Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent
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Résumé |
en
We consider a single psychological agent whose utility depends on his action, the state of the world, and the belief that he holds about that state. The agent is initially informed about the state and decides whether to memorize it, otherwise he has no recall. We model the memorization process by a multi-self game in which the privately informed first self voluntarily discloses information to the second self, who has identical preferences and acts upon the disclosed information. We identify broad categories of psychological utility functions for which there exists an equilibrium in which every state is voluntarily memorized. In contrast, if there are exogenous failures in the memorization process, then the agent memorizes states selectively. In this case, we characterize the partially informative equilibria for common classes of psychological utilities. If the material cost of forgetting is low, then the agent only memorizes good enough news. Otherwise, only extreme news are voluntarily memorized.
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Auteur(s)
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Jeanne Hagenbach
1
, Frédéric Koessler
2, 3
1
ECON -
Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
( 226874 )
- 28 rue des Saints-Pères - 75007 Paris
- France
-
Sciences Po ( 301587 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR 8259 ( 441569 )
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8545 ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement UMR1393 ( 577435 )
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2021-02
|
Page/Identifiant |
31 p.
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
|
Référence interne |
-
PSE Working Papers n°2021-11
|
Projet(s) Européen(s) |
-
MOREV
- Motivated Reading of Evidence
Numéro CORDIS :
850996
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Multi-self game, Disclosure games, Imperfect recall, Selective memory, Motivated beliefs, Psychological games, Anticipatory utility
|