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Vulnerability and integration in Jordan: Syrian refugees in their local environment

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Author Jalal Al Hussein

Country Jordan

Key words refugees, legal status, vulnerability, poverty, international assistance, Jordan Compact, humanitarian-development nexus, labor market, public services, social cohesion



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
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Map: Number of Syrian refugees by governorate in Jordan registered by UNHCR in November 2017



Source: UNHCR, november 2017, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/61163>
 Credit: Laura Monfleur, january 2018

Vulnerability and integration in Jordan: Syrian refugees in their local environment

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Résumé

L'accord conclu en février 2016 entre la Jordanie et ses principaux bailleurs de fonds, le *Jordan Compact*, par lequel la Jordanie s'engageait à régulariser le statut professionnel des réfugiés syriens en échange de compensations économiques et financières internationales, confirma la nécessité d'une transition (*nexus*) entre assistance humanitaire et programmes de développement dans les situations de réfugiés prolongées. Six années après sa conclusion, le processus du *Jordan Compact* semble en panne. Malgré de nombreuses mesures incitatives sous forme de campagnes de régularisation du statut légal des réfugiés et de nombreux projets de formation et de placement, seulement 60 000 réfugiés syriens sur les 200 000 prévus par le *Jordan Compact*, disposent aujourd'hui (juin 2022) d'un permis de travail. De ce fait, les promesses d'investissements internationaux et d'exportation de produits manufacturés vers les pays membres de l'Union européenne ne se sont pas réalisées.

Le présent rapport se propose d'analyser les différents facteurs qui conditionnent l'insertion des réfugiés dans leur environnement local. Ces facteurs sont d'abord d'ordre politique et juridique, liés aux opportunités et contraintes induites par le cadre légal jordanien dans lequel s'opère l'intégration des réfugiés, en particulier dans les domaines clés de l'accès aux services publics et au marché du travail. Ils sont aussi d'ordre socioéconomique. Le rapport confronte à ce titre les données statistiques de la vulnérabilité fournies par les acteurs institutionnels en fonction d'indicateurs standard aux « voix » des réfugiés syriens face aux différents types de vulnérabilité matérielle, sociale et juridique auxquels ils sont confrontés. Puis le rapport traite de la pertinence des politiques d'assistance engagées par la Jordanie et ses partenaires internationaux afin de répondre à ces vulnérabilités. En conclusion, le rapport tente de dégager des pistes susceptibles de repositionner l'assistance internationale sur les questions de vulnérabilité, de cohésion sociale et, au-delà, sur la question de la stabilité du pays.

Mots-clés : réfugiés, statut juridique, vulnérabilité, pauvreté, assistance internationale, *Jordan Compact*, nexus assistance humanitaire-développement, marché du travail, services publics, cohésion sociale

Pays : Jordanie

Abstract

The Compact reached between Jordan and its main donor countries in February 2016 by virtue of which Jordan committed itself to regularize the professional status of Syrian refugees in exchange for financial and economic compensations, confirmed the necessity

of transitioning between humanitarian assistance and development programmes in protracted refugee situations. Six years on, the 'Jordan Compact' has not delivered its promises. Despite numerous incentives in the form of regularization campaigns of the refugees' legal status and livelihoods programmes, only 60,000 Syrian refugees out of 200,000 expected by the Compact have a work permit. Conversely, the expected international investments and exportation of manufactured products towards European Union countries have not materialized.

This report aims to analyse the various factors that determine the integration of the refugees in their local environment. The factors are primarily political and legal, pertaining to the opportunities and constraints stemming from the regulations determining the modalities of their access to public sector services and to the labour market. Socioeconomic factors are also to be considered. The report confronts statistical data on the vulnerability of the refugees delivered by state actors based on standard indicators (poverty, security, education and health status, etc.) to the "voices" of the Syrian refugees regarding the various material, social and legal types of vulnerability they face daily. Then it tackles the relevance of the aid policies implemented by Jordan and its international partners in order to respond to such vulnerabilities and, beyond, ensure the country's social stability. As a conclusion, the report puts forward recommendations designed to improve international assistance outcomes on vulnerability and social cohesion.

Keywords: refugees, legal status, vulnerability, poverty, international assistance, Jordan Compact, humanitarian assistance-development nexus, labour market, public services, social cohesion

Country: Jordan

Executive summary

In Jordan, the various social assistance and protection programs launched since the beginning of the Syrian crisis have no doubt made it possible to reduce certain vulnerabilities on a local scale. However, it remains difficult to measure their long-term effects or determine whether they have not on the contrary simply made up an "improved" humanitarian aid.

For Syrian refugees, vulnerability in terms of poverty and access to basic services is still comparatively high compared with that of Jordanians and other non-Jordanian groups of residents, even though it has been decreasing since 2016 following Jordan's decision to integrate them partially into the formal labor market. It has been compounded by a pervasive feeling of uncertainty resulting from the absence of long-term prospects and remaining social discrimination, particularly in the fields of labor, higher education and justice.

During the last decade, the Jordanians' standard of living has deteriorated as well, with poverty and unemployment rates that have kept increasing, given rise, since the *Jordanian Spring* in 2011, to indigenous protest movements across the country. This and the hardening of the authorities as illustrated by the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Teachers' Syndicate in 2020, currently pose, more than the widely-reported tensions between host and refugee communities, the most serious threats to political and social cohesion in Jordan.

The 2016 *Jordan Compact*, which plans a shift from humanitarian aid towards more developmental agenda revolving around the access of Syrian refugees to the formal labor market, appears to be challenged. Despite some advances, particularly where access to certain basic services is concerned, the key process of formalizing Syrian manpower (with a work permit as its central criterion) and its counterpart, namely increased international aid not only as the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, but also as a catalyst of economic growth on a national scale, has remained on standby.

The aim of formalizing the professional status of some 200,000 Syrian refugees has driven the Jordanian authorities to develop, with technical support from the International Labor Office (ILO), unprecedented measures concerning only Syrian refugees, including the issuance of "flexible" work permits in the sectors of construction and agriculture, and short-term permits for *cash-for-work* projects. The measures, which have been accompanied by a strengthening of labor inspection measures, have not been sufficient to encourage a majority of Syrian workers to join the formal sector. Since 2016, less than a quarter of them (between 37,000 and 62,000 workers per year) have held valid work permit. Amongst the factors that continue to hinder the march towards formalization are concerns amongst Syrian workers about the possible consequences of such formalization on their humanitarian status and related "humanitarian income" (cash assistance), the lack of decent jobs created by the Jordanian economy and the quasi-structural character of informal employment in Jordan.

Since March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated Jordan's economic crisis, triggering a significant increase in unemployment and poverty, and accelerating the resort of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees to negative strategies such as debts, child labor, and reduced basic expenses. It also exposed the vulnerability of a large number of Jordanian and foreign informal workers that were not eligible for the emergency assistance provided by Jordan to formal workers during the pandemic.

Such enduring vulnerabilities calls for carefully balanced efforts between humanitarian action and development. In other words, developmental approaches aimed to durably enhance the socioeconomic integration of the refugees through improved livelihoods should be implemented gradually and take into account their remaining humanitarian needs.

It is not easy to clearly delineate the future trends of Jordanian politics vis-à-vis refugees and more generally non-Jordanian residents. While since 2019, governmental employment measures have given priority to nationals discussions have been engaged between the Jordanian government and the main providers of social welfare to Syrian refugees, namely the UNHCR (*United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*) and the World Food Program (WFP) about the inclusion of the Syrian refugees in Jordan's social welfare system (cash assistance). This could facilitate the inclusion of Syrian refugees, see that of other nationalities in the future, in the Jordanian economic and social fabric. Other issues at stake include full access of Syrian refugees to education that still needs to be expanded (more specifically in the higher education and vocational training sectors), better access to the formal labor market and to justice that remain hindered by institutional constraints (informality) and psychological constraints (lack of confidence in Jordanian institutions).

In this context, how should Jordan's international partners commit to responding to the protracted Syrian crisis and reposition their actions to combat vulnerability more efficiently durably than through emergency aid provided by UN actors without however replacing state bodies? The major role played by job creation on the national agenda since the *Jordanian Spring* 2011 and the signing of the *Jordan Compact* in 2016 should firstly lead international partners to promotion of the decent character of those jobs provided by the labour market that are mainly occupied by labour migrants, including the Syrian refugees. The distribution of decent labour does not only aim at improving working conditions, but also at serving as a motivating factor for more Jordanians and Syrians (and women in particular) to engage in the formal the labor market.

