



The rise and strength of authoritarian restoration – constructing a comparative logic for research

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Chapter 11. The rise and strength of authoritarian restoration – constructing a comparative logic for research

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From the ideologues and practitioners of Hindutva to the French Front National, a variety of authoritarian voices demand the restoration of community against formalized society and local traditions against the stranger. They call for strong states enforcing law and order. They defend traditional family models against individualism and gender pluralism. They claim to represent some dispossessed, victimized, humiliated and pure constituency. Some of their opponents denounce them as “fascists”.

What happened? Where do they come from? Why are they successful today?

Background of the study

This study is an offshoot of the collective volume "Gauging and engaging deviance, 1600-2000s" (Sitas, Keim, Damodaran, Trimikliniotis, & Garba, 2014) see also (Sitas, Damodaran, Keim, & Trimikliniotis, 2016). In my contribution, entitled “Colonialism, National-Socialism and the Holocaust” (Keim, 2014), I confirmed that the Nazis transferred a series of measures and techniques to identify, classify, administer, reform or eliminate deviance from the colonies to Europe. I also stressed those aspects of Nazism that fall out of the picture if we limit analysis to the colonial connections, such as the European tradition of anti-Semitism or the deviance-defining measure of “degenerate art”. After completion of the first volume, we received a variety of reactions, including critiques of our take on the Nazis as opposed to the more “sympathetic deviants” whom we identified as the agents of social emancipation throughout history. It was decided that we would work on a second collective volume and that I would pursue my reflection on post-1945 fascists. However, since then, in the light of rapidly changing realities, instead of starting from the 1945 turning point in order to investigate continuities into the post-war period, I have decided to start in the pressing and disturbing present and to eventually reach back into history from there.

The object of research

We had sensed, in the final chapter of “Gauging and engaging deviance”, that the current situation was a quagmire and we were uncertain about what the future could bring. In the meantime, within a few years, it has become evident that authoritarian figures demanding the restoration of some threatened, pure community with a glorious past could consolidate their influence and power in a large variety of contexts.

At first sight, it may seem like we are faced with one global moment and movement: "[t]he central question of our times is whether we are witnessing the worldwide rejection of liberal democracy and its replacement by some sort of populist authoritarianism". Indeed, if we count the US, Russia, India, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, "and major aspirants to authoritarian right-wing rule" in France, Austria and other EU countries, "[t]he total population of these countries is almost a third of the total population of the world" (Appadurai, 2017, p. 1). Or elsewhere, "[t]he political earthquakes of our times - whether the triumph of Donald Trump, a self-confessed sexual predator and racist, the electoral apotheosis in India and the Philippines of strongmen accused of mass murder (Narendra Modi and Rodrigo Duterte), or the mass acclaim in Russia and Turkey for such pitiless despots and imperialists as Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - have revealed an enormous pent-up energy. The near-simultaneous rise of demagoguery across the world points to a shared, codetermining situation, even though the secessions of our time, from ISIS to Brexit, have many local causes" (Mishra, 2017, p. 104).

In the face of such diversity of places and names, I could indulge in a classification exercise from the outset. For Europe, for instance, I would end up with an elaboration on extreme right, radical right, populist right, moderate centre-right reacting to the radical right, etc. A lot of literature is trying to do this, but it would take a very long time and the results would not be very interesting. Mudde, for example, in order to provide clear-cut categories, has to discuss cases like the Swiss Car Party and even needs to leave out a few important examples (Mudde, 2007). And ultimately, whether a party is classified as "extreme right" or "radical right" does not matter that much. Instead, we are interested here in the conditions for the current strength of a variety of authoritarian voices and projects and their appeal to specific population groups. The question is about similarities and differences regarding the conditions of their emergence and success; furthermore, why they are appealing to certain constituencies and how their programs and practices have evolved over time, within a given context. In order to answer those questions, however, I need to address the intuition that all the cases, despite their obvious differences, do indeed share some significant points in common.

Selection of cases

Out of the existing examples, I shall ultimately deal with at least four of them: the far-right in Europe, Daesh as an example of jihadism, Erdogan's Turkey, Modi's India.¹ The first concerns parties and movements at various national levels, connected at the regional European level to some degrees. The European far-right comprises examples of political ideologies, as opposed to jihadism, Erdogan's Turkey and Modi's India with their various brands of religious politics (Griffin, 1991, pp. 26–55). Jihadism is a paramilitary but also educational and youth movement that was able, for a short time, to establish a state-like apparatus, whereas Turkey and India have consolidated full-fledged political regimes.

To begin with and for the purpose of my contribution to *Deviance* volume 2, I shall comparatively work on jihadism and the European far-right, two highly dissimilar cases. They are each other's devils, and at the same time they are accused of entertaining uncomfortable connections. By now, even social scientists dare suggest intuitive comparisons between them: "We used to think of fundamentalism as that feature of thought and action that characterizes the 'other' of the West, and,

¹ I have been encouraged to include further chapters on Trump's US and on Israel's transformation into a quasi-Apartheid state, depending on the format the research project might take in the long run.

in that vein, much has been written about Islamist fundamentalism as the other. Yet, ironically, the most palpably proximate 'other' to have emerged is the one from within our midst. I will focus here on this proximate fundamentalism, that of populations who live in Western or Western-aspiring democracies and which seem to be motivated by a desire to return to the 'fundaments' of their culture, civilization, religion and nation, all in one. This fundamentalism is fuelled by religion and tradition, to be sure, but religion essentially mobilized to defend the purity of the people and a radical version of the nation" (Illouz, 2017, pp. 49–50). Or elsewhere: "What used to be called 'Muslim rage', and identified with mobs of brown-skinned men with bushy beards, is suddenly manifest globally, from saffron-robed Buddhist ethnic-cleansers in Myanmar to blonde, white nationalists in Germany" (Mishra, 2017, p. 104).

A particular body of German-language literature emphasises historical connections between National-Socialism and several movements in the Arabic worlds, epitomized in the meeting between Hitler and Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, in explaining the rise of jihadism. The connecting feature, according to those anti-German intellectuals, is the central and fundamental anti-Semitism of both. I argue that those links are not sufficient to explain the strength and outlook of jihadist movements today. Despite historical connections, they deserve a thorough analysis of their own. Ultimately, my analysis will therefore comprise both connections and comparisons. It is for reasons of practicality that I limit the initial step to these two examples. My long-term aim, however, is to develop a broader analytical framework and empirical take on the phenomenon, in order to be able to cover more cases, as mentioned above. Based on these two cases, I put forth here a first attempt at formulating a decentred comparative methodology.

Literature review

In the existing literature, I have not found an overall framework suitable for this endeavour. First, the literature that I have consulted so far is split into various regionally specialized and disciplinary fields. Regarding Europe, few works focus on the supra- or transnational context as opposed to the different national contexts, where we find a huge variety of national post-war historiographies; sociologies of political movements and parties; discourse analyses of extreme right-literature, speeches and writings; national survey research on electorates; social psychological and social work takes on extremist individuals and groups; as well as, at the more abstract level, lengthy attempts at comparative definition and classification of "populist" or "extreme right" groups and parties. A supranational orientation can be found in international relations literature, in particular on the Russian connections with the European far right. As for the more critical reflections, a lot of effort is put into disentangling and comparing current parties with those of the interwar years, debating whether the current ones can be characterized as (neo-)fascist or not.

