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Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities in Algeria, Iraq, and Turkey, 1990-2019¹

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Abstract

This paper draws on political attitudes surveys to document the evolution of political cleavages in light of inequality dynamics in Algeria (2002-2018), Iraq (2005-2018), and Turkey (1991-2018). We investigate how social divides and ethno-religious conflicts shape voting behaviors in these three countries through their interaction with the voting system and the structure of inequalities. Our findings suggest that identity-based voting remains highly interconnected with social disparities and does not offer extensive explanatory power on its own, except in the extreme case of the Iraqi sectarian political system. Socioeconomic factors play a differentiated role depending on the historical and institutional context and have increasingly been at the heart of popular mobilizations outside of the electoral arena.

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Introduction

Shaken by civil wars, interstate conflicts and intifada for several decades, the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region seems to find its unity around the predominance of violence. To explain such a political turmoil, a common view consists in reducing all conflicts in the region to their ethno-religious dimension. A cultural divide between Sunni and Shia Islam and/or between ethnic communities would devastate the area. The rivalry of states, affiliated to either Shia Iran or Sunni Saudi Arabia, in the context of heightened tensions around hydrocarbon resources as much as clientelism and corruption would foster the role of non-state actors defined along clear identity lines (Wehrey, 2017). At first sight, several phenomena seem to corroborate this view. Lebanon and Iraq adopted sectarian systems to ensure peaceful democratic transitions after deadly civil wars (Salibi 1988; Traboulsi 2012; Marr, 2018, Dodge, 2019). Power sharing arrangements between the various religious and ethnic communities took the form of quota or seat allocation in both governments. More generally, political Islam resurfaced in the region, after decades of ban and underground activism. It managed to quickly generate mass appeal with the arrival in power of openly religious parties, such as the FIS in Algeria, the AKP in Turkey, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Willis, 1999; Bozarslan 2013; Zürcher, 2017; Masoud, 2014; Corstange and Masoud 2016; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014).

This view however appears quickly limited and overlooks the electoral competition process. Ethno-religious claims were quite absent from the different waves of mass protest that shook the region since almost a decade. From the Arab Springs of 2011 to the 2019-2020 streets demonstrations in Algeria, Lebanon, or Iraq, without forgetting the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013, popular uprisings uniting different social groups called for further democratization and fairer redistribution of national income, without clear identity stance, at least at their start (Gerges, 2013; Jazayeri, 2016; Jabar, 2018; Assouad, 2020). Given these massive social contestations, it became important for policymakers and scholars alike to understand whether underlying inequality dynamics had redefined political conflicts in socioeconomic terms. Is the salient anti-elite discourse revealing a new role for class-based voting? And retrospectively, did the socioeconomic dimension ever disappear behind the identity vote?

The focus on religious and ethnic rivalries, at the expense of social was probably supported by the low levels of wealth and income inequalities described by standard international estimates in most MENA countries, like official GINI indexes. In 2011, the Lebanese or Egyptian official GINI indexes were below 0.35 for example, meaning that both countries were as egalitarian as the most egalitarian countries in history such as Scandinavian countries in the 1980s. These low levels have recently been questioned by a growing literature emphasizing the limits of survey based estimated and the existence of large measurement errors in existing inequality statistics (Van der Weide et al. 2016; Alvaredo et al. 2018; Assouad 2019; Moshrif 2020). According to these new figures, MENA would rather be one of the most unequal regions in the world, reaching inequality levels close to those observed in Brazil or South Africa: the top 10 percent receiving around 65 percent of the total regional income since 1990, six times as much as the bottom 50 percent. During the same period, only about 40 percent went to the top 10 percent in Western Europe (Blanchet et al., 2019). These extreme levels of inequality are thus likely to have affected the structure of political conflicts, with unclear effects on the identity-vote. Adopting a multidimensional perspective for studying how cleavages intertwined, while departing from an orientalist bias, seems therefore key for understanding political dynamics in the region.

Looking at individual level data, this paper documents how social polarization in terms of income and education have interacted with the evolution of political cleavages in three countries of the Middle East over several decades: Turkey (1991-2018), Iraq (2005-2018) and Algeria (2002-2018). Drawing on opinion surveys, we follow the methodology developed by Piketty (2018) and which was first applied to the US, the UK and France. The goal of this paper is to document the multidimensional aspect of political cleavages in these three countries by paying a specific attention to income and education, but also to age, gender in addition to the ethno-religious identity. To do so, we built systematic times series on socioeconomic determinants of voters over election cycles using simple measures of inequality. This paper belongs to a multi-country project that creates comparable and homogenous series on political cleavages across time and spaces (Gethin et al. 2021; Uraz, 2020). In particular, the parameter of interest is the differences in voting behaviors between comparable deciles: the top 10 percent and the bottom 50 percent (the richest vs. the poorest, the most educated vs. the less educated and so on).

We restricted the analysis to the cases of Algeria, Iraq and Turkey due to data quality and availability. The overall methodology developed by Piketty (2018) is based on the use of post-electoral survey, that is individual micro-data with information on votes, educational levels and income. In the absence of such exit polls in the region, we use three opinion surveys: the World Value Survey (WVS), the Arab Barometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES). While our results should be taken with great care given important issues of survey misreporting and comparability, our work finds its place in a recent trend of the literature that invites to not discard the MENA in survey research (Benstead, 2018; Cavatorta and Wegner, 2018; Tessler, 2020). We hope that our results can contribute to quantitatively document electoral cleavages in these three countries, and spur further data collection efforts in a region severely affected by lack of data transparency.

These three countries, with radically different recent histories, present various institutional configurations, but face similar types of social and political tensions. Algeria has a strong executive regime with a limited power left to the parliament. Iraq set up a semi-federal parliamentary system based on an ethno-religious sharing of the power in the early 2000s. Turkey, by contrast, has a long-established multiparty system that may have represented a potential leading democratic model in the region, but recently experienced a strengthening of its executive (Cammett et al., 2015).

Four main findings emerge from our analysis. First, income plays a differentiated role on voting divides but remains a meaningful determinant. In Algeria and Turkey, voting patterns for the incumbents display cross-class features uniting both poorest and richest voters, which may explain the stability of their respective ruling parties. In Iraq, the extremely strong sectarian dimension of the vote used to override intra-sect inequalities, questioning the relevance of income in voting behaviors, until the recent reconfiguration of the anti-sectarian opposition and mass mobilizations outside of the electoral arena.

Second, we find that ethnic minorities tend to exhibit higher level of social disparities than the main ethnic group and always have a differentiated voting behavior, pointing towards contextual interactions between identity-based vote and ethnic inequalities. The Kurds in Turkey and the Berbers in Algeria have been significantly less supportive of the incumbent over the period, with a clear class dimension in the first case only: the Kurds being significantly poorer. In Iraq, the alignment of the vote with the ethno-religious identity,

triggered by the sectarian mode of governance, mirrors strong inequalities between communities that however reverted over time: the Kurds became richer than the historically privileged Sunni and the majoritarian Shia.

Third, other dimensions of identity, such as religiosity and age, echo changes in the structure of social inequalities and translate into political cleavages. In Turkey, the salient religious divide has to be understood as part of a broader cultural cleavage, which opposes voters with different education levels, in a context of historical support of the secular republic among the most educated. In Iraq and Algeria, the potential of a generational cleavage requires special attention given the social and economic exclusion of the youth. Youth discontent seems to have mostly channeled through abstention in the two countries.

Lastly, the recent mass protests invite to pay specific attention to alternate modes of political participation than the vote such as protestation and abstention. In Iraq and Algeria, the two street movements that started in 2019, as well as the last elections turnout, exhibit new interclass and cross-sectarian dynamics.

This paper makes three main contributions. First, we extended and adapted a framework developed for Western democracies to low- and middle-income countries, which historically experienced authoritarian surges and inference of the army in politics. No country of the MENA region had ever been studied in this systematic and comparative perspective. We made an innovative use of standardized survey data that are easily updatable with future data releases.

Second, we adopt a party system approach that favors comparative perspective but has been relatively less mobilized in MENA studies. We assume that political cleavages are well captured by electoral outcomes and party choices declared by respondents.

Third, we provide an empirical perspective that may confirm or challenge existing analysis developed in sociopolitical studies of the vote in these three countries. For Turkey, our results corroborate a large literature looking at the social base of the AKP. For Iraq, they suggest that we need to pay a special attention to the social and ethnic characteristics of voters that supported lists with anti-system discourse, beyond the traditional secular opposition. For Algeria, our results invite to reconsider the initial ideological differences between the FLN

and the RND that attracted both sides of the income distribution as well as the strong identity-dimension in the Berber vote.

This paper adds to the literature on the development of crony capitalism in the Middle East and its political economy consequences (Cammett et al. 2015; Diwan, Malik and Atiyas, 2019). This literature has quantitatively documented various mechanisms through which the economic liberalization turns of the 1980s-1990s have fueled a reinvention of the clientelist and populist features presents in most MENA regimes (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; Gürakar, 2016; Rijkers et al., 2017; Diwan and Haidar, 2020). In particular, our findings confirm how blurred borders between private and public capital have allowed the institutionalization of rent-seeking behaviours and the set-up of distributive policies along identity lines, ensuring a cross-class support for the incumbents. The redefined alliances between the government, the powerful security apparatus, and an emerging business bourgeoisie, which temporarily replaced post-independence social contracts, appear to have become more fragile with the widespread of the discontent among all social groups.

This paper also contributes to the literature pointing the relevance of electoral studies in the region. While most MENA countries hold regular elections since several decades, little is known on the evolution of the social composition of political party electorate or the role of party competition in the regime changes from an historical perspective (Hinnebush, 2017). An orientalism bias has made of the MENA a region aside in comparative politics and reflects on the limited studies available on the programmatic positions of political parties (Cavatorta, 2017; 2020). This paper relates to the studies stressing the importance of party competition in the Middle East despite concerns around electoral irregularities, for showing approval or opposition to the regime by the mean of abstention (De Miguel et al. 2015; Buttorff, 2019) or for distributive politics purposes (Lust, 2009; Blaydes, 2011; Cammett, 2015; Wuthrich, 2015; Corstange, 2016; Blaydes, 2020).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 present country-specific analysis and are structured in a similar way: they include a summary of recent history politics before turning to the main cleavages identified. Section 5 concludes.

2. Turkey

With its long history of democratic rule, Turkey is considered as a specific case in the MENA landscape. The political predominance of a ruler openly claiming its Islamic identity since 2002 has been questioning a transition to identity politics. Standing as the party of the left behind of the republican era, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) invites to adopt a renewed cross-cleavages perspective in which socioeconomic determinants keep playing a major role.

In this section, we first draw an overview of the Turkish political landscape, starting with the first multiparty elections of 1946. Then, we question the salience of a religious divide in a republic shaped by state secularism. The need of integrating other dimensions leads us to identify a rising “inverted” class divide, with low-income and less-educated voters shifting towards right-wing parties since the early 1990s. Finally, we turn to the inescapable ethnic and regional features of Turkish cleavages, reflecting on the socioeconomic disparities behind the ‘Kurdish question’.

A Multiparty System Challenged by New Players

Turkey became an independent nation-state in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The new regime, led by Mustafa Kemal, implemented a set of radical and authoritarian nation-building policies to create a secular and westernized nation. Despite the set-up of a representative body and universal suffrage, the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) was the only party ruling until 1946. Political opposition and minority movements were heavily repressed, preventing any multiparty system until the start of the Cold War (Zürcher, 2017).

The first free and fair elections of 1950 marked the success of an opposition party that managed to rally the private sector and rural discontent. The original matrix of Turkish politics was born: on one hand, the old establishment, represented by the state-founding party CHP, nationalist, urban, secular, and interventionist, thereby often positioned on the left of the political spectrum; on the other hand, the previously excluded rural pious and the conservative

bourgeoisie, corresponding to the center-right, the culturally dominated “periphery” (Mardin, 1973). Three decades of alternations between the CHP and its challenger followed.

The military constitutes a third major actor of Turkish politics. Two direct coups, in 1960 and 1980, and two indirect ones by means of memorandum in 1971 and 1997 led to government changes, notably preserving the secular aspect of the state (Hale, 1994). The 1980 coup, in a context of increasing street violence between far-right and far-left activists, may have been the one with the longest-lasting effect. All previously existing parties, including the CHP, were banned from the political scene and a new electoral law introduced a crucial electoral threshold, preventing any extreme to get into the parliament. The state ideology was redefined towards a “Turkish Islamic Synthesis” to unite both Islamism and Turkish nationalism in a broad right bloc (Kaya, 2017).

The 1980s paved the way to a multiparty system split in between three to four main actors, governing altogether through coalitions. The center-right, while internally divided, concentrated the majority of votes (Figure 1). The center-left split between a social-democratic branch and a more traditional one until the reborn CHP replaced them as main challenger. This equilibrium was broken in 1995 when an Islamic party crossed the 10 percent electoral threshold and became the first party in terms of vote share. At the same time, Kurdish parties, representing the country’s main ethnic minority, entered the electoral arena. These two “structural fears” of the Republic, namely ethnic division and political Islam, had until then aligned within the left-right divide prevailing during the Cold War (Özerdem and Whiting, 2019).

Despite military interventions and the successive bans of the Islamic parties, another Islamic party, the AKP captured all discontent votes in 2002, on the aftermath of the country’s most severe economic crisis up to date (Pamuk, 2018). Against all expectations, the conservative party ruled by Erdoğan, the successful mayor of Istanbul, managed to remain in power until today, opening an unprecedented period of one-party dominance since 1946. During its first years in power, the AKP managed to present itself as the party that will integrate the country into the EU while initiating a notable open-policy dialogue with the Kurdish dissidents. Continuing a set of institutional and structural reforms initiated ahead of its mandate, the first terms of the party were marked by relatively “high-quality growth” but these improvements quickly reversed (Acemoglu and Ucer, 2019).