New employment projects should also better take into account the aspirations and coping/adaptation strategies of the workers among refugees and vulnerable Jordanians, including their reliance on a still vibrant informal labor that offers more work flexibility and (for employers as well) avoids the payment of social security obligations. The mass formalization of informal workers is first and foremost the responsibility of the local authorities as it involves regulatory and legislative measures. Jordan has taken incentive measures along these lines for the benefit of Syrian refugees. To support this formalization effort, international efforts could attempt to help apply these measures in sectors of the labor market that have left unregulated for several decades. For example, in the sector of agriculture, the authorities are currently endeavouring to regularize the status of all national and migrant labourers labor force and modernize production means, notably through digitalization and the use of innovative and water-saving techniques.

The expansion of decent employment in Jordan, which is considered key for the formalization of the local and foreign labour, could be facilitated based on the following orientations:

- Technical support for work inspections, using the digitalization of inspection procedures, and the training of inspectors on child, women and disabled persons labour issues;
- Digitalization of procedures related to working relations between private employers and employees regarding for instance safety and health issues, and payment procedures;
- Strengthening access to justice of workers opposed to their employer through support for legal NGOs, be they local or international;
- Better consider the needs of refugees that have only been partly covered social protection and livelihoods programmes mainly centered on Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts, such as Sudanese, Somalis, Iraqis, etc.

Moreover, International actors need to be more strategic in terms of their interventions, whatever the sector of intervention:

- *the choice of local sustainable partners*: the weak sustainability of Jordanian civil society social programmes should lead international actors to strengthen strategies based on durable partnerships with the State or corporatist bodies to ensure the durability of interventions. Partnership with governmental instances would also make it possible to engage a dialogue on sensitive subjects, such as the opening up of entrepreneurship to refugees and the extension of the range of formal jobs open to non-Jordanians. Partnerships with civil society organizations remain central in the legal aid sector, since they have proved consistently efficient in providing judicial support for refugees and vulnerable Jordanians;
- *coordination/co-financing*: it is important to strengthen the coordination between international donors and assistance providers through co-financing projects. This would create synergies, give more amplitude to interventions and avoid redundant projects, particularly in the field of employment and vocational training.

Introduction

Context: fighting vulnerability, from humanitarian to development

Jordan has strived to respond to the territorial, social, and economic challenges generated by the Syrian refugee crisis. Currently, some 660,000 of them are registered with HCR, some 18% of whom live in camps managed jointly by the UNHCR and sister UN agencies. The remaining part live in municipalities and have had access to municipal services, housing and according to specific modalities to Jordan's public or private health care and education.

In 2016, Jordan operated a significant policy change in its management of Syrian refugees. Convinced that the latter were to stay durably in the country following the strengthening of the Baas regime at the end of 2015¹, the Jordanian authorities decided to turn the humanitarian burden into an asset for the country's economic development. This approach was materialized by the *Jordan Compact* signed in February 2016 in London between Jordan and its main donor countries, including the European Union (EU): in exchange for Jordan's acceptance of the access of Syrian refugee workforce (estimated at around 200,000 people, essentially working in the informal sector) to the formal labor market, international stakeholders committed to increase and diversify international aid in the form of favorable loans, direct investments and export incentives towards the countries of the EU (see sub-section III.1).

This Compact has significantly transformed the approach to vulnerability and how to deal with it. Without ignoring the burden of relief efforts for the most vulnerable Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts, it has placed the assistance programs within the framework of Jordan's macroeconomic development. This implies committing to directly tackling the traditional challenges of the national economy since the end of the 2000s: decreasing growth, a public debt which represents 90% of the gross domestic product (GDP) since 2012, insufficient job creation and high unemployment and poverty rates, plethora and admittedly plethora and inefficient public services, and an informal economy which covers around a quarter of private firms, some forty percent of Jordanian workers and a majority of migrant workers²). It seems that these adverse characteristics of the Jordan economy and labour market have not been considered during the discussion leading to the conclusions of the Compact, as the partners were in a hurry to reach an agreement that met their particular preoccupations: on the one hand, Jordan wished to draw advantage from the financial and economic impact of the *Jordan Compact*, while

¹ The Jordanian vision of a long-term exile of Syrian refugees due to the absence of any prospects of a political solution in a near future was publicly formulated in 2015, in the preamble of the *Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2015* (<https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-response-plan-2015-syria-crisis-march-2015-enar> – p. 8). This approach was validated by the European Union (EU) in 2016, as it observed that Jordan had finally agreed that most of the refugees would stay in the country as long as the situation in Syria did not allow for their return in safety conditions, in: *EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2016-2018*, https://mop.gov.jo/EBV4.0/Root_Storage/EN/EB_Info_Page/Partnership_Priorities.pdf – p. 8.

² The percentage of businesses registered has nevertheless increased, from 64.5% in 2015 to 76% in 2019. International Labour Office (ILO), *Decent Work Country Programme The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2018-2022*, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/genericdocument/wcms_656566.pdf

international stakeholders, the EU more especially, were in the throes of a “migration crisis” with the immigration of more than a million asylum seekers in EU countries in 2015. This resulted in mutual misunderstandings and failed expectations regarding both the formalization of Syrian workers and the impact of international aid on the local economy. The economic and social crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020 has further complicated the situation, leading the Jordanian authorities to prioritize the employment and the social protection of Jordanians possible at the expense of Syrian workers. However, this ordeal could just as well provide Jordan and its international partners with an opportunity to redefine the terms of their partnership according to a common assessment of vulnerabilities affecting the resident population of Jordan and to act accordingly based on shared expectations.

Study aims and structure

The aim of this study is to take stock of and assess socioeconomic vulnerability in Jordan and to put forward recommendations aimed to address it. It is no easy task to define what is really meant by “vulnerability”. The voices of so-called “vulnerable” people, such as refugees of both sexes, and those of humanitarian institutions indicate that “vulnerability” cannot be reduced to a static reality; rather it is a set of situations characterized by a deficit, experienced and/or felt as such by individuals, relative to the dissatisfaction of the expectations in one or several sectors of everyday life (legal status, level of material resources, access public services, physical and legal protection, etc.) and the capacity to deal with it. It is in this perspective that we will tackle the vulnerability of refugees and their host communities before identifying the humanitarian and developmental policies that have been elaborated to reduce it.

The study is composed of four parts

The first section analyze the legal framework that has governed the modalities of integration of refugees in Jordan in terms of opportunities and limitations this has imposed in terms of economic and social integration. This includes access to public services and to the labor market. This section also examines how Jordan has managed to preserve its stability despite the successive protracted “refugee crises” it has had to endure and manage since the arrival of the Palestinian refugees in 1948.

The second section examines how t vulnerability, in its various manifestations, has evolved since the beginning of humanitarian/socioeconomic intervention on behalf of the Syrian refugees and their host communities in 2012. In doing so, it will confront related statistical data provided by the institutional actors according to standard indicators of vulnerability (poverty, coping strategies, access to public services, etc.) with the subjective “voices” of the assisted populations in order to establish a hierarchy of the needs likely to guide future interventions. The analysis will also cover the political dimension of the vulnerability, namely the impact of vulnerability and assistance programmes on the horizontal relations between refugees and their host communities and the vertical relations j between the latter and the local authorities.

The third section deals with the assistance policies engaged by Jordan and its international partners since the advent of the *Jordan Compact* in February 2016. Here we will highlight the challenge posed by the implementation of the “nexus”, namely the transit

mentioned above of humanitarian assistance programmes to a developmental assistance approach centered on employment within the context of the development policies launched by Jordan since the early 2000s.

Based on the previous sections, the fourth section puts forward recommendations aimed to thematically and operationally reposition the interventions of the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in order to improve livelihoods and, beyond, Jordan's stability.

