



# Law Enforcement Intelligence and Intelligence-led Policing

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## LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

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Code de champ modifié

In his seminal book on organisational intelligence, Harold L. Wilensky defines intelligence as ‘the problem of gathering, processing, interpreting and communicating the technical and political information needed in the decision-making process’ (Wilensky [2015] 1). In social science research, the concept of intelligence encompasses two very different ways through which organisations acquire knowledge of their working environment. The first one refers to mechanisms and processes of all kinds by which organisation’s members construct their perception and understanding of the issues at stake. These mostly informal processes are deeply embedded in everyday work practices. They include strong elements of subjectivity, prejudiced beliefs, organisational myths, as well as cognitive biases related to emotions, culture, values, power and interests. The second way of knowing relates to the acquisition of rationale and objective knowledge. It involves the use of knowledge-producing professionals, rationalised and formalised procedures to collect and manage information, expertise work, assessment tools, analytical techniques, etc. These two ways of knowing refer to the classical distinction between practical knowledge and rational knowledge.

The generation of practical intelligence in law enforcement agencies has been addressed by several famous research studies, among which we can mention Jonathan Rubinstein’s work on how patrol officers develop their sense of territory (Rubinstein [1973]) and Peter K. Manning research on how drug detectives construct their particular professional perspective on drug-related crime (→ Drug Offences) and the ways to combat it (Manning [1980]). These works demonstrate both the predominant influence of practical knowledge on day-to-day police decision-making and the considerable limitations that this knowledge induces when the police organisation seeks to improve its performances, whatever the nature of the desired outcomes. The crucial importance of gathering and processing information is not a new feature of policing activities, but has always been a central aspect of police work, which the advent of the ‘risk society’ and the ‘information society’ has further developed and complexified (Ericson and Haggerty [1997]). The current period is characterised by a significant expansion of what Harold Lasswell (Lasswell [1975]) calls the ‘intelligence function’ of law enforcement organisations, that is the organisational structures, procedures and tools, as well as the professional knowledge, techniques and skills which are specifically dedicated to rationalising and making more efficient organisational intelligence (Innes and Sheptycki [2004]).

This is why recent scientific debates on police intelligence are primarily concerned with how to strengthen the weight of rational knowledge in Law Enforcement Agencies’ (LEA) management and policing policy making. These debates culminated in the 2000s with the spread in several countries of a new model of policing known as intelligence-led policing (ILP), a reform

movement that was accompanied by the production of a number of social science studies aiming at theorising, analysing and evaluating this model.

There is no doubt that the question of how LEAs embraced and implemented ILP is just one aspect of the much wider issue of 'intelligence' in law enforcement. Nevertheless, it can be argued that focusing on ILP is a proper way to address this broader issue. Debates around ILP are highly representative of debates on law enforcement intelligence. Research on ILP has been an opportunity for its contributors to reflect more broadly on the intelligence function in law enforcement, with the result that most of the recent findings on policing intelligence have come from these research trend on ILP. These findings are very similar to those produced by other fields of academic research working on other policy sectors, such as studies on policy intelligence. This indicates that LEAs face the same difficulties as many other government organisations when it comes to increasing the scope and power of decision-making processes based on expert knowledge.

The first part of this entry presents the conception of law enforcement intelligence as it is formulated and promoted by the ILP model. The second part presents how ILP was implemented in UK (→ England and Wales) and → USA, two countries in which this model was central to the policing reforms carried out in the 2000s, namely. The third part explains why the ILP's project to rationalise the intelligence function is ill-suited to the realities of LEAs' operations, with the exception of units or agencies that fight against high-profile crime.

## I ILP AS A POLICING MODEL

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is one of the types of reforms that have been carried out in an effort to address the loss of efficiency and legitimacy of the 'standard model' of policing. This 'standard' or 'professional' model emerged in Western countries in the 1930s and became largely predominant after the Second World War. It relies on three main police tactics, which are random patrol across all parts of the community, rapid response to emergency calls for service, and a reactive case-working approach of the investigation of crimes (Weisburd and Eck [2004]). A series of social changes have made this standard model less and less satisfactory and adequate, even though it continues to drive much of current police activity. These include the explosion of crime rates from the 1970s to the 1990s, the new paradigm of risk management, the failure of LEAs to meet social expectations and political demands for increased public safety and order maintenance, a growing concern with → organised crime and terrorism (→ Terrorism and Financing of Terrorism), and a willingness to take advantage of information technology. What these new policing models have in common is that they invite LEAs to develop strategic approaches and that they claim to be knowledge driven and data based.

Intelligence-led policing, which emerged in the 1990s, takes part in this reform movement. This model aims to rationalise and develop as much as possible the gathering, sharing and use of information in LEAs, in order to design and manage effective strategies to mitigate public safety issues. This

approach was very much in vogue in the 2000s and 2010s and has inspired police reforms in many countries, in the forefront of which are all the Western English speaking countries (UK, USA, → Canada, → Australia and → New Zealand).