The disappearance of any EU adhesion prospects, coupled with economic difficulties and geopolitical changes in the region following the Syrian War and the Arab Springs led the AKP to gradually shift towards a combination of ultra-nationalism and political Islam. 2015 announced the first loss of majority for the incumbent, which had to ally with far-right nationalists. This initiated an authoritarian drift that was further accentuated by the failed putsch attempt of 2016. A referendum in 2017 institutionalized the shift to a strong presidential system and the Kurdish question was militarized in light of the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).

A New Role for the Religious Cleavage in the Secular Republic?

The advent of an Islamic party as the major incumbent in the oldest secular republic of the Middle East raised debates on the potential rise of the role of religion in voting behavior. Yet, data suggest that the increased support for Islamic parties was not concomitant with an increase in religiosity (Livny, 2020). While religiosity, captured through self-description as religious, does have an impact on vote choice, Figure 2 points to the persistence of a religious divide preceding AKP's electoral success. Since 1991, religious voters have consistently been more likely to vote for right-wing parties than non-religious voters by 25 to 35 percentage points after controls.

The mainstream center-right thus already captured the more religious and conservative part of the electorate. Moreover, the AKP initially claimed its affinities with Christian-Democratic parties and incarnated a moderate approach in a fragmented Islamic landscape that did not unite under his umbrella (Hale and Özbudun, 2011). Research paying specific attention to parties' discourses and practices equally reveals that Islamic parties have not been emphasizing religious matters in electoral campaigns before getting access to power (Wuthrich, 2015).

The perceived increase in the importance of the religiosity dimension may denote a mutation of "Islamic identity", aligned with interests in economic liberalization. Far from the traditional vision of the rural pious, the modern devout would instead cultivate such identity, giving him access to business and social connections relying on interpersonal trust schemes. Islamic business associations notably played a major role in the empowerment of new

entrepreneurs (Hakan Yavuz, 2003; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). The interaction of religiosity with other socioeconomic dimensions, and the subsequent intra-elite conflict between the secular apparatus and an openly devout new business elite, may be key for understanding Turkish dynamics.

The Rise of “Inverted” Class Cleavages?

Political analysts quickly noticed the AKP’s singular ability to rally diverse electoral bases such as the “poor and the pious” from rural areas and the rising liberal bourgeoisie of central Anatolia, amplifying an electoral bridge initiated by the Islamic parties throughout the 1990s. The AKP success, which initially allowed the party to rule without joining any coalition, would not have been possible without also gaining the support of poor workers and especially of the *gecekondu* (“built at night”), poor urban dwellings resulting from the massive internal migration movement in the 1960s (Bermek, 2019).

What clearly appears in Figure 3 is that the AKP scored more than 40 percent in all income quintiles, except the highest one. The AKP confirmed its comparative advantage among low-income groups over time, despite an apparent lack of changes in the high level of income inequalities throughout the 2000s, which even further increased since 2013 (Alvaredo et al., 2019). Regarding top-income voters, data suggests an intra-elite conflict with roughly equal support for the CHP and the AKP among the economic elite.³ Several factors can contribute to explain this cross-class success.

On the one hand, the AKP could leverage on the “Islamic trust advantage” built by previous movements and their strong ties with social civil organizations (Cammett and Luong, 2014). The discredit of all mainstream parties, due to several major financial crises in the 1990s and to their perceived collusion, arguably also helped the AKP to impose itself as a coalition of both globalization losers and winners. The greater fiscal discipline and the unprecedented low levels of inflation may have pleased the exporting small and medium enterprises as much as the poorer workers.

³ See appendix Figure AB2.

On the other hand, the factors having fueled the growth, namely a massive credit expansion and a boom in the construction sector, renewed clientelism schemes beyond religious networks. The Housing Policy benefited many low-income dwellings while public procurement contracts and credit lending facilities went to politically connected firms (Gürakar, 2016; Bircan and Saka, 2019). The AKP might also be a political reply to a long-lasting rural-urban divide. The poor urban workers kept being associated to their rural roots and differing values and practices, especially their religiosity. The poverty reduction and the real estate boom under AKP rule coincided with an upward mobility of this working class, which may have translated into a new generation of politicians proud of their rural origin (Erman, 2017).

Strikingly, highest-educated voters have also consistently been less supportive of the incumbent, and more supportive of the CHP, than the lower educated since the early 1990s (Figure 4). The effect of education appears to be highly robust to controls and strong enough to revert the impact of religiosity.⁴ Such-defined “intellectual elites” therefore seem to relate more to the Kemalist tradition of secularism. Education was indeed at the core of Kemal’s modernization reforms, which initiated a long-lasting cultural cleavage in the country (Assouad, 2020; Sakalli, 2019).

The education divide also recently took a generational dimension when the AKP put an end to the marginalization of religious schooling (Lüküslü, 2016). Interestingly, the youth voted less for the AKP than older voters, but controlling for education significantly reverses this trend starting in 2015.⁵ While the party may have lost the young graduates that were over-represented in the 2013 Gezi Park protest, it did not get massively rejected by the new generation at large, despite a rising youth unemployment rate. Moreover, contrasting with other MENA countries, Turkey exhibits an extremely high level of electoral participation including among the youth.

All in all, the AKP appears to have been much more popular among low-income and especially lower-educated voters since the 1990s, while top-income and higher-educated voters have been more supportive of the CHP. While partially congruent to the religious

⁴ See appendix Figure AB31.

⁵ See appendix Figure AC3.

cleavage, this divide appears to have a strong socioeconomic dimension. This class cleavage differs significantly from that observed in other Muslim-majority countries studied, such as Pakistan where the secular left has historically been supported by low-income voters and by the poorer Sindhi ethnic group (Gethin et al. 2020).

The Regional Cleavage and the “Kurdish Question”

Turkey’s landscape is clearly divided between the richer West Aegean coast and the urban centers of Istanbul and Ankara, on one side, and the historically most deprived Eastern and Southeastern regions, on the other, where the majority of Kurds live.⁶ As a consequence, the Kurdish question is often framed as a “class cleavage” (Hakan Yavuz, 2001) and encompasses long-lasting regional inequalities that take as much an income than an educational dimension.

While Kurdish dissent took different shapes, between demands for cultural recognition and quest for self-determination, its qualification as a proper political matter is a recent phenomenon. Until the mid-1990s, the cleavage took the form of alternate phases of ‘tacit’ coexistence or self-reinforcing cycles of state repression and escalation of violence (Barkey, 2017). The first unilateral ceasefire of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in 1993 and the abandonment of its separatist quest paved the way for openly Kurdish political parties to emerge in the electoral arena. Yet, Kurdish parties were successively banned, despite major electoral gains in Southeastern regions.

The AKP’s arrival to power in 2002 led to an interesting change in regional voting patterns. By sharing a somewhat similar history of state repression than Kurdish parties, the AKP attracted the more pious and socially conservative electorate of the Southeastern regions. Moreover, its first terms represented a noticeable exception of recognition of Kurdish sub-identity that led the party to gain significant political support among the two predominantly Kurdish regions.⁷

⁶ See appendix maps and figure AA17.

⁷ See appendix Figure AB7.

The reversal of the regional and international context however put an end to this parenthesis in 2015. The empowerment of the Syrian Kurdish organization in the fight over ISIS led to the resurgence of Kurdish ethno-nationalism (Kaya and Whiting, 2019). In line with these changes, our findings suggest that Kurdish speakers have massively voted against the AKP in the past decade, with a peak in 2015. In that year, they were less likely to support the incumbent by almost 50 percentage points after controls (Figure 5).⁸

At the same time, a new Kurdish party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), appeared as a threatening electoral opponent in 2015, by adopting an inclusive radical left stance (Kaya, 2019). For the first time, Kurdish MPs were entering the parliament as a party, while the HDP succeeded in being not exclusively supported by the Southeast region.⁹ Overall, the Turkish ethno-regional cleavage remains deeply rooted in socioeconomic inequalities but is not fully frozen. The Kurds supported ruling parties when those met both their cultural and social demands, while Kurdish parties managed to federate votes beyond their ethnic group when adopting inclusive platforms.

3. Iraq

The first democratic elections of Iraq took place in 2005, in a country still under US occupation and devastated by a heavy economic and humanitarian toll. The new regime adopted an unprecedented identity-based mode of governance, equally sharing the power between the different ethnic and religious groups. Since then, rising protests and fragmentation of ethno-sectarian blocks have been questioning the future of Iraqi governance.

In this section, we first introduce the major institutional changes that followed the US-led invasion of the country in 2003. We document the prominence of the sectarian divide in voting patterns by looking at the votes of the main ethno-religious Iraqi groups. Considering the effect of income on the vote, we question whether intra-sect inequalities challenged this cleavage over the period, paying a specific attention to the social reconfiguration of the opposition. The lack of strong additional divides beyond the sectarian one, in a context of

⁸ Notice that not all Kurds speak Kurdish as first language, so that our results are likely to underestimate this divide.

⁹ See appendix Figure AC6.

rising abstention, leads us to analyse the signs of a governance crisis that seems to surpass both social and ethno-religious cleavages.

A Democratic Transition Shaped by Ethno-Religious Sectarianism

Iraq found its modern territorial form after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Britain administered the country after World War I and the country only became fully independent in 1932. Under the influence of Pan-Arabism, promoted by the Egyptian Nasser, a coup overthrew the monarchy in place in 1958 and established a nationalist republic under military ruling. Social and agrarian reforms were implemented, backed by one of the most prominent communist party of the Middle East. In 1968, the Ba'ath Party took power and imposed a secular dictatorship. Quickly embodied by its leader Saddam Hussein, the Baathist regime signed the political dominance of Sunni Muslims from central Iraq over poorer Shia and incarnated an Arabic nationalism hostile to the Kurdish part of the population (Dawisha, 2009).

While the first decades were marked by significant improvement in human development outcomes, the two Gulf Wars (with Iran 1980-1988 and the annexation attempt of Kuwait in 1991), followed by ravaging international economic sanctions, let the country devastated. The US-led invasion in 2003, supposedly to prevent nuclear armament, ended unravelling the former regime. The post-2003 period instituted a profound institutional reconfiguration and opened an era of extreme violence. The disbanding of the Iraqi army and the systematic de-Ba'athification of the institutions put more than half a million of Iraqi out of work and let to an insurgency in Sunni areas. The conflict quickly turned into all-out civil war between violent militia, often aligned with tribal and religious interests. Political violence and insecurity remained an inherent part of the Iraqi landscape until today¹⁰ (Marr, 2018).

A sectarian mode of governance, sharing power equitably between the various ethnic and religious groups of the country – primarily Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, but also Turkmen and Christian – emerged under the aegis of the US. This system, the *muhassassa*, appeared as the preferred way to end the capture of power by a politico-military minority. All communities

¹⁰ According to the Iraqi Body Count, the outbreak of the civil war in 2006 and 2007 led to more than 25K civilian death per year, but more than 4K of annual deaths were still registered until 2018.

united in apparently monolithic blocks and only few secular parties imposed themselves in the political landscape. With the Baath party banned and its former members prohibited from standing for the elections, all main players were former opponents to Saddam's regime, either organized in exile or clandestinely.

Despite tensions and a new war in 2014 due to ISIS expansion over the North-West of the territory, the Islamic-dominated system has been remarkably stable since 2005, and elections held continuously. This normalization let a greater place for intra-group competition over time. The higher demographic weight of Shia led their coalitions to gain the highest vote share, while Sunni Arabs initially boycotted the electoral process (Figure 6). Yet, the quota-sharing system ensured that the government would be made of coalitions, with a turning allocation of positions among the three groups. Secular and anti-sectarian alliances also took a growing importance. United against the autocratic drift of the Shia Prime Minister Al-Maliki, the secular list Al-Iraqiya notably arrived first in the 2010 elections but rallied mostly Sunni votes.

Political elites gradually moved from fractionalization to collusion around power-sharing, while popular discontent increasingly transcended identity boundaries. Growing streets protests aroused throughout the country, and primarily in Shia areas since 2015 (Costantini, 2020). Moving from demands for basic services provisions, the social movement quickly denounced the failures of the state at large, questioning the legitimacy of its identity mode of governance. For the first time, the anti-sectarian stance deeply resonated in the Shia political bloc in the elections of 2018 and a new coalition managed to reshuffle the cards, reflecting this call for out-of-the-system alliances. Yet, record abstention as much as sustained protests since October 2019 have been questioning the ability of the 2003 regime to reinvent itself (Dodge and Mansour, 2020).

Spatial Inequalities and Sectarian Voting

More than three decades of conflicts severely deteriorated Iraqis' social conditions. With infrastructures and institutions in tatters, poverty has been exploding in an economy dominated by the resource curse (OPHDI, 2017). The salient security issue of the post-2003 era and poor governance further delayed any improvement of the situation for a population still lacking basic services (World Bank, 2014). No significant reduction in either poverty or

income inequality has then been observed throughout the period. The twin crisis of 2014, the worsening of economic conditions due to the collapse of oil prices and the resurgence of violence with the rise of ISIS, cancelled all the progress made in poverty reduction since the civil war (Krishnan and Olivieri, 2016). The share of the population under the national poverty line stagnates around 20 percent and is estimated to have increased by at least 10 percentage point in 2020 as a result of the global pandemic (UNDP, 2020).