The difficulty in researching jihadism is that it is a particularly volatile, unstable, multi-sited and locally anchored yet transnationally connected, half-underground and highly mediatized and politicized object of study. Apart from the media frenzy, analyses are scattered over different disciplinary (sub)fields – area studies and oriental studies, historiography of single countries, (social) psychology and social work approaches on "radicalizing individuals" and "deradicalization measures"; security and terrorism studies; international relations literature – produced not only by academics, but also to a large degree by think tanks with varying agendas. The literature is furthermore divided by language, where my own limitation is not to have access to any writings in Arabic, knowing that

regionally based academics publish their analyses mainly in Arabic newspapers, whereas academic analyses are dominated by English-language academics outside of the region (Hanafi & Arvanitis, 2014). Furthermore, different theoretical and conceptual vocabularies coexist. Some of them gain currency and end up being taken for granted, like the term “populism” for the European far-right or the term “terrorism” for jihadist activities. I have not come across attempts to integrate those various insights into an overall framework. Finally, synthesizing the various inputs is particularly difficult in as far as the debate is extremely politicized. This holds the advantage that one does not have to justify one’s research interest and object. The problem, however, is to achieve an analytical separation of scholarly categories from their normative connotations and from the political positionings that accompany them.

Constructing the comparative logic

We find few sustained attempts at providing an overall picture. One example is the recent edited volume *The Great Regression* (Geiselberger, 2017). As the above-mentioned quotes indicate, the book argues that we are currently witnessing a global turning-point towards authoritarianism – a Great Regression, similar to Polanyi’s Great Transformation (Polanyi, [1944] 1977), to which several of the authors refer. At first sight, there are indeed similarities across the different places. However, looked at more closely, the single chapters also reveal different local and regional stories. “The great regression” starts out from a global outlook, but ends up with a few, again mostly Western cases. Russia, Turkey, India, the Philippines are mentioned in the introductory paragraphs to strengthen the impression of a global moment. Daesh is occasionally mentioned, as an example standing outside of the established national political realms. The single chapters quickly limit themselves to the rather conventional scope and focus on single or a selection of a few Western countries, including one chapter on fundamentalism in Israel. Some of the contributions could lend themselves to comparative research and a generic take on the issue, like Nachtwey’s (Nachtwey, 2017), mobilizing critical theory on the authoritarian personality and Elias’ theory of civilization, but this potential has not yet been empirically fulfilled. Of course, the volume was written in the middle of a chaotic phase. Overall, however, we end up wondering whether the idea of a unique, coherent global movement is more than just an illusion at first sight.

My ambition is to reflect in greater depth on potentially shared causes without neglecting specificities of local and regional contexts, and to comparatively look at the development of the authoritarians in question, of their political strategies, their key values and their organizational forms. I start from the assumption that certain factors are globally shared, such as the 2008 economic crisis. However, local and regional manifestations of authoritarian restoration are only intelligible through in-depth contextual analysis of the ways those global moments were refracted in highly diverse contexts. Before that, however, I need to comparatively address the shared features of authoritarian restorationists in order to put some sociological order into ad-hoc intuitions.

To do so, I have decided to rely on a particular body of literature. Instead of spending much time on a typology for current cases, I will study each of the cases directly through decentring and upscaling a generic framework developed on the basis of historical studies of interwar fascisms, with a particular emphasis on Mann (Mann, 2004). This is a specific framework, building cumulatively on an elaborate corpus of comparative studies in generic fascism.

One could argue that any endeavour to globalize the term “fascism” and to use it post-1945 is doomed to failure. First of all, because theories of fascism refer to the specific situation of interwar Europe; second, because their generic, comparative value is highly contested even with regard to their applicability to the history of different European countries. Furthermore, to identify a set of ideas and practices, a movement, party or regime as fascist is to discredit them politically. In the specific context of German intellectual debate that has been mine for many years, it is impossible to use the concept of National-Socialism, in particular, comparatively, since this would mean demonizing those one compares to Nazis, qualifying Nazi horrors and insulting the victims: three intellectual prohibitions. Given the state of debate within Germany, they do make some sense. It is indeed particularly difficult in the discussion I wish to open here to separate political positionings, normative judgments and analytical tools.

It will become evident in the following that my ambition is not to globalize the term fascism, but to use an analytical framework that was developed to study fascism. I have decided to coin the term “authoritarian restoration” to generically refer to all of the cases under study. This avoids wasting time on defining how close to which certain line they need to get to be called fascist or not.² It also avoids being accused of intellectual inaccuracy and of abuse of the term fascism.

There are however several reasons to start this endeavour from established theories of interwar fascism. While being conscious of the historical and political burden of the concepts and theories, I do not think they will prevent meaningful sociological work on the topic. Fascism theories offer an overarching, systematic and coherent theoretical framework to start with. The most elaborate theoretical works have appeared recently and build on three waves of generalizing fascism theories (Reichardt, 2004, p. 386). Recent studies on fascism take movements and regimes seriously as political forces in their own right and manage to finally overcome the division between idealist vs. materialist approaches.

In order to grasp the emergence and meaning of current authoritarian restoration, fascism theories are a useful, particularly well-developed branch of scholarship. They are far more conceptually precise and theoretically useful than academic writings on current right-wing “populism” or “Islamic terrorism”, which are more limited in scope, hardly comparative, mostly descriptive and largely undertheorized. Put differently, I transfer this approach through time and space, in what resembles a decentring exercise. Fascism theories provide the overall themes that help organize and synthesize the disparate bodies of literature.

Ultimately, the aim of my study follows the logic of “comparative history as the contrast of contexts” (Skocpol & Somers, 1980, p. 175). Do we face multi-level crises similar to the interwar period today? What local and regional dynamics are at play? What are the specific local versions and effects of shared global trends? Therefore, do we identify distinct, unique cases or do common causes at the global level explain the crisis?³ The question here is whether “these unique features” might “affect the working-out of putatively general social processes” (Skocpol & Somers, 1980, p. 178), in this case

² Others have similarly struggled, as Zachariah about using the concept of “fascism” in analysing Indian politics of the 1920s and 1930s, tackling the problem of application to a non-European context Zachariah (2010, p. 181).

³ It becomes obvious here that a considerable part of Mann’s framework is not specific to fascism. Speaking about four sources of social power, a context of multiple crises, and about credible responses to crises empowering those who represent them are considerations of a much broader significance.

of the emergence of authoritarians in different contexts. With regard to the contrast of contexts, the selection of two highly different cases makes sense. Another important question, following analysis of crisis contexts, is to ask how authoritarians offered distinctive solutions to the four crises; and beyond, which constituencies were attracted by those solutions because of their particular social location.

However, before elaborating on those questions, given the disparities between the contexts in question, is it necessary to define the category of authoritarian restoration. The argument I wish to put forward here is that although the current Western European far right (FN, AfD and their surrounding networks) and jihadism (Daesh) differ in some central aspects, they do share a certain family resemblance.

Family resemblances between cases

As a collective of authors, we have decided to include a chapter on authoritarian restoration in the second volume because intuitively, we believe that the cases in question have some features in common. Their spontaneous disqualification as “fascists!” recognizes this resemblance. The concept of family-resemblance follows Wittgenstein.