ILP promotes a conception of law enforcement intelligence which is much more extensive and far reaching than the conventional police approach. According to this standard view, police intelligence is essentially a means of gathering criminal evidence in the course of the investigation of a criminal case. Only some of the specialised criminal investigation units use intelligence techniques, mainly to combat the most serious forms of crime by means of undercover methods (James [2013]). Intelligence work is viewed as an art rather than as a technique and as an organisational function, and as a result it remains largely under-proceduralised, un-standardised and under-managed. Information gathering is the business of individual front-line police officers, who autonomously engage in researching the information they need, mainly by interviewing informants, victims, → witnesses and suspects. To a large extent, these same agents have considerable discretion in appreciating the usefulness and reliability of such information, as well as in interpreting it and deciding how to use it (Skolnick [1994]). 'Intelligence' is often assimilated to the recruitment and handling of confidential informants, and to the use of undercover agents. It is seen as the business of only those specialist investigators who rely on these informants (Flood and Gaspar [2009]). The traditional view of police intelligence is also characterised by the propensity to withhold information, the tendency to favour informal channels for exchanging sensitive and valuable information, and the tendency to immediately react to single pieces of information rather than to identify the possible broader problem of which the information might be a symptom.

### *1 Putting the intelligence function at the centre of policing decision-making*

In contrast, ILP sees intelligence as a core function of the police organisation. Its aim is to give police management a better capacity to identify, understand and respond a broad range of crime and order issues. According to ILP proponents, the role of intelligence is to inform decision-making processes at all levels of the organisation in order to choose the most efficient strategy for action. For example, Jerry Ratcliffe, who is one of the main theorists of ILP, defines this approach as 'the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and crime prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnerships projects drawn from the evidential base' ([2008] 84-85).

ILP defines intelligence as a process which consists in collecting, checking, evaluating and bringing together information of various natures, gathered from different sources, and then using analysis techniques to 'connect the dots' and to produce insights and explanations that enable policing stakeholders to have a better understanding of the issues they have to deal with. Intelligence must enable decision makers to understand an issue in its complexity and comprehensively, which means grasping its causes,

processes and effects, as well as its likely future developments, in order to identify a range of policy options that are promising.

ILP in police organisation is described as a six-step process: 1- setting of objectives for the intelligence function and management of the organisation's intelligence capabilities; 2- active information gathering from closed and open sources; 3- information processing, which includes its evaluation, selection, treatment and aggregation; 4- information analysis, which identifies information gaps and gives meaning to raw information by converting it into 'intelligence products' (assessments, profiles, reports, bulletins, etc.); 5- dissemination of intelligence to all potential users who have the need to know and the right to know; 6- collection of feedbacks from end-users of intelligence products, evaluation of results of the intelligence function in order to adjust the organisation's intelligence strategy (USDOJ [2005]).

Analysis is considered as the most important step in this cycle, as it is through analysis that information gathered is transformed into knowledge that is useful for decision making, both for strategic and tactical choices (Loyka, Faggiani and Karchmer [2005] 5, 35). Analysts should be committed to producing insights that are meaningful, useful and actionable for decision-makers, while police managers must learn to use intelligence products to feed their strategic and tactical thinking (Ratcliffe [2008] 98).

According to ILP theorists - although there is still some debate about this - it is preferable for analysts to be police officers rather than civilian employees. The reason for this is that an analyst needs to have sufficient experience of concrete police work to be able to give relevant advice to police managers. Analyst positions should be filled by police officers with higher education: at least four years of university education according to the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA), preferably in a social science curriculum. In addition, these officers must be genuinely motivated and qualified to do a very demanding intellectual work. Such officers who are willing to devote part of their career to analytical work rather than operational or management work are everywhere exceedingly difficult to find (Carter [2007] 253). For this reason, it is considered necessary to define career paths oriented towards the intelligence function. These career paths should be designed to be attractive both in terms of remuneration and the possibility of career promotion (IACP [2010] 4).

Police intelligence is no longer viewed as a mere tool for criminal investigation, but as a strategic management instrument that applies to all fields of action of policing, from the prevention of quality of life issues and anti-social behaviour to the fight against organised crime and terrorism (Christopher and Cope [2009] 237), and that all types of police units should use intensively (Carter [2004] 2, 95). ILP's reliance on analysis to improve the efficiency of police work is a good illustration of the managerial perspective which underlies this model. Expert and scientific knowledge are seen as positive inputs into police decision-making, while the common sense and practical knowledge of field police officers is considered as driving to less efficient choices.

ILP is seen as a way to increase proactivity of police action. It aims to promote among police officers a culture of informed, rational and problem-solving oriented decision-making (Grieve [2009] 15). In this sense, ILP can be viewed as the police adaptation of the 'knowledge management' approach to modernise bureaucratic organisations.