This extreme poverty is however unevenly distributed over the territory, which impacts ethnic inequality. Despite the lack of ethnic census, government statistics of 2010 estimate around 65% of Iraqi population to be Shia and 35% Sunni, while the share of Kurds, mainly Sunni, ranges between 15 to 20 percent. The three main ethno-religious groups largely concentrate in defined areas: the North is mostly Kurdish, the Centre Sunni and the South of the country Shia (Figure 7).¹¹

Regional inequalities however reverted over time. While Shia and Kurdish provinces have been historically the most deprived, the latter experienced a reversal of fortune.¹² After having suffered from state repression and ethnic cleansing campaigns, the Kurdistan region benefited from a rather peaceful and prosperous time, under a *de facto* autonomy regime since 1991 institutionalized with the 2005 semi-federal constitution (Natali, 2010). In contrast, the succession of conflicts had a more pronounced spatial divergent effect, at the expense of the Sunni North-West. Increasing geographical disparities deepened the ethnic cleavage that took the form of an independence referendum for the Kurdistan Region in 2017, whose legality was rejected by the federal government. United as opponents to Saddam's regime, the alliance between Kurdish and Shia has been increasingly questioned with the war against ISIS (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

The sectarian feature of the Iraqi system leads by construction to extremely high regional cleavages. The regional variable captures almost perfectly the ethno-religious divide (Figure 8). Yet, decomposing Iraq within three major groups occupying distinct territories remains a simplified misrepresentation. Mixed provinces, such as the capital Baghdad or the disputed province of Kirkuk, remain important, and only one-third to one-half of Iraqi

¹¹ See appendix maps.

¹² See appendix Figures BA8 and BA9.

governorates are demographically dominated by a single community. The geographical decomposition of political outcomes also confirms that inter-sectarian votes exist beyond support for secular and anti-sectarian coalitions. Kurdish votes, nonetheless, display a dissimilar pattern, with almost no national list interfering in the Kurdish political scene.¹³

What Place for the Income Gradient in a Sectarian Vote?

Decomposing the vote along the income dimension confirms the importance of regional and sectarian disparities: controlling for ethno-religious identity almost completely cancels the effect of income on the vote between 2005 and 2014.¹⁴ Yet, the sectarian divide is not going without deep intra-sect inequalities. A poverty mapping exercise by district notably reveals that pockets of extreme poverty are side by side with islands enriched by oil windfalls, including within regions predominantly populated by one sect (Vishwanath et al. 2017).

This might be partly due to a supply side shortage. The fall of Saddam Hussein regime came along with the ban of the former socialist pan-Arabism ideology. Few parties openly identified themselves on a left-right spectrum or aimed at gathering poor voters in the post-2003 era. Secular coalitions, which adopted a more socialist tone, struggled finding an effective cross-sectarian resonance and initially appealed more to richer Iraqi.¹⁵

The sectarianization of Iraqi politics also coincided with a struggle over oil resources and their redistribution, that notably channeled through public sector appointment (Al-Mawalwi, 2019). Civil servants are much richer, while the poor are concentrated in informal jobs. In a country often ranked in the world top ten corrupted countries, patronage defined on an ethno-religious base kept playing a prominent electoral role (Abdullah et al., 2018). The civil war that tore apart the country after 2003 and the close links between politics and militia lastly made of the sectarian vote a matter of security (Haddad, 2020a).

It is only in 2018 that poorer voters became significantly more supportive of anti-sectarian lists, when the alternative took the form of an unprecedented alliance between the secular

¹³ See appendix Figures BB5.

¹⁴ See appendix Figures BC1, BC2, and BC3.

¹⁵ See appendix Tables B3 to B7.

communists and a faction of Islamic Shia, the Saadrists (Figure 9). Decried as a tactical alliance with no future, this coalition revealed the importance of the interactions between leftists and Islamic movements on social grounds (Robin-D’Cruz 2019). By redefining the boundaries of the “anti-sectarian” camp suddenly prone to incorporate Islamic components, this novel coalition may have reintroduced a class cleavage while transforming the social composition of the opposition.

At the same time, the 2018 elections illustrated how a system based on sectarian lines failed to equally benefit all members of a same sect. It is in the mostly Shia province of Basra that social protests started mid-2015. Demonstrators held their own Shia leaders accountable for the worsening of public services and lack of electricity in one of the most oil-rich governorates, despite religious tensions revived by the war against the Sunni Islamic State (Haddad, 2020b).

An Absence of Alternate Cleavages in a System in Crisis?

Decades of conflicts severely damaged public institutions and infrastructures in Iraq, especially education and healthcare that used to be ranked near the top of the region in the late 1970s. The collapse of the Iraqi educational system could have then impacted the political choices of Iraqi. Nonetheless, as for income, education does not seem to impact voting patterns after having controlled for ethno-sectarian dynamics.¹⁶

The absence of a salient education divide may however relate to the continuous and massive exodus of the former educated middle class. Initiated during the war decades, the brain drain further amplified with the sectarian violence and the deBa’athification process, leading to their potential disappearance in Iraq demographics nowadays (Sassoon, 2012). Interestingly, anti-sectarian lists were initially more supported by higher-educated voters (Figure 10). Yet, by reinventing themselves, anti-sectarian alliances managed to diversify their electorate beyond the former elite of the Saddam regime.

¹⁶ See appendix Figures BC7 and BC8.

Moreover, inequalities in access to schooling partly overlap with a generational effect in one of the youngest countries in the world.¹⁷ Youth and women are equally excluded from the labour force while the succession of conflicts led to a massive share of internally displaced persons that still accounts for one out of ten Iraqi, a majority of women and children concentrated in poor urban areas (UNDP, 2014). Yet, one does not observe the emergence of new striking cleavages along age or gender dimensions.¹⁸

Social discontent, rather than channeling through votes for anti-sectarian lists, may have however mostly expressed itself in the form of abstention, especially high among young and female voters. Strikingly, while boycott aligned with Sunni identity at first, refusing to cast a vote may have become the clearest cross-sectarian and cross-class mode of political expression.¹⁹ Trust deficit towards the government equally jumped across all social and ethno-religious groups (Figure 11). In 2018, the predominantly Shia-populated southern region was not only exhibiting the highest level of political activism but also the highest share of respondents reporting a total lack of confidence in the government, surpassing for the first time the score of the Sunni middle-north region.

To some extent, the rising abstention and continuous protests movements may invite to conclude that the anti-sectarian lists are not necessarily perceived by discontent voters as incarnating an opposition to a political system that little mirrors the evolution of social cleavages (Jabar, 2018). These lists are not preferentially more supported by most politically active voters, nor by the ones that expressed no trust in the government since 2014.²⁰

4. Algeria

Algerian politics is still dominated by the state-party that ruled the country after the independence, the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN). Yet, the country was the first one of the Arab World to launch multiparty elections at the end of the 1980s but the attempt quickly failed. Since 2019, massive mass protests, the Hirak, have been

¹⁷ United Nations Development Program, *Iraq Human Development Report*, (UNDP, 2014)

¹⁸ See appendix Figure BC9.

¹⁹ See appendix Figure BD1 and BD4.

²⁰ See appendix Figures BC12 and BC13.

profoundly shaking the regime, questioning the potential transformation of the regime's social base.

We first look at the sociospatial disparities of the country in the presence of an important minority group geographically concentrated, the Berbers. In the absence of strong regional divide in the political scene, we turn to the decomposition of the electorate along the income gradient. We identify an original cross-class alliance incarnated by a formal two-party ruling that unite both the half poorer and the richest earners. The massive abstention of the youth leads us to put in perspective the importance of the generational cleavage. We lastly turn into the other dimensions of abstention and political activism in light of the massive protests that shake the regime since 2019.

From Post-Colonial Authoritarianism to an 'Electoral Autocracy'

Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962. The new regime, deprived of its former French and Algeria-born European bureaucrats, replaced them with trusted war veterans, enshrining from the start the deep connections between the State and the military (Stora, 2004). The FLN that had united revolutionary dissidents during the independence war (1954-1962), imposed itself as the new state party. It established an authoritarian system promoting state socialism and Arabic nationalism which prevailed for almost three decades, until nation-scale riots forced the regime to adopt governance reforms in 1988.

Calling for ending corruption in a context of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, the popular unrest was met by the adoption of a new constitution that paved the way for a democratization process, raising hope in the whole Arab world. The experience was however cut short when a fundamentalist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (*Front Islamique du Salut*, FIS) won the first pluralist elections of 1991, triggering military intervention (Peyroulou, 2020).

With the National Assembly dissolved and the FIS banned, the military took effective control of the country. State repression coupled with a violent radicalization of part of the Islamists triggered a decade of bloody civil war. It was only after this "Black Decade" that a second democratization turn happened. In 1999, Bouteflika, a long-standing FLN member backed by the military, was elected president. He would remain in place for nearly two decades, relying

on a new pro-government coalition between the FLN and a technocratic movement, the Democratic National Rally (*Rassemblement National Démocratique*, RND) (McDougall, 2017).

The political landscape in Algeria remained dominated by the alliance of the FLN and RND despite no strong popular backing in general elections (Figure 12). The extremely high vote shares going to other marginal parties did not translate into the allocation of parliamentary seats.²¹ While the multiparty electoral system was preserved during the civil war, relatively fairer elections only took place after 2002, and kept being blamed for only perpetuating a status quo with limited democratization (Aghrout and Zoubir, 2015). A contested constitutional modification, ruling out presidential terms' limits in 2008, also strengthened the executive.

The Arab Spring wave in 2011 had relatively little repercussions in Algerian politics. Consumption subsidies, pay rises for civil servants, and youth unemployment schemes mitigated the protests (Volpi, 2013; Achy, 2013). New political parties were legalized but stayed aside the parliament due to the electoral threshold. Non-fundamentalist Islamic parties also federated in 2012 but did not manage to replicate the success encountered across the region (Ghanem, 2014; 2019). Overall, the opposition remained weak and divided, and abstention strong, exceeding 50 percent over the period.

Instead, located riots had an increased role in the political agenda in a context of worsening socioeconomic conditions. They gained an unprecedented national dimension in February 2019, following the announcement of Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth mandate (Karthala, 2019). Despite the president's renunciation and the organization of new elections massively boycotted, the so-called Hirak protests were still mobilizing a year after it started, with unclear political consequences at the time of writing (Volpi, 2020).

Spatial Disparities and Ethnic Cleavages in Algeria

Algeria is a middle-income country, which relies mostly on its reserves of hydrocarbon and gas, all located in its Southern part. The coast, while representing only 4 percent of the

²¹ See appendix Figure CA1.

country's surface, concentrates almost half of inhabitants and companies. This massive coastal settlement has come with important spatial disparities, especially between the north and the poorer south (Khaoua, 2014).²² However, while new regional claims have been taking a growing importance in the 2010s in the form of movements against unemployment and youth marginalization in the South, they do not seem to have found an echo in the electoral arena with no major distinct party representing the distinct interest of the South.

The picture is quite different when turning to the Berber-populated region of Kabylia, in the North of the country. The Berber, or self-named Amazigh, represent about a quarter of the Algerian population. Distinct by their language and culture, they were initially not recognized by the newly independent state that promoted the Arabization of the country. The so-called "Berber question" reached the political scene in 1980 when popular uprisings took place in Kabylia. Although contained to that region, this first large-scale unrest endorsed socioeconomic and democratic requests at large.

No regional or ethnic Berber political party was launched with the introduction of multiparty elections in 1991. Instead, two of the main secular opposition parties, the Socialist Forces Front (*Front des forces socialistes*, FFS) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (*Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie*, RCD), were more successful in the region, even if they did not incorporate any ethnic claim in their platform (Figure 13). The Kabyle vote appears as a contestation vote that may be explained by the potential exclusion from power and clientelist networks organized by the government. Mountainous and densely populated, Kabylia used to be highly rural and remaining rural spots encounter important unemployment rates (Willis, 2014). However, contrary to the Kurds in Turkey, the Algerian "ethnic question" does not have a clear class dimension, as Kabylia does not appear to be significantly poorer or richer than the rest of the country.²³

A Renewed Cross-Class Alliance in a Two-Party Ruling System

Since the end of the Black Decade, two parties, the FLN and the RND, have been effectively running the country, despite apparently opposite ideological stances. The FLN had historically

²² See appendix maps.

²³ See appendix Figures CA12 and CA13.

a strong socialist component while the RND initially incarnated a new liberal economic view, uniting technocrats behind the structural adjustment reforms defended by the International Monetary Fund (Hamadouche and Zoubir, 2009). The income gradient of these two parties reflects this divide. The FLN seems to have been relatively more successful among low-income voters, while the RND has appealed to higher-income voters (Figure 14). The same is observed with respect to education.²⁴ The difference however disappeared at the end of the period and may denote the increase perception of collusion between the two parties.

Such pattern recalls the characteristics of so-called neopatrimonial states with cartel ruling, in which blurry frontiers between politics and the economic sector foster clientelistic loyalties among a socially diverse electorate (Eisenstadt 1973). On one hand, the regime adopted a strong welfare component since the 1970s and kept with high level of spending and redistributive policies with respect to MENA standards, ensuring poverty reduction (Eibl, 2020). The distribution of the hydrocarbon rent went through housing or interest rate subsidy and important state employment. On the other hand, the RND also constitutes the party of the new entrepreneurs and globalization, as liberalization in the 1990s led to a rapid expansion of the private sector and marked a new stage for the crony capitalism system (Belguidoum, 2020). Each party within the ruling cartel therefore attracted a side of the income distribution, reconciling – or making disappear – class cleavages, thus contributing to maintaining the political *status quo*.

