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## International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

Thomas Douenne  
Adrien Fabre  
Linus Mattauch

June 2023



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# International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

Adrien Fabre\*, Thomas Douenne<sup>†</sup> and Linus Mattauch<sup>‡§</sup>

June 13, 2023

## Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Recent surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries covering 72% of global carbon emissions show strong support for an effective and progressive way to combat climate change and poverty: a global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Using complementary surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience in policy circles. A list experiment shows no evidence of social desirability bias, majorities are willing to sign a real-stake petition, and global redistribution ranks high in the prioritization of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires. Universalistic attitudes are confirmed by an incentivized donation. In sum, our findings indicate that global policies are genuinely supported by a majority of the population. Public opinion is therefore not the reason that they do not prominently enter political debates.

**JEL codes:** P48, Q58, H23, Q54

**Keywords:** Climate change, global policies, cap-and-trade, attitudes, survey.

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\*CNRS, CIRED. E-mail: adrien.fabre@cncrs.fr (corresponding author).

<sup>†</sup>University of Amsterdam

<sup>‡</sup>Technical University Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research – Member of the Leibniz Association and University of Oxford

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## **1 Introduction**

Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and inequality. Disagreements on burden-sharing, differing priorities, and lack of institutional capacity are commonly seen as obstacles to effective global collaboration on these objectives. We examine a key condition for the success of global cooperation, neglected in social science research so far: the support of citizens in affluent countries for globally redistributive policies which can deliver on poverty reduction and climate change mitigation. This article investigates public attitudes towards such global policies.

Recent surveys administered to over 40,000 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries reveal substantial support for those policies, especially global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022). In particular, a global 2% tax on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million would effectively reduce poverty as it would mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50%, if merely 35% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose.<sup>1</sup> Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive measures.

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<sup>1</sup>Figures derived from Chancel et al. (2022), the [WID wealth tax simulator](#), and the World Bank.

To gain insights into the factors shaping public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conducted complementary surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the UK. The focus of our approach is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. By employing a list experiment, a real-stake petition, and conjoint analyses, our study demonstrates genuine and robust support for the GCS among respondents. For example, the conjoint analyses provide evidence that political parties would not lose vote intention by endorsing the GCS.

These findings underscore a strong demand for globally redistributive climate policies, even in the absence of significant policy proposal. In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind this policy implementation gap.

**Literature** Few prior attitudinal surveys have examined policies for global redistribution. Exceptions include [Carattini et al. \(2019\)](#), who studies global carbon taxes with international per capita redistribution and find agreement close to 50% in high-income countries. In addition, [ISSP \(2019\)](#) uncover near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries. [Ghassim et al. \(2022\)](#) examines support for global democracy in a range of countries and finds that, in countries governed by a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties that are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies ([A.1.1](#)); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing ([Appendix A.1.2](#)), attitudes toward foreign aid ([Appendix A.1.3](#)); global carbon pricing ([Appendix A.2.1](#)), global redistribution ([Appendix A.2.3](#)), basic income ([Appendix A.2.4](#)), and global democracy ([Appendix A.2.5](#)).

## 2 Results

The presentation of results proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the survey data ([2.1](#)), we first document broad international support for global approaches to climate policy that lead to global redistribution ([2.2.1](#)). Subsequently, we present specific findings from surveys in the U.S. and Europe that document support for the GCS, wealth

taxes, and foreign aid in those countries (2.2.2-2.2.5). We proceed to study the support for the Global Climate Scheme in more detail, by means of a list experiment, petition, conjoint analyses, prioritization task, and by eliciting pros and cons (2.3). To understand the gap between support for global policies and their appearance in public discussion, we conclude by reporting results on underlying universalistic values (2.4) and beliefs about the support of others (2.5).

## 2.1 Data

The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Complementary* surveys (see Table 1).

Table 1: Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.

Survey	<i>Global survey</i>	<i>Complementary surveys</i>		
	<i>Global</i>	<i>Eu</i>	<i>US1</i>	<i>US2</i>
Country coverage	20 countries	FR, DE, ES, UK	U.S.	U.S.
Sample size	40,680	3,000	3,000	2,000
Main purpose	Stated support for global policies	Focus on GCS (sincerity, rationales, etc.) + Support for global redistribution + Universalistic values		

**Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. This survey serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022](#).

**Complementary Surveys** To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, complementary surveys were conducted in 2023. These surveys are based on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents.

The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical, except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.