Finally, ILP is also based on the idea that local security issues are connected to national and international ones. The role of intelligence is to explore and understand these connections (Ratcliffe [2008] 22).

## *2 Prioritisation and targeting of policing action*

ILP calls for the prioritisation of policing. Law enforcement intelligence capacities should be used to choose, from the multitude of community safety issues that require police attention, those that should be addressed as a matter of priority.

The expected benefits of this prioritisation are a better distribution of resources between the different dimensions of police work (preventing criminal activities and other risks to public safety, calling offenders to account, reducing fear of crime, ensuring civility in public spaces, etc.), a better resources allocation between different parts of the police force's jurisdiction, a better planning of policing strategies and operations and, above all, a better choice of targets for action. This idea of strengthening the intelligence function to identify the best priority targets for police intervention is at the heart of the ILP as a policing model. These priority targets should be the most cost-effective ones from the perspective of solving security problems in a durable way and at the same time making efficient use of scarce policing resources (Maguire and John [2000]). This may include prolific troublemakers or offenders, professional criminal, criminal organisation leaders, as well as major sources of insecurity or risk factors that are likely to cause significant social harm (Sheptycki and Ratcliffe [2004]). One of the main roles of the intelligence function is to continuously produce up-to-date information on all priority issues and targets, and also to identify and evaluate emerging problems and threats.

## *3 ILP borrowings from earlier knowledge-based policing approaches*

ILP borrows ideas from various developments already taking place in Western LEAs and tries to combine these heterogeneous features to create a reform model that intends to be coherent, encompassing and promising (James [2013]). ILP is thus a mixture of pre-existing models that have been developed earlier to address the crisis of the standard model of policing, the most influential of which are problem-oriented policing (POP) and CompStat.

ILP borrows from POP the idea that it is possible to improve the quality and effectiveness of services provided to the public through a more accurate understanding of crime and disorder issues, which is itself made possible by improved and widened data collection as well as by more sophisticated analysis of this information. Another idea taken from POP is that there are security issues that can be better tackled through long-term proactive strategies than through piecemeal reactive responses. Such problem-solving

initiatives should be based on inter-agency cooperation and focus on addressing the causes of the targeted issue. ILP theory places particular emphasis on the importance of information sharing within security networks, which is considered to be the only way to identify the most relevant levers to reduce public safety issues (Carter [2004]).

This is why ILP guidelines recommend that LEAs develop partnership strategies for information sharing and joint analysis of security concerns. Such strategy should set out how information and analysis will be produced and exchanged: distribution of tasks and duties between network members, periodicity of intelligence exchanges, confidentiality requirements, communication tools and formats to be used, establishment of contact points in partner organisations to facilitate communication and operational cooperation, provision of specific training to these contact persons to enable inter-professional mutual understanding, etc. ILP also suggests that LEAs make efforts to get closer to community members who are more likely to become information sources, such as shopkeepers, community or neighbourhood associations, religious organisations, actual and former municipality officials and employees, school staff, social landlords, and mass transit companies.

ILP takes from CompStat the idea that statistical overviews, crime maps, environmental assessments, problem profiles and criminal analyses provided by analysts should be carefully considered by police managers and should be systematically discussed in management meetings.

ILP is also linked to other approaches to improving problem-solving capacities of public service organisations or public policies, such as knowledge management, learning organisations, intelligence studies, and policy intelligence.

## **II ILP IN PRACTICE**

There is an important difference between ILP as a reform model and ILP in action, i.e. ILP as it has been concretely implemented in the countries that have adopted the model. This implementation gap is illustrated by considering the cases of the UK and USA.

### *1 ILP in Great Britain*

The emergence of ILP in Great Britain is rooted in the introduction of new public management in public policies during the 1980s. This approach calls for administrations to systematically employ targeted action in order to improve the efficiency with which public resources are used.

In 1993, in a report entitled ‘Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively’, the Audit Commission, a body dedicated to promoting new public management in government, recommended that police forces adopt intelligence-led approaches (Audit Commission [1993]).

The first ILP experiments took place in the 1990s, particularly in Kent and the Metropolitan Police of London. The Kent Police established intelligence

units to advise police managers responsible for setting the police force's strategic goals. The preparation of police strategies and tactics was assigned to working groups and steering committees, whose members were required to read intelligence products written for them. These groups and committees also had to drive and supervise intelligence work in the whole organisation. Intelligence bulletins were provided to heads of police units, which contained short, medium, and long-term forecasts (→ Forecasting Models). This Kent policing model stressed the need for better training of staff specialising in intelligence work (John and Maguire [2003]).