The Relevance of a Generational Cleavage

The Algerian population is very young, with more than 40 percent aged below 25. The youth is one of the most fragile groups of the country, with an unemployment rate two to three times higher than the national average over the period. In the absence of socio-economic opportunities and the decline of targeted policies that became too costly after the drop in oil prices in 2014, almost two-third of the youth reported having thought about emigrating from Algeria in 2019 (Unicef, 2019).²⁵

In this context, the relationship between the youth and the regime has been especially scrutinized (L. Thieux, 2021). Young Algerians were one of the main actors of the 1988 riots

²⁴ See appendix Figure CC3.

²⁵ See appendix figure CD7.

and they sizably joined Islamist armed groups during the civil war (Willis, 1999). The historical legitimacy of the FLN taken from its participation into the independence war, as in many post-colonial rulings, also tends to fade away among the new generations. The youth has thus displayed a significant rejection of the regime party, while older voters have been much more likely to support the FLN, except in 2017 (Figure 15).

This relative surge in the youth's support to the FLN should nonetheless be interpreted with care. The results are mostly driven by increased abstention, with less than a fifth of voters younger than 35 declaring having voted in the 2017 legislative elections, in a context where aggregate turnout reached only 35 percent.²⁶

A Discredited Electoral System

The extremely high abstention over the period casts doubts on the ability of the multiparty system to capture discontent and echoes the continuous call to boycott election made by part of the opposition (Buttorff, 2019). While presidential elections present a higher turnout, the appointment of presidential candidates does not reply to a party system mechanism. The ruling parties (FLN, RND) and some opposition parties back the candidate endorsed by the military. The incumbent therefore faced almost no real challengers and with the notable exception of 2019 was re-elected with more than 80 percent of votes.

Abstention, together with street protests have then been seen as a renewed form of political participation in Algeria since the early 2000s (Hamadouche, 2009). In fact, political activism, as captured by the share of respondents having signed a petition or attended an organized demonstration, has been increasingly invested by the more disadvantaged social strata over time (Figure 16). Civil movements have also been seen as potential ways to bring the democratic opposition together with an increasing participation in various forms of civil society beyond political parties and labor unions (Northey, 2018). As the movement of the unemployed in the South of the country, the Hirak movement claimed its independence from any political parties (Hamadouche and Dris, 2019).

²⁶ See appendix Figure CD1.

By a striking parallel, Iraqi and Algerian 2019 protests took place in rentier states, that avoided their own Arab Springs in 2011, but were increasingly fragilized by the drastic decline in their oil revenues. The two movements, adopting an anti-elite and anti-corruption rhetoric, revealed that high inequality levels have become part of political conflicts. Transcending existing cleavages and displaying interclass and intersect dynamics, they appear as momenta susceptible to reverse previous equilibria, letting the future of both regimes uncertain.

5. Conclusion

This paper extends a comparative methodology initially developed in Piketty (2018) to three countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. Creating simple measures of inequality along different dimensions, we investigated whether one could relate the divides observed in voting patterns to some aspect of social and income inequality.

In Turkey, we identified that the salient religious divide preceded the arrival in power of the current incumbent. Taken on its own, the religious cleavage does not explain how the AKP rose to power and managed to predominate for almost two decades in the secular republic. The need of integrating other dimensions, such as education and income, leads us to identify a rising “inverted” class divide, with low-income and lower-educated voters shifting towards right-wing parties since the early 1990s. The ethnic conflict around the Kurdish minority, which translated into strong regional voting patterns over the period, encompasses tremendous spatial disparities. All in all, the role of socioeconomic determinants in the Turkish setting seems especially accurate, despite the apparent move to identity politics.

In Iraq, we found a strong persistence of the sectarian voting that goes beyond existing intra-sect inequalities. Nonetheless, this cleavage might have been recently questioned by the reconfiguration of the opposition that became more inclusive in the last elections. Moving from an alliance of secular parties with an over-representation of Sunnis Arabs, the anti-sectarian lists were equally supported by the poorer Shia in 2018. However, the diversity of the social composition of the opposition might relate to its lack of unity and extreme fragmentation. The absence of alternate political cleavages beyond the sectarian one may explain why popular discontent has rather channelled through abstention, which became the clearest cross-sectarian mode of political expression.

In Algeria, contrarily to the two other settings, socio-spatial diversities do not overlap with the geographical concentration of an important ethnic minority, the Berbers. The Berbers supported a well-identified part of the opposition over the period, suggesting the relevance of an identity vote. They however did not adopt separatist requests. Moreover, we identify that the power structure of the FLN, the state-party that ruled the country since the independence, may have been recently reinvented. The system now displays an original cross-class alliance, exemplified by an actual two-party ruling which unites both the half-poorer and the high-income voters. However, the massive abstention throughout the period called for further investigating the socioeconomic determinants of the discontent part of the population. While rejecting the existing party competition system, increasingly socially diverse protestors massively took the streets since February 2019.

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
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
Figure 1 - Legislative election results in Turkey, 1987-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Turkish political parties in legislative elections between 1987 and 2018.


Figure 2 - The religious cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2015



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters and the share of non-religious voters voting for right-wing and Islamic parties, and the same difference for the CHP, before and after controls. In 2015, religious voters were more likely to vote for these parties by 30 percentage points. Religious voters are defined as those who declare being "A religious person" (World Values Survey) or "Very religious / Somewhat religious" (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems).


Figure 3 - The AKP vote by income in Turkey, 2007-2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) by income quintile. In 2018, 48% of the poorest 20% of voters (Q1) voted AKP, compared to 32% of the top 20% (Q5).


Figure 4 - The educational cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2017



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for right-wing (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic (RP/FP) parties before 2007 or for the AKP after that date, before and after controls. In 2018, highest-educated voters were less likely to vote AKP by 14 percentage points.


Figure 5 - The Turkish-Kurdish cleavage in Turkey, 1995-2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Kurdish speakers and the share of speakers of Turkish and other languages voting for right-wing and Islamic parties before 2007 and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after that date, before and after controls. Kurdish speakers were less likely to vote AKP by 32 percentage points in 2015.


Figure 6 - Legislative election results in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).


Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Iraqi political parties in legislative elections between 2005 (January, labelled here as 2004) and 2018.

Figure 7 - Geographical distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Iraq



Source: authors.


Figure 8 - The regional cleavage in Iraq, 2005-2018
Vote for Shia Islamic lists by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by region. In 2018, Shia Islamic Lists received 53% of votes in Southern Iraq, compared to 0% in North-Eastern Iraq. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.


Figure 9 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among low-income voters in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of top 50% earners voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity. In 2018, low-income voters were more likely to vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by 3 percentage points. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.


Figure 10 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group. In 2018, 22% of the 50% least educated voters supported secular or anti-sectarian lists. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.


Figure 11 - Trust deficit towards the government by region in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure decomposes distrust expressed towards the government by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.


Figure 12 - Legislative election results in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main parties or groups of political parties in legislative elections held in Algeria between 2002 and 2017. FFS: Front des forces socialistes; RCD: Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie; PT: Parti des travailleurs.


Figure 13 - Vote for the secular opposition by region / language in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular opposition parties (Front des forces socialistes, FFS and Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie, RCD) by region. In 2017, 11% of Kabyle voters supported the secular opposition, compared to 6% of other voters. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taken as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.


Figure 14 - Vote for FLN / RND and income in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the ruling parties (Front de libération nationale, FLN and Rassemblement national démocratique, RND), before and after controls. In 2002, top-income voters were less likely to vote FLN by 6 percentage points.


Figure 15 - The generational cleavage in Algeria, 2002-2017
Vote for FLN by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Liberal Front (FLN) by age group. In 2002, 27% of voters aged below 25 voted for the FLN, compared to 48% of those aged over 55.


Figure 16 - Political activism by income group in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).


Note: the figure shows the share of individuals declaring having already attended a demonstration or signed a petition by income group. This share grew from 22% to 33% among the poorest 50% between 2002 and 2017.

Figure AA1 - Composition of the electorate by education



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level.


Figure AA2 - Composition of the electorate by age



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by age group.


Figure AA3 - Composition of the electorate by region



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by region. No data available in 1999.


Figure AA4 - Composition of the electorate by language



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by language. No data available in 1991 and 1999.


Figure AA5 - Composition of the electorate by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by degree of political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration). No data available after 2007.


Figure AA6 - Composition of income groups by language, 2007



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by language in 2007.


Figure AA7 - Composition of income groups by language, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups by language in 2018.


Figure AA8 - Composition of income quintiles by region, 1991



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by region in 1991.

Figure AA9 - Composition of income quintiles by region, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
 Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by region in 2018.


Figure AA10 - Composition of income quintiles by education level, 1991



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by education level in 1991.


Figure AA11 - Composition of income quintiles by education level, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by education level in 2018.

Figure AA12 - Income composition of regions, 1991




Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
 Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 1991.

Figure AA13 - Income composition of regions, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
 Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2018.


Figure AA14 - Education composition of regions, 1991



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the distribution of education groups by region in 1991.

Figure AA15 - Education composition of regions, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education groups by region in 2018.


Figure AA16 - Linguistic composition of regions, 2007



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of regions by language spoken at home in 2007.


Figure AA17 - Linguistic composition of regions, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of regions by language spoken at home in 2018.


Figure AB1 - Party choice of Kurdish-speaking voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of the party choice among Kurdish speaking population. No data available in 1991 and 1999.


Figure AB2 - Party choice of top-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of top 10% earners voting either Islamic (RP/FP) and AKP or centre-left (DSP/SHP) and CHP in the Turkish adult population, and its evolution over time.


Figure AB3 - Party choice of low-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of bottom 50% earners voting either Islamic (RP/FP/AKP), center-right (DYP/ANAP), centre-left (DSP/SHP/CHP) or Kurdish parties in the Turkish adult population, and its evolution over time.


Figure AB4 - Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by education group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (ANAP/DYP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by education group.


Figure AB5 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by education group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by education group.


Figure AB6 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by education group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by education group.


Figure AB7 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by region



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by region.

Figure AB8 - Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by religiosity (practices)



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
 Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (ANAP/DYP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by religiosity (measured by service attendances or frequency of pray). Top 10 percent denotes hardly no religious practices and bottom 50 percent denotes regular religious practices.


Figure AB9 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties by religiosity (practices)



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by religiosity (measured by service attendances or frequency of pray). Top 10 percent denotes hardly no religious practices and bottom 50 percent denotes regular religious practices.


Figure AB10 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by religiosity (practices)



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and by the CHP, by religiosity (measured by service attendances or frequency of pray). No data available in 2011.


Figure AB11 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties by language



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date by language. No data available in 1991 and 1999.


Figure AB12 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by language



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (SHP/DSP) and the CHP by language. No data available in 1991 and 1999.


Figure AB13 - Vote for Kurdish parties by language spoken at home



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish parties by language spoken at home. No data available in 1991 and 1999.


Figure AB14 - Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by age group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (DYP/ANAP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by age group.


Figure AB15 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by age group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by age group.


Figure AB16 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by age group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (SHP/ DSP) and the CHP by age group.


Figure AB17 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties by gender



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by gender.


Figure AB18 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by gender



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by gender


Figure AB19 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by political activism degree, measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available after 2007.


Figure AB20 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (SHP/DSP) and the CHP by political activism degree, measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available after 2007.


Figure AB21 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by perceived social class



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by right-wing and Islamic parties by perceived social class.


Figure AB21 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by perceived social class



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by perceived social class.


Figure AB23 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties by interest in politics



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right (DYP/ANAP), Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by interest declared in politics. No data available in 2011 and 2015.


Figure AB24 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by interest in politics



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by interest declared in politics. No data available in 2011 and 2015.


Figure AB25 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by income quintile.


Figure AB26 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by income group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date by income group.


Figure AB27 - Vote for centre-right parties and AKP by income group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (DYP/ANAP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by income group.


Figure AB28 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP by income group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by income group.


Figure AB29 - Vote for Kurdish parties by income group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish parties by income group.


Vote for Islamic parties and AKP by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by income quintile.


Figure AB31 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among highest-educated religious voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by right-wing and Islamic parties among voters self-describing themselves as a religious person, according to their highest educational attainment.


Figure AB32 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among highest-educated women



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, among women, according to their highest educational attainment.


Figure AB33 - Vote for centre-left parties and CHP among top-income voters by education level



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP among top 10% earners, according to their highest educational attainment.


Figure AB34 - Vote for Islamic parties and the AKP among the youth by education level



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, among voters aged below 30, according to their highest educational attainment.


Figure AC1 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among top-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic (RP/FP) parties before 2007 and for the AKP after that date, before and after controlling for other variables.


Figure AC2 - Vote for selected parties among low-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic parties (RP/FP) and the AKP after 2007 or for the center-left (DSP/SHP) and the CHP, before and after controlling for other variables.


Figure AC3 - Vote for Islamic parties and AKP among young voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below 25 and the share of older voters voting for Islamic parties (RP/FP) and the AKP after 2007, before and after controlling for other variables.


Figure AC4 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among women



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for centre-right (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic (RP/FP) parties before 2007 and for the AKP after that date, before and after controlling for education, income, age, employment and marital status, region and religiosity.


Figure AC5 - Vote for right-wing and Islamic parties among upper-class voters



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and voters that identified as upper class and the share of other voters supporting right-wing and Islamic parties. In 2015, the upper class is defined as those who declared several forms of capital accumulation (residence, property, bonds, savings).


Figure AC6 - Vote for Kurdish parties in Southeastern Anatolia



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Southeastern Anatolia residents and the share of other voters voting for Kurdish Parties, before and after controlling for other variables. No data are available before 2007. The Kurdish minority is predominantly located in the South Eastern region.


Figure AD1 - Vote for Kurdish parties by position on a left-right scale



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Kurdish parties by the self-assessed position of voters on a left-right scale.


Figure AD2 - Vote for Islamic and AKP by position on a left-right scale



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties (RP/FP) and the AKP by the self-assessed position of voters on a left-right scale.


Figure AD3 - Vote for centre-left and CHP by position on a left-right scale



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by the self-assessed position of voters on a left-right scale.


Figure AD4 - Abstention by age group



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by age group and its evolution over time. No data available before 2011.

Map A1 - Geographical distribution of the Kurdish population in Turkey




Share of the province population self-identifying as Kurdish

- Less than 20%
- 20% - 40%
- 40% - 65%
- Above 65%
- No data available

0 100 200 km


Source: authors' computation using ethnic self-identification reported in the KONDA's monthly Barometer series (2010-2015)

Map A2 - Geographical distribution of income per capita in Turkey, 1997




Source: authors' computation, Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)

Map A3 - Geographical distribution of income per capita in Turkey, 2017




Source: authors' computation, Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)

Map A4 - Geographical distribution of lowest-educated population in Turkey, 2018




Source: authors' computation, Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)

Map A5 - Geographical distribution of the highest-educated population in Turkey, 2018



Source: authors' computation, Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)


Map A6 - Geographical distribution of the non-religious population in Turkey



Source: authors' computation, self-reported religiosity from KONDA's monthly Barometer series (2010-2015).

Note: The religiosity variable is coded into four items: non-believer, believer, religious, devout.

Map A7 - Geographical distribution of the very religious population in Turkey



Source: authors' computation, self-reported religiosity from KONDA's monthly Barometer series (2010-2015).
Note: The religiosity variable is coded into four items: non-believer, believer, religious, devout

Table B1 - Survey data sources

| Year | Survey | Source | Sample size |
|------|----------------------------------------|--------|-------------|
| 1990 | World Values Survey | WVS | 1 030 |
| 1996 | World Values Survey | WVS | 1 907 |
| 2001 | World Values Survey | WVS | 3 401 |
| 2007 | World Values Survey | WVS | 1 346 |
| 2011 | Comparative Study of Electoral Systems | CSES | 1 109 |
| 2015 | Comparative Study of Electoral Systems | CSES | 1 086 |
| 2018 | Comparative Study of Electoral Systems | CSES | 1 069 |

Source: authors' elaboration.

Table B2 - Complete descriptive statistics by year


| | 1991 | 1995 | 1999 | 2007 | 2011 | 2015 | 2018 |
|---------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Education: Primary | 64% | 65% | 57% | 49% | 49% | 42% | 36% |
| Education: Secondary | 27% | 26% | 34% | 39% | 38% | 45% | 44% |
| Education: Tertiary | 9% | 9% | 9% | 12% | 12% | 13% | 20% |
| Age: 18-24 | 25% | 22% | 20% | 21% | 18% | 18% | 17% |
| Age: 25-34 | 27% | 26% | 29% | 32% | 27% | 24% | 23% |
| Age: 35-45 | 21% | 24% | 25% | 22% | 20% | 21% | 24% |
| Age: 45-60 | 19% | 17% | 18% | 18% | 22% | 22% | 24% |
| Age: 60+ | 9% | 10% | 8% | 8% | 14% | 15% | 12% |
| Gender: Man | 50% | 50% | 51% | 50% | 45% | 51% | 44% |
| Employment status: Employed | 42% | 42% | 42% | 39% | 27% | 35% | 39% |
| Employment status: Unemployed | 9% | 4% | 10% | 6% | 10% | 8% | 6% |
| Employment status: Inactive | 49% | 54% | 48% | 55% | 63% | 57% | 54% |
| Region: Aegean | 24% | 4% | | 13% | 5% | 13% | 13% |
| Region: Black Sea | 13% | 12% | | 12% | 8% | 9% | 10% |
| Region: Central Anatolia | 13% | 17% | | 16% | 20% | 17% | 15% |
| Region: Eastern Anatolia | 4% | 18% | | 9% | 4% | 8% | 7% |
| Region: Istanbul | 22% | 14% | | 14% | 21% | 18% | 19% |
| Region: Marmara | 8% | 24% | | 13% | 13% | 14% | 13% |
| Region: Mediterranean | 10% | 11% | | 13% | 11% | 11% | 12% |
| Region: South Eastern Anatolia | 6% | 0% | | 10% | 18% | 11% | 10% |
| Language: Kurdish | | 1% | 0% | 8% | 14% | 11% | 8% |
| Language: Other | | 1% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 1% | 1% |
| Language: Turkish | | 98% | 100% | 89% | 84% | 88% | 91% |
| Perceived social class: Working class | | 21% | 23% | 31% | | 28% | |
| Perceived social class: Lower middle class | | 27% | 36% | 38% | | 45% | |
| Perceived social class: Upper middle class | | 43% | 26% | 26% | | 21% | |
| Perceived social class: Upper class | | 9% | 14% | 5% | | 6% | |
| Turnout: Did not vote | | | | 24% | 7% | 9% | 7% |
| Turnout: Voted | | | | 76% | 93% | 91% | 93% |
| Interest in politics: Not at all interested | 29% | 23% | 34% | 33% | | | 24% |
| Interest in politics: Not very interested | 23% | 18% | 26% | 28% | | | 23% |
| Interest in politics: Somewhat interested | 38% | 46% | 32% | 30% | | | 39% |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Interest in politics: Very interested | 10% | 13% | 8% | 8% | | 14% |
| Political activism: None | 85% | 85% | 84% | 87% | | |
| Political activism; Having signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration | 15% | 15% | 16% | 13% | | |
| Religiosity: Non-religious person | 25% | 22% | 19% | 17% | 12% | 12% |
| Religiosity: Religious person | 75% | 78% | 81% | 83% | 88% | 88% |

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.


Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by year for selected available variables. The decline in the share of non-religious respondents is due to inconsistencies across data sources and should not be interpreted as an overall rise in religiosity in Turkey.

Figure BA1 - Composition of the electorate by education level




Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by education level.

Figure BA2 - Composition of the electorate by age




Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by age group.

Figure BA3 - Composition of the electorate by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by region.


Figure BA4 - Composition of the electorate by linguistic group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by language. No data available in 2018.


Figure BA5 - Composition of the electorate by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by degree of political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration).

Figure BA6 - Composition of income quintiles by language, 2004




Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2004.

Figure BA7 - Composition of income quintiles by language, 2014



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2014.


Figure BA8 - Composition of income quintiles by region, 2004



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by region in 2004. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BA9 - Composition of income quintiles by region, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2018. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BA10 - Composition of education groups by region, 2004



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by region in 2004. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BA11 - Composition of education groups by region, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by region in 2018. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BA12 - Composition of income groups by political activism, 2005



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in 2005.


Figure BA13 - Composition of income groups by political activism, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in 2018.


Figure BA14 - Composition of income quintiles by employment sector, 2010



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by employment sector in 2010.

Figure BA15 - Composition of income quintiles by employment sector, 2018




Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by employment sector in 2018.

Figure BA16 - Income composition of Iraqi regions, 2004




Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 2004.

Figure BA17 - Income composition of Iraqi regions, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 2018.


Figure BB1 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by education group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by education group.


Figure BB2 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group.


Figure BB3 - Vote for Sunni Islamic lists by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Sunni Islamic lists by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BB4 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-sectarian lists by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BB5 - Vote for Kurdish lists by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish lists by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BB6 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by language



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by language. No data available in 2018.

Figure BB7 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by language



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by language. No data available in 2018.


Figure BB8 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by age group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by age group.


Figure BB9 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by age group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by age group.


Figure BB10 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by gender



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by gender.


Figure BB11 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by gender



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by gender.


Figure BB12 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by degree of religious practices



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by degree of religious practices. Bottom 50% denotes highly religious (regular practices) and top 10% denotes none or hardly no religious practices.


Figure BB13 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by degree of religious practices



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-sectarian lists by degree of religious practices. Bottom 50% denotes very religious (regular basis) and top 10% denotes none or hardly no religious practices.


Figure BB14 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by political activism degree measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available in 2004.


Figure BB15 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by political activism degree measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available in 2004.


Figure BB16 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by wealth index



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by wealth index.


Figure BB17 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by wealth index



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by wealth index.


Figure BB18 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by level of confidence in the government



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by confidence expressed in the government.


Figure BB19 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by level of confidence in the government



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by confidence expressed in the government.


Figure BB20 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by interest in politics



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by interest declared in politics.


Figure BB21 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by interest in politics



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by interest declared in politics.


Figure BB22 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by income quintile.


Figure BB23 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by income quintile.


Figure BB24 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists by income group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by income group.


Figure BB25 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by income group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by income group.

Figure BC1 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists among top-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC2 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among top-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC3 - Vote for Sunni Islamic lists among top-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for Sunni Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC4 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists among low-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC5 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists among highest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC6 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among highest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC7 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists among lowest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of education voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC8 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among lowest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of education voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC9 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among young voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below 25 and the share of older voters voting for the secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controls.


Figure BC10 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among women



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controls.


Figure BC11 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among voters experiencing significant economic difficulties



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters who declared experiencing significant economic difficulties and the share of other voters voting for the secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC12 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among politically active voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of politically active and the share of other voters (defined as having already signed and/or attended a demonstration) voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controls.


Figure BC13 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among voters not trusting the government



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters having limited or no confidence in the government and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BC14 - Vote for Shia Islamic lists among Southern Iraq voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters in Southern Iraq and the share of other voters voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for income and ethno-religious identity.


Figure FBD1 - Abstention by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by region. Middle-Northern is predominantly Sunni. Baghdad is mixed. Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure FBD2 - Abstention by age group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by age group. Results have been reweighed to match official abstention rates.


Figure FBD3 - Abstention by education group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by education group. Results have been reweighed to match official abstention rates.


Figure BD4 - Abstention by income group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by income group. Results have been reweighed to match official abstention rates.


Figure BD5 - Abstention by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the decomposition of the electorate who declared having not voted in the last elections by political activism degree measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available in 2004.


Figure BD6 - Political activism by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the regional decomposition of political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in the Iraqi adult population. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni. Baghdad is mixed. Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.


Figure BD7 - Composition of regions by political activism, 2005



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of political activism, measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration, by region in 2005.


Figure BD8 - Composition of regions by political activism, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of political activism, measured by having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration, by region in 2018.


Figure BD9 - Political activism by income group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration by income group.


Figure BD10 - Trust deficit towards the government over time



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of trust expressed in the government in the Iraqi adult population and its evolution over time.


Figure BD11 - Trust deficit towards the government by income group



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having absolutely no confidence in the government by income group.


Figure BD12 - Turnout among top-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BD13 - Turnout among low-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of income who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BD14 - Turnout among highest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of lowest 90% educated voters who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity.


Figure BD15 - Turnout among lower-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% educated voters and the share of other voters who declared having voted in the last elections, before and after controls.


Figure BD16 - Turnout among young voters



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below 25 and the share of older voters that declared having voted in the last elections.


Figure BD17 - Turnout among women



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men that declared having voted in the last elections.


Map B1 - Geographical distribution of multidimensional poverty in Iraq in 2017



Source: authors' computation using subnational decomposition of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (University of Oxford).

Note: The Multidimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards.


Map B2 - Socio-spatial disparities evolution in Iraq between 2004 and 2018



Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University).

Note: The map shows the geographical time-evolution of the Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI). The SHDI is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.


Map B3 - Socio-spatial disparities in Iraq in 2004



Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University).

Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

Map B4 - Socio-spatial disparities in Iraq in 2018



Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University).

Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

Table B1 - Survey data sources

| Year | Survey | Source | Sample size |
|------|---------------------|----------------|-------------|
| 2004 | World Values Survey | WVS | 2 325 |
| 2006 | World Values Survey | WVS | 2 701 |
| 2011 | Arab Barometer | WVS | 1 234 |
| 2013 | World Values Survey | WVS | 1 200 |
| 2019 | Arab Barometer | Arab Barometer | 2 461 |

Source: authors' elaboration.

Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

Table B2 - Complete descriptive statistics by year

| | 2004 | 2005 | 2010 | 2014 | 2018 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Education: Primary | 57% | 59% | 58% | 50% | 57% |
| Education: Secondary | 30% | 30% | 30% | 37% | 27% |
| Education: Tertiary | 13% | 11% | 12% | 13% | 16% |
| Gender: Woman | 52% | 52% | 51% | 48% | 49% |
| Gender: Man | 48% | 48% | 49% | 52% | 51% |
| Employment status: Employed | 39% | 40% | 38% | 39% | 25% |
| Employment status: Unemployed | 10% | 8% | 8% | 9% | 11% |
| Employment status: Inactive | 51% | 52% | 53% | 52% | 64% |
| Marital status: Not Married | 28% | 28% | 30% | 31% | 35% |
| Marital status: Married | 72% | 72% | 70% | 69% | 65% |
| Religion: Sunni | 32% | 25% | 76% | | 41% |
| Religion: Shia | 67% | 73% | 23% | | 59% |
| Ethnicity: Arab | 80% | 75% | 83% | 79% | |
| Ethnicity: Kurdish | 17% | 23% | 16% | 15% | |
| Language at home: Arabic | 80% | 71% | 83% | 79% | |
| Language at home: Kurdish | 17% | 27% | 16% | 15% | |
| Language at home: Other | 3% | 2% | 2% | 6% | |
| Turnout: Did not vote | 49% | 9% | 17% | 23% | 40% |
| Turnout: Voted | 51% | 91% | 83% | 77% | 60% |
| Interest in politics: Not at all interested | 26% | 19% | 11% | 19% | 56% |
| Interest in politics: Not very interested | 21% | 17% | 37% | 34% | 19% |
| Interest in politics: Somewhat interested | 35% | 37% | 41% | 39% | 17% |
| Interest in politics: Very interested | 18% | 26% | 11% | 8% | 9% |
| Wealth: Significant difficulties | 11% | 8% | 15% | 11% | 15% |
| Wealth: Some difficulties | 19% | 15% | 45% | 15% | 32% |
| Wealth: Without notable difficulties | 61% | 68% | 34% | 42% | 37% |
| Wealth: Enough for savings | 10% | 9% | 7% | 32% | 17% |
| Political activism: None | | 78% | 77% | 79% | 81% |
| Political activism: Having signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration | | 22% | 23% | 21% | 19% |
| Location: Urban | | | 70% | 33% | 71% |
| Location: Rural | | | 30% | 67% | 29% |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Region: Middle-Northern Iraq | 22% | 25% | 32% | 27% | 29% |
| Region: Baghdad | 21% | 20% | 26% | 21% | 23% |
| Region: North-Eastern Iraq | 14% | 13% | 13% | 14% | 11% |
| Region: Southern Iraq | 43% | 43% | 29% | 38% | 38% |
| Age: 18-24 | 20% | 20% | 25% | 23% | 26% |
| Age: 25-34 | 29% | 30% | 29% | 26% | 27% |
| Age: 35-50 | 33% | 32% | 26% | 32% | 27% |
| Age: 50+ | 18% | 19% | 19% | 19% | 20% |
| Government trust: Great, some or limited | 71% | 78% | 71% | 77% | 38% |
| Government trust: Absolutely not | 29% | 22% | 29% | 23% | 62% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by year for selected available variables.

Table B3 - Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2005 (january)

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| | Shia parties | Kurdish parties | Secular parties | Sunni parties | Other |
| Overall vote share | 49,53% | 26,45% | 14,65% | 3,11% | 6,26% |
| Education level | | | | | |
| Primary | 51% | 29% | 10% | 2% | 7% |
| Secondary | 44% | 25% | 21% | 6% | 5% |
| Tertiary | 52% | 17% | 21% | 3% | 7% |
| Education group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 51% | 29% | 10% | 2% | 7% |
| Middle 40% | 46% | 25% | 19% | 4% | 5% |
| Top 10% | 52% | 17% | 21% | 3% | 7% |
| Income decile | | | | | |
| D1 | 75% | 3% | 17% | 2% | 3% |
| D2 | 68% | 11% | 13% | 3% | 6% |
| D3 | 64% | 13% | 13% | 5% | 6% |
| D4 | 60% | 16% | 14% | 5% | 5% |
| D5 | 54% | 21% | 16% | 4% | 5% |
| D6 | 40% | 36% | 15% | 3% | 6% |
| D7 | 40% | 36% | 15% | 3% | 6% |
| D8 | 38% | 38% | 11% | 4% | 9% |
| D9 | 33% | 42% | 13% | 3% | 9% |
| D10 | 28% | 47% | 20% | 0% | 4% |
| Income group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 64% | 13% | 14% | 4% | 5% |
| Middle 40% | 38% | 38% | 14% | 3% | 8% |
| Top 10% | 28% | 47% | 20% | 0% | 4% |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 45% | 29% | 17% | 4% | 5% |
| Unemployed | 62% | 22% | 9% | 2% | 5% |
| Inactive | 53% | 24% | 13% | 3% | 7% |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Woman | 50% | 27% | 13% | 2% | 8% |
| Man | 49% | 26% | 16% | 4% | 5% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Not Married | 47% | 32% | 11% | 2% | 7% |
| Married | 50% | 25% | 16% | 3% | 6% |
| Age | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 51% | 32% | 8% | 3% | 6% |
| 25-35 | 50% | 26% | 15% | 3% | 6% |
| 35-50 | 51% | 25% | 16% | 3% | 5% |
| 50+ | 45% | 23% | 18% | 4% | 9% |
| Region | | | | | |
| Middle-Northern Iraq | 23% | 17% | 20% | 27% | 13% |
| Baghdad | 58% | 5% | 28% | 6% | 4% |
| North-Eastern Iraq | 2% | 90% | 2% | 0% | 6% |
| Southern Iraq | 75% | 0% | 17% | 1% | 6% |
| Religion | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Sunni | 5% | 77% | 6% | 5% | 8% |
| Shi'ite | 73% | 0% | 18% | 2% | 7% |
| Other | 31% | 0% | 69% | 0% | 0% |
| Confidence in government | | | | | |
| Great | 46% | 32% | 19% | 0% | 2% |
| Some | 43% | 36% | 14% | 1% | 6% |
| Limited | 57% | 17% | 18% | 2% | 5% |
| Absolutely not | 59% | 13% | 9% | 11% | 8% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 51% | 16% | 15% | 4% | 14% |
| Not very interested | 46% | 31% | 9% | 4% | 10% |
| Somewhat interested | 43% | 38% | 13% | 3% | 4% |
| Very interested | 63% | 12% | 21% | 3% | 2% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in January 2005.

Table B4 - Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2005

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| | Shia parties | Kurdish parties | Secular parties | Sunni parties | Other |
| Overall vote share | 42,40% | 23,00% | 12,10% | 16,50% | 6,00% |
| Education level | | | | | |
| Primary | 45% | 25% | 10% | 14% | 7% |
| Secondary | 39% | 22% | 16% | 19% | 5% |
| Tertiary | 39% | 16% | 17% | 23% | 5% |
| Education group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 45% | 25% | 10% | 14% | 7% |
| Middle 40% | 40% | 23% | 14% | 18% | 5% |
| Top 10% | 39% | 16% | 17% | 23% | 5% |
| Income decile | | | | | |
| D1 | 30% | 25% | 15% | 24% | 7% |
| D2 | 43% | 20% | 11% | 18% | 8% |
| D3 | 39% | 19% | 15% | 17% | 8% |
| D4 | 46% | 17% | 13% | 15% | 9% |
| D5 | 51% | 15% | 11% | 13% | 10% |
| D6 | 47% | 18% | 12% | 16% | 7% |
| D7 | 43% | 22% | 13% | 19% | 4% |
| D8 | 43% | 22% | 13% | 19% | 4% |
| D9 | 40% | 32% | 10% | 15% | 4% |
| D10 | 43% | 27% | 12% | 15% | 4% |
| Income group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 42% | 19% | 13% | 18% | 8% |
| Middle 40% | 43% | 23% | 12% | 17% | 4% |
| Top 10% | 43% | 27% | 12% | 15% | 4% |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 38% | 25% | 14% | 20% | 3% |
| Unemployed | 44% | 10% | 15% | 19% | 12% |
| Inactive | 46% | 23% | 10% | 13% | 8% |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Woman | 46% | 25% | 11% | 12% | 7% |
| Man | 39% | 21% | 13% | 21% | 5% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Not Married | 38% | 28% | 12% | 16% | 6% |
| Married | 44% | 21% | 12% | 17% | 6% |
| Age | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 39% | 26% | 13% | 15% | 6% |
| 25-35 | 43% | 22% | 11% | 19% | 5% |
| 35-50 | 44% | 22% | 12% | 15% | 7% |
| 50+ | 42% | 24% | 12% | 18% | 5% |
| Region | | | | | |
| Middle-Northern Iraq | 3% | 11% | 25% | 46% | 15% |
| Baghdad | 56% | 1% | 19% | 21% | 2% |
| North-Eastern Iraq | 0% | 99% | 0% | 0% | 1% |
| Southern Iraq | 90% | 0% | 6% | 1% | 3% |
| Language | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Arabic | 56% | 1% | 13% | 30% | 0% |
| Kurdish | 27% | 71% | 0% | 1% | 1% |
| Other | 60% | 16% | 19% | 5% | 0% |
| Religion | | | | | |
| Sunni | 1% | 58% | 5% | 29% | 7% |
| Shi'ite | 91% | 0% | 6% | 1% | 3% |
| Other | 0% | 85% | 15% | 0% | 0% |
| Confidence in government | | | | | |
| Great | 60% | 32% | 4% | 1% | 3% |
| Some | 62% | 22% | 7% | 3% | 6% |
| Limited | 28% | 24% | 18% | 18% | 11% |
| Absolutely not | 7% | 8% | 25% | 53% | 6% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 49% | 18% | 18% | 11% | 4% |
| Not very interested | 42% | 25% | 10% | 14% | 9% |
| Somewhat interested | 44% | 22% | 11% | 14% | 8% |
| Very interested | 42% | 15% | 13% | 28% | 2% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2005.

Table B5 - Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2010

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| | Shia parties | Kurdish parties | Secular parties | Sunni parties | Other |
| Overall vote share | 42,37% | 22,16% | 24,72% | 5,25% | 5,50% |
| Education level | | | | | |
| Primary | 41% | 22% | 28% | 5% | 4% |
| Secondary | 46% | 17% | 21% | 6% | 10% |
| Tertiary | 35% | 38% | 24% | 3% | 0% |
| Education group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 41% | 22% | 28% | 5% | 4% |
| Middle 40% | 45% | 19% | 21% | 6% | 9% |
| Top 10% | 35% | 38% | 24% | 3% | 0% |
| Income decile | | | | | |
| D1 | 24% | 18% | 40% | 3% | 15% |
| D2 | 36% | 11% | 24% | 1% | 27% |
| D3 | 48% | 5% | 22% | 10% | 15% |
| D4 | 48% | 10% | 23% | 13% | 5% |
| D5 | 54% | 13% | 22% | 12% | 0% |
| D6 | 51% | 19% | 29% | 0% | 0% |
| D7 | 54% | 8% | 34% | 5% | 0% |
| D8 | 47% | 20% | 33% | 0% | 0% |
| D9 | 54% | 15% | 31% | 0% | 0% |
| D10 | 62% | 7% | 20% | 11% | 0% |
| Income group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 42% | 11% | 26% | 8% | 13% |
| Middle 40% | 51% | 15% | 32% | 1% | 0% |
| Top 10% | 62% | 7% | 20% | 11% | 0% |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 44% | 25% | 25% | 5% | 1% |
| Unemployed | 27% | 15% | 22% | 9% | 27% |
| Inactive | 43% | 21% | 25% | 5% | 6% |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Woman | 42% | 25% | 24% | 5% | 4% |
| Man | 43% | 20% | 25% | 6% | 7% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Not Married | 44% | 20% | 26% | 2% | 8% |
| Married | 42% | 23% | 24% | 7% | 4% |
| Age | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 48% | 19% | 28% | 0% | 5% |
| 25-35 | 47% | 21% | 20% | 5% | 7% |
| 35-50 | 33% | 24% | 27% | 9% | 6% |
| 50+ | 41% | 25% | 25% | 6% | 3% |
| Region | | | | | |
| Middle-Northern Iraq | 13% | 6% | 59% | 3% | 18% |
| Baghdad | 74% | 2% | 15% | 9% | 0% |
| North-Eastern Iraq | 0% | 96% | 0% | 4% | 0% |
| Southern Iraq | 93% | 1% | 6% | 0% | 0% |
| Language | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Arabic | 58% | 1% | 34% | 6% | 0% |
| Kurdish | 5% | 90% | 1% | 4% | 0% |
| Other | 0% | 0% | 7% | 0% | 93% |
| Religion | | | | | |
| Sunni | 15% | 41% | 29% | 4% | 11% |
| Shi'ite | 81% | 3% | 10% | 5% | 0% |
| Other | 15% | 73% | 12% | 0% | 0% |
| Confidence in government | | | | | |
| Great | 47% | 43% | 4% | 5% | 0% |
| Some | 69% | 20% | 7% | 4% | 0% |
| Limited | 29% | 11% | 47% | 8% | 5% |
| Absolutely not | 12% | 25% | 42% | 5% | 16% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 71% | 13% | 10% | 6% | 0% |
| Not very interested | 55% | 11% | 24% | 11% | 0% |
| Somewhat interested | 32% | 22% | 33% | 2% | 11% |
| Very interested | 31% | 52% | 10% | 3% | 3% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2010.

Table B6 - Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2014

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------|
| | Shia parties | Kurdish parties | Secular parties | Sunni parties | Other |
| Overall vote share | 41,84% | 20,32% | 7,67% | 7,52% | 22,65% |
| Education level | | | | | |
| Primary | 50% | 16% | 7% | 8% | 19% |
| Secondary | 37% | 26% | 9% | 7% | 21% |
| Tertiary | 28% | 18% | 9% | 8% | 37% |
| Education group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 49% | 17% | 7% | 8% | 19% |
| Middle 40% | 36% | 25% | 9% | 7% | 23% |
| Top 10% | 28% | 18% | 9% | 8% | 37% |
| Income decile | | | | | |
| D1 | 67% | 7% | 5% | 4% | 18% |
| D2 | 42% | 21% | 9% | 9% | 19% |
| D3 | 37% | 22% | 11% | 7% | 23% |
| D4 | 43% | 24% | 7% | 6% | 21% |
| D5 | 40% | 23% | 7% | 6% | 24% |
| D6 | 30% | 22% | 7% | 7% | 34% |
| D7 | 34% | 22% | 6% | 7% | 30% |
| D8 | 50% | 22% | 5% | 9% | 13% |
| D9 | 46% | 22% | 8% | 11% | 13% |
| D10 | 32% | 18% | 10% | 9% | 32% |
| Income group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 46% | 19% | 8% | 6% | 21% |
| Middle 40% | 40% | 22% | 6% | 9% | 23% |
| Top 10% | 32% | 18% | 10% | 9% | 32% |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 42% | 21% | 9% | 9% | 19% |
| Unemployed | 62% | 5% | 4% | 3% | 27% |
| Inactive | 39% | 22% | 7% | 7% | 25% |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Woman | 39% | 23% | 5% | 8% | 25% |
| Man | 45% | 18% | 10% | 7% | 20% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Not Married | 33% | 28% | 7% | 6% | 27% |
| Married | 46% | 17% | 8% | 8% | 21% |
| Age | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 36% | 30% | 6% | 6% | 23% |
| 25-35 | 39% | 22% | 8% | 7% | 24% |
| 35-50 | 46% | 14% | 7% | 7% | 25% |
| 50+ | 47% | 15% | 12% | 11% | 15% |
| Region | | | | | |
| Middle-Northern Iraq | 14% | 5% | 15% | 19% | 47% |
| Baghdad | 74% | 2% | 9% | 7% | 7% |
| North-Eastern Iraq | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Southern Iraq | 76% | 0% | 4% | 1% | 18% |
| Language | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|
| Arabic | 54% | 0% | 11% | 7% | 29% |
| Kurdish | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Other | 41% | 0% | 0% | 32% | 26% |
| Confidence in government | | | | | |
| Great | 34% | 33% | 3% | 4% | 26% |
| Some | 53% | 21% | 3% | 5% | 19% |
| Limited | 43% | 14% | 8% | 7% | 29% |
| Absolutely not | 33% | 22% | 9% | 17% | 19% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 28% | 8% | 10% | 15% | 40% |
| Not very interested | 39% | 22% | 8% | 9% | 23% |
| Somewhat interested | 50% | 22% | 7% | 4% | 17% |
| Very interested | 36% | 32% | 9% | 4% | 20% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2014.