Methodology

This study is based on the abundant existing empiric and academic literature on the subject of refugees (and specifically Syrian refugees) and their management in Jordan, as well as on qualitative data and information drawn from fieldwork carried out from July 2020 to January 2021, including:

- discussions facilitated by AFD with government and non-government institutions which had taken part in the implementation of AFD projects in the framework of the Minka Middle East Initiative. The object of these discussions was not to evaluate the Minka initiative but to highlight from discussions with those by whom it was implemented the types of vulnerability that they revealed, and the opportunities and challenges that their processing raises;
- discussions with representatives of HCR and other international assistance institutions, as well as with the Jordanian government about the impacts of assistance programs on the reduction of vulnerability in its different aspects and cohesion/social stability.
- discussions and *focus groups* conducted with Syrian refugees about their relations with host communities and authorities, as well as about their future. A list of the discussions can be found in the appendix at the end of this rapport.

1. The legal and political framework of refugee management in Jordan

This section reviews the legal and political frameworks specific to the installation of refugees (of all origins) in Jordan and examines their implications for their legal status, as well as for Jordan's stability.

1.1. A plethora of formal and real statuses which generate vulnerability

It is not the least of Jordan's paradoxes that, although it is one of the main refugee host countries per capita, with a UNHCR-registered population representing 7% of its population, it is not a member of the international refugee protection system as set up by the Convention relative to refugee status in 1951 (and its additional Protocol in 1966) and the HCR status. In addition Jordan is the main host country for the Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East better known under its acronym, UNRWA³.

| Country of origin | Syria | Iraq | Yemen | Sudan | Somalia | Others | TOTAL |
|--------------------------------------|----------|--------|--------|-------|---------|--------|---|
| Number of refugees registered | 660,262* | 66,835 | 14,640 | 6,098 | 749 | 1,611 | 750,195 (6.9% of the total population of Jordan) |

Source: UNHCR Factsheet – Jordan – September 2020: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Jordan%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20September%202020.pdf>

* In addition to this, around 650 000 Syrian may not be registered with HCR according to several governmental sources.

³ Established in December 1949, UNRWA has, since May 1950, directly provided services to refugees registered in the fields of primary education, health, relief services and social services, and more recently microcredit and urban management in the camps.

| Category | Refugees from Palestine/Israel in 1948 | Refugees from Gaza between 1967 and July 1968 (ex-Gazans) | Palestinian refugees from Syria | TOTAL |
|--|--|---|---------------------------------|--|
| Number of refugees registered | 2,110,000 * | 158,000 ** | 17,448 *** | 2,285,448 (21% of the total population of Jordan) |
| Source: * UNRWA in figures, 30 December 2019 – https://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa/unrwa-figures-2019-2020 ; Protection in Jordan – https://www.unrwa.org/activity/protection-jordan/ ** Discussion – UNRWA Jordan Office / *** Syria Emergency Snapshot, PRS overview, May 2020. | | | | |

While the above-mentioned Convention and its Protocol (from which the UNRWA Palestinian refugees are excluded⁴) stipulate that refugees should have the same rights regarding property, housing, post-primary schooling, and work as foreign residents, and rights concerning participation in legal proceedings, social protection, and primary education as nationals of the host country⁵, in Jordan, local legislation alone takes precedence. However, the latter only provides for a few legal standards applicable to refugees. This includes protection against extradition for political refugees that is provided for in the 1952 Constitution (see article 21, paragraph 1), and a few arrangements provided for by the law of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs that exempts asylum/seekers or refugees from the obligation to have valid identity papers on entering the territory (see article 29), and are given the opportunity to avail themselves of travel documents according to modalities determined by the Ministry of Interior (see article 4c, 10). However, the Jordanian legislation gives them no explicit rights to residence, education, health, and employment. Each refugee crisis has *de facto* been managed by the Jordanian authorities according to specific arrangements based on their perception of the political and/or socioeconomic opportunities and challenges that their integration involved⁶.

This has resulted in refugee populations with different legal and social statuses, degrees of integration and living conditions and compounded the already segmented nature of the Jordanian resident population along societal/political fault lines between:

- Jordanian and labour migrant workers in the labor market, the latter generally being confined to manual and low-qualified jobs in hospitality, agriculture, construction, factory work that the former have been reluctant to engage in (see below II.2.a). Most labour migrants (90% in 2016) are informal workers not covered by Social Security or health insurance.⁷

⁴ Article I, paragraph D of the Convention excludes all refugees receiving services from other United Nations agencies than those of the HCR.

⁵ See Convention and Protocol relative to refugee status, <https://www.unhcr.org/fr/4b14f4a62>

⁶ Al Hussein J. and Napolitano, V. (2019), "La politique Jordanienne à l'égard des réfugiés syriens: entre hospitalité et protection des intérêts nationaux", *Confluences Méditerranée*, L'Harmattan, 2019/3, n° 110.

⁷ Winkler H. and A. Gonzalez (2019), Jordan Jobs Diagnostic, Jobs Series, No. 18, World Bank Group – <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32751/143662.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y>

- Jordanians of Palestinian origin, i.e. those 1948 refugees to whom citizenship has been granted since 1949 (as confirmed by the 1954 law on nationality), but who are also considered of Palestinian nationality under their "right of return" to Palestine on the one hand, and "indigenous Jordanian nationals" or "Transjordanians" on the other. A marked schism between these two groups of Jordanian citizens emerged following the revival of Palestinian nationalism at the end of the 1960s that has been compounded since the 1970s by way of discrimination towards the Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the sphere of employment in the public sector (see sub-section I.2). The "ethnic" Palestinian community has itself been divided since 1967 between the 1948 Jordanians of Palestinian origin and the 1967 Displaced Palestinians from Gaza who sought refuge in Jordan following the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip following the Six-Day War (see next section below).
- Jordanians with different tribal affiliations, more specifically in rural regions where the presence of state institutions is less prevalent than in urban localities. Considered by the urban elites of the country as an anachronistic survival of the social order predating the creation of the Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, the tribes continue to play an important role in the local management of justice⁸, as well as during municipal and parliamentary elections.⁹

⁸ More generally, in an uncertain political context marked by the rise of the Islamist movements, the authorities consider the tribes to be an element preserving the Hachemite regime. The authorities have sought to contain "tribalism" rather than eliminate them. In the field of justice, the practice of *Jalwa*, which exhorts all the relatives of the perpetrator of a crime (5 levels of kinship) to leave their village for fear of collective punishment pending an agreement (generally of a financial nature) between the victim's and the perpetrator's families, is still enforced by the authorities. Recent attempts were made to limit the impact of the *Jalwa* to one year and the number of members of the perpetrator family to two degrees of kinship. Some criminals having completed their prison sentence remain in detention due to a lack of agreement between the families. On the subject of tribal justice and its relationship with formal criminal law, see recently: *Jordan: Hundreds Displaced Based on Family Ties – Enforcement of Local Practice Outside Rule of Law*, 17 September 2019 – <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/17/jordan-hundreds-displaced-based-family-ties>

⁹ At the level of general elections, the *one man, one vote* rule, which has obliged voters to choose just one candidate since the 1993 general elections, has favored tribal candidates at the expense of candidates affiliated to political parties, and particularly those from the Islamic Action Front (the political representatives of the Muslim Brethren in Jordan). At municipal level, the predominance of tribal members in town councils is documented in Clarke J. (November 2012), "Municipalities Go to Market: Economic Reform and Political Contestation in Jordan", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 358-375. It remains to be seen to what extent the 2015 reform of the law on municipalities has changed this.

1.2. Palestinian refugees and displaced persons, the generic referents of the Jordanian management of refugees

The Palestinian refugees are the only refugees to be considered refugees with a right of residence pending their return to their homes of origin. Two sub-groups of Palestinian refugees with distinct statuses coexist: (i) the 1948 Palestinian refugees who settled in Jordan in the wake of the 1948 Israeli-Arab conflict and to whom citizenship was granted between 1949 and 1954; (ii) the displaced persons from the Gaza Strip (most of them 1948 refugees) that settled in Jordan following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and ensuing Israeli occupation: they were denied citizenship, but granted Jordanian temporary travel documents that replaced initial Egyptian travel documents¹⁰; (iii) the "Palestinian refugees from Syria" who have arrived in Jordan fleeing the Syrian civil war since 2011.