The complementary surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions such as gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables A4-A5 confirm that our samples closely match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section [Methods](#). The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices [C](#) and [D](#).

## 2.2 Stated support for global policies

### 2.2.1 Global support

The global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure 1, reproduced from [Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022](#)). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale is in line with [Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer \(2019b\)](#) and consistent with individuals’ concerns for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest ([Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022](#); [Douenne & Fabre 2022](#); [Klenert et al. 2018](#)).


Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure 1). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries based on tradable shares.<sup>2</sup> The three policies garner a majority of abso-

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<sup>2</sup>The policies were all described with further details to make sure people understood them. Specifically, the policies were presented as follows: an international emissions trading system where “countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share”; “a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education”; “a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly”.



Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-indifferent answers (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure A3 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I. Reproduced from Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022, Figure A21.)

Note 2: \*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

lute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent” answers). Support for this policy is even higher in middle-income countries, however their samples are only representative of the online population (young, graduated and urban people are over-represented).

Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure 1. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,

garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

A global quota with equal per capita emission rights produces the same distributional outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income. The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries.<sup>3</sup> Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that people may find a quota more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the complementary surveys.

### 2.2.2 Global Climate Scheme

The complementary surveys (*US1*, *US2*, *Eu*) consist of a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers. The same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting the top 5% (in the U.S.) or top 1% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults,<sup>4</sup> calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from the policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net

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<sup>3</sup>The levels of support are consistent with the findings of [Carattini et al. \(2019\)](#), the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax.

<sup>4</sup>The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss by taxing only the top 1%.

gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, participants are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple *Yes/No* question.

The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe,<sup>5</sup> while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure 2). Appendix F presents the sociodemographic determinants of GCS support, showing, for instance, stronger support among young people.

**The Global Climate Scheme** The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by [Stern & Stiglitz \(2017\)](#), and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for each human above 15 (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a “climate club” and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). This median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK

### 2.2.3 Global wealth tax

Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries” garners absolute majority support of over 67% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 4). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.<sup>6</sup> We ask certain respondents ( $n = 1283$ ) what percentage of global tax revenues

<sup>5</sup>The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%] in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

<sup>6</sup>A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France,

Figure 2: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. (Questions 35, 36, 20, 22 and 26).

		United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74	
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75	
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70	

Figure 3: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred share of global tax for low-income (in %)	34	33	36	30	33	34

should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30% (Germany) to 36% (U.S., France) (Figure 3). To other respondents ( $n = 1233$ ), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

#### 2.2.4 Other global policies

We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 4). Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the “cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit.” The latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10

£20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people).

Figure 4: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure A24 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires	69	84	84	84	87	83

billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

### 2.2.5 Foreign aid

We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government

spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who support an unconditional increase (Figure 5). Among the 45% who think aid should be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions they deem necessary (Figure 6). The three most commonly selected conditions are: “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this condition), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%), and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%).<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure 7). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure A37). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior research (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid (Figure A18). We then elicit respondents’ preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived one (Figures A16–A20). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure A21). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-care rather than lower taxes (Figure A22).

### 2.3 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere

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<sup>7</sup>It is worth noting that these conditions align closely with the principles of the GCS.

Figure 5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure 6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights	61	72	76	70	74	66
That recipient countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations	36	49	46	53	56	39
That other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid	45	51	52	51	49	49
That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires	36	38	33	41	35	41
That we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted	68	77	79	80	72	76

answers is limited.

### 2.3.1 List experiment

By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of interest. The tacit support is estimated as the difference in the average number of policies supported between two groups, whose list differ only by the inclusion of that policy (Hainmueller et al. 2014). List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability

Figure 7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

bias, silencing racism in the Southern U.S. (Kuklinski et al. 1997) or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia (Chapkovski & Schaub 2022). In our case, as shown in Table 2, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support.<sup>8</sup> Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

### 2.3.2 Petition

We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state’s office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a real-stake petition, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS:  $p = .30$ ; NR:  $p = .76$ ).<sup>9</sup> In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p.,  $p = 10^{-5}$ ) and NR (4 p.p.,  $p = .008$ ). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and the overall

<sup>8</sup>We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list* (Imai 2011).

<sup>9</sup>Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.



Table 2: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	US	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.01]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

willingness to sign a real-stake petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

### 2.3.3 Conjoint analyses

In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms.