For its part, in 1991 the Met undertook an effort to professionalise the intelligence function by setting up a System for Investigation and Detection (SID), the aim of which was to inform all policing strategies, tactics and operations, as well as local security partnerships. This system was intended to target prolific offenders, develop strategies to reduce certain types of crime and set up partnership initiatives to deal with specific security issues. The SID planned to put in place a strategy for developing the intelligence function as an integrated structure throughout the whole organisation. It also established intelligence managers and set up tasking and coordinating meetings to ensure that operational units made effective use of the intelligence resources available to them (Grieve [2009]).

The ILP initiatives in Kent and London were recognised as best practice in a report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), entitled 'Policing with Intelligence' (1997), which stressed the need to better integrate intelligence and operational activities in police forces. HMIC and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) agreed that intelligence-led approaches – especially the Kent policing model – should be extended to all UK police forces. A new name had to be found for the model to dissociate it from its territorial origin and facilitate its dissemination to other places, hence the appellation National Intelligence Model (NIM). The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS, ancestor of the National Crime Agency) was given the task of disseminating the NIM (James [2013]).

The NIM requires a strategic assessment to be carried out before any strategic decision is taken, a practice that originated at the NCIS created in 1992. This assessment consists of reviewing crime and disorder trends in order to determine policing priorities, identifying emergent problems and threats, taking account of legal and policy changes at national level, and devising partnership initiatives. Analysts must also provide intelligence products to inform tactical decisions, such as reviews of on-going actions, evaluations of the results of those actions, offender profiles, hotspot analysis, and problem profiles (based on the SARA method).

The NIM also insists on profiling criminal markets, organisations and networks. This kind of analysis is intended to identify key participants, to map networks, to characterise modus operandi, to identify the resources on which criminals rely most and the vulnerabilities they take advantage of, and to determine which component of the criminal organisation should be targeted first, with the aim of disrupting that organisation as much as possible (Innes and Sheptycki [2004]). These strategic and tactical assessments should be presented at Tasking and Coordinating Group meetings, which bring together

heads of intelligence units and managers of operational units. It is in these groups that, in principle, all important strategic and tactical decisions should be taken (John and Maguire [2003]). The NIM also aims to make connections between three levels of the problem that are usually addressed separately: local, national and international. It seeks to encourage police managers to develop responses that combine repressive, preventive and partnership approaches.

The implementation of the NIM is far from having had the expected impact in terms of developing the intelligence function in police forces. Adrian James' research ([2013]) showed that organisational and management changes have been real, but that these transformations have not led to a profound change in police practices. The implementation of the NIM has been hampered by the poor intelligence culture in most UK local police forces. In particular, police managers were reluctant to take an interest in intelligence products and to involve analysts in strategic decision-making processes (Christopher and Cope [2009]). On the whole, this reluctance was justified, as very few analysts were able to provide decision-makers with assessments and profiles that could make a valuable contribution to strategic thinking (John and Maguire [2003]). Most analysts were only capable of producing statistical charts or criminal intelligence products, and were not trained to carry out such complex tasks as conducting environmental assessments, risk assessments, problem profiles or impact studies (Sissens [2008]).

The NIM was criticised for being organizationally too complex. Some police officers were discouraged by the model because of the use of technical jargon to which they were not accustomed. Transformation process was poorly managed. NCIS only appointed four staff to help local police forces to implement the NIM. Training materials were insufficient and were distributed too late. Guidelines contained national standards that were inadequate to local conditions and not flexible enough (John and Maguire [2003]).

In addition, the NIM was in competition with other policing reforms being pursued at the same time, such as reassurance policing and partnership policing (Christopher and Cope [2009]). This has resulted in very different levels of implementation in different places and the development of very heterogeneous practices, even though the NIM aimed to standardise the intelligence function across the country.

ILP has not succeeded in reducing the weight of reactive and repressive logics in policing. Proactive approaches have been introduced at the margins, but few police forces were able to develop long-term knowledge-based problem-solving strategies. As police forces remained focused on fulfilling their performance indicators and on fighting crime, partners interested in developing problem-solving strategies deserted the coordination meetings required by the NIM. Many police organisations have adopted the NIM in a formal way. Intelligence products are presented at Tasking and Coordination meetings, but they are of low quality and do not influence decisions. These meetings are not places where innovative problem-solving strategies are developed and negotiated with other members of the security networks, but times for internal monitoring performance targets (Harfield and Harfield [2008]).

## *2 ILP in the United States*

The first national initiatives to encourage local LEAs to develop their intelligence function began in the late 1970s. The main aim was to prompt state and city police forces to adopt tools that would enable them to combat → organised crime such as mafias. It was recommended that all local police forces should have an intelligence unit with adequate staffing and management, depending on the size of the police organisation (Carter [2004]). LEAs that can afford it should create intelligence manager and crime analyst positions (USDOJ [2005]). These recommendations were largely ignored by local LEAs. The memory of past abuses of McCarthyism discouraged many of them from creating units that could be suspected to doing political police, and that despite the adoption, from 1976 onwards, of increasingly restrictive standards aimed at protecting the privacy and civil liberties of citizens.