Jordan is considered the Arab country that has offered the 1948 Palestinian refugees the best conditions for socioeconomic integration. Overriding the "positive discrimination" recommended by the Arab league, i.e. maintaining them in statelessness in the name of their "Palestinian nationality" and their UN-promoted right to return to their villages and homes¹¹, Jordan has granted them citizenship to associate them fully in the political and economic development of the country. However, citizenship was meant to be functional and temporary, pending the time when return would be possible: since 1948, Jordan has continued to promote the "right of return" and preserved its most visible symbols, i. e. the Palestinian refugee camps (where about one-fifth of them live¹², and UNRWA, as the embodiment of the UN's commitment to eventually implement UN resolutions related to the return of the refugees. However, the gamble on the coexistence between "Transjordanian" citizens and "Jordanians from Palestine" did not resist the rise of the Palestinian nationalism the 1960s, which resulted in a military and political confrontation with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the Black September events in 1970-1971. Even though the military threat posed by the PLO militia disappeared in 1971, the recognition of the PLO as the "unique representative of the Palestinian people" by the international community in 1974¹³ and the scenario promoted by the Israeli right-wing that Jordan could become a future alternative home for the Palestinians, has resulted in an unofficial discourse that stigmatizes the "Jordanian of Palestinian origin" (i.e. the Palestinian refugees) as a potential threat to the domestic stability of the regime¹⁴. A policy of "positive discrimination" has been applied on Palestinian refugee-citizens that has mainly manifested itself through a hiring preference for Jordanians of "Transjordanian" origin for high level positions in public administration¹⁵.

¹⁰ Since the end of the 1980s, the "ex-Gazans" who had come to Jordan following the 1967 war with Egyptian travel documents (Egypt governed the Gaza Strip between 1948 and 1967) were issued with 2-year "temporary" passports. Since 2017, they have also been able to acquire a 5-year "temporary" passport. Neither the 2-year passport nor the 5-year one grant Jordanian citizenship.

¹¹ See Resolution 194 (II) of the United Nations Assembly, article 11.

¹² i.e. approximately 409,000 people (spread over 10 UNRWA camps and 3 camps managed by the Jordanian government alone) out of a total of 2.2 million refugees registered with UNRWA – UNRWAFS_080119.pdf

¹³ Resolution 3210 of October 14, 1974 of the United Nations Assembly.

¹⁴ As declared in the 1991 National Charter, a document prepared by a royal commission to define the country's orientations following the royal decision to sever all legal and administrative links with the West Bank and the resumption of free general elections in 1989: *"The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship must not be understood or exploited...to lead to a weakening of the Jordanian state from the inside or to create conditions leading to the realization of Zionist designs to make Jordan an alternative to the Palestinian homeland"* – see <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/charter-national.html>

¹⁵ Abu-Odeh, A. (1999), *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*. Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press.

However, since the "Palestinian Jordanians" are relatively protected by their citizenship, the "positive discrimination policy" has mainly affected those Palestinians who arrived in the country during and in the wake of the Six-Day War (June 1967) and who have never been naturalized, such as the displaced persons from Gaza ("ex-Gazans"). Even though their right of residence in Jordan pending a hypothetical return to Palestine is in principle guaranteed, they still have, almost half a century after their arrival, "temporary" identity documents with limited civil rights. Initiating a practice that was pursued with more recent Iraqi or Syrian refugees, Jordan has treated them on par with Jordanian citizens for access to primary schools (for those not attending UNRWA schools) and secondary schools. However, under the guise of preserving their "right of return", they have been submitted to the more constrained and expensive non-Jordanian regime for access to medical services, higher education and, since 2016, to the labour market.¹⁶ Such "positive discrimination" was made harder on the most recent wave of Palestinian refugees: the Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) who held Syrian identification documents¹⁷. Since 2012, they have been sent back to the border or deported, often after a stay in a holding camp, following the Prime Minister's principle developed in 2013 which stipulated that these refugees "should have the right to return to their home territory in Israel and Palestine... they should stay in Syria until the end of the Syrian crisis... [because] it is not up to Jordan to solve Israel's problems"¹⁸.

Although the more or less "positively discriminatory" regime imposed on the various groups of Palestinian refugees is formally based on legal claims which may seem for many out of date nowadays, such as those relative to the right of return or the conspiracy of an alternative Palestinian State in Jordan¹⁹, it has nonetheless proved its resilience and may serve, all things being equal, as a reference for understanding the policies pursued by Jordan vis-à-vis more recent categories of refugees.

1.3. "Guest-refugees", populations structurally on the margins

Refugees from other countries such as the Syrian, Iraqi, Sudanese, Yemenite, or Somalian refugees that have arrived in Jordan since the 1990s are not officially considered refugees in the same way as the Palestinian refugees, but rather "guests" or temporary "visitors": a non-legal formula which refers to the tradition of Arab hospitality, but guarantees neither right of residence nor legal protection. Their refugee "title" is nevertheless granted to them based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1998 between Jordan and HCR in a context marked at the time by the Iraqi refugee crisis. The MoU confirms the principle of *non-refoulement*, respect for religious belief, and the right to participate in legal proceedings and receive legal aid. It also sets the parameters for cooperation regarding protection and assistance for refugees/asylum seekers, giving HCR the exclusive responsibility of defining the refugee quality²⁰.

¹⁶ In addition, as for other foreign residents, they have no access to most liberal professions in the fields of health, education and finance are forbidden to them. They may work as engineers or lawyers, but only as employees of Jordanian firms.

¹⁷ According to UNRWA, only 13% of the PRS are in this case. Most of them (55%) are actually Palestine refugees from Jordan (naturalized Jordanians) who were living in Syria, and 18% are Syrian nationals related to Palestine refugees in Syria. Source: discussions with the UNRWA Field Office.

¹⁸ See: *Not Welcome Jordan's Treatment of Palestinian Escaping Syria*, Human Rights Watch, August 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/07/not-welcome/jordans-treatment-palestinians-escaping-syria>

¹⁹ See the speech by the Prime Minister before Parliament: "al-Khasawneh: no to the resettlement of refugees... and no to a solution at Jordan's expense" 13 January 2021 – <https://jo24.net/article/388605>

²⁰ For a period which should not ex In addition, as for other foreign residents, they have no access to most liberal professions in the fields of health, education and finance are forbidden to them. They may work as engineers or lawyers, but only as employees of Jordanian firms.

However, this temporary status does not automatically grant right of residence, even temporarily, pending their return or their resettlement in another country. The only public services easily accessible to refugees registered with HCR are free primary and secondary education²¹, and medical assistance whose cost has first varied according to the nationality of the different refugee populations before being uniformly set since 2019–2020 at the level of indemnities applied to the "non-insured Jordanians", i. e. equal to 40 to 50% of the health expenses in public establishments. In principle, they have no access to the formal labour market. The Jordanian legislation only authorizes the planned employment of foreigners on condition that it supplements any lack of qualifications or human resources within Jordanian manpower in certain economic sectors and according to pre-established quotas.²² Contrary to the migrant workers who have arrived since the early 1970s to fill the lack of local manpower in sectors unattractive to Jordanians such as agriculture, construction, tourism and domestic services, the refugees have initially been considered threats to the country's social and/or political balance, which has generally led the Jordanian authorities to prevent their access to the formal labor market. Informality, defined as absence of social protection and of written contracts is what has defined the refugees' work conditions in Jordan.

Amongst the "refugee guests", the "hybrid" case of the Syrian refugees, the largest UNHCR-registered group, stands out. Realizing in 2015 that in view of the continuous situation of insecurity prevalent in Syria and the low number of resettlements in third countries²³, those refugees were to stay, stretching its limited resources and imposing severe stress on its economy, finances and public services, Jordan undertook to improve the legal status of the Syrian refugees. This started with campaigns of regularization of illegal resident the issuance of "service cards" issued by the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior (MoI) Jordanian to Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR since 2015. Currently valid for one year and renewable, these cards, short of being residence permits, nevertheless guarantee the right to freedom of movement on the national territory and access to the educational and health services provided by public institutions²⁴. In 2016, considering that the Syrian refugee crisis could be turned into a development opportunity, it agreed to formalize, within the framework of the Jordan Compact it reached with its international donors, the status of Syrian refugee workforce operating in sectors of the economy open to non-Jordanians. In so doing, it induced a nexus between humanitarian and development assistance, whereby socioeconomically integrated refugees could be phased out of internationally-subsidized social services (cash or vouchers). The *Jordan Compact* of 2016 also provided for substantial international financial and economic assistance that would boost Jordan's ailing economy and provide job opportunities for both Jordanians and Syrians (see below Section III).

²¹ As for the displaced persons from Gaza, higher education considers them as international students with enrolment fees that are inaccessible for most of them.