Proponents of the idea of a family resemblance between cases refuse to provide one clear-cut, minimal definition of a concept. Indeed, family resemblance precludes the existence of one unique essential trait of all cases (Wittgenstein, 1999, § 65). Instead, family resemblance refers to a “complicated network of resemblances that are interrelated and intersected” (Wittgenstein, 1999, § 66) (author’s translation). In order to illustrate this point, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of a thread that consists of interwoven fibres. None of the fibres runs through the whole thread. What runs through the whole thread is the interweaving of its fibres that do not have one thing in common, but form a common thing (Wittgenstein, 1999, § 67). Logicians have translated this idea into a succession of cases, where case 1 displays features a,b,c,d, case two features b,c,d,e, case three features c,d,e,f, or a,b,e,f, etc. Speaking of family resemblances avoids having to define clear boundaries for the concept without rendering it useless or less useful (Wittgenstein, 1999, § 68).

The authoritarians in question can be directly compared with one another regarding their core values and their organizational forms. Mann provides a definition that is specific to fascism: “Most concisely, fascism is the pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism (Mann, 2004, p. 13). This definition can serve as an entry point in as far as it provides a concise and specific conceptual grip and it is in coherence with the overall research strategy. *Nation-statism* corresponds to the exaggeration of two core elements of 20th century political ideology. Fascist *nationalism* was grounded in the idea of the organic, integral nation. Obsessed with unity, fascism therefore constructed a clear distinction between the nation and its internal and external enemies. *Statism* means the worshipping of state power, of the state as the bearer of a project for economic, social and moral development. A strong, hierarchical and authoritarian nation-state representing the organic nation was the ultimate political goal and at the same time the

organizational form that fascism took once in power. However, fascists were more radical in the formulation of their ultimate goal than in the actual form they gave their states.⁴

Transcendence refers to the goal of transcending class conflict and national divides, in accordance with the idea of the organic nation and its representation by the state. Transcendence would be obtained by repressing or eliminating the revolutionary left and by removing political and racial enemies on the one hand. On the other hand, corporatist institutions would integrate interest groups, different economic sectors and socio-economic classes into the nation-state. This ultimate aim of (class) transcendence was not accomplished, however, due to structural weaknesses in ideology (Griffin, 1991, pp. 26–55) and due to changes in fascists' strategies throughout the various stages until their accession to power (Paxton, 1998). The *cleansing* aspect directly follows from transcendent nation-statism: political opponents as well as strangers within the organic nation could not be accommodated through compromise but were defined as eliminable enemies to be cleansed if the ideal of the transcendent and organic nation was to be achieved.

The cleansing was carried out by bottom-up *paramilitary* organizations. Those militias, structured by male comradeship, represented the key value and organizational form of fascism and often existed prior to political parties. This particular provocative and aggressive bottom-up organization distinguished fascism within the political arena of the interwar years, and has since set it apart from other forms of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. Paramilitarism represented the key value of fascism in as far as it was meant to be exemplary for the organic nation, for the hierarchical state it was supposed to create, and for the new man that fascism was to bring about. Paramilitarism was to carry out the cleansing. Mann's criteria of cleansing and paramilitarism redress the major weaknesses of purely ideological accounts of fascism in as far as they address fascism in action. Ideology, discourse and political myths only become active and harmful once they are harnessed to power organizations: "Fascism was always uniformed, marching, armed, dangerous, and radically destabilizing of the existing order" (Mann, 2004, p. 16). The task now is to adapt this conceptual framework to the cases under study; furthermore, to put order into the elements that allow us to speak of a family-resemblance between different types of authoritarian restoration.⁵

Exclusive solidarity

Nationalism is certainly one of the key concepts need to understand today's European far-right. However, today's is a different nationalism from that of interwar fascism. Its combination with statism to form nation-statism is less obvious. More importantly, not only for an adequate understanding of jihadism, but for the case of the far-right as well, it seems necessary to extend Mann's concept, too specific and too narrow for my task, into a broader concept of exclusive

⁴ This corresponds to Griffin's analysis of major structural weaknesses of fascist ideology Griffin (1991, pp. 26–55) as well as to Paxton's analysis of fascism as evolving in stages throughout which initial aims were often watered down or betrayed Paxton (1998).

⁵ This section contains relatively few literature references. This is explicable through the fact that I wrote it last, "on top" of the sections that deal with the contrasting of contexts and the contextualised historical development of the current authoritarians, back to their deep roots Keim (forthcoming).

solidarity that extends beyond the nation. The more unspecific term "community", as in Paxton's definition of fascism,⁶ comes closer to this than Mann's "nationalism".

"Exclusiveness" is adapted from Jacquemain's discussion of the European extreme right as an "exclusive identity project". Here I will leave out the identity aspect, since it is not specific to authoritarian restoration. That solidarity is thought of as something exclusive, in turn, characterises authoritarian restoration as opposed to non-authoritarian and non-restorationist, inclusive narratives of solidarity. "Solidarity" is adapted from Sitas's idea of the creation of non-class "horizontal solidarities" through anti-apartheid and anti-colonial forms of nationalism (Sitas, 2015). I leave out "horizontal" because in some of the observed cases, the self-perception as an elite or vanguard as well as hierarchical models of organisation prevail.

Sitas's reflections on non-class solidarities also provide a useful analytical and comparative grid to specify variants of this common theme. Sitas argues that "[i]n discussing [...] the discursive work of nationalism, articulated by people who attempt to create such historical solidarities, it is important to understand that there are five elements that make the 'narrative' cohere. The table below tries to create a heuristic map of them" (Sitas, 2015, p. 4). The five elements are taken up here in order to highlight variations of exclusive solidarity that current authoritarian restorationists put forth:

Insert Table 1

Sitas addresses the various configurations that marked the anti-apartheid struggle as well as political violence and civil war in the KwaZulu Natal-region during the transition period. I am applying his thoughts to two radically different contexts. This has led me to adapt the key concept of "originary trauma", certainly justified for the movements and organisations he studies. I argue that the term originary trauma does apply to jihadism. Speaking about the traumata of the far-right, however, would mean taking seriously and lending credibility to their strategy to establish themselves as victims in a national and international political field in which they are located on the side of the powerful. Speaking about the originary trauma of jihadism but of the originary grievance of the Western European far right therefore introduces a conceptual imbalance – yet one that is congruent with the power differentials between the two and between each of them and their surroundings.