The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C).<sup>10</sup> For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.<sup>11</sup> The outcome is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor sub-

<sup>10</sup>Indeed, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure A7).

<sup>11</sup>Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ( $n = 757$ ) and 77% in Europe ( $n = 746$ ), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ( $n = 751$ ) and 84% in Europe ( $n = 747$ ). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ( $n = 741$ ) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53% ( $n = 721$ ). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ( $n = 771$ ) and 77% in Europe ( $n = 766$ ) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

stitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

In the third analysis, we present to two random branches of the sample hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table 3 shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ( $p = .005$ ) in voting intention in France. The effect is also positive at 3 p.p. ( $p = .13$ ) in the U.S., although not significant at the 5% threshold. Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States.<sup>12</sup>

Table 3: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003


Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left- or center-left coalition will win the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ( $n = 2,218$ ), i.e. the respondents who choose *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other* for their political affiliation. In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy*


<sup>12</sup>We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

Figure 8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany

- Klimaschutz:
  - Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
  - Plan zur Wärmedämmung
  - Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030
- Wirtschaftspolitik:
  - Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
  - Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
  - Staatsschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
  - Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen
- Außenpolitik:
  - Globales Klimaprogramm
  - Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
  - Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
  - Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern
- Gesellschaft:
  - Volksentscheid auf Bundesebene
  - Cannabis-Legalisierung
- Steuerpolitik:
  - Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
  - Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen




(d) Spain

- Política climática:
  - 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
  - Plan de aislamiento térmico
  - Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030
- Asuntos económicos:
  - Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
  - Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
  - Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
  - Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar
- Política exterior:
  - Plan climático global
  - Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
  - Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
  - Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja
- Asuntos sociales:
  - Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
  - Abolición de la prostitución
- Sistema fiscal:
  - Plan de redistribución nacional
  - Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



(e) UK

- Climate policy:
  - Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
  - Thermal insulation plan
  - Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030
- Economic issues:
  - £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
  - Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
  - Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
  - Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers
- Foreign policy:
  - Global climate scheme
  - Global tax on millionaires
  - Global democratic assembly on climate change
  - Doubling foreign aid
- Societal issues:
  - Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
  - Legalization of cannabis
- Tax system:
  - National redistribution scheme
  - Wealth tax



(Figure 8). Except for the category *foreign policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, the policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.<sup>13</sup> This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).

The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60% in Europe and 58% in the U.S. (Figure 9). In the U.S. for example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election. This result reminds the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy (Ghassim 2020).

Figure 9: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	58	60	61	59	65	58

<sup>13</sup>This is the Average Marginal Component Effect computed following Hainmueller et al. (2014).

### 2.3.4 Prioritization

Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruction was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires, while the GCS came in as the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires consistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country, garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK

### 2.3.5 Pros and Cons

We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS, utilizing either an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format, respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support or opposition to the GCS (see Figure A8). Notably, the least important aspect was the negative impact on their household, with 60% in Europe ( $n=1,505$ ) and 75% in the U.S. ( $n=493$ ) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%. However, due to the limited variation in the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive.

The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automatically translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international

aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers (see Figure A10). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure A9). This exercise confirms the findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned.<sup>14</sup>

In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see Section 2.5), and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of this “pros and cons treatment” was to simulate a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after participants viewed a list of its pros and cons.<sup>15</sup> Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after participants were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support remains significant,<sup>16</sup> these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate around it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

## 2.4 Universalistic values

To better understand people’s support for specific policies, we also ask broad questions to study their values. When we ask participants which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose “sentient beings (humans and animals),” 22% choose “humans,”

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<sup>14</sup>Moreover, around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

<sup>15</sup>Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

<sup>16</sup>Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table A1).

33% select their fellow citizens (or “Europeans”), 15% choose “My family and myself,” and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly “My State or region” or “People sharing my culture or religion”). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority of left-wing voters can even be considered universalist voters (see Figure A38 for main attitudes by vote).

When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global justice.”

Furthermore, when we ask participants to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent’s random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient’s origin, while in the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34%). Moreover, the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by right-wing voters or non-voters.

## 2.5 Second-order Beliefs

To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policy-makers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile. However, the evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an incentivized question about perceived support (Figure 10).

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate. The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and



68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the US2 survey.

Figure 10: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

### 3 Discussion

Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022), as they reveal robust majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from complementary surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. We find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority support for our main policy of interest—the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encompasses carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied by a global basic income funded by the scheme’s revenues. Additional experiments, such as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over prominent national climate policies and

aligned with a significant portion of the population holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover, the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly, a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that does not.