²² As for the displaced persons from Gaza, higher education considers them as international students with enrolment fees that are inaccessible for most of them.

²³ According to HCR figures, by 2020 less than 1% of refugees were formally resettled outside Jordan (a minimum of 1,557 people in 2020 and a maximum of 19,313 people in 2016); see UNHCR, *Resettlement Factsheet for Jordan (December 2020)*, in: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/84337>. Moreover, in 2019 and despite the opening of the borders between Jordan and Syria in 2018, only 30,000 registered refugees had returned home – see: *UNHCR continues to support refugees in Jordan throughout 2019* – <https://www.unhcr.org/jo/12449-unhcr-continues-to-support-refugees-in-jordan-throughout-2019.html#:~:text=In%20addition%2C%2030%2C000%20Syrian%20refugees,main%20reasons%20hindering%20their%20return>.

²⁴ The population in the three camps set up to host the most vulnerable among them (Zaatari, Azraq and Emirati) are entirely serviced by international humanitarian agencies. Refugees need a special exit permit to leave these camps.

Such opportunities were not granted to other refugee populations. Beside their UNHCR registration card, Their acquisition of yearly residence permits is still conditioned to in the same way as for migrant workers to a formal job (covered by an "employer-sponsor" (Jordanian *kafeel*), relatively expensive work permits or high bank deposits. These are conditions which few of them can meet²⁵. For example, in 2013, only a third of Iraqi refugees arriving in Jordan with a temporary visa were subsequently able to obtain annual resident permits²⁶. Most of the few thousands Sudanese or Yemenite nationals currently holding a work/residence permit arrived in Jordan many years ago as migrant workers, and not as refugees²⁷. The large majority of legal non-Palestinian or non-Syrian refugees are thus condemned to survive in informality, with no possibility of recourse.

1.4. Traditional stability factors

The stability of Jordan a country subjected to strong social, political, and economic tensions in a particularly unsettled regional environment, has been regularly raised as a key issue by international observers and actors since the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. Nevertheless, stability, in terms of maintaining state institutions has prevailed, even though the causes of potentially destabilizing tensions have not always been resolved. Hence, several factors have contributed to reduce those tensions in past decades. A first political factor refers to the anemic political life in Jordan. The revival of democratic life in 1989 has not generated strong mass parties able to channel and instrumentalise the voices of the different vulnerable segments of the population. The memory of the inter-necine conflict between pro-PLO fighters and the Jordanian army during the Black September events of 1970-1971 and, more generally, the fear that regional conflicts could spillover to Jordan resulted in security services limiting the activities of any protest campaigns by parties or "civil society" organizations, including among the foreign communities such as the displaced persons from Gaza or Syrian refugees.

Other factors of a more socioeconomic nature also played a significant role in Jordan's stability. Despite the local tensions they have generated within ineligible host communities, the assistance programs implemented by UNRWA for the "Palestine refugees" since May 1950 and by the HCR and partner organizations, specifically in favor of Syrian refugees since 2012, have enabled Jordan to cushion the adverse socioeconomic consequences caused by their inflows and improve the infrastructure of host municipalities. They have also represented, in the eyes of the refugees, the symbols the international community's solidarity with their cause Also to be acknowledged as important in mitigating refugee crises is the crucial role played locally, albeit on the fringe of official governmental and international assistance plans by local charities and national civil society organizations,²⁸ as well as private solidarity networks based, as in the Syrian refugee case, on ancestral family/clan networks that linked Jordanians and Syrians on both sides of the border.

²⁵ Bank deposit in a Jordanian bank is set at 20,000 Jordanian dinars (around 28,000 USD) for the Iraqis, according to Sheldon Z. (2018), *Nationality, Class, and Iraqi Migrants in Jordan*, ACOR – <https://acorjordan.org/2018/01/02/nationality-class-iraqi-migrants-jordan/>

²⁶ The population is however described as being relatively well-off, with more than 40% of them having university diplomas – see Sadek G. (2013), *Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq*, Library of Congress, p. 5 et Dalen K. and J. Pedersen (2007), *Iraqis in Jordan: their number and characteristics*. Report, Government of Jordan/Fafo/ UNFPA.

²⁷ Johnston R., D. Baslan and A. Kvittingen (2019), *Realizing the rights of asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan from countries other than Syria, with a focus on Yemenis and Sudanese*, p. 25. In December 2017, 1,891 Sudanese 2,439 Yemenis held work permits as foreign workers.

²⁸ Islamist organizations with "quietist" Salafi tendencies financed by Gulf countries were the first to supply emergency aid during the first waves of Syrian refugees in 2012-2013, before the full involvement of the HCR and UN sister agencies, see Ababsa M. (2014), *Gulf Donors and NGOs Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Jordan*, UNHCR.

From a more developmental perspective, the existence of a large informal labour market has, despite the notions of substandard and precarious work it conjures up, has traditionally played an essential socioeconomic stabilizer, making up for the lack of formal jobs created by the local economy (see II.1.b below) and reducing the cost of living through the production of inexpensive products and services²⁹. It also enables the economic participation of workers who are reticent for various reasons to formalize their employment: this is, for example, the case of Syrian refugees who fear that their formal economic integration and improvement of their livelihoods deprives them of their refugee status and related rights and opportunities (cash assistance or resettlement opportunities in third countries for instance: see sections II and III).

²⁹ Shawabkeh M. (2007), Labor Rights in Jordan, UNDP-Jordan – www.undp-jordan.org/Portals/0/Labor%20Rights-English.doc; UNDP, *The Informal Sector in the Jordanian Economy*, <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/jordan/docs/Publications/Gov/The%20Informal%20Sector%20in%20the%20Jordanian%20Economy-jo.pdf>

2. The general state of vulnerability in Jordan

The current vulnerability of the UNHCR-registered refugees in Jordan is primarily to be analyzed within the context of the restrictive and differentiated “refugee regime” developed by the Jordanian authorities since 1948. Section II focuses on the evolution of vulnerability since 2015 amongst Syrian refugees, as such and in comparison with that of other populations: the non-Syrian refugees registered with HCR, the Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA and the Jordanian population as a whole, as determined by standardized indicators developed by the UNHCR and sister humanitarian agencies. In so doing, it highlights the limitations and weaknesses of such a standardized approach. Section II tackles more subjectively the way in which vulnerability is experienced and expressed in Jordan by the different communities, and its consequences on social cohesion.

2.1. The “institutional vulnerability” of refugees: weaknesses, permanence and contrasting trajectories

a) Methodological considerations

Since 2012/2013, the living conditions of Syrian refugees, who are the victims of what is commonly known as “the greatest humanitarian emergency of our times”³⁰, have been the subject of a large number of studies focusing on their “vulnerability”, a notion that the HCR defines in an inclusive and multivariate manner, beyond the traditional criterion of poverty – expressed as in terms of minimal consumption expenditure: It also covers the risks of inescapable exposure to various types of threats: physical or legal (human rights), material (inability to cover their fundamental needs, including food security), social (limited access to basic services, including access to the labor market).³¹ Vulnerability is thus declined herein as a set of indicators that is developed using a statistical tool – the *Vulnerability Assessment Framework* (VAF) since 2014. Set up by HCR and other partner agencies on the basis on field investigations, the VAF has since then monitored the multi-layered vulnerability status of the Syrian refugee communities (and since 2021 that of other UNHCR categories) in order to target more efficiently refugees eligible for material assistance. Some of the indicators are considered “universal”, such as the level of poverty and coping strategies; other are called “sectoral” and pertain to the refugees’ access to basic services and the labor market.

This multidimensional approach to vulnerability was also adopted in 2013 by Jordan and its Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) to measure the socioeconomic impact of the Syrian refugees on the Jordan’s host communities, its public services and public finances. Since 2015, in order to demonstrate its wish to integrate Syrian refugees in the medium and long run, the latter’s needs have been included alongside those of Jordanian host communities with the framework of the *Jordan Response Plans* (JRP)³². Contrary to the VAF, vulnerability and its sectoral variations according to the JRP are not expressed in terms of sectoral needs, but in financial terms, i.e. the budgets required to

³⁰ <https://www.unhcr.ca/fr/notre-travail/situations-durgence/syrie/>

³¹ UNHCR (2019), *Vulnerability Assessment Framework – Guidance Note*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/68856>

³² The JRP has been reassessed every year/two years since 2016. The JRP reports are documented in reports under the authority of MoPIC.

respond JRP remains therefore more a tool for analyzing the vulnerability of the Jordanian authorities than an instrument for studying the vulnerability of Jordanian and Syrian refugee residents.