The need to extend from nationalism to the logic of exclusive solidarity is quite straightforward in the case of jihadism. The fact that jihadism relies first and foremost on a religious ideology has implications for the applicability of Mann's core concept of "nation-statism" to Daesh. Indeed, the caliphate project was clearly opposed to the idea of the nation and to any type of nationalism. What sets jihadism apart from other forms of exclusive solidarity is its universalistic ethos in restoring the original Ummah as the pioneering core of an eschatological Islamic world-empire, the utopian "dar al-islam" [check: Lutz Berger, *Islamische Theologie*, Wien, 2010. 221 f.], with the objective of infinite extension in order to follow the commandments of divine revelation. Its ultimate objective dissolves spatial and temporal boundaries (Müller, 2016, p. 31). Jihadism calls for solidarity amongst members of the Ummah as the historical subject, a decisively anti-national idea, since the creation of nation-

⁶ "Fascism is a system of political authority and social order intended to reinforce the unity, energy, and purity of communities in which liberal democracy stands accused of producing division and decline" Paxton (1998, p. 21).

states in the Islamic worlds is directly associated with colonialism and the divide of the Ummah. The idea of "community" for jihadism is therefore a radically different one from the "Volksgemeinschaft". It includes Muslim believers beyond any national borders and is universalist and transcendent in outlook. The originary trauma jihadist groups are addressing is the decline of Islamic civilisations as a consequence of colonisation and Westernisation. This decline is not so much attributed to material forms of oppression and exploitation, to unequal exchange in capitalist markets or to racially motivated domination and exclusion. Rather, it is analysed primarily as the result of deep problems in the areas of culture and education. Decline in the Muslim worlds, in comparison with a powerful Occident, is in stark contrast to the theological premise of the superiority of Islam. One interpretation of the meaning of this tension is that Muslims are not following the message of their Prophet closely enough (El-Mafaalani, 2018). The marginalisation of traditional Islamic education alienates Muslims from their cultural legacy and prevents them from developing a holistic Islamic worldview and from living according to Islamic ideals. The modern nation-state based on Western models inhibits them from implementing sharia law.

While nationalism is the wrong keyword to understand jihadism, exclusive solidarity fully applies: The religious distinction between dar al-islam (the house of Islam) and dar al-harb (the house of war) draws a clear line between Islam and the non-Islamic world. Beyond space, time is also ordered along the same logic, with the distinction of jahiliyya (the time of ignorance) and hakimiyya allah (the rule of God). Beyond their historic sense (the time before and after the advent of Islam), this timeline refers to the ongoing confrontation between the "degenerate" Occident and Islam. Jahiliyya refers to "a cultural, psychological, and social state of anomie illustrated by the antagonism between Islam and Western societies" (Nordbruch, 2005, p. 19). While the legacy of this narrative can be traced back to the earliest religious conflicts between the three Abrahamic monotheistic creeds, through the Crusades, the so-called Reconquista, colonial conquest and the wars of liberation, one of the latest climaxes in a long line of reiterations of the same theme has been the division of Palestine and the creation of Israel post-1945 (Nordbruch, 2005, p. 19). The current phase – the invasion of Iraq, 9/11 etc. – need not be expanded upon here.

The Westernisation of culture keeps Muslims from leading their life in accordance with Islamic principles and values. This corresponds to a meta-outgroup, the (formerly colonising) Occident, for a long time economically, culturally and militarily superior to the Islamic worlds, as well as to the general outgroup of non-Muslims, considered inferior to Muslims as a rule. Jihadism shares with the far right an antifeminist and homophobic outlook and an obsession, in this case not with politically correct, but religiously correct sexuality. Jihadism bases its legitimacy and veracity on the universal truth of the revealed sources as well as on the societal model of the historical community of followers of the prophet. Those elements make the jihadist narrative coherent and attractive for followers as a means of restoring their unity and dignity (Peters, 1996; Reissner, 1996).

In the particular case of Daesh, the creation of a caliphate and the organisation of state structures added another mode of veracity. The caliphate was enacted through territorial conquests. This legitimised Daesh's violent organisation inside, its cleansing of deviant population groups, and its aggression towards the outside. The ultimate aim, differently from the big 20th century totalitarianisms, was not only a this-worldly, political one. Instead, jihadism foresees an apocalyptic end, the world victory of Islam in a final battle, and it includes a transcendental reference to the other-worldly paradise for its fighters. This lends legitimation to its acts. Simultaneously, however,

the quest for territorial expansion proved to be its weakness. As soon as the Islamic State began to lose territory, the legitimacy and veracity of the caliphate became questionable (Müller, 2016, pp. 29–32).

The case of Europe looks more complex, with different levels of belonging embedded. First of all, there are two slightly distinct invocations of Europe ("l'Occident", "das Abendland") as priority scales of exclusive solidarity, one of the reasons why "nationalism" would cut the story short. The first is the idea of a "white Europe", based on white supremacy, sustained by eugenicist and genuinely racist ideologies and obsessed with the assumption of a natural hierarchy of races and the ultimate ideal of racial purity, in line with the colonial mindset of National-Socialism and its imperial outlook. The section on "Black Disgrace" in my chapter in our last volume illustrated that defence of the white race had become a major European-wide issue in the interwar years (Keim, 2014). An articulate denunciation of racial miscegenation and decadence related to post-colonial immigration remains limited to small circles of the extreme right. Moral panics around sexual aggression of Muslim refugees against white women, however, echo such historical memories and fears of the dark stranger. In the broader public, what disturbs people is rather the idea of cultural heterogeneity. This makes them call for an exclusive solidarity of white Europeans, across nation-states within Europe. This is all the more logical as the issue of migration is in itself also a transnational phenomenon (Sebaux, 2016, p. 387).

A slightly different shade is contained in calls for solidarity at the level of a civilizational "Occident". The grievance here is the alleged ongoing Islamisation of Judeo-Christian civilisation. This relates to the vision of the Muslim as highly reproductive, conveying fears of a Muslim invasion, outbreeding and 'takeover' of Europe (Zúquete, 2008). The invocation of Christian identity is one of the connections between the conservative, centre-right and fractions of the extreme right. The idea of a civilizational Occident that needs to be defended against Islamisation or even the assertion of a necessary re-Christianisation of Europe is behind the calls for "Reconquista!" voiced by identitarian groups today (Keim, 2017). They invoke historical antecedents for legitimisation purposes, eternalise the supposed conflict between Europe and Islam, and stir fears about the imminent decadence of Christian Europe. This version is obviously close to the idea of "white Europe", but with emphasis on the cultural co-presence of Muslims than on racial aspects. In France, in particular, both combine in specific ways. Colonial thinking is deeply ingrained into far-right discourses about Islam, since in their perception any Muslim is Algerian and any Algerian a Muslim. In this sense, moral panics around sexual aggression against white French women is not so much related to fear of miscegenation, but rather reflect the perception of a threat to civilizational achievements of emancipation.⁷ Interestingly, references to the Occident as the historical subject to be restored reach out beyond the current EU, including Russia. Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin features as one of the key ideologues on the continent for the theorisation of white and Judeo-Christian Europe and is a reference all across Europe (see (Keim, forthcoming).

We could apprehend those developments beyond a narrow nationalism as emerging post-nationalism in the current far-right. I find it more adequate to think about it as intersecting levels of exclusive solidarities. Below the European level, there are calls for solidarity amongst the people of

⁷ As various feminist groups have pointed out, this argument of Muslims being oppressive against women sounds rather ironic in the sense that the advocates of this version of the Occident otherwise often hold rather patriarchal views.

one nation. They vary from country to country but share a series of meta-outgroups. In comparison with the interwar years, one of the most substantive shifts regarding the outgroups is the progressive inclusion, at least in several official discourses of established far-right parties, of the arch-deviant Jew (see (Keim, 2014) into the idea of a Judeo-Christian Europe. This applies to Western Europe only and has intensified massively with migrations resulting from wars and conflicts in the Middle East and most importantly, since the series of violent attacks within Europe claimed by or attributed to Daesh and related groups. Since then, the deviant figure of the Muslim has been fused with the deviant figure of the terrorist once and for all. The desperate discourse and agitation around "international terrorism" reveals how poorly equipped all concerned nation-states are to even conceptually face a non-state transnational army carrying out non-state violence.

Apart from dark strangers and Muslims, nationals appear to be threatened by the undocumented or illegals, i.e. individuals and groups living inside the country's borders but outside of national control and legislation. Their cheap, ultra-exploitable labour is perceived as a threat to domestic jobs. Cadgers, i.e. all those who undeservingly benefit from social welfare created by the people of the nation, are another outgroup. This call for exclusive solidarity is based on an assumption of national priority and the need to maintain the integrity of the nation. Simultaneously, it makes it more difficult to address matters in terms of class, inequality and redistribution.

In this sense, at local and communitarian levels, exclusive solidarity translates into a "right to stay amongst us".⁸ Combined with calls to curb or "reverse" immigration flows, this right to stay amongst us also translates into policies for spatial segregation and avoiding closeness between supposedly culturally different and incompatible population groups. According to Jacquemain, far from an outward-looking rhetoric of sovereignty, from assumptions of racial superiority, and from the ideal of an organic nation or from aggressive or imperialist nationalism, nationalism has been reformulated to better fit the rising fear of heterogeneity and cultural friction within European societies: "The point is no longer to dominate, or to reject domination, but to organise segregation, to refuse cohabitation. The new far right's project is about responding to globalisation with the vision of a generalised apartheid of sorts" " (Jacquemain & Claisse, 2012, p. 22).

That Europe serves as the level of identification and belonging does not contradict the existence of the national framework as another level for exclusive solidarities. From there we can identify another shared outgroup. Again, these days, cosmopolitans are viewed as opposed to patriots. The calls for a European front against the debilitating effects of immigration, outbreeding, globalisation or cultural mixing are still expressed under the umbrella idea of solidarity amongst sovereign nations, the "Europe of fatherlands". In this sense, the political and administrative framework of the EU functions as a key projection, including the political and bureaucratic elites and experts, the new cosmopolitans, that sustain and support it nationally as well as at the European level in order to destroy the nation (Chebel d'Appolonia, 1992, p. 23). This is what AfD-member of parliament Alexander Gauland expressed when he said "It is time that we take the destiny of the German people [Volk], in order for it to remain a German people, out of the hands of our Chancellor" (quoted in Sarovic). Far-rightists voice conspiracy theories against a political establishment that sells out its populations and aims at their nation's decadence through Islamisation and racial mixing in order to

⁸ For in-depth, qualitative empirical studies see for example Girard (2017); Pudal (2011).

further US dominance.⁹ The EU appears here as the opposite of the vision of a "Europe of fatherlands". The shared concerns about the subordination of the nation under the European *Acquis Communautaire*, or "Brussels Mandate", including loss of national sovereignty and implementation of the Schengen agreement, i.e. supposedly "open borders", are but another variation on the themes of loss of national sovereignty and specificity (Baier, 2016; Chebel d'Appolonia, 1992, p. 22).

Apart from the Muslim, cosmopolitan elites and the EU, the "lying media" are other meta-outgroups, as it is supposedly under the influence of "hegemonic leftists". In Germany, in particular, references to the "Lügenpresse" are clearly reminiscent of NS-vocabulary and discourse. Although it is not an outgroup per se, another common object of outrage is political correctness. This does not only refer to supposed "anti-national racism" (i.e. affirmative action and non-racist language, for ex.) but also to what is perceived as a "gender ideology" ("Genderwahn", "idéologie du genre"), where "gender mainstreaming" is understood as having debilitating effects on the healthy development of masculinity and femininity amongst young children, on the reproduction of traditional family models and ultimately of white Europeans – some put forth rather intellectual or cultural arguments, a few insist on the eugenicist implications (Herkenhoff, 2016, pp. 205–206; Oppelland, 2017). In France, the "Manif pour tous!"-movement against same sex marriage has been a major mobilising moment in which the centre-right and extreme right connected.

Against this background of shared themes, I will look more closely at the two national cases I am most familiar with: Germany and France. In France, the appeal to the people of the nation is expressed in terms of the "Grande Nation". The specific originary grievances here are the collaboration under Vichy, which discredits the aspirations of the far right within broad segments of the population; the Algerian war and independence, representing the loss of the Grande Nation; as well as 1968 and the supposed "leftist hegemony" that followed and against which the far right re-established itself as a counterforce. The social foundation of alienation experienced by the people of the Grande Nation is postcolonial cultural heterogeneity, i.e. the presence of "dark strangers", especially French Islam. The key outgroup is closely related to French colonial history, a chapter that stretches into the metropole and has not been adequately addressed by means of a conscious politics of memory or any reconciliatory attempt: "The dread of the past of French Algeria looms as a crucial dark side of the far-right movement" (Stora, 1997, p. 14). JM Le Pen himself declared that "[t]he fight for a French Algeria has prepared the fight for a French France" (cited in (Stora, 1997, p. 24).

In the German case, the historical subject of the national people would be the *Volksgemeinschaft*. There is asymmetry in my categorization since ideas of the Grande Nation are much more broadly accepted in France than ideas of *Volksgemeinschaft* in Germany. However, if the aim is to understand national specificities, I believe this distinction still makes sense. I have elaborated on the German concept of Volk at length in my contribution to volume I. Suffice to say here that after a period stretching into the recent past where NS-vocabulary had been banned from public space but subsisted in hidden ways, the AfD has led a strategic struggle to reintroduce NS-laden terms into public debate. This concerns in particular the adjective "völkisch", which clearly conveys historical connotations.

⁹ The Eastern European version is more confident in adding that the US are led by Jewish capital (George Soros).

The originary grievance of the Volksgemeinschaft-ideologues is paradoxically, but without any doubt, the expansionist war and the Holocaust, or more precisely, its undeniability. This is what delegitimises any call for a German Grande Nation within broad segments of the population. Since the Holocaust cannot be denied, the far right plays around with ambiguous references to this past, partly to provoke attention, partly to trivialise the facts, and partly to express its frustration at being strongly disadvantaged with regard to other national far right movements. While the early post-war far right in Germany opposed parliamentarism and multiculturalism as the macro sources of alienation of the Volksgemeinschaft, nowadays the German culture of remembrance, in Björn Höcke's (AfD) view a "shame culture" or "culture of disgrace" is seen as the basic social foundation that inhibits national pride. Björn Höcke's agitation against the German disgrace in terms of its memory politics echoes Goebbels's outrage against the "Disgrace of Versailles".

Outgroups are similar as in the French case. The modalities of veracity, aiming to overcome the grievance of the undeniability of the Holocaust, involve the invocation of 1000 years of German history, in the midst which the NS-years appear as no more than "peanuts" ("ein Vogelschiss", literally: "a bird's shit"; Gauland, quoted in Hebel, 2018). Within those parts of the German far right that are intellectually versed, racial organicism remains another source of legitimacy of Volksgemeinschaft (Chebel d'Appollonia, 1992, p. 21, see also Kemper, 2016).

In framing calls for exclusive solidarities, jihadism as well as the European far right have found their most promising response to the ideological crisis (see Keim, forthcoming). In placing exclusive solidarities above the individual, they aim to transcend internal conflict and to close up spaces of privilege. They represent "displacement ideologies" that give the illusion of solving social and economic conflict along lines of race, culture or creed (Hammerschmidt, 2005). Because exclusive solidarities are essentially based on the exclusion of others and enemies, the potential for violence and coercion is inherent in them. The aim of restoring a pure community as the basis for exclusive solidarity is one of the two key shared aspects that allow us to speak of a family resemblance between those two highly different cases of authoritarian restoration.