Nevertheless, some progress was made at that time, such as the introduction of the first regional intelligence sharing systems linking together local police forces in a systematic way. The main agents of change then were professional associations such as the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (created in 1956) and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA created in 1980). These associations contributed to the widespread use of criminal intelligence techniques. The success of CompStat systems from the 1990s onwards was another notable development, which paved the way for the mass conversion of US LEAs to ILP approaches. Finally, during the 1990s, efforts were made to professionalize staff of intelligence units, in the context of various federal programs that promoted the systematic use of threat assessment (Loyka, Faggiani and Karchmer [2005]).

Prior to the 2000s, the role of intelligence units in most local police forces, with the exception of large police departments of some major cities, was limited to managing internal dissemination of locally collected raw intelligence, providing access to regional, state and national databases, and compiling statistics to illustrate activity reports. These units produced little analysis beyond the simple matching of criminal information to investigate cases (Carter and Schafer [2007]).

One of the first local forces to adopt ILP was the Kansas City Police Department, which established a Crime Information Center, whose mission was to direct patrols either to places where criminal activity is anticipated (based on intelligence gathered through undercover techniques) or in search of dangerous or prolific offenders (Heaton [2000]).

The shock of the 9/11 attacks placed the strengthening of intelligence capabilities of LEAs at the top of the national security agenda. The main causes that were identified to explain the failures of American police and intelligence agencies to prevent the attack were the lack of information sharing, as well as their inability to correctly interpret the information they had in their possession. The idea gained ground that the most effective weapon in the war against terrorism is intelligence (Loyka, Faggiani and Karchmer [2005]).

In 2002, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the leading professional organisation of senior police officers in the United States, held a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit at which the British approaches to ILP were presented as the model to pursue. The summit called for a nationwide effort to develop intelligence capacities in all LEAs, as well as to standardise tools, procedures, work practices and methods of analysis. It was admitted that this effort should respect the willingness of local police forces to retain their autonomy from state and federal governments. Therefore, the development of ILP was conceived as being “nationally coordinated but locally driven” (IACP [2002] ii). The local LEAs affirmed their opposition to a reform of police intelligence whose content would be entirely determined by the security agenda of the federal government, focused on the fight against terrorism and transnational crime, as well as on the containment of illegal immigration (→ Crimmigration). Representatives of local police forces demanded that the modernisation of intelligence systems should also benefit to the reduction of local public safety issues, such as gang violence, robberies, burglaries, car thefts, etc.

In 2003, a National Criminal Information Sharing Plan (NCISP) was adopted, in which both the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security were participants. A Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council was established by the U.S. Attorney General to monitor the NCISP’s implementation and to further develop quality standards for intelligence systems. As a follow-up to the NCISP, several federal bodies and professional associations - such as IACP, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) or Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) of the U.S. Department of Justice - developed guidelines for managers of local police forces on how to improve the intelligence function in their organisation and how to align with new national standards. There was a strong financial incentive as complying with national guidelines was a condition for obtaining federal grants.

The main outlines of American ILP development policy were very similar to those of the British policy: creating and strengthening intelligence units; appointing and training intelligence managers and analysts; rationalising, planning and intensifying the collection, sharing and use of police intelligence; using intelligence to better prioritise and target police action; developing analysis to make the intelligence function a strategic decision-making tool; the will to combine ILP with community policing, problem-oriented and partnership policing (Carter and Phillips [2015]). The idea was to improve the level of skill and expertise of intelligence units so that they would be able to make an in-depth and usable assessment of any security issue at the request of police managers (IALEIA [2004]; USDOJ [2005]).

A specific American feature is the national network of 78 regional Fusion Centres, whose main role is to facilitate information sharing between federal, state and local LEAs, as well as from other sectors of government, partners of the private sector and tip hotlines. Each of them has teams of analysts tasked with integrating, matching and analysing information transmitted by local police forces of the region. Analytic products and threat assessments are reported back to affiliated LEAs. Fusion Centres’ analysts have generally more advanced professional skills than their colleagues of local police forces.

Therefore, they can provide training and advice local intelligence units. They can also carry out complex analyses for local LEAs and help them to improve and evaluate their intelligence function. However, few Fusion Centres have succeeded in fulfilling such a leading role within their regional intelligence community due to a lack of consultation with police forces and a lack of interest in their specific intelligence needs, and also due to a lack of connection between local analysts and analysts of the centres (Lewandowski, Carter and Campbell [2017]). Many police officers of local LEAs distrust Fusion Centres, and perceive them as always giving priority to federal needs (Ratcliffe [2008]). Conversely, some federal authorities have criticized Fusion Centres for not systematically consider the implication of intelligence for national security and counterterrorism. This failure of national ILP policies to achieve sufficient coordination of LEAs intelligence capacities between jurisdictions, and across levels and sectors of government, has also been documented for the British NIM.