Having ruled out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens' support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, we propose five alternative explanations. The first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting. Nationalistic framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values. Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may simply be unaware of specific global redistributive policies, let alone base their political ideas on them. This lack of awareness may lead people to perceive such policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic. This hypothesis is supported by ignorance of the GCS expressed in the feedback fields, where a common response is a variation of "thank you for this interesting, thought-provoking survey." Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic elites (Gilens & Page 2014; Persson & Sundell 2023), public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in preventing global redistribution.

Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global inequality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support these hypotheses could help draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased prominence.

## Methods

**Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Complementary* surveys. The *Complementary* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 participants between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 participants and was conducted from February to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G confirms that our samples are representative of the population.

**Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*).

**Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022). The raw results are reported in Appendix B<sup>17</sup> while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. The questionnaires are the same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan ([osf.io/fy6gd](https://osf.io/fy6gd)).

**Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three participants with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have

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<sup>17</sup>Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the U.S. President's office.

## Data and code availability

All data and code of the *Complementary* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [github.com/bixiou/global\\_tax\\_attitudes](https://github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes). Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public upon publication.

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## A Literature review

### A.1 Attitudes and perceptions

#### A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies

Carattini et al. (2019) test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 1). This is another piece of evidence that the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) find that the support for a carbon tax increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one’s own country.

In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020) finds support ranging from 55% to 74% “a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”. Through an experiment, he also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one’s country’s UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of “a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks” (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.

(2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than at the national level (40%).

The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that “for environmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other countries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).

### A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions, most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization efforts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable, in particular an equal right to emit per person.

This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort sharing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit). Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same



in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for uncovering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarification. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing principles in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emissions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its relatively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel & Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional to historical emissions”. Using a choice experiment, [Carlsson et al. \(2013\)](#) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”. The study by [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold

a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al. \(2023\)](#) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current vs. accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred). (Back to Section [2.2.1](#))

### A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries. The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they become aware of them.

For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

[Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.<sup>18</sup> They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In [Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries’ average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, [Gilens \(2001\)](#) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, [Nair \(2018\)](#) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as

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<sup>18</sup>[Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) offer the best results on desired aid because (as [Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al. (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram (2017), Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated). (Back to Section 2.2.5)

#### A.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax

We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,<sup>19</sup> though surveys consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income countries, Schechtel & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in

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<sup>19</sup>We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

#### **A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms**

**Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Reyssen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close to their town, region or country than to the world. To measure universalism, [Enke et al. \(2023b\)](#) ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” ([PIPA 2001](#)). [Enke et al. \(2023a\)](#) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and [Cappelen et al. \(2022\)](#) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., [Cherry et al. \(2017\)](#) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview.

**Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-

tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. [Bernauer & Gampfer \(2015\)](#) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country's emissions at one third of the global total. [Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer \(2019a\)](#) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. [McEvoy & Cherry \(2016\)](#) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, [Aklin & Mildemberger \(2020\)](#) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by [McGrath & Bernauer \(2017\)](#) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

#### **A.1.6 Second-order beliefs**

[Allport \(1924\)](#) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when [O'Gorman \(1975\)](#) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. [PIPA \(2001\)](#) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States has been documented by [Andre et al. \(2021\)](#). Similarly, [Sparkman et al. \(2022\)](#) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half, while [Drews et al. \(2022\)](#) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain. Additionally, [Geiger & Swim \(2016\)](#) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

## **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

### **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, [Hoel \(1991\)](#) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional objective, [Grubb \(1990\)](#), [Agarwal & Narain \(1991\)](#) and [Bertram \(1992\)](#) were the first to

advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: “by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis”.<sup>20</sup> Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer et al. 2000; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Jamieson 2001; Rajan 2021).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton 2011).

Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a “dual-track transition to global carbon pricing”: an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters) contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-

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<sup>20</sup>By “adult per capita”, Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global redistribution.

### A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles. While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).

**Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult. Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-emitting countries.

**Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in proportion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it collects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights, this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be compared in terms of distributive effects.

**Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *historical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a carbon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.<sup>21</sup>

To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.<sup>22</sup> Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which

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<sup>21</sup>It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

<sup>22</sup>Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

is flawless. [Matthews \(2015\)](#) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such as the populations at the chosen start year ([Neumayer 2000](#)), or at a future date such as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion ([Raupach et al. 2014](#)). [Fanning & Hickel \(2023\)](#) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like [Matthews \(2015\)](#) also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's population has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would accumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

**Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this principle, [Baer et al. \(2008\)](#) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on individual income above \$7,500.

