The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal (1935-1941) (Revised Version),Montréal, Cahiers Scientifiques du CIRANO, 2020s-46 - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2020

The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal (1935-1941) (Revised Version),Montréal, Cahiers Scientifiques du CIRANO, 2020s-46

Résumé

This paper presents the late convergence process from American economists that led them to support a strong antitrust enforcement in the Second New Deal despite their long-standing distrust toward this legislation. The paper presents the path from which institutionalist economists, on one side, and members of the First Chicago School, on the other one, have converged on supporting the President F.D. Roosevelt administration towards reinvigorating antitrust law enforcement as of 1938, putting aside their initial preferences for a regulated competition model or for a classical liberalism. The appointment of Thurman Arnold at the head of the Antitrust Division in 1938 gave the impetus to a vigorous antitrust enforcement. The 1945 Alcoa decision crafted by Judge Hand embodied the results of this convergence: in this perspective, the purpose of antitrust law enforcement does consist in preventing improper uses of economic power.
Loading...
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

halshs-02991441, version 1 (06-11-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-02991441 , version 1

Citer

Frédéric Marty, Thierry Kirat. The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal (1935-1941) (Revised Version),Montréal, Cahiers Scientifiques du CIRANO, 2020s-46. 2020. ⟨halshs-02991441⟩
53 Consultations
0 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 07/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus