Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power
Antonin Macé
(1, 2, 3)
,
Rafael Treibich
(4)
Antonin Macé
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 17445
- IdHAL : antonin-mace
- ORCID : 0000-0002-3076-9633
- IdRef : 187539375
Résumé
We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e., the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power
|
Résumé |
en
We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e., the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.
|
Auteur(s) |
Antonin Macé
1, 2, 3
, Rafael Treibich
4
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
CNRS -
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
( 441569 )
- France
4
SDU -
University of Southern Denmark
( 50786 )
- 5320 Odense
- Danemark
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2021-08
|
Volume |
13
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
70-111
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1257/mic.20180309 |
UT key WOS | 000677858600003 |
Loading...