Table 3.

| VAF indicators (2019): profiling and targeting the beneficiaries among the Syrian refugees registered | | JRP sectors (2020–2022): interventions meeting the needs of Syrian refugees, host communities, and public services and their costs | |
|--|--|---|---------------|
| <i>Sectoral vulnerability indicators</i> | Education | Education | |
| | Livelihoods | Economic empowerment | Livelihoods |
| | Food security | | Food security |
| | Housing | Housing | |
| | WASH – <i>Water, Sanitation, Hygiene</i> | WASH Health | |
| | Santé | Santé | |
| | Basic needs | Services publics (municipalités) | |
| | Child labor | Public services (municipalities) | |
| <i>Universal vulnerability indicators</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Standard of living (poverty rate)</i> - <i>Dependency rate</i> - <i>Adaptation strategies</i> | Environment | |
| | | Energy | |

Sources: UNHCR (2019), *Vulnerability Assessment Framework*; Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020–2022*.

It is not easy to statistically determine vulnerability in Jordan. The different approaches adopted by the VAF and the JRP, along with their segmentation into a multitude of sectoral indicators make it difficult to capture it in its entirety or to establish any form of prioritization. In addition, neither the VAF nor the JRP measure the impact of vulnerabilities on the intra- or inter-community cohesion or between the communities and local authorities³³. When it comes to Syrian refugees, an additional issue relates to the fact that those registered with HCR only represents part of the total population living on the Jordanian territory. Some refugees are not registered, either (i) because they entered Jordan illegally or left the Zaatari camp where they were registered without the necessary authorizations, and now live in fear of facing the Jordanian authorities; or (ii) because they received

³³ Such a monitoring of "social stability" is conducted in Lebanon under the authority of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and HCR.

sufficient aid from family ties (particularly for those married to Jordanians) or professional networks. The number of those unregistered Syrians is still being debated. Based on the 2015 national census that determined the total number of Syrians in Jordan at 1,265,000 persons and the number of UNHCR-registered refugee Syrians at 645,000 in 2015, the number of unregistered Syrians was thus estimated at approximately 620,000 persons, namely half of the total Syrian population. There is no reliable information on this population group, which also includes non-refugee Syrians that resided in the country before 2011.³⁴ They are nevertheless taken into consideration in the JRP³⁵.

Other refugee populations have long been misrepresented in humanitarian statistics:

- *Non-Syrian refugees registered with HCR*: these living conditions of these refugees have been monitored through HCR home visits. However, until 2022, they were not included in the VAF. Their situation was mainly documented in ad hoc qualitative studies and monitoring exercises conducted by the World about their food needs.³⁶ The 2022 edition of the VAF thus investigates their situation but still less consistently than the Syrian refugees.³⁷
- *Palestine refugees*: there are no statistics on the vulnerability of Palestinian refugees in Jordan per se. Since the launching, in the early 2000s, of the *Jordan First* and *We are all Jordan* governmental campaigns, which aimed to reform the country across the board under the banner of unified Jordanian national identity, irrespective of their origins, Jordan has shown itself to be hostile to the mention of any segmentation of the Jordanian people between its two main (Transjordanian/Palestinian) components. The last authorized *ad hoc* study on Palestinian refugees per se dates back to 2011 and mainly focused on the refugees living in the 13 Palestinian camps³⁸.

b) Vulnerability due to poverty: poverty, food security, and adaptation strategies

These limitations are to be taken into account when considering available vulnerability data. Data relative to "monetary poverty" show, based on a threshold of minimum expenses of 68 JOD [96 USD] per individual and per month, i. e. 816 JOD [1,152 USD] per year for absolute poverty³⁹ varying poverty rates between the different segments of the resident population of Jordan. The Jordanian population that enjoys a monopoly over all public sector

³⁴ According to the 2004 census, 38,130 Syrians were living in Jordan, including 5,700 formal employees in businesses with a work permit. Many others (whose number is still to be determined) were working as informal daily or seasonal workers. To these must be added the members of the Syrian opposition hosted in Jordan since the 1970s and Syrian men and women married to Jordanians.

³⁵ See the declaration by the Minister of the Interior on January 27, 2020 complaining that unregistered refugees do not receive HCR services – see Ghaith Hammad (minister of the Interior), "600,000 unregistered Syrian refugees do not receive services" in *Urduniyat*, January 27, 2020.


³⁶ Since 2019, the PAM partially covers their food requirements and documents the standard of living of each of the main refugee populations by nationality: Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis Sudanese, Somalis, and others. The PAM also documents the case of Palestine refugees from Syria covered by UNRWA with whom it shares the data platform on vulnerable refugees. See WFP, *Jordan – Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment*, 2018.

³⁷ UNHCR, *Vulnerability Assessment Framework – Population Survey of Refugees Living in Host Communities Jordan 2022*, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/93754>

³⁸ Palestinian refugee camps have a specific status: they are not formally integrated in the municipalities' development plans and are managed by committees and UNRWA, which gives them an extraterritorial status. They host around 18% of the 2.3 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA.

³⁹ Absolute poverty is defined by a minimum expenditure level required to cover such basic needs as food, housing, clothing, education, etc. "Abject" poverty focuses mainly on food security and was measured in 2019 by an expenditure below the threshold of 28 JOD (39.5 USD) per person and per month.

jobs access to all private sector jobs has on average been affected by a 14% to 16% incidence of absolute poverty since 2010. As indicated by Chart 1, the level of poverty incidence is higher in within refugee/displaced populations including the displaced persons from the Gaza strip (40% in 2011), or the Syrian refugees (over 75%)⁴⁰.



Sources : UNICEF, *Geographic Multidimensional Vulnerability Analysis – Jordan, 2020*.
 UNHCR, *Vulnerability Assessment Framework, 2015, 2019*.
 Fafo (2014), *The socioeconomic conditions of Jordan's Palestinian camp refugees –*
<https://www.fafo.no/en/publications/fafo-reports/item/the-socio-economic-conditions-of-jordan-s-palestinian-camp-refugees>

The degree of vulnerability in terms of monetary poverty is positively determined by demographic factors, in particular size of household⁴¹. It is also linked to socioeconomic causes such as the low level of employment and/or income. This is also the case of the Jordanians of Palestinian origin who live in camps and have found themselves relatively marginalized in the local labour market. The Governorate of Amman, which absorbs the major part of the economic activities of the country⁴² and has the highest proportion of single-parent households, is where the Syrian refugees and the Jordanians are the least affected by poverty. Conversely, it is in the rural, economically marginalized governorates, such as Mafraq and Maan, that the poverty rates are the highest.⁴³

⁴⁰ The vulnerability (poverty) levels of Jordanian and Syrian refugees are subject to periodic surveys, within the framework of the *Housing Expenditure and Income Survey* for the former, and the VAF for the latter. The other populations or sub-populations, such as the Palestinian refugees in the camps or the Displaced from Gaza, have been subject to *ad hoc* statistical surveys carried out mostly by UNRWA and by the Fafo Norwegian Research Institute in 2010.

⁴¹ As indicated in the 2019 VAF, a "registered case" (the members of a household considered as a unit for a specific intervention) of four people or more record a poverty rate of 98%, 16% of whom are below the "abject" poverty line, while a case made up of one person alone record a 16% poverty rate and no "abject" poverty.

⁴² More than half of the jobs (55%) are created in Amman, according to *Jordan's National Employment Strategy 2011-2020*.