Table B7 - Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2018

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|---------------|--------|
| | Shia parties | Kurdish parties | Anti-Sectarian parties | Sunni parties | Other |
| Overall vote share | 36,33% | 20,21% | 20,39% | 8,88% | 14,19% |
| Education level | | | | | |
| Primary | 40% | 12% | 22% | 12% | 14% |
| Secondary | 30% | 33% | 18% | 4% | 15% |
| Tertiary | 36% | 27% | 20% | 4% | 12% |
| Education group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 40% | 12% | 22% | 12% | 14% |
| Middle 40% | 32% | 29% | 19% | 6% | 14% |
| Top 10% | 36% | 27% | 20% | 4% | 12% |
| Income decile | | | | | |
| D1 | 46% | 5% | 24% | 10% | 14% |
| D2 | 48% | 10% | 19% | 4% | 19% |
| D3 | 44% | 7% | 24% | 8% | 17% |
| D4 | 33% | 11% | 20% | 19% | 17% |
| D5 | 31% | 12% | 22% | 20% | 16% |
| D6 | 36% | 14% | 23% | 11% | 16% |
| D7 | 35% | 30% | 23% | 0% | 13% |
| D8 | 32% | 32% | 17% | 7% | 13% |
| D9 | 32% | 36% | 13% | 10% | 9% |
| D10 | 27% | 45% | 19% | 0% | 9% |
| Income group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 40% | 9% | 22% | 12% | 16% |
| Middle 40% | 34% | 28% | 19% | 7% | 13% |
| Top 10% | 27% | 45% | 19% | 0% | 9% |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 26% | 32% | 22% | 4% | 17% |
| Unemployed | 33% | 25% | 22% | 9% | 10% |
| Inactive | 42% | 14% | 20% | 11% | 14% |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Woman | 41% | 16% | 21% | 8% | 14% |
| Man | 33% | 23% | 20% | 9% | 15% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Not Married | 34% | 28% | 17% | 7% | 14% |
| Married | 38% | 16% | 22% | 10% | 14% |
| Age | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 36% | 25% | 20% | 5% | 13% |
| 25-35 | 40% | 21% | 18% | 9% | 12% |
| 35-50 | 34% | 16% | 20% | 14% | 16% |
| 50+ | 36% | 19% | 25% | 6% | 14% |
| Region | | | | | |
| Middle-Northern Iraq | 46% | 5% | 8% | 22% | 18% |
| Baghdad | 38% | 0% | 30% | 4% | 27% |
| North-Eastern Iraq | 0% | 87% | 12% | 0% | 1% |
| Southern Iraq | 53% | 1% | 40% | 0% | 6% |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Religion | | | | | |
| Sunni | 25% | 39% | 11% | 15% | 10% |
| Shi'ite | 51% | 0% | 36% | 0% | 12% |
| Other | 25% | 0% | 53% | 0% | 22% |
| Confidence in government | | | | | |
| Great | 42% | 10% | 12% | 18% | 18% |
| Some | 33% | 30% | 12% | 10% | 14% |
| Limited | 29% | 24% | 26% | 14% | 7% |
| Absolutely not | 40% | 16% | 23% | 6% | 16% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 39% | 13% | 21% | 6% | 21% |
| Not very interested | 30% | 25% | 23% | 17% | 5% |
| Somewhat interested | 35% | 34% | 16% | 4% | 10% |
| Very interested | 42% | 11% | 22% | 13% | 11% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.


Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2018.

Table B8 - Complete structure of the vote in Iraq, 2018

| | Feels close to no party | Did not vote in the last elections |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Overall sample share | 51,71% | 55,15% |
| Gender | | |
| Woman | 53% | 59% |
| Man | 51% | 51% |
| Age | | |
| Below 25 | 52% | 63% |
| 25-35 | 53% | 58% |
| 35-50 | 51% | 52% |
| 50+ | 53% | 45% |
| Education group | | |
| Bottom 50% | 51% | 54% |
| Middle 40% | 52% | 57% |
| Top 10% | 54% | 51% |
| Income group | | |
| Bottom 50% | 53% | 54% |
| Middle 40% | 58% | 56% |
| Top 10% | 45% | 46% |
| Employment status | | |
| Unemployed | 56% | 51% |
| Employed | 46% | 50% |

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.


Figure CA1 - Legislative election results in Algeria (share of seats), 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results.

Note: the figure shows the share of parliamentary seats received by selected groups of Algerian political parties in legislative elections between 2002 and 2017.


Figure CA2 - Composition of the electorate by age



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by age group.


Figure CA3 - Composition of the electorate by region



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by region. No data available in 2002.


Figure CA4 - Composition of the electorate by language



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by language. No data available in 2017.


Figure CA5 - Composition of the electorate by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of the electorate by degree of political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration).


Figure CA6 - Composition of income quintiles by language, 2002



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2002.


Figure CA7 - Composition of income quintiles by language, 2012



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the composition of income quintiles by language in 2012.


Figure CA8 - Composition of income quintiles by region, 2012



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2012.


Figure CA9 - Composition of income quintiles by region, 2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles by region in 2017.


Figure CA10 - Composition of income quintiles by region (coastline vs hinterland), 2012



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in the coastline wilayats (Jijel, Skika, Annaba, El Taref, Chlef, Tipasa, Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Tlemcen, Témouchent, Oran, Mostaganem and Alger) and the hinterland ones in 2012.


Figure CA11 - Composition of income quintiles by region (coastline vs hinterland), 2017



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in the coastline wilayats (Jijel, Skika, Annaba, El Taref, Chlef, Tipasa, Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Tlemcen, Témouchent, Oran, Mostaganem and Alger) and the hinterland ones in 2017.


Figure CA12 - Composition of income quintiles by region (Kabylia), 2012



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia compare to the rest of Algeria in 2012.


Figure CA13 - Composition of income quintiles by region (Kabylia), 2017



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabyllia compare to the rest of Algeria in 2017.


Figure CA14 - Composition of income quintiles in Kabylia by provinces (wilayah), 2012



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia decomposed by its wilayah in 2012.


Figure CA15 - Composition of income quintiles in Kabylia by provinces (wilayah), 2017



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia decomposed by its wilayah in 2017.


Figure CA16 - Composition of employment by gender



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of individuals employed by gender in the Algerian adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure CA17 - Composition of employment by age



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of individuals employed by age in the Algerian adult population and its evolution over time.


Figure CA18 - Socially active voters by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the income groups distribution of the respondents affiliated with a civil society organization (including labor unions and religious groups, excluding political parties membership) in the Algerian adult population.


Figure CB1 - Vote for FLN by education group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by education group.


Figure CB2 - Vote for RND by education group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by education group.


Figure CB3 - Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by education group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by education group.


Figure CB4 - Vote for Islamic opposition parties by education group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by education group.


Figure CB5 - Vote for FLN by region



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. No data available in 2002.


Figure CB6 - Vote for FLN by region (coastline vs hinterlands)



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. No data available in 2002.

Figure CB7 - Vote for FLN by region / language (Kabylia vs non-Kabylia)



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taking as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.


Figure CB8 - Vote for RND by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by age group.


Figure CB9 - Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by age group.


Figure CB10 - Vote for Islamic opposition parties by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by age group.


Figure CB11 - Vote for Islamic opposition parties by religious practice



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by degree of religiosity, measured by religious practices.


Figure CB12 - Vote for FLN by religious practice



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by degree of religious practices.


Figure CB13 - Vote for FLN by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by income quintile.


Figure CB14 - Vote for FLN by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by income group.


Figure CB15 - Vote for FLN by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by FLN by income quintile.


Figure CB16 - Vote for ruling parties (FLN/RND) by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income quintile.


Figure CB17 - Vote for ruling parties (FLN/RND) by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income group.


Figure CB18 - Vote for ruling parties (FLN/RND) by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income quintile.


Figure CB19 - Vote for RND by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by income quintiles.


Figure CB20 - Vote for RND by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by income group.


Figure CB21 - Vote for RND by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by RND by income quintile.


Figure CB22 - Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income quintiles.


Figure CB23 - Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the opposition secular parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income group.


Figure CB24 - Vote for Islamic opposition parties by income quintile



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by income quintiles.


Figure CB25 - Vote for Islamic opposition parties by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.


Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by income group.

Figure CB26 - Vote for FLN by gender



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by gender.


Figure CB27 - Vote for FLN by religiosity (self - description)



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by religiosity (measured by self-description as religious or non religious).


Figure CB28 - Vote for FLN by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by political activism.


Figure CB29 - Vote for FLN by wealth index



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by wealth index (measured by the perception of the respondent of how much his household income covers his expenses).


Figure CB30 - Vote for FLN by interest in politics



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by interest expressed in politics.


Figure CB31 - Vote for FLN by membership in civil society organizations



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by membership in civil society organizations (excluding political parties memberships). No data available in 2014.


Figure CC1 - Vote for ruling parties (FLN / RND) among low-income voters



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for the FLN and the RND.


Figure CC2 - Vote for FLN among young voters



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below 25 and the share of other voters voting for the FLN.


Figure CC3 - Vote for ruling parties (FLN / RND) among highest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voting for the FLN and the RND, before and after controlling for other variables.


Figure CC4 - Vote for ruling parties (FLN / RND) among lowest-educated voters



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% voters and the share of top 50% voters in terms of education voting for the FLN and the RND, before and after controlling for age.


Figure CD1 - Decomposition of abstention by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by age groups. No data available in 2002.


Figure CD2 - Decomposition of abstention by education group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by education group. No data available in 2002.


Figure CD3 - Decomposition of abstention by income group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by income group. No data available in 2002.


Figure CD4 - Decomposition of abstention by political activism



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by political activism. No data available in 2002.


Figure CD5 - Decomposition of abstention by participation in civil society



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by membership in civil society organizations (excluding political parties memberships). No data available in 2002.


Figure CD6 - Decomposition of abstention by region (Kabylia)



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections in Kabylia and in the other regions of Algeria. No data available in 2002.


Figure CD7 - Composition of emigration thought by age group, 2019



Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of emigration willingness by age groups in 2019. No data available for the other dates.


Figure CD8 - Participation in civil society organizations by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the figure shows the age groups distribution of the respondents affiliated with a civil society organization (including labor unions and religious groups, excluding political parties membership) in the Algerian adult population.


Map C1 - Geographical distribution of vulnerability to multidimensional poverty in Algeria in 2012



Source: authors' computation using subnational decomposition of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (University of Oxford).

Note: The Multidimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards. The population vulnerable to multidimensional poverty is defined by experiencing 20 to 33.3% intensity of deprivation.


Map C2 - Geographical distribution of multidimensional poverty in Algeria in 2012



Source: authors' computation using subnational decomposition of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (University of Oxford).

Note: The Multidimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards. The population in multidimensional poverty is defined by experiencing at least 33.3% intensity of deprivation.


Map C3 - Socio-spatial disparities evolution in Algeria between 2002 and 2018



Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University)

Note: The map shows the geographical time-evolution of the Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI). The SHDI is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.


Map C4 - Socio-spatial disparities in Algeria in 2002



Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University)

Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

Map C5 - Socio-spatial disparities in Algeria in 2018



Source: authors' computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Radboud University)

Note: The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the United Nations Development Programme's official Human Development Index to the subnational level and captures education, health and living standards.

Table B1 - Survey data sources

| Year | Survey | Source | Sample size |
|------|---------------------|--------|-------------|
| 2002 | World Values Survey | WVS | 1 282 |
| 2013 | Arab Barometer | WVS | 1 220 |
| 2019 | Arab Barometer | WVS | 2 332 |

Source: authors' elaboration.

