The Mixed Nature of the EU-Canada FTA: Between Competences Distribution and Democratic Legitimacy
Résumé
In their Chapter, Manon Damestoy and Nicolas Levrat explore the procedural hazards inherent to the current procedure for concluding and ratifying mixed agreements, through the case study of CETA. Investigating the dramatic showdown between the Walloon Parliament (blocking the signature of CETA by Belgium) and European institutions as well as the rest of EU member States, they underline both the legal uncertainties and the democratic legitimacy issue raised in 2016 about the current common commercial policy (CCP). This chapter analyses the rationale and content of the “Namur Declaration” and the responding “Trading together Declaration”, both drafted by Academics to contextualise and conceptualise the issues of EU treaty making power in the domain of an extended CCP. The authors conclude that leaving a veto right on the outcome of such complex yearlong negotiations led by the Commission to each national (or even subnational) Parliament constitutes a ‛Damocles sword’, incompatible with the EU’s wish to appear as a reliable commercial partner. For this reason, they take inspiration from the early involvement of national Parliaments as regard the respect of the subsidiarity principle, referring to the “yellow and red card” procedures existing in Protocol n° 2. Damestoy and Levrat suggest to associate national Parliaments at an early stage of the negotiation process of potentially mixed agreements. They argue this would both diminish outcome uncertainty for mixed agreements, and bring a renewed legitimacy to EU CCP.
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