⁴³ In Amman, 66% of Syrian refugees were poor, of whom 7% were in "abject" poverty in 2018 for compared to 11,4% of Jordanians in 2010. By comparison, in Mafraq for example, 86% of Syrian refugees were poor in 2018 (including 21% listed below the

Higher poverty rates have coincided with higher food insecurity rates. These have increased over the past decade, both due to the reduction of the assistance channeled by the WFP as a result of decreasing contributions from donor countries, and to the Jordanian government's decision to stop subsidizing basic food products in order to balance the public budget in 2018⁴⁴. Estimations regarding food insecurity amongst Syrian refugees up to 2020 indicate a worsening of the situation, even if they diverge as to the type of indicator and of methodology adopted. Whereas HCR indicated in its 2019 VAF that around half the Syrian refugees were "highly" (15%) or "severely" (34%) prone to food insecurity, the other half being "moderately" vulnerable⁴⁵, the WFP revealed that in 2018, only 20% of Syrian refugees were food secure, compared to 80% who were not, including 14% of them who were significantly food insecure and 66% who were "vulnerable" – or likely to feel food insecure⁴⁶. On its part, the WFP also noted that Syrian refugees were more affected by food insecurity than other vulnerable categories: food insecurity concerned 76% of Somali refugees, 70% of Sudanese refugees and of poor Jordanians registered with the National Aid Fund, the governmental welfare organization, 69% of Yemenite refugees, 67% of Palestinian refugees from Syria registered with UNRWA; and 66% of Iraqi refugees⁴⁷. On its part, the WFP also noted that Syrian refugees were more affected by food insecurity than other vulnerable categories: food insecurity concerned 76% of Somali refugees, 70% of Sudanese refugees and of poor Jordanians registered with the National Aid Fund, the governmental welfare organization, 69% of Yemenite refugees, 67% of Palestinian refugees from Syria registered with UNRWA; and 66% of Iraqi refugees⁴⁸. However, Syrian refugees are comparatively more covered by international aid: In 2020, 75% of them, including almost all the refugees in camps (120,000/127,000 people) and over two-thirds (69%) of the refugees residing in host communities outside the camps (370,000/535,844 individuals), were dependent on WFP aid in the form of *cash-for-food*⁴⁹. In comparison, only 11.1% of the 89,993 registered refugees of other nationalities (approximately 10,000 people) were eligible for WFP aid.

However, as Chart 1 indicates, poverty trends have improved for Syrians, with decreasing average poverty rates between 2015 and 2019 notably due to an increase in the economic participation (from 52% in 2014 to 59% in 2018) and decreasing unemployment rates (from 57 to 23% during the same period). This positive trend results from the implementation of the 2016 *Jordan Compact*⁵⁰. It may also result, more negatively, from the various subsid-

"abject" poverty line") and 26/27% of Jordanians in 2010 – see VAF 2019 and *Jordan Human Development Report 2015*, MoPIC, UNDP, p. 31 (https://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/library/Human_Development/NHDR/2015.html).

⁴⁴ Despite the implementation of compensatory measures – see (i) WFP (World Food Programme/Reach (April 2019), *Jordan – Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment, 2018* – <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-comprehensive-food-security-and-vulnerability-assessment-2018-april-2019>; (ii) *Turning the Corner – Jordan's Path to Growth*, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2019 – https://mop.gov.jo/ebv4.0/root_storage/en/eb_list_page/reform_matrix_turningcorneren28feb2019-1.pdf

⁴⁵ See UNHCR, VAF 2019, p. 49.

⁴⁶ See WFP (2018), *Jordan – Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment*, p. 6. The investigation conducted by Fafo in 2017/2018 showed a lower percentage of 53 percent of food insecurity, but of whom 23% were severely affected by this situation. See Tiltnes A., H. Zhang and J. Pedersen (2019), *The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan Results from the 2017-2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps*, Fafo.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 55, 125 and 136.

⁴⁸ Care, *How Urban Syrian Refugees, Non-Syrian Refugees and Vulnerable Host Communities in Jordan are Coping and Meeting Challenges, Eight Years into the Syria Crisis*, 2018, p. 9.

⁴⁹ See WFP (2020), <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/covid-19-update-overview-refugee-food-security-jordan-september-2020>

⁵⁰ See: VAF 2019, op.cit., p. 13; and Tiltnes A. and G. Tyldum (2019), *Syrian refugees in Jordan: better off than before but still vulnerable – a Brief*, Fafo; Tiltnes A., H. Zhang and J. Pedersen (2019), *The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan Results from the 2017-2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps*, Fafo.

tence strategies used by refugees to compensate for cuts in the financial assistance supplied by HCR and the WFP⁵¹. These comprise, in the UNHCR parlance, *livelihood-based coping strategies*), including degrading high-risk activities, such as begging or child labor (46% of Syrian households in 2019); *crisis strategies* such as the reduction of health and education expenditure, or the sale of productive assets (31%), and *stress strategies*, which consist for instance in buying food on credit (7%). Only 13% of Syrian households do not use such strategies⁵². In comparison, the percentage of households who use no subsistence strategies is over double among the Somali refugees (21%) and the Palestinians from Syria (24%), triple among Iraqi refugees (33%) and four times among Yemeni refugees (41%). This attests to these other groups' older presence and better access to livelihoods in Jordan⁵³.

In contrast, the trend in terms of poverty levels is negative for the Jordanian population: the poverty rate amongst Jordanians rose from 14.4% in 2010 to 15.7% in 2018, due particularly to an increase in unemployment rates during the last decade, from around 11.5-13% in the 2011-2015 to 19.1% in 2019 following a series of shocks which saw the growth rate decline by approximately 8% between 2003 and 2008, and then around 2% since 2010⁵⁴, resulting from the conjunction of different factors, namely the 2008/2009 global financial crisis; the relative decrease in the transfer of funds from Jordanians working in the Gulf countries⁵⁵ and the Syrian refugee crisis⁵⁶. Following the outbreak of the crisis, the unemployment rate amongst Jordanians jumped to 25% in 2021.⁵⁷ From an employment perspective, the number of job created yearly by the Jordanian economy (currently around 39,000-40) is highly insufficient to absorb some 100,000 Jordanian new entrants on the labour market (see section III.2)⁵⁸.

The relative social and economic decline of the Jordanians, which pervades internal public debates in , can also be measured against the observations made by NGOs operating in the field . In 2018, Care Jordan revealed that cases of Jordanians declaring that they faced difficulties in paying their rent and basic services were three times the number of other nationalities⁵⁹. Such financial vulnerability, which also affects Jordanians above the poverty line, is notably due to the insufficient coverage of the public social (cash) assistance pro-

⁵¹ A 2018 quantitative survey showed that 40% of Syrian refugee households had seen their situation deteriorate since their arrival in Jordan. See Yassin N. (2018), 101 *Facts and Figures on the Syrian refugee crisis*, vol.II, UNHCR, 2019, p. 123. During discussions with Syrian refugees in Amman and Mafraq in 2018 and 2019, complaints were voiced regarding the fact that decreasing levels of international assistance had increased their resorting to debts and reductions of medical expenditure.

⁵² See VAF 2019, pp. 29-30, and WFP, Jordan – Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment, 2018.

⁵³ According to WFP, Somali refugees are those who tend to adopt most such "emergency" strategies" (18% against 5 to 10% for Iraqi, Sudanese, Yemeni and Palestinians from Syria refugees) – see WFP, *ibid.*, pp. 66, 107 et 142.

⁵⁴ See World Bank data – <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=JO>

⁵⁵ Money transfers currently represent 10% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), to be compared with more than 20% between 1996 and 2003, a decrease due specifically to the return of a certain number of Jordanians expatriates following the indigenization policies of the workforce operated by the Gulf countries in past few years – see <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=JO> et *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES)*, European Training Foundation (ETF), 2017, <https://www.etf.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/publications/migrant-support-measures-employment-and-skills-5>.

⁵⁶ A study carried out by the World Bank in 2020 quantifies the impact of the Syrian crisis in Jordan in terms of the erosion of the growth rate of the GDP since 2011 to 1.6 percentage point (pp) – see: *The Fallout of War – The Regional Consequences of the Conflict in Syria*, Groupe Banque mondiale, 2020 – <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria>

⁵⁷ See the statistics of the Jordanian Department of Statistics, http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/linked-html/Emp&Un.htm

⁵⁸ According to the statistics of the Jordanian Department of Statistics, the number of jobs created fell from 70,000 in 2008 to 39,000 in 2018 – http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/linked-html/Job.htm

⁵⁹ See Care, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

vided by the *National Aid Fund* (NAF): only 7% of households earning 2,500 JOD (3,531 USD) per year, slightly less than the individual minimum annual income of 2,640 JOD (3,729 USD) – i. e. 220 JOD per month (31 USD) – are registered with it⁶⁰. However, Jordanian poor rely less on subsistence strategies as they can rely on alternative solidarity networks, including family/tribal networks or charity organizations, sometimes religious ones⁶¹. If necessary, as is the case of three-quarters of NAF-registered Jordanians, they are more likely to resort to less harmful strategies, such as taking out loans, selling productive assets or the reducing health expenditure⁶².