Statism

Obviously, political actors who favour exclusive solidarities based on faith have a fundamentally different vision of the state than those who base their solidarities on some form of nationalism or Europeanism. In Western Europe, the neoliberal turn, with the increased individualization of economic success and material risks, has caused a discursive shift. Against materially based inclusive solidarity, visions of culture-, nation- or race-based exclusive solidarity have gained ground. The far right could capitalise on this inversion of trends that has accompanied the retreat of the state from its post-war welfare- and social security-functions (Jacquemain, 2011). The trend towards cultural exclusivity and national closure that the far-right proposes as a response to the economic and ideological crises of neoliberalism also has another, more macro-level reason: the fact that no state can claim to control its national economy. With the ascent of neoliberalism and global capitalism, statism in terms of the state as an economic actor itself has been in crisis. The state has appeared as weakened, within Western Europe not only in terms of its economic agency, but supposedly because of the superimposed EU framework. The 2008 economic crisis and the fact that the state has reentered the economic field as a major political actor has led to partial reconfigurations within the far right. In addition to cultural exclusivity and various shades of nationalism, some parties reaffirm a

strong state against the EU and against globalisation. Beyond calls for “making X great again” or the metaphor of the closed border, certain economic imaginaries take shape. In their view, a strong state is a free state, where free means mainly free from the subordination of national law and action under the EU treaties, but also free from international legal dispositions and from US domination. The key features of this statism of the current far right, realised differently by different far-right groups and parties, are at least five: 1) regaining control over the economy (for instance, the FN's call for an interventionist, protectionist, re-industrialising state); 2) guaranteeing law and order, a feature that it shares, although often in more exaggerated, pioneering expressions, with the conservative right (more security for spotless citizens who are threatened by migrants and terrorists through more police, more prison places, the reintroduction of the death penalty, reinforced border and immigration controls); 3) asserting national values and identity, in accordance with the recently created “Ministère de l’Intérieur, de l’Immigration et de la Laïcité” or Ministry of the Interior, Construction and Heimat (Ministerium des Inneren, für Bau und Heimat);¹⁰ this also includes refusal of “national repentances” in Germany and of strong regionalisms in France; 4) guaranteeing true democracy;¹¹ and 5) providing exclusive public services as an exclusive privilege for true nationals (family policies and public school education as major sites of ideological struggle).

To conclude, statism clearly is a feature of the current German and French far rights. It does not appear as a major issue when compared to their blatant racist and anti-immigration discourses. However, their statism does not combine as elegantly as in Mann's account of historical fascism into nation-statism. I have outlined above that exclusive solidarities are linked together within, but also beyond national frames of reference. The emerging vision of a “Europe of fatherlands” tries to follow this movement of changing levels of reference and ensures the maintenance of nation-statist ideas.

Daesh stands out as a jihadist movement that insists on and promoted its statehood, baring “dawla” in its name to start with. The literature opposes this to the “Islamic Emirate” of the Taliban that had been characterized as an “anti-state”. Daesh early on oriented its organization and functioning towards the model of the modern state (Müller, 2016, p. 29) and has made serious advances towards the creation of a caliphate: “Islamic State’s establishment and implementation of the ‘caliphate’ is the organisation’s unique selling point. (...) The more ‘evidence’ that is made available, the more resilient Islamic State becomes to assertions that it is illegitimate” (Winter, 2015, pp. 28–30).

¹⁰ Through the ideological renewal initiated by M. Le Pen, the FN has reinterpreted Republican values like laïcité and public service in authoritarian restorationist garb. In the case of laïcité, “that could be understood as a logic of individual emancipation but also as a logic of injunction to conformity” Jacquemain (2011, pp. 2–3) transl. wk), the aim is clearly to demonstrate that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with French Republicanism Perrineau (2016, p. 65).

¹¹ That the far right calls for more, better or true democracy sounds paradoxical only at first sight. There is a legacy of claims to “true democracy” within the extreme right reaching back into NS-ideology Botsch (2017). The strategy of far-right leaders, in line with the NS-heritage, is directed against representative democracy and oriented towards the ideal of the charismatic leader who embodies the will and destiny of the nation. This is what is meant, ultimately, by “direct” or “true democracy” within the far right: freeing the direct link between leader and followers from bureaucratic hurdles, democratic procedures and superimposed transnational frameworks. The FN also favours this direct and exclusive relationship between the public and the charismatic leader Baier (2016); Della Porta (2017, pp. 34–36). Furthermore, at a more abstract level, in line with its Euroscepticism, the far right considers the strong State to be the only “truly democratic” body as opposed to the EU. The latter is considered to be under the grip of the power of cosmopolitan elites, lobbyists, bureaucrats and experts, global finance and the rules of the globalised economy at large, working to the detriment of nations and their people Oppelland (2017); Decker (2016, p. 11).

This concerns first of all its conquest of territories, which allowed among other things for a considerable degree of economic autonomy. Furthermore, Daesh had sought to recover existing Syrian and Iraqi state structures such as hospitals, schools and universities (Müller, 2016, p. 29), and created new ones. In the controlled territories, Daesh set up ministries and departments and a modern bureaucracy as well as executive structures including a secret service. It collected and administrated taxes and duties, introduced a currency (Müller, 2016, p. 29), determined prices, set up functioning courts and an educational system. Raqqa, its capital, had a flag and an anthem (Rosiny, 2015, p. 100). In setting up all those structures typical of a modern state, the "Islamic State is forever seeking to provide evidence that it is not just talking about the 'caliphate', but that it is enacting it, too" (Winter, 2015, p. 29). The caliphate differed from a nation-state in fundamental ways. In fact, it "(...) transgresses the authority and capacity of a nation-state" (Rosiny, 2015, pp. 100–101)¹².

The seizure of territory and establishment of state structures projects the reality of the caliphate and guarantees its legitimacy. Beyond this, it seems that the mujahedin believed in the necessity to provide particularly strong state structures, first and foremost to reinstall and guarantee law and order in a region marked by social, political, juridical and military chaos and economic inequality. This authoritarian law-and-order approach resembles that of the far right. In a longer-term perspective, however, it also appears that the state was to be a guarantor of Islamic values and principles, not dissimilar here again from the nation-statist idea of guaranteeing national values. Ultimately, the Islamic State would be the bearer of sharia law.

While the aspect of statism was covered in the case of Daesh, it was not all that the caliphate project is about. Ideologically, not only did the caliphate go far beyond the idea of the nation-state in terms of the utopia of a global, universal realization of the Muslim Ummah; it also encompassed a theological meaning that went far beyond the modern state. Its statism was merely a means towards reaching an eschatological, God-given end.

The family resemblance between the far right and jihadism remains limited at the level of their allegiance to statism, although it is a feature in both cases. Maybe it is underestimated as a grounding force in both. The far-right project is definitely more strongly congruent with the limitations of the nation-state, while the jihadist ideal exceeds them. The second feature of their family resemblance lies in the authoritarianism implied in their calls for law and order, conformity and obedience.