**Climate Equity Reference Framework** [Baer et al. \(2008\)](#) propose another effort-sharing method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as follows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Business as Usual scenario from [IEA \(2007\)](#) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.



The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR), is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the mitigation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as  $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$ , with  $a = .4$ .

This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the **EcoEquity calculator** allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasidou et al. 2022).<sup>23</sup>

The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three drawbacks. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is inconsistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *responsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes<sup>24</sup> and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-


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<sup>23</sup>The **U.S. Climate Action Network** and the think tank **EcoEquity** (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ( $a = .5$ ), their own **business as usual projections** of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

<sup>24</sup>Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions<sup>25</sup> in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure A1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure A2).


Figure A1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network \(Athanasidou et al. 2022\)](#) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

<sup>25</sup>The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity”.

Figure A2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network \(Athanasiou et al. 2022\)](#) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

**Contraction and Convergence.** [Meyer \(2004\)](#) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights to each country, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

**Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-

sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al. 2016, 2017).

### A.2.3 Global redistribution

Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022), low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global inequalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al. 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale, although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international transfers.

Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in

two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In contrast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of 250\$/month (higher than the GDP per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally reduce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be rationalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

#### A.2.4 Basic income

Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end extreme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychological well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes of UCT ([Bastagli et al. 2016](#); [Standing 2014](#)).

While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and biometric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress, with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally accessible. ([Hanson 2016](#)).

#### A.2.5 Global democracy


The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace. International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institutions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change, wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-](#)

ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates. Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly composed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legislative powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon follow.

## B Raw results

Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

Figure A3: Absolute support for global climate policies. Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey. Reproduced from [Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022](#), Figure A20.)



Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure A4: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure A5: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Number of correct answers to understanding questions	1.8	2	2	2	2	2

Figure A6: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.3.1, Question 24)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
List exp.: NR/GCS/C/O	2	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.7	2.6
List exp.: NR/C/O	1.4	1.9	2.1	1.6	2	1.9
List exp.: GCS/C/O	1.4	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.8
List exp.: C/O	0.9	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.1	1.3



Figure A7: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.3.3)

		United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74	
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68	
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77	
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82	
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52	
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72	

Table A1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.3.5)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure A8: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) (Back to Section 2.3.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure A9: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.3.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure A10: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.3.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world countr global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro  pro: pros  pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con  con:  cons  cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure A11: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure A12: Support for a global wealth tax.

“Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low- income countries?”

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education.” (Question 35)




Figure A13: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure A14: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure A15: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)




Figure A16: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure A17: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure A18: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure A19: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.2.5)




Figure A20: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

“Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.2.5)






Figure A21: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 “How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)” (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Lower spending on defense	30	21	16	30	17	22
Lower spending on retirement pensions	5	3	4	2	1	5
Lower spending on healthcare	10	3	4	3	2	4
Lower spending on welfare benefits	14	12	19	11	3	12
Lower spending on education	8	2	2	1	3	5
Lower spending on other programs	19	24	22	37	11	12
Higher taxes on the wealthiest	68	64	55	82	35	85
Higher corporate income tax rate	51	27	21	27	15	53
Higher personal income tax rates	10	7	3	8	2	18
Higher public deficit	4	6	5	9	2	7

Figure A22: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid] “How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)” (in percent) (Question 42) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure A23: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure A24: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat* or *strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 4 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure A25: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure A26: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.  
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure A27: Group defended when voting.  
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure A28: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure A29: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure A30: Charity donation.

“How much did you give to charities in 2022?” (Question 50)




Figure A31: Interest in politics.  
 “To what extent are you interested in politics?” (Question 51)




Figure A32: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure A33: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure A34: Voted in last election. (Question 54)






Figure A35: Vote in last election (aggregated). *PNR* includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure A36: Perception that survey was biased.  
 “Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)




Figure A37: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question (manually recoded, in percent)

(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure A38: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).  
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.4)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

## C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global policies)

- A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and A3]

*Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

- B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take measures to fight climate change.”

*Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree*

- C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- If other countries do more, [country] should do...
- If other countries do less, [country] should do...

*Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

- D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share.

Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

- E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and A3]

*The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

*emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them for the damages.*

F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a substitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 onwards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have to pay anything
- The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures 1 and A3]

*Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree*

G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and A3]  
*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

British person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

- I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and A3]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

## D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly corresponds to the Eu questionnaire as well as the combination of the US1 and US2 questionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the US2 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the support of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in Eu (likewise, either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

At each section or question, we specify in square brackets in which questionnaires it is present (US1, US2 and/or Eu) as well as country specificities. Figures A39-A41 also allow understanding the structure of each questionnaire. Qualtrics and Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure A39: Eu survey structure




Figure A40: US1 survey structure





Figure A41: US2 survey structure





## [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1. Welcome to this survey!

This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted **for research** purposes on a representative sample of [1,000 British people].

It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around **20 min**] to complete.

The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to some understanding questions.

If you are attentive and lucky, **you can win up to** [US1, Eu: **\$350**; US2: **\$150**] in points. (**See terms and conditions**).

Please answer every question carefully.

### **Do you agree to participate in the survey?**

*Yes; No*

2. What is your gender?

*Woman; Man; Other*

3. How old are you?

*Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above*

4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

*France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other*

5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

*Yes; No*

7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the members of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

*1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more*

8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?  
*1; 2; 3; 4 or more*
9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are possible)  
*White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native; Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say*
10. What is the [US1, US2: *annual*; Eu: *monthly*] gross income of your household (before withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, Social Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income from other sources.  
 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely: *Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000; between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I prefer not to answer;*  
 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8, and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf. the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two, middle three, and last three items, respectively.  
 US1, US2: *Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or associates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);*  
 FR: *École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou technologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA, DESS...)*  
 DE: *Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt- oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur; Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher*

ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*  
UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

12. What is your employment status?

*Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed (searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

*Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in U.S. dollars)?

If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S. dollars)?]

Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example, if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

[Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and \$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000*; For Eu, the thresholds are: FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

*Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

## [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion. To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

**Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive** [US1, US2: **\$30/month**; UK: **\$30 (that is £25) per month**; FR, DE, ES: **€30/month**], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

**The typical [American] would lose out financially** [US1, US2: **\$85**, FR: **€10**, DE: **€25**, ES: **€5**, UK: **£20**] **per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded from the basic income. (Back to Section [2.2.1](#))

### 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [*Figure A4*]

Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

*Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

*Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

*Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

*Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here is the second policy:

**National redistribution scheme:**

This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive [\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK: £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1, US2: [See more details.](#)] <sup>26</sup>

17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure A4]

Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

*Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest [Americans] would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

**Global Climate scheme:**

To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

---

<sup>26</sup>8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](http://taxjusticenow.org) by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

*Below \$315,000: unchanged*

*\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%*

*\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%*

*\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%*

*\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%*

*Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%*

It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all humans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American] would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

**National redistribution scheme:**

This policy would **increase taxes on the top [5%]** and provide cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000 per year].

18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are implemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure A4]

Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

*A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would neither gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two policies:]

[US1: **Coal exit:**

To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

Eu: **Thermal insulation plan:**

To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all households, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR, DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater than this cost. ]

[US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

Eu: **Death penalty for major crimes:**

This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as terrorism and mass shootings.]

Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

[Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [*Clicking displays the previous summarized descriptions.*]

19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown that:
  - 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
  - 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.
20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure 2]  
*Yes; No*
21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure 10]  
The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.  
*Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme* [slider from 0 to 100]
22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure 2]  
*Yes; No*
23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure 10]  
The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.  
*Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution* [slider from 0 to 100]
24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many** do you support? [Figure A6, Table 2]

[Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- Global climate scheme
- National redistribution scheme
- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2; 3; 4

[Branch GCS/C/O]

- Global climate scheme
- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2; 3

[Branch NR/C/O]

- National redistribution scheme
- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2; 3

[Branch C/O]

- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2



## [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure A7]

Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the same time.

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme

*Bundle A; Bundle B*

26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme, and the Global climate scheme)? [Figure 2]

*Yes; No*

27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure A7]

Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the same time.

[Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme	Global climate scheme National redistribution scheme

[Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

[Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

[Branch NR + C vs. NR]

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

*Bundle A; Bundle B*

28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.

Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next presidential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]

Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 3, Figure A7]

[Table 3. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the policies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the European versions.]

<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
[Global climate scheme / no row]	[ / no row]

[US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.