Note: the table shows the surveys used, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

Table B2 - Complete descriptive statistics by year

| | 2002 | 2012 | 2017 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|
| Education: Primary | 20% | 63% | 44% |
| Education: Secondary | 48% | 25% | 31% |
| Education: Tertiary | 32% | 11% | 25% |
| Age: 18-24 | 26% | 22% | 22% |
| Age: 25-34 | 29% | 28% | 30% |
| Age: 35-54 | 35% | 32% | 27% |
| Age: 55+ | 10% | 18% | 21% |
| Gender: Men | 51% | 50% | 50% |
| Employment status: Employed | 59% | 38% | 28% |
| Employment status: Unemployed | 11% | 11% | 21% |
| Employment status: Inactive | 29% | 52% | 51% |
| Marital status: Single | 49% | 53% | 45% |
| Marital status: Marital | 51% | 47% | 55% |
| Language: Arabic or Algerian dialect | 85% | 95% | |
| Language: French or other | 2% | 0% | |
| Language: Amazight | 13% | 5% | |
| Turnout: Did not vote | | 48% | 79% |
| Turnout: Voted | | 52% | 21% |
| Interest in politics: Not at all interested | 28% | 43% | 48% |
| Interest in politics: Not very interested | 48% | 42% | 35% |
| Interest in politics: Somewhat interested | 17% | 13% | 15% |
| Interest in politics: Very interested | 7% | 1% | 2% |
| Wealth index: Significant difficulties | 5% | 17% | 8% |
| Wealth index: Some difficulties | 12% | 34% | 41% |
| Wealth index: Without notable difficulties | 60% | 40% | 40% |
| Wealth index: Enough for savings | 23% | 9% | 11% |
| Political activism: None | 74% | 77% | 73% |
| Political activism: Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration once | 26% | 23% | 27% |
| Region: Alger | | 11% | 10% |
| Region: Eastern Highlands | | 16% | 16% |
| Region: Middle Highlands | | 6% | 6% |
| Region: Western Highlands | | 6% | 5% |
| Region: North Eastern Region | | 11% | 18% |
| Region: North Middle Region | | 19% | 24% |
| Region: North Western Region | | 21% | 18% |
| Region: South Region | | 10% | 3% |
| Region: Coastline (including Alger) | | 54% | 55% |
| Region: Hinterlands | | 46% | 45% |
| Region: Kabylia | 13% | 25% | 27% |
| Region: Other regions of Algeria | 87% | 75% | 73% |

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Note: the table shows descriptive statistics by year for selected available variables.

Table B3 - Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2002

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|
| | FLN | RND | Islamic opposition (Hamas/MRN) | Secular opposition (FFS/RCD) | Other |
| Overall vote share | 35,28% | 8,23% | 17,20% | 3,33% | 35,96% |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Woman | 40% | 11% | 15% | 3% | 32% |
| Man | 32% | 6% | 19% | 3% | 40% |
| Age | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 27% | 10% | 20% | 4% | 40% |
| 25-35 | 32% | 9% | 17% | 2% | 40% |
| 35-55 | 40% | 8% | 17% | 4% | 30% |
| 55+ | 48% | 4% | 12% | 2% | 35% |
| Education group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 45% | 7% | 15% | 3% | 29% |
| Middle 40% | 27% | 10% | 20% | 3% | 40% |
| Top 10% | 19% | 6% | 16% | 3% | 56% |
| Income decile | | | | | |
| D1 | 31% | 7% | 7% | 2% | 53% |
| D2 | 37% | 7% | 14% | 2% | 39% |
| D3 | 41% | 7% | 18% | 3% | 31% |
| D4 | 41% | 7% | 18% | 3% | 31% |
| D5 | 39% | 8% | 21% | 3% | 29% |
| D6 | 37% | 8% | 25% | 4% | 26% |
| D7 | 37% | 8% | 25% | 4% | 26% |
| D8 | 38% | 12% | 24% | 4% | 23% |
| D9 | 32% | 15% | 17% | 3% | 33% |
| D10 | 31% | 14% | 20% | 5% | 29% |
| Income group | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 38% | 7% | 15% | 3% | 37% |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Middle 40% | 36% | 11% | 22% | 4% | 27% |
| Top 10% | 31% | 14% | 20% | 5% | 29% |
| Employment status | | | | | |
| Employed | 35% | 10% | 18% | 4% | 35% |
| Unemployed | 34% | 5% | 15% | 2% | 44% |
| Inactive | 37% | 7% | 17% | 3% | 35% |
| Marital status | | | | | |
| Not Married | 34% | 9% | 21% | 3% | 32% |
| Married | 37% | 8% | 14% | 3% | 37% |
| Language | | | | | |
| Arabic or Algerian Dialect | 37% | 8% | 19% | 1% | 35% |
| French or Other | 25% | 27% | 4% | 4% | 39% |
| Tamazight | 25% | 2% | 10% | 18% | 45% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 35% | 5% | 14% | 1% | 46% |
| Not very interested | 34% | 10% | 19% | 4% | 33% |
| Somewhat interested | 39% | 8% | 23% | 5% | 24% |
| Very interested | 34% | 7% | 8% | 4% | 48% |
| Political Activism | | | | | |
| None | 37% | 8% | 17% | 3% | 35% |
| Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration | 32% | 9% | 17% | 5% | 38% |
| Rural / Urban Index | | | | | |
| Urban | 38% | 9% | 19% | 4% | 30% |
| Rural | 33% | 7% | 15% | 3% | 42% |

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2002. Vote shares have been reweighed so as to match exactly official election results.

Table B4 - Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2012

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|
| | FLN | RND | Islamic opposition | Secular opposition (FFS/RCD) | Worker's Party (PT) | Other |
| Overall vote share | 17,35% | 6,86% | 9,27% | 4,96% | 4,96% | 56,60% |
| Gender | | | | | | |
| Woman | 47% | 20% | 5% | 6% | 14% | 8% |
| Man | 47% | 15% | 10% | 13% | 7% | 8% |
| Age | | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 34% | 22% | 5% | 16% | 15% | 9% |
| 25-35 | 39% | 18% | 7% | 9% | 16% | 10% |
| 35-55 | 33% | 25% | 13% | 10% | 11% | 9% |
| 55+ | 76% | 6% | 2% | 8% | 2% | 5% |
| Education group | | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 59% | 12% | 6% | 10% | 4% | 8% |
| Middle 40% | 34% | 19% | 11% | 10% | 16% | 10% |
| Top 10% | 28% | 35% | 6% | 8% | 20% | 3% |
| Income decile | | | | | | |
| D1 | 56% | 8% | 2% | 20% | 5% | 10% |
| D2 | 45% | 14% | 5% | 14% | 6% | 16% |
| D3 | 52% | 12% | 1% | 12% | 7% | 17% |
| D4 | 56% | 6% | 6% | 9% | 16% | 8% |
| D5 | 57% | 15% | 3% | 11% | 10% | 3% |
| D6 | 50% | 6% | 8% | 21% | 5% | 10% |
| D7 | 56% | 15% | 1% | 10% | 9% | 9% |
| D8 | 44% | 11% | 1% | 15% | 15% | 14% |
| D9 | 32% | 16% | 6% | 13% | 28% | 5% |
| D10 | 25% | 28% | 10% | 8% | 14% | 15% |
| Income group | | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 53% | 11% | 3% | 13% | 9% | 11% |
| Middle 40% | 45% | 12% | 4% | 15% | 14% | 9% |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Top 10% | 25% | 28% | 10% | 8% | 14% | 15% |
| Employment status | | | | | | |
| Employed | 32% | 25% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 9% |
| Unemployed | 37% | 14% | 2% | 12% | 18% | 17% |
| Inactive | 62% | 11% | 6% | 9% | 6% | 6% |
| Marital status | | | | | | |
| Not Married | 42% | 17% | 6% | 10% | 17% | 8% |
| Married | 50% | 17% | 9% | 10% | 5% | 8% |
| Region | | | | | | |
| Alger | 39% | 14% | 7% | 15% | 5% | 20% |
| East Highlands | 49% | 19% | 14% | 5% | 11% | 1% |
| Middle Highlands | 61% | 9% | 0% | 4% | 12% | 14% |
| North Eastern Region | 46% | 30% | 8% | 4% | 9% | 2% |
| North Middle Region | 32% | 14% | 3% | 22% | 14% | 15% |
| North Western Region | 61% | 15% | 6% | 5% | 10% | 4% |
| South Region | 54% | 13% | 5% | 14% | 8% | 7% |
| Western Highlands | 39% | 28% | 26% | 0% | 4% | 3% |
| Language | | | | | | |
| Arabic or Algerian Dialect | 49% | 17% | 8% | 8% | 10% | 8% |
| Tamazight | 18% | 15% | 2% | 38% | 14% | 13% |
| Turnout | | | | | | |
| Did not vote | 37% | 20% | 5% | 16% | 16% | 6% |
| Voted | 49% | 17% | 8% | 9% | 9% | 9% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 52% | 13% | 3% | 10% | 12% | 10% |
| Not very interested | 46% | 17% | 7% | 12% | 10% | 8% |
| Somewhat interested | 46% | 20% | 13% | 6% | 8% | 7% |
| Very interested | 20% | 53% | 14% | 12% | 0% | 0% |
| Political Activism | | | | | | |
| None | 53% | 14% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 8% |
| Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration | 37% | 22% | 10% | 11% | 11% | 9% |
| Rural / Urban Index | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| Urban | 44% | 18% | 8% | 10% | 10% | 10% |
| Rural | 53% | 16% | 7% | 9% | 10% | 5% |

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2012. Vote shares have been reweighed so as to match exactly official election results.

Table B5 - Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2017

| | Share of votes received (%) | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|--------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------|
| | FLN | RND | Islamic opposition | Secular opposition (FFS/RND) | Worker's Party (PT) | Other |
| Overall vote share | 25,99% | 14,91% | 15,34% | 7,56% | 2,15% | 33,68% |
| Gender | | | | | | |
| Woman | 61% | 10% | 6% | 9% | 2% | 11% |
| Man | 58% | 13% | 5% | 9% | 3% | 12% |
| Age | | | | | | |
| Below 25 | 65% | 9% | 1% | 7% | 2% | 15% |
| 25-35 | 52% | 11% | 5% | 7% | 3% | 19% |
| 35-55 | 60% | 13% | 5% | 11% | 3% | 8% |
| 55+ | 64% | 11% | 6% | 7% | 1% | 10% |
| Education group | | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 58% | 11% | 7% | 9% | 2% | 12% |
| Middle 40% | 62% | 12% | 3% | 8% | 3% | 11% |
| Top 10% | 53% | 16% | 5% | 13% | 5% | 9% |
| Income decile | | | | | | |
| D1 | 74% | 4% | 2% | 14% | 0% | 6% |
| D2 | 68% | 7% | 2% | 16% | 0% | 6% |
| D3 | 53% | 14% | 3% | 7% | 2% | 19% |
| D4 | 52% | 12% | 7% | 10% | 1% | 15% |
| D5 | 59% | 13% | 5% | 14% | 0% | 8% |
| D6 | 62% | 12% | 4% | 11% | 1% | 9% |
| D7 | 63% | 11% | 4% | 8% | 2% | 11% |
| D8 | 62% | 9% | 3% | 9% | 2% | 14% |
| D9 | 72% | 8% | 2% | 5% | 3% | 10% |
| D10 | 62% | 12% | 4% | 9% | 3% | 10% |
| Income group | | | | | | |
| Bottom 50% | 61% | 10% | 4% | 12% | 1% | 11% |
| Middle 40% | 65% | 10% | 3% | 8% | 2% | 11% |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|
| Top 10% | 62% | 12% | 4% | 9% | 3% | 10% |
| Employment status | | | | | | |
| Employed | 59% | 14% | 4% | 10% | 3% | 10% |
| Unemployed | 50% | 11% | 3% | 9% | 3% | 21% |
| Inactive | 61% | 11% | 7% | 8% | 2% | 10% |
| Marital status | | | | | | |
| Not Married | 55% | 12% | 4% | 7% | 2% | 17% |
| Married | 61% | 12% | 6% | 10% | 3% | 9% |
| Region | | | | | | |
| Alger | 58% | 13% | 8% | 7% | 4% | 10% |
| East Highlands | 58% | 9% | 10% | 11% | 2% | 9% |
| Middle Highlands | 48% | 17% | 6% | 14% | 3% | 12% |
| North Eastern Region | 72% | 10% | 4% | 4% | 2% | 7% |
| North Middle Region | 55% | 12% | 1% | 18% | 2% | 12% |
| North Western Region | 60% | 12% | 5% | 1% | 4% | 18% |
| South Region | 33% | 9% | 13% | 30% | 0% | 15% |
| Western Highlands | 63% | 12% | 10% | 0% | 6% | 7% |
| Turnout | | | | | | |
| Did not vote | 63% | 12% | 2% | 4% | 5% | 14% |
| Voted | 57% | 11% | 13% | 9% | 3% | 7% |
| Interest in politics | | | | | | |
| Not at all interested | 62% | 4% | 5% | 8% | 1% | 18% |
| Not very interested | 57% | 16% | 5% | 10% | 4% | 8% |
| Somewhat interested | 66% | 13% | 6% | 6% | 2% | 6% |
| Very interested | 42% | 12% | 5% | 8% | 9% | 25% |
| Political Activism | | | | | | |
| None | 61% | 11% | 5% | 6% | 2% | 13% |
| Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration | 55% | 13% | 5% | 14% | 4% | 8% |

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2017. Vote shares have been reweighted so as to match exactly official election results.

Table B6 - Structure of no response and abstention in Algeria, 2019

| | Feels close to no party | Did not vote in the last elections |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Overall sample share | 58.05% | 79.23% |
| Gender | | |
| Woman | 57% | 77% |
| Man | 53% | 76% |
| Age | | |
| Below 25 | 74% | 92% |
| 25-35 | 65% | 84% |
| 35-55 | 51% | 76% |
| 55+ | 42% | 58% |
| Education group | | |
| Bottom 50% | 53% | 76% |
| Middle 40% | 55% | 77% |
| Top 10% | 62% | 79% |
| Income group | | |
| Bottom 50% | 55% | 74% |
| Middle 40% | 50% | 76% |
| Top 10% | 42% | 74% |
| Ethno-regional identity | | |
| Living in Kabylia | 54% | 75% |
| Non living in Kabylia | 57% | 69% |

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.

Notes: the table shows the average share of respondents by selected individual characteristics in 2019.