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Article Dans Une Revue European Economic Review Année : 2022

Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent

Résumé

We consider a single psychological agent whose utility depends on his action, the state of the world, and the belief he holds about that state. The agent is initially informed about the state and decides whether to memorize it, otherwise he has no recall. We model the memorization process by a multi-self game in which the privately-informed first self voluntarily discloses information to the second self, who has identical preferences and acts upon the disclosed information. We show that, for broad categories of psychological utility functions, there exists an equilibrium in which every state is voluntarily memorized. In contrast, if there are exogenous failures in the memorization process, the agent always memorizes states selectively. In this case, we characterize the partially informative equilibria for common classes of psychological utilities.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03672216 , version 1 (22-12-2022)

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Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler. Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent. European Economic Review, 2022, 142, ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.104012⟩. ⟨halshs-03672216⟩
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