Eu (*where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”*): Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties’; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]

[US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]

[Figure 8; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

[US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

30. [new page] [*Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is given here.*] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you prefer? [Figure 8]

	<b>Platform A</b>	<b>Platform B</b>
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
<b>Foreign policy</b>	Global climate scheme	-

*Platform A; Platform B*

## [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

*[Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked) before Question 20]*

31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures A9, A10]

{Open field}

32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure A8]

- It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- It would penalize my household.
- It would make people change their lifestyle.
- It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- It could foster global cooperation.
- It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- It could be subject to fraud.
- It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

*Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

## [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).  
*Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*
34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the U.S] / Africa].

**In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]? [Figure A11]**

*Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

## [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

*[Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global\_first); Question 36 then Question 35 (national\_first); Question 37 (global\_share); Question 38 (sharing)]*

35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?  
Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2, A12]  
*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*
36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]? [Figures 2, A13]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of them in Africa).

Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in low-income countries.

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country's national budget)? [Figure A14]

*Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries* [slider from 0 to 100]

38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world.

In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of them in Africa).

Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure A15]

- The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For example, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service and state-funded schools].
- Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

## [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

US2 Please select "A little" (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

*Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES: 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: defense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education, roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, science...)]. [Figure A18]

*Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%; 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.]

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid? [Figures A16, A17, A19 and A20]

41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual foreign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign aid.

How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure A21]

*Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit*

42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure A22]

*Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; over spending on other programs [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

### **[Eu, US1] Petition**

43. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme? [Figure A23]

As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) *Yes; No*

### **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal with climate change. [Figures 4 and A24]

Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages
- High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*



45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 4 and A24]

- Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population
- Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets
- A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each human

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure 5]

Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

*Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figures 6, A16]

*That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure 7]

*Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

*prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

## **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1] In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure A25]  
*[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it respects global justice; ndifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.] interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure A30]  
*I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and [\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure A31]  
*Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure A32]  
*Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure A33]  
*Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure A34]  
*Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.] [Figure A35]

[US1, US2: *Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say*

FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election

DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*

ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*

UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure A26]

- Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- Climate change
- Global poverty

*Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time*

57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure A27]

*Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

## [Eu, US1] Prioritization

58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures A28 and A29]

You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100. Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

*See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.*

[sliders from 0 to 100]

## [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR: 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for electric vehicles.
- Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance low-carbon investments.

Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used to... ?

- Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- Finance low-carbon investments
- Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon investments

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Multiple answers possible)

*I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the national level;*

*I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions above) than previously suggested;*

*I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*

*I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*

*I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*

*I don't know*

## **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure A36]

*Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*

62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries? [Figure A37]

*{Open field}*

63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or suggestions in the field below.

*{Open field}*

64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconferencing) for 30 min?

This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.

*Yes; No*

## E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

To specify the GCS, we use the IEA’s 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030. Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of \$30 per month would allow 670 million people to escape extreme poverty, defined with the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.<sup>27</sup>

To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030, we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult: that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a country  $c$ ,  $e_c$ , evolves from baseline year  $b$  proportionally to the evolution of its adult population  $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$ . Thus, the global share of country  $c$ ’s carbon footprint,  $s_c$ , is proportional to  $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$ , and as countries’ shares sum to 1,  $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$ . Multiplying country  $c$ ’s emission share with global revenues in 2030,  $R$ , and dividing by  $c$ ’s adult population in year  $y$ , yields its average cost per adult:  $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$ . Using findings from Ivanova & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all surveys (using  $y = b = 2015$ ), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure A42. For the record, Table A2 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$ ).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>By taking the **ratio** of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in **PPP** and **nominal**, we obtain the purchasing power of \$1 in this region: \$2.4 in 2019.

<sup>28</sup>2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects

Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise, given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress, and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated Assessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al. 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and carbon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030), so we conservatively chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates. Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.<sup>29</sup> For example, although countries' decarbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be overestimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre (2023).

(Back to Section 2.2.2)

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would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose  $y = b = 2015$  rather than  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$  to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

<sup>29</sup>Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure A42: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.