Transcendence

The nationalism of the current far-right does involve some idea of transcendence, in particular of the divide between "the people" and the elites. However, the strong sense of transcendence that was tangible in interwar fascisms has become obsolete in a context where class struggle has nearly come

¹² "First, the caliphate transcends existing nation-states and aims to unite all Muslim territories under its rule. This is why the Islamic State in Iraq and in Sham (ISIS) rebranded itself the Islamic State without any territorial limitations. The new caliphate is purposely keeping its borders vague; it wants to expand its territory. Furthermore, the protagonists are not concerned about diplomatic recognition. According to their understanding, those Muslim territories that pay homage to the caliph will become provinces (wilayat) of the Islamic State; gaining recognition from 'infidel' states is explicitly not an aim. The manmade colonial borders of the existing nation-states are irrelevant and should be demolished. (...)" Rosiny (2015, pp. 100–101).

to an end. With the bureaucratisation and overall weakening of trade unions, the fragmentation and alienation of the working class through the restructuring, transformation and offshoring of production, combined with the neoliberal narrative of individualisation has led to a situation where class conflict, i.e. conflict over distribution, has given way to “multiculturalism” as the major site of social friction. And the dark strangers are an outgroup to far-right exclusive solidarities. The same applies to the supposed divide between corrupt elites and ordinary people. Transcendence is not a necessary option for national renaissance and reintegration.

Jihadism is a religious ideology more than a political one (Griffin, 1991). The original meaning of transcendence is religious and applies to jihadism in this original sense.¹³ Still, it is not aberrant to perceive an aspect of transcendence in Mann’s sense of the term in Daesh as well. Clearly, the jihadist ideal also implied a this-worldly transcendence of division and strife caused by secular ideologies, sectarian power struggles, clientelism, lack of justice and economic inequalities through the restoration of the original Ummah of true believers and subsequently through its global extension. This implied either the conversion or the extermination of non-believers, apostates and all sorts of disruptive and opposing elements. Daesh’s project therefore gave a transcendental meaning to its extermination policy (see below cleansing) as a solution to existential sectarian conflicts as well as to its global fight against nonbelievers inside and outside the Islamic worlds.

Paramilitarism

During the interwar years, political violence as a means of political struggle was widely accepted. Today the political context in Western Europe is fundamentally different, and paramilitarism has disappeared from the political landscape after 1945, unless we call secret armies – OAS or Gladio – paramilitary.¹⁴

It is at smaller scales that in every European country, we find organized groups that practice extreme-right-inspired political violence against leftists, migrants and ethnic minorities, and in a few cases against representatives of establishment politics and the state. Against the commonly held assumption, often expressed in court procedures against perpetrators, that right-wing violence is essentially a spontaneous law and order problem involving drunk, jobless and not especially bright youth “without any definite political orientation”, more often than not violent acts appear to depend on some form of organisation. Because they remain small in scope – at least for their visible part – do not control territory and do not wear uniforms, we cannot consider them paramilitary.¹⁵

Vigilantism gives shape to the “dark side” of civil society and seems to represent a truly mobilising activity (Roth, 2003). According to statistics in Germany, for instance, alongside committed neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists, individuals without prior political experience have joined such vigilante

¹³ Müller has suggested the term “transcendent totalitarianism” to account for “the religious elements at the basis of Daesh’s totalitarian ideology”, in as far as “beyond terror, it seems to be the transcendent moment, the orientation towards God, that provides cohesion to the totalitarian society of the caliphate project” Müller (2016, p. 31).

¹⁴ Müller (1991); Ganzer (2005); Roth (2016).

¹⁵ Although there are none in Western Europe, we do find truly paramilitary formations in some parts of Eastern Europe. Bulgaria has a strong paramilitary movement, sponsored among others by Russia, to prevent cross-border migration but also to stifle anti-Putin demonstrations Fromm (2016). The recently banned Hungarian Guard was set up to protect the population against “Roma crime” – the Roma being defined here as a criminal tribe Damodaran (2014); Gauriat.

groups in recent years to practice violent self-justice against refugees (Quent, 2016, p. 21), as parts of civil society interpreted rising numbers of refugees as state failure. The motivation of vigilante groups is not a radical change of system, but rather stabilising the system by defending the old order through self-justice (Quent, 2016, p. 20). The German group Bürgerwehr Freital/360, for example, pursued the aim of creating "national liberated zones" until its members were condemned for creation of a terrorist association in 2018.

If those groups and actions cannot count as paramilitary and remain marginal in the political game, in all mentioned cases, organized violence is a means to claim agency, to take concrete measures to introduce order into a social world that is perceived as anomic. They all enact the claim that the state does not sufficiently guarantee the security of its legitimate citizens, defined according to an exclusive identitarian conception. Often this assumption is combined with conspiracy constructs of an external manipulation of the state. Despite their own illegal action in terms of the state's monopoly of violence, their aim is to reinforce a strong, authoritarian state (Quent, 2016; Waldmann, 2011, Anm. 10). An interesting additional observation refers to the nearby complete "speechlessness" of right-wing violence. This sets it apart from left-wing violence, which has always sought to provide verbal, elaborate and often strongly theorized justifications of its actions. Right-wing violence, however, hardly provides official justifications, "because the inferiority of certain groups of humans is regarded as natural. (...) Theoretically sustained avowals are not deemed necessary in order to legitimate violence, because in their own view, the perpetrators execute the natural order and the true interest of the people [Volk]" (Quent, 2016, p. 24), transl. wk).

The case of Daesh provides a completely different picture. Paramilitarism was probably the only thinkable organizational form through which Daesh's objectives could be attained. The creation of a radically new form of state could not be achieved through intellectual circles, social movements or political parties. To speak of paramilitarism seems to be far more adequate than to speak of terrorism, which is the preferred term in mainstream public and political discourse. Talk of terrorism, though adequate in reference to the violent attacks that were carried out on European territory, sounds like a helpless attempt by existing nation-states to maintain an illusion of superiority, control, sovereignty and agency in the face of a transnational organizational form that strongly resembles an army, albeit a transnational or non-national one. The para-military form of organization drew specific core constituencies (jihadist veterans and former Iraqi army officials) into the organization. For the younger generation of new recruits, be it locally, regionally, or transnationally, the paramilitary training and organization functioned as a "total socializing institution" similar to Mann's description of the fascist militias as "micro-cages". The transnational youth movement was excited by the idea of a radical organizational form conducive to the use of physical violence as a means of empowerment (Keim, forthcoming).

Violence was one of the key aspects of Daesh's rise and rule. The meaning of its violence and killing was backed by an apocalyptic vision of a final battle between Islam and its enemies. For the individual fighter, contrary to the conventional fascist paramilitary, killing and dying was encouraged through the promise of other-worldly rewards in paradise. Those theological underpinnings lent full legitimacy to violent action (Müller, 2016, p. 31). This is not to insinuate that jihadists were only busy fighting and killing. Wiktorowicz (Wiktorowicz, 2006) made it clear that education was as important to them as to other Islamist factions and that, in fact, they spent more time with books than with guns. Similarly to the students and educated youth joining the interwar fascists, many of Daesh's

jihadists were men and women of high ideals and values, as expressed in their passion for and excellence in classical poetry (Creswell & Haykel, 2015).