More generally, ILP implementation faces the same limitations in both countries: lack of training of intelligence unit staff, lack of interest of police managers for intelligence products other than performance evaluation and crime analysis, difficulties in using the intelligence function for problem-oriented policing (Carter and Schafer [2007]).

### **III IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ILP IN LEAs**

The obstacles faced by ILP initiatives in Great Britain and the United States are representative of a series of common difficulties in developing the intelligence function that can be observed in many other contexts.

#### *1. Obstacles to the rationalisation of intelligence in LEAs*

First of all, proponents of this kind of approaches tend to minimise the investments and costs necessary for such reform to achieve effective results (Sheptycki [2004]). ILP may have seemed promising because knowledge-based approaches appear to be particularly cost-effective at first glance. However, the implementation of effective strategic decision support tools requires the recruitment of highly qualified analysts, major training efforts at all levels of the organisation, the establishment of complex procedures for sharing information and using intelligence products, a sustained commitment from police chiefs and managers to transform organisational culture, and this even though performance in reactive activities continues to be the main criterion for assessing the success of police forces and their managers. In reality, very few police forces have made the investments that are necessary to achieve a sufficient improvement in the quality of the intelligence function, to a point where this function is able to provide a satisfying return on investments (James [2013]). Instead, insufficient investment leads to perverse effects: staff are assigned to analytical tasks that they are unable to carry out correctly, information sharing efforts are rendered useless due to the lack of analytical skills in intelligence units, and efforts to analyse security issues are wasted due to managers' lack of interest in strategic assessments (Harfield and Harfield [2008]). These perverse effects lead to a loss of confidence in

the promises of ILP approaches, resulting in the stalling of reform efforts, even if the organisation continues to display an ILP strategy.

A second obstacle to ILP development is that some powerful professional groups within the police do not consider such a reform to be in their best interests. Specialized criminal investigators, who are the most prestigious branch of the police, generally prefer not to share with intelligence units the sensitive intelligence they gather, as their professional autonomy and organisational power is largely based on the discretion they gain through concealing the most valuable information (Manning [2004]). Moreover, in most LEAs, criminal investigation units specialised in combating high-profile crime are the only ones that are truly proactive. Their interest is that the organisation's scarce intelligence capabilities continue to be essentially dedicated to criminal intelligence work, rather than being tasked with strategic intelligence, an activity more useful to managers than to detectives (James [2013]). Police managers also have reason to be cautious. They know that the introduction of new intelligence tools entails additional responsibilities for them. These tools can reveal previously invisible problems. Benefiting from additional intelligence entails a risk of being blamed when that information was not taken into account. In addition, the introduction of new strategic intelligence procedures imposes on managers a change in the way they prepare decisions, which can require a significant learning effort. Some aspects of the police culture inhibit the rationalisation of the intelligence function that goes hand in hand with ILP. For many police officers, evaluation of work situations is traditionally based on tacit knowledge and people-to-people exchange of information. The idea of placing information sharing in a managerial framework raises resistance.

A third weakness of ILP approaches is that it assumes that many police activities can be managed and implemented as problem reduction strategies. This does not fit with the perception of most police officers and managers, especially uniformed ones, who continue, with good reason, to see police work as being essentially reactive (Christopher and Cope [2009]). The vast majority of uniformed police officers consider that they have enough work to do with the handling of events and cases reported by citizens, and are therefore reluctant to use intelligence tools that could bring them additional workloads (James [2013]). Managers are unwilling to engage in long-term strategies which lock up scarce resources and take time to show outcomes, as they know they are dependent on pressing political demands, on media expectations for immediate results, and on performance indicators that encourage them to give priority to quickly producing quantifiable outputs (Ratcliffe [2008]).

As Peter Manning (Manning [2008]) has pointed out, police managers tend to use intelligence techniques in a way that fits with the mainstream working philosophy and with the operational routines to which they are familiar. They do not use these techniques to improve their understanding of security issues and to challenge their habitual ways of thinking and acting. Therefore, introducing intelligence techniques into a LEA does not automatically lead to significant rationalisation of the way policing activities are planned, managed and implemented. The development of the intelligence function can also contribute to obscuring dissonant information, confirming

stereotypes, reinforcing simplistic or biased views, and justifying the indiscriminate use of the same routine responses to all kinds of problems. For the most part, intelligence techniques are used not to find the best solution to an identified and analysed problem, but to better take into account incidents that the organisation is experienced, accustomed and well equipped to dealing with through its standard operating procedures. The main reason why some local LEAs adopt new intelligence capabilities is to show external audiences that they are modernising and professionalising, and are able to use scientific techniques to carry out their tasks. Police chiefs who invest in the intelligence function do so not so much with a view to better understanding their working environment, but more for career advancement purposes or to improve their LEA's public image. In other words, the adoption of intelligence capabilities is not contradictory to the maintenance of traditional policing models: ILP induces new managerial procedures but little change in on-the-ground practices (Ratcliffe [2002]; Weisburd and Braga [2009]).

