin, I am more Algerian than French". Another respondent says: "If I had some money, I would go back to my country. You see, or not. I came to work. You understand or not. Finally, it's basic, basic, here: our parents came for what? They came for... to make money, and everything. It's not because we... we wanted to live in France, and everything." Some students refer to the past: "For sure, there will be people who say: I do not like... I do not like France. Because... And what's more, I understand them. Finally, the people who say... For example, what they did to my country of origin, it's not been judged." One female student is more concerned with the current feeling of being rejected: "I do not want to say that I am French. [Interviewer: Because?] Because otherwise people will believe uh... yeah, that I'm burying my head in the sand and all that."

Finally, being Muslim, let alone being Muslim and religiously absolutist, rather than being a non-believer, substantially increases the chances of not fully condemning the attacks, particularly those of January, and of not having felt concerned by the minute's silences. This result tends to support the hypothesis of *the role of religious faith as well as that of religious absolutism*. In our sample, compared to Christian or non-religious students, Muslim students are two to four times more likely to refuse to condemn the perpetrators of the attacks altogether, and two to three times more likely than Christians or students without a religion not to have felt concerned by the minute's silences in January and November (Table 3). As a result, non-absolutist

young Muslims remain more numerous than young absolutist Christians in not fully condemning the perpetrators of the attacks and not having felt concerned by the minute's silences. A clear division of attitudes is evident between Muslim students on the one hand and Christian and non-religious students on the other.

Table 3. Proportion of students in our high school sample who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the 2015 attacks, or who did not feel concerned by the minute's silences, according to religion and religious absolutism

	N	Proportion of students (%) who do not fully condemn the perpetrators of ...		Proportion of students (%) who did not feel concerned by the minute's silence...	
		January	November	January	November
No religion	2,796	14	7	17	13
Christians	1,609	17	7	17	13
<i>Of which: Non-absolutist Christians</i>	1,512	17	6	16	12
<i>Of which: Absolutist Christians</i>	97	31	16	25	25
Muslims	1,753	45	24	42	32
<i>Of which: Non-absolutist Muslims</i>	1,195	40	21	38	28
<i>Of which: absolutist Muslims</i>	558	54	30	53	40
Other religions	163	31	17	29	25
Total	6,828	24	12	25	19

Interpretation: 14% of students without religion do not fully condemn the perpetrators of the January 2015 attacks.

When several socio-economic characteristics are taken into account, including students' social backgrounds, as well as certain parameters of a more psychological nature (their feeling of ethno-religious discrimination, their tolerance of deviance and violence), being a non-absolutist Muslim rather than without religion doubles the chances of not fully condemning the 2015 attacks and of not having been concerned by the minute's silence. This probability is tripled among young absolutist Muslims (Table 4). Absolutism also reinforces the probability that young Christians do not fully condemn the perpetrators, but religious absolutism remains much more common among young Muslims. In addition, compared to the Christian students in our sample, Muslim students are much more likely to consider their religion to be "very important" in their intimate and personal lives (63% vs. 16%), to report feeling "very close" to people who have the same religion as them (52% against 17%) and to say they are "already committed to the defence of their religion" (30% against 9%). The link between attitudes towards attacks and religious denomination resists the inclusion of additional variables such as the degree of religiosity of students or the degree of cultural anti-liberalism that characterizes them (models not shown). When we asked a student if one can make fun of religions, he said: "When you practice a religion, it's like a symbol, and if you make fun of it, it's... how can one say... it's, well, it's not done." This student, like many others, associates religion with a "symbol" of

belonging to a group, and thus to the respect of an identity that is both personal and collective and can be violated.

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There are several major reasons to treat these statistical results with caution. Firstly, these results are obtained from estimates made from a sample of students that is not representative of high school students in France, or even second-level students in public high schools of the four academies from which they were drawn. To find out to what extent these results could be generalized to larger populations, further surveys would be needed. Then, the share of the variations of the attitudes of the pupils that the statistical models presented here make it possible to explain is relatively low, since according to the models it goes from 4% to 12% (Table 4). While these orders of magnitude are not unusually low in the social sciences, they do invite modesty about their interpretation. Finally, in the absence of a unified theoretical model, it is difficult to identify the mechanisms that could explain the reactions of students to attacks. Perhaps the models presented do not take into account individual or contextual characteristics that would better explain the attitudes towards the attacks - but what are these characteristics? By what precise causal mechanisms does the fact of being of foreign or Muslim origin increase the propensity not to fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks and not to have felt concerned by the minute's silence? Why are some students more tolerant than others of deviance and violence in social life? And how do these effects fit together?

With the necessary caution, however, it can be considered that the group of students most likely not to fully condemn the perpetrators of the 2015 attacks and not to have felt concerned by the minute's silence are, on the one hand, relatively tolerant of deviance and violence in social life, and on the other hand pupils of foreign origin, who do not identify themselves with the victims of the attacks nor with France, and finally Muslim pupils (especially religious absolutists), who conceive of the disrespect of the dogmas of their religion as an unacceptable form of disrespect towards them. Listening to students who identify strongly with the Muslim religion, it appears that many of them challenge the freedom to be disrespectful of Islam and some of its dogmas; indeed, some of them experience irreverence towards Islam as a lack of respect, an attack on their personal integrity and their collective identity. Students who are reluctant to fully condemn the perpetrators of the attacks also tend to be emotionally indifferent to the attacks and to refuse to express a feeling of national solidarity. A distance in terms of identity, a lesser feeling of belonging to the national community seems to reduce their empathy with regard to the victims, with whom some students are struggling to identify. These young people are characterized not only by certain *opinions* that break with the values and principles of liberal societies, but also by the fact that in 2015 they did not share the *collective emotions* of most French people.