Table A2: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO <sub>2</sub> footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)			
			Algeria*	-1	6.0
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	7	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Colombia	15	3.0
United States	-76	21.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Australia	-59	17.6	Vietnam	16	2.9
Canada	-55	16.7	Peru	16	2.8
South Korea	-49	15.6	Morocco	16	2.7
Taiwan	-41	14.0	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-28	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-18	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-12	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1

*Note:* Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead. Values differ from Figure A42 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

## F Determinants of support

Table A3: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.2.2](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069** (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.308*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## G Representativeness of the surveys

Table A4: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to 2.1)

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in

Table A5: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to 2.1)

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in

Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

## H Attrition analysis

Table A6: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.092	0.073	0.076	21.564	0.018
Income quartile: 2	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.714 (3.218)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.001 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.030*** (0.011)	0.499 (2.856)	-0.002 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.001 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.015)	-3.516 (3.331)	0.004 (0.010)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)	1.736 (2.752)	0.004 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.054*** (0.017)	-0.054*** (0.017)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.792 (2.640)	-0.033** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.040** (0.016)	-0.040** (0.016)	-0.008 (0.018)	3.768 (3.087)	-0.033** (0.014)
Age: 50-64	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.047*** (0.016)	4.687* (2.694)	-0.043*** (0.013)
Age: 65+	0.056*** (0.021)	0.056*** (0.021)	-0.055*** (0.016)	7.896* (4.585)	-0.052*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.050*** (0.008)	-0.050*** (0.008)	0.020** (0.009)	0.160 (2.576)	0.002 (0.005)
Urban	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.010 (0.011)	4.989** (2.428)	-0.005 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.037*** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.010 (0.014)	7.738** (3.083)	0.004 (0.009)
Race: Hispanic	0.044*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.018 (0.016)	2.207 (2.523)	-0.001 (0.009)
Region: Northeast	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	-5.474 (5.304)	-0.005 (0.008)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.962 (4.978)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: West	0.006 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.022* (0.013)	-5.075 (4.983)	-0.002 (0.009)
Observations	4,500	4,500	2,854	2,688	2,688
R <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.023	0.030	0.005	0.018

Table A7: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.068*** (0.015)	1.444 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.013)
Income quartile: 3	0.020 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	-0.031* (0.017)	8.630 (9.816)	-0.009 (0.015)
Income quartile: 4	0.009 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.020)	5.532 (3.594)	0.0002 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	2.295 (3.067)	0.010 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	0.024 (0.015)	0.024 (0.015)	0.011 (0.024)	-0.743 (1.437)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.019 (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)	0.004 (0.022)	9.366 (6.911)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.037** (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	-0.057*** (0.021)	0.703 (1.350)	-0.078*** (0.021)
Age: 65+	0.092*** (0.019)	0.092*** (0.019)	-0.073*** (0.021)	3.145 (2.738)	-0.095*** (0.021)
Gender: Man	-0.085*** (0.011)	-0.085*** (0.011)	0.018 (0.012)	4.670 (6.036)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.018 (0.012)	0.018 (0.012)	0.015 (0.014)	1.985 (1.213)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.039** (0.016)	0.039** (0.016)	0.013 (0.018)	19.755 (13.916)	-0.013 (0.014)
Race: Hispanic	0.037** (0.015)	0.037** (0.015)	-0.025 (0.016)	3.358* (1.957)	-0.029** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.0005 (0.015)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.018 (0.018)	-0.701 (2.859)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	0.007 (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)	0.001 (0.015)	3.051 (4.911)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)	0.010 (0.018)	-1.659 (1.936)	-0.010 (0.015)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.054	0.031	0.009	0.031

Table A8: Attrition analysis for the Eu survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 6 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: ES	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.050*** (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	-35.375* (18.649)	-0.006 (0.010)
Country: FR	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-5.377 (20.286)	-0.012 (0.009)
Country: UK	0.039*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.014)	0.027** (0.011)	-19.224 (17.882)	-0.006 (0.009)
Income quartile: 2	0.003 (0.012)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.028** (0.013)	29.027 (20.302)	-0.016 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.059*** (0.011)	0.678 (12.284)	-0.023** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	-0.028* (0.014)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.045*** (0.013)	11.603 (18.776)	-0.019* (0.010)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.009)	7.918 (12.848)	-0.008 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.022* (0.013)	0.019 (0.013)	0.031* (0.019)	36.191* (21.496)	-0.004 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.049*** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.013)	-0.008 (0.016)	34.108** (15.221)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.070*** (0.014)	0.068*** (0.014)	-0.011 (0.017)	45.820** (21.671)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.137*** (0.016)	0.135*** (0.016)	-0.013 (0.017)	29.582** (13.099)	-0.062*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.034*** (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	-25.172* (14.587)	0.010 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.004 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.017* (0.010)	-15.348 (17.562)	0.007 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.017 (0.011)	-14.010 (20.315)	0.001 (0.009)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.038	0.038	0.024	0.004	0.024

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