Intelligence techniques are widely seen by the rank and file as a means of managerial control of police work, and by management as an excessive empowerment of analysts, a traditionally underestimated professional group. Managers are all the more reluctant to accept such empowerment as analysts may draw on their analytical techniques - and on the scientific legitimacy that these techniques convey - to promote priorities and objectives other than those preferred by managers (Ratcliffe [2009]).

These concerns about increasing the influence of ILP techniques and staff in strategic decision-making within LEAs are even greater when it comes to involving them in policy making within security partnerships. This is due to the fact that in partnership initiatives, the allocation of police resources to long-term projects is a commitment made to partners outside the police. It is difficult for the police to withdraw from such engagements, even if new priorities require them to do so, as this creates tensions in inter-agency cooperation. By their very nature, ILP activities have the effect of making more explicit, so less reversible, police commitments, as the work of strategic analysts consists to produce reports in which they describe and assess possible solutions to issues that security partnerships are considering to address. When produced, such reports inevitably provide a basis for partners to make demands on the police, and are therefore an additional source of constraint for police chiefs. Conversely, when the police instrumentalise ILP approaches in support of their demands on partners, the latter tend to defect from the partnership. For this reason, attempts to promote ILP approaches as a tool for driving security partnerships have mostly failed, as the literature points out (Harfield and Harfield [2008]; Grieve [2009]; James [2013]).

This issue of lack of skill among analysts is the fourth main limitation to the diffusion of ILP. Overall, analysts are ill-equipped to fulfil the role assigned to them by ILP approaches: they do not have adequate training to make valuable strategic intelligence products, some lack motivation due to the lack of internal promotion opportunities, they hesitate to suggest strategies for fear of impinging on the managers' sphere of competences (and thus displeasing them). Civilian analysts are looked with disdain by many sworn officers and analysts who come from the ranks of the police often see such an assignment as a loss of status. Most police officers of all ranks consider that

operational work in the field is the only suitable way to get proper knowledge of security issues in the jurisdiction. So, they do not trust analysts, who do desk work, to provide appropriate recommendations (Sissens [2008]). In many cases, intelligence products that are provided to senior officers are at the same time useless for managing reactive interventions (which do not require in-depth knowledge of problems' causes) and not sufficiently sophisticated to help prepare strategic initiatives (Ratcliffe [2008]).

A variety of solutions have been proposed to overcome these obstacles: training analysts better so that they are able to design feasible policing strategies; increasing the status of analysts in LEAs and allowing senior analysts to advise police chiefs directly; improving the quality and accessibility of intelligence products; training police managers to use these products and to design problem-solving strategies based on it; set up procedures that compel managers to take into account analysts' assessments and suggestions, such as periodic mandatory meetings or working groups; introduce a end-users driven system to evaluate and improve the work of intelligence units. But, on the whole, it has rarely been possible to overcome the reluctance of police managers to fully integrate the intelligence function in strategic decision-making. The main reason for this is that there is no clear evidence that ILP brings real benefits to the performance of police forces, except in the fight against certain forms of crime, according to the criteria that are commonly used to appreciate the outcomes of policing work. As ILP theorists themselves admit, it is exceedingly difficult to measure the contribution of intelligence capabilities to the success or failure of policing (Ratcliffe [2008]).

According to Geoffrey Dean and Peter Gottschalk (Dean and Gottschalk [2007]), LEAs can be classified into three categories according to the level of development of their intelligencer function. A low level of development means that LEA members are able to use work procedures and technological tools that facilitate the circulation of factual information between organisational units, such as electronic messaging, databases, etc. An intermediate level means that the organisation has learned to feed and exploit its databases in such a way as to identify, beyond the mere accumulation of factual information on incidents, recurring problems, serial phenomena and trends. A higher level means that the LEA has acquired the ability to employ analytical techniques and tools (data interpretation methods, specialised software, expert systems) that enable police managers and officers to understand the causes of identified patterns. The ambition of the ILP reforms is to upgrade LEAs to the highest level, but the obstacles mentioned above mean that very few LEAs achieve this.

## *2 ILP has been more successful in the field of high-profile crime investigation*

While ILP approaches and techniques face difficulties in breaking through as a strategic decision-making tool, they are experiencing a higher degree of success in one specific area of policing, namely the investigation of high-profile crime. Since the 1970s, criminal intelligence units have become accustomed to employing analytical techniques such as time lines, event

charts, relationship plotting, financial investigation, confidential informant management, criminal profiling and criminal mapping. These techniques make it possible to identify serial events, patterns and trends that are possibly indicative of criminal activities with a regular (hotspots, prolific offenders, professional criminals, etc.) or organised (criminal organisation, network or market) nature. These intelligence techniques are used for different purposes such as anticipating evolutions of certain criminal issues, identifying individuals who present a high risk of committing offences, or finding effective ways of disrupting a criminal organisation, mapping criminal networks, etc. (Flood and Gaspar [2009]). This use of intelligence techniques is primarily oriented towards solving criminal cases, identifying suspects and gathering court evidence. It is moderately interested in determining the causes of criminal problems, unless it can help to take legal action against perpetrators (Harfield and Harfield [2008]). It is particularly suited to the fight against serious organised crime, which has transnational ramifications and uses increasingly sophisticated operating methods, for example to launder proceeds of crime (Grieve [2009]).