Unlike in Mann's definition, however, jihadists would probably not claim that paramilitarism is one of their key values, but a necessary strategic step towards achieving a new form of universal community of believers. Ideas of hierarchy are not absent from the theological underpinnings of jihadism, but not in the sense of military hierarchy, as was the case with fascists.

Another point of difference in comparison with fascist paramilitarism is the fact that in the initial phase, paramilitarism remained the only organizational form – apart, maybe, from particularly cohesive educational networks with a strong capacity to secure donor funding to be channelled into the paramilitary structures as well. However, Daesh never actually created political parties. This reflected its radically different worldview, understanding of politics (especially liberal democracy and therefore the creation of parties as being an "un-Islamic" occidental import) and strategic orientation. It also reflected the radically different context of emergence of Daesh as opposed to the interwar fascists. In (Keim, forthcoming), I outline that in the case of strongly fragmented societies, the state does not regulate political conflicts, but serves as the prey of the winning actors. Daesh, however, never agreed to even try to capture state-power within existing states. Instead of competing inside a clearly determined national political field, Daesh emerged as a paramilitary movement where nation-states were crumbling and had the strategic ambition, from the outset, to create its own state as a superior, wholesale alternative.

Cleansing

Cleansing, in the sense it acquired in interwar fascism, has not been a discernible recent characteristic of far-right parties. Appadurai argues that politicians like Putin, Erdoğan, Modi or Trump "promise national cultural purification as a route to global political power" (Appadurai, 2017, p. 5). The FN's nationalism, with its core idea of the Grande Nation, goes into that direction at times. However, this "cultural purification" could at best be considered as a sort of cleansing in the figurative sense.

Considering the political violence exercised by extreme right groups, even the broader far right movements and official parties have not publicly endorsed those actions. It would be counterfactual speculation to try and guess to what extent far-right parties would make good on their intentions of promoting an exclusive solidarity based on the ideal of a pure and integral nation if they arrived in power.

If there has been cleansing, we could almost argue somewhat ironically, that it has happened within the ranks of the far right. Marine Le Pen and the French Front National are known to have silenced their connections with violent extreme right groups and to have expelled them from marches and public demonstrations (Fourest & Venner, 2011). Similarly, the AfD has spent considerable amounts of time with internal disputes around the exposure of blatantly Nazi attitudes by some of its key representatives and the necessity to avoid any overt connections. A real detective's work even showed how Björn Höcke, one of AfD's chief politicians, has carefully hidden his intellectual contributions and political activities on behalf of the neo-Nazi party NPD (Kemper, 2016). In the political sense, we could debate whether a different form of cleansing has happened within the far

right that tries to blur its lineages with interwar fascism, in accordance with its originary grievance, the undeniability of the Holocaust.

Cleansing can very well be considered as one of the core ideas and activities of the Islamic State, in combination with the above-mentioned objective of achieving transcendence. From the outset, Daesh classified an entire set of individuals and populations that needed to disappear in order for the full realization of its utopian caliphate to be achieved. This was sustained by the ideological distinction between dar al-islam and dar al-harb. The inside of the caliphate was imagined as a place of peaceful coexistence, where anyone who did not submit to God-sanctioned rule and authority had to be eliminated in order to ensure the presumed harmony amongst true believers. Setting examples and creating fear prevented future troubles and rifts. Especially at times of military failures and retreat, disciplinary problems inside the Islamic State were reported to be particularly harsh as “traitors” and “defectors” were punished by imprisonment and execution (Rosiny, 2015, p. 104). The outside, however, dar al-harb, was imagined as the place of war, occupied by Islam’s enemies. “This ‘situation of occupation’ makes appear excessive violence not only against internal enemies, alleged doubters and sceptics, apostates and traitors, as ultima ratio” (Müller, 2016, p. 31).

Different from interwar European fascisms, the licence to kill would not operate on the basis of human efforts towards the definition, (scientific) classification and management of deviants according to existential characteristics. Instead, following purely theological considerations, it was to be of a superior order following God’s commandments. This made it much easier to determine decisive selection criteria, rather effortlessly: “Anyone who does not acknowledge the caliph is an ‘apostate’. [...] According to this radical understanding, the caliphate is in fact a ‘license to kill’” (Rosiny, 2014, p. 6).

In principle, anyone could convert and join the Ummah. Yet, the interpretation of what it meant to be and behave like a true believer was extremely limited. One of the supposed reasons for the split with al-Qaeda, for instance, seemed to be that al-Zawahiri refused to kill fellow Muslims and favoured a focus on external enemies – the Occident and Israel, occupation forces – whereas Daesh did not hesitate to kill Muslims as well, beginning with Shiites (Juillet, 2016, p. 28) and “disobedient” or “recalcitrant” tribes (Balanche, 2016, pp. 137–138; Rosiny, 2015, p. 101). In practice, however, part of the cleansing did happen along ethnic lines – for instance, the genocidal attack on the Yazidi populations in August 2014. This incident also made the distinction between true believers on the one hand, and enslavable populations – Yazidi women and children – most obvious to the international community. Whereas during the war as well as outside of its territory, the cleansing was carried out by paramilitary groups, once Daesh was able to seize territory, it proceeded to state-typical forms of violence to ensure cleansing measures. Cleansing was one of Daesh’s key characteristics.

Insert Graph 1

Conclusion

Graph 1 represents the five key features of Mann's definition of fascism. For the purpose of this study they had to be adapted. One important modification decentres "nationalism" towards "exclusive solidarity", a concept specified in table 1. Daesh and the French and German far-right do overlap at this level, since both put forth pure communities as the bearers of exclusive solidarities. In their eyes, those communities are currently under threat and need to be restored in their original splendour. This resemblance is not to obfuscate a power imbalance between the two, conceptually highlighted in the different framing of the "originary trauma" in the case of Daesh, "originary grievance" in the case of the Western European far-right.

Furthermore, the aspect of statism is shared by both. This concerns their (ideal) organisational form and the function they attribute to the state, one of guaranteeing social order and exercising political authority and control. This justifies calling those networks, movements and parties "authoritarian". The concrete forms this is supposed to take, however, do not resemble each other and are also legitimised differently, in accordance with a political as opposed as to a religious ideology. Finally, paramilitarism was extended to include other, small-scale forms of political violence, namely vigilantism and terrorism. While Daesh uses and legitimises all three, in Western Europe (unlike in Eastern Europe, where paramilitarism is a current far-right organisational form), only the latter two co-exist.

On the basis of this systematisation of empirical and conceptual insights, I argue that the family resemblance between the Western European far-right and jihadism is more than an optical illusion. It will be up to another book chapter to analyse out of which global and local contexts such authoritarian restoration movements and parties have emerged, under which conditions they could gain strength and to which specific constituencies they appeal. In (Keim, forthcoming), I will outline the extent to which their respective histories are connected in specific ways in more detail. Beyond being each other's "outgroup", for instance, they both share an uncomfortable past, including Nazi support for Islamist actors, later used as instruments of foreign intelligence services. The establishment of anti-jihadism as a mobilising basis for current far-right movements in Europe is but the latest step in the troubled connections between the two. Complementing this chapter by a study that contrasts contexts will also decentre the national frame of analysis, since both the far right and jihadism are transnationally connected and diversely anchored in terms of key thinkers and texts, network structures, funding and the like.

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