Appendix

Table 4. Nested logistic regressions of the likelihood, for a student in our high school sample, not to fully condemn the perpetrators of the 2015 attacks (rather than to condemn them fully or to not respond), and not to feel concerned about the minute's silence (rather than to feel concerned or to not respond).

Explanatory variable (Hypothesis)	Types of responses	Do not fully condemn the perpetrators of ...								Do not feel concerned by the minute's silence of ...							
		January 2015				November 2015				January 2015				November 2015			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Sex	Girl	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>
	Boy	ns	ns	ns	ns	1.3 ***	1.3 ***	ns	ns	1.2 ***	1.2 ***	ns	ns	1.5 ***	1.5 ***	1.3 ***	1.3 ***
Place of birth and geographical origins (Identity issues)	Born in France of two parents born in France (or NR)	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>
	Born in Fr. of at least 1 parent born abroad	2.8 ***	2.8 ***	2.4 ***	1.5 ***	2.8 ***	2.8 ***	2.5 ***	1.7 ***	2.5 ***	2.5 ***	2.2 ***	1.6 ***	2.3 ***	2.3 ***	2.1 ***	1.5 ***
	Born abroad	3.6 ***	3.5 ***	3.2 ***	2.0 ***	3.2 ***	3.0 ***	2.8 ***	1.9 ***	2.5 ***	2.4 ***	2.2 ***	1.6 ***	2.3 ***	2.2 ***	2.1 ***	1.5 ***
Household composition (Family breakdown)	Nuclear <= 2 children	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>
	Nuclear >= 3 children	1.4 ***	1.3 ***	1.3 **	ns	1.4 ***	1.4 ***	1.4 **	ns	1.3 ***	1.3 ***	1.2 **	ns	1.4 ***	1.4 ***	1.3 **	ns
	Non-nuclear (or NR)	1.2 **	1.2 **	1.2 *	ns	1.4 **	1.4 **	1.3 *	ns	1.3 **	1.3 **	1.2 *	ns	1.2 **	1.2 **	1.2 *	Ns
Standard of living of the family (Sense of socio-economic exclusion)	You are comfortable	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>
	It's okay	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	1.1 *
	You have to be careful	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
	It's hard to make ends meet	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	1.3 *	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
	NR	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
At the end of your studies you expect to find a job...	Very easily		<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>		<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>		<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>	<i>Ref</i>
	Quite easily		ns	ns	ns		0.6 **	0.6 **	0.7 *		ns	ns	ns		ns	ns	ns

Explanatory variable (Hypothesis)	Types of responses	Do not fully condemn the perpetrators of ...								Do not feel concerned by the minute's silence of ...							
		January 2015				November 2015				January 2015				November 2015			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
(Sense of socio-economic exclusion)	Quite hardly		ns	ns	ns		0.7 *	ns	ns		ns	ns	ns		ns	ns	ns
	Very hardly		ns	ns	ns			ns	ns		ns	ns	ns		ns	ns	ns
	NR		ns	ns	ns		0.6 *	ns	ns		ns	ns	ns		ns	ns	ns
Sense of ethno-religious discrimination	[scale from 1 to 10]			1.05 ***	ns			ns	ns			1.03 **	ns			ns	ns
Tolerance of deviance and violence in social life	[scale from 1 to 10]			1.2 ***	1.1 ***			1.1 ***	1.1 ***			1.1 ***	1.1 ***			1.1 ***	1.1 ***
Religion and religious absolutism	No religion				<i>Ref</i>				<i>Ref</i>				<i>Ref</i>				<i>Ref</i>
	Non-absolutist Christian				ns				ns				ns				ns
	Absolutist Christian				2.1 **				1.9 *				ns				1.7 *
	Non-absolutist Muslim				2.8 ***				2.2 ***				1.9 ***				1.7 ***
	Absolutist Muslim				4.4 ***				3.2 ***				3.4 ***				2.7 ***
	Other religion (or NR)				1.9 ***				1.7 ***				1.5 ***				1.4 **
Pseudo R ²		0.057	0.058	0.091	0.119	0.052	0.056	0.079	0.099	0.045	0.046	0.071	0.091	0.043	0.043	0.066	0.081
X ² (ddl)		433.6 (9)	437.3 (13)	690.1 (15)	900.3 (20)	260.8 (9)	282.2 (13)	396.9 (15)	501.0 (20)	349.4 (9)	354.7 (13)	544.2 (15)	700.6 (20)	284.3 (9)	288.6 (13)	436.6 (15)	536.9 (20)

*** $p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$. ns not significant

Interpretation of the shaded box: comparing two students living in similar family and economic contexts, the one born in France of at least one parent born abroad (rather than being born in France of two parents born in France) tends to be 2.8 times more likely (odds ratio) not to fully condemn the perpetrators of the January 2015 attacks, rather than to condemn them completely.

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