As a result of the affinity of specialised criminal investigation units with intelligence techniques and the stronger professional legitimacy of criminal intelligence, policies to develop ILP have often abandoned their initial ambition to develop problem-oriented policing intelligence, partnership intelligence and community intelligence, and have shifted to a more limited objective of strengthening criminal intelligence (Gill [2000]). This has been the case with the British NIM, which has mainly resulted in the integration of local criminal intelligence gathering capabilities into a centralised management system of the most serious threats dominated by national agencies (Christopher and Cope [2009]). It has also been the case in the United States, but to a lesser extent, due to the greater independence of local LEAs from the centre (Carter and Carter [2009]). This difficulty of many LEAs to use the intelligence function for other purposes than fighting crime as led to the disenchantment of many ILP proponents and theorists - especially academic experts - who have ceased to refer to this approach and began to promote their original concept of knowledge-based problem-oriented policing (what ILP was supposed to be in their opinion) under alternative labels such as knowledge-led policing or evidence-based policing.

Many LEAs have been able to develop a viable model of intelligence-led criminal intelligence, built around three core capabilities: a better scanning of the criminal environment through the use of risk assessment techniques and methods to identify crime patterns, a better analysis of the action of particularly prolific or harmful criminal groups, and spatial crime analysis. The number of analysts is growing and their importance is increasing, but they remain in a traditional role of supporting complex investigation. They are used to highlight links that are difficult to detect without the use of sophisticated techniques, and to suggest new lines of enquiry.

The spread of criminal intelligence techniques has been facilitated by the growing incidence of terrorism. Given the scale of the damage inflicted by an attack, the police cannot limit their action to identifying and arresting the perpetrators once the attack has been committed. Police are expected to disrupt the terrorist plot before it is carried out. This requires the adoption of

a counter-intelligence agency approach, characterised by the intensive use of organisational intelligence capabilities and the proactive use of law enforcement resources (Manning [2016]).

## CONCLUSION

As theorised by its developers and proponents, ILP is intended to make LEAs evolve from a narrow conception of intelligence work as a criminal investigation tool to a broader view of the intelligence function as an organisation-wide and all-purpose decision support instrument. In practice, it appeared that such a qualitative leap in the intelligence function was only possible in some LEAs that have made considerable investments in the development of their intelligence capabilities. These necessary investments include recruiting and training intelligence professionals working in the LEA, training police officers who may gather and transmit information (potentially everyone in the LEA), training end-users of intelligence products (chiefs and managers, but also each police officer who participates in a problem solving or risk reduction initiative), substantially developing and reorganizing processes of intelligence collection, sharing and utilisation, and establishing effective ways of injecting knowledge produced by the intelligence function in strategic and tactical decision making. A strong involvement of police chiefs and a high level of endorsement by managers is another necessary condition. Given the constraints under which police forces are commonly operating, few LEAs have managed to make the leap, if we except those LEAs that are specialised in combating serious crime. ILP models have not easily spread beyond the police force from which the model originates.

ILP can be seen as a promising approach that has spread through international professional and academic channels and that has been appropriated by innovation entrepreneurs seeking new solutions to improve the cost-effectiveness of policing strategies. ILP was found appealing because it is a model of knowledge production and management, but not a way to directly address security problems. ILP could therefore easily be considered capable of improving police performance in dealing with a wide variety of security issues, without the need for a substantial increase in police resources, since an equivalence was made between better knowledge (a supposedly cheap resource by comparison with more personnel and equipment) and better performance, which is fundamentally a wrong assumption when applied to most policing activities. ILP embodies a very rationalist and problem-solving view of police work and policing decision-making, a view that is relatively out of step with the professional perspective of a vast majority of police officers, except certain managers and specialised investigators. This view is more in line with ideas supported by managerial and academic experts, such as learning organisation, knowledge intensive organisation, risk management, new public management or policy intelligence, all concepts that encounter the same difficulties as ILP in being translated into effective organisational practices and strategies (Harfield and Harfield [2008]). ILP models have in common that they underestimate the weight of organisational politics and cultural rigidities in police decision making, as well as the importance of conflicting interests within police organisation and between policing

stakeholders. Withholding information and producing biased intelligence (intentionally or not) are crucial resources in these struggles, so few stakeholders are willing to tie their hands by giving too much power to analysts who are supposed to produce evidence-based and objective assessments.

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