Poverty levels for both Jordanians and non-Jordanians are likely to have been aggravated as a result of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The isolation measures imposed by the authorities in 2020 have contributed to impair an already stagnant economy (see *supra* II.1.b) with, from March to June 2020, losses estimated at 8.2% of the GDP, an increase in the unemployment rate from 16.8% in 2019 to 20.4% during the first quarter of 2021,⁶³ and a significant decrease in average monthly income from 368 to 215 JOD – i.e. just above the minimum monthly income set at 220 JOD⁶⁴. For the year 2020, the poverty rate is said to have risen by 38 pp among Jordanians and "only" 18 pp among Syrian refugees – a discrepancy that can be explained by the fact that the refugees are less dependent than Jordanians on income from stable jobs or from private remittances, two sources of income that the pandemic has considerably dried up⁶⁵.

Although the social programs set up by the Jordanian authorities to cushion the impact of the isolation measures in the form of a distribution of cash and food aid, are said to mitigate the spread of poverty (by about 4 pp), a surge in negative subsistence strategies, including the reduction of health, education, and food expenditure, and child labour and sharing expenses with other impoverished families⁶⁶. The COVID-19 crisis also revealed the vulnerability of informal irregular, seasonal, or temporary workers that were not eligible for the governmental social relief programmes. Migrant workers and refugees were relatively more affected by the isolation measures: between April and June 2020, 35% of Syrian workers permanently lost their jobs compared to 17% of Jordanian workers. Moreover, only 24% of them were then covered by the social security Corporation and 15% had a health insurance against 63 and 42%, respectively, of Jordanians⁶⁷.

c) Vulnerability due to lack of basic services

The vulnerability of the different components of the resident population of Jordan is also to be defined in terms of access to basic services such as education, health, municipal services, and justice.

⁶⁰ See JRP 2020–2022, p. 70 ou UNICEF (2020), *Geographic Multidimensional Vulnerability Analysis – Jordan*, p. 121.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71. 41% of them receive this type of aid.

⁶² WFP, *Jordan – Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment, 2018*; once again, these results are contra-dicted by Care (*op.cit.*) that observes that the Jordanians have a debt which is four times higher than that of the Syrians but do not resort to "emergency" strategies as the Jordanians (Care, 2018, *op.cit.*).

⁶³ According to the *Department of Statistics* – http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/linked-html/Emp&Un.htm

⁶⁴ See ILO (June 2020), *Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Enterprises and Workers in the Informal Economy* – https://labordoc.ilo.org/discovery/fulldisplay/alma995073693402676/41ILO_INST:41ILO_V2

⁶⁵ See UNHCR (December 2020), *Compounding Misfortunes*, World Bank, Joint Data Centre on Forced Displacement, pp. 13–20 (<https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/compounding-misfortunes-changes-poverty-onset-covid-19-syrian-refugees-and-host>).

⁶⁶ ILO (June 2020), *Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Enterprises and Workers in the Informal Economy*. The number of evictions of tenants who could not afford to pay their rent, including for refugees, sharply increased in 2020: the percentage of refugees resorting to HCR legal aid for such issues rose from 1% in March 2020 to 24% in the autumn of 2020.

⁶⁷ And only 30% of them had a valid work permit; voir Fafo/ILO, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

Education: Jordan can pride itself with having reached almost universal education for Jordanian boys and girls at primary school level (97%)^{68 69}. However, that proportion is lower amongst poor families: one fifth of the households receiving assistance from the National Aid Fund have at least one child who drops out of school, mainly due to engagement and marriage (34 percent, mostly amongst girls), safety during transportation to school and inside the school (29 percent) and lack of interest in studies (20 percent).⁷⁰ The dropout issue is more serious amongst the Syrian refugee population. Following awareness campaigns by the Ministry of Education and the international organizations, the rate of enrolment of Syrian children in 2019 reached 87% in the primary cycle (from the first to the tenth class) and 72% for the whole of the primary and secondary cycles (95% pour Jordanians and 90% for the other nationalities). However, a deeper examination of these data shows that while the rate of enrolment reaches around 100% during the elementary cycle (up to 11-12 years old), its decreases steeply to 39% for the ages which correspond to the beginning of the secondary cycle (15-16 years old) and 13% at the beginning of university studies (18-19 years old)⁷¹. The dropout phenomenon is especially marked in large households with high rates of dependent (non-working) adults. According to the 2019 VAF, around 4.8% of Syrian refugee children were working continuously and 3.9% in forms of employment considered hazardous.⁷² The deterioration of livelihoods caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have aggravated the child labour issue.

Educational challenges for Syrians also concern the low quality of schooling they receive received by Syrian primary school children in the afternoon classes (*second shift*) given in a few hours by a little-qualified staff, and access for non-Jordanian students to university studies which have become expensive and which does not compensate for the small number of existing scholarships⁷³.

Health services: Health services: the modalities of the access of Syrian refugee living outside camps to public healthcare have varied several times since 2011/2012:: from free access to primary healthcare (as for insured Jordanians) between 2012 and 2014, to healthcare at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians (subsidized at 80% but which are still between 40 and 50% higher than the rate for insured Jordanians) between 2014 and 2018, to healthcare at "international" rates, i.e. from two to five times the price for uninsured Jordanians between 2018 and 2019, and again healthcare at the rate for uninsured Jordanians from April 2019. Since August 2020, following pressure from HCR, this rate has been applied to all UNHCR-refugee populations. This may be a significant breakthrough, but it does not solve the issue of the relatively high healthcare costs for unsubsidized medication and surgical interventions, despite financial support from HCR and UNRWA

⁶⁸ UNICEF, *Education – Inclusive and quality education for every child*, Education | UNICEF Jordan

⁶⁹ UNICEF (2020), *Geographic Multidimensional Vulnerability Analysis – Jordan*. The girl/boy ratio went from 96.3 in primary schools to 114.8 in secondary schools.

⁷⁰ xxxxxx

⁷¹ See: Tiltnes A., H. Zhang and J. Pedersen, Fafo, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-11; *National Child Labor Survey 2016 of Jordan* (Center for Strategic Studies – University of Jordan), p. 23 (https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_510520.pdf). These figures nevertheless show an increase in the number of enrolled Syrian children since 2013, with approx. 60% of the children registered.

⁷² See VAF 2019, p. 85; to be compared with the 2.6% of Syrian children and the 1.0% of Jordanian children in 2015/2016, who do jobs that are harmful to their health; *National Child Labor Survey 2016 of Jordan* (Center for Strategic Studies – University of Jordan), *ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷³ "I want to continue to study" – *Barriers to Secondary education for Syrian Refugee children in Jordan*, Human Rights Watch, 2020 – <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/26/i-want-continue-study/barriers-secondary-education-syrian-refugee-children-jordan>

(for the vulnerable ex-Gazans)⁷⁴. This represents a challenge for Syrian refugee households, a third of whom have members suffering from chronic diseases⁷⁵. As has been observed, refugees who cannot ensure healthcare costs tend to replace it with traditional medicine recipes or advice given free of charge by pharmacists. Such proxy therapies represent the second type of healthcare used by Syrian refugees (outside the camps) after public hospitals and clinics⁷⁶. This may explain why the feeling of "medical vulnerability" amongst them is still high despite decreasing weight of medical expenses within household budgets⁷⁷.

Municipal services (water, hygiene, sanitation, and waste) Municipal services (water, hygiene, sanitation, and waste): the VAF 2019 indicators relative to water, hygiene and sanitation show that only 11% of Syrian refugees are considered highly vulnerable (9%) or severely vulnerable (2%). The vast majority is therefore deemed moderately vulnerable (72%) or slightly vulnerable (17%)⁷⁸. These somewhat positive figures reflect the relatively satisfactory coverage of the dwellings of Syrian refugees by the municipal water services (88% in 2018 against 71% in 2014) as well as the presence of functional latrines in these dwellings despite the fact that some of the main of host municipalities are among the poorest in water resources in Jordan.⁷⁹ These figures remain nevertheless inferior to those of non-Syrian refugees and poor Jordanians registered with the NAF (between 94 and 99%)⁸⁰. In addition, access to drinking water for Syrian refugee households remains relatively low, at 64%, which obliges the remaining third of refugees to buy relatively expensive drinking water in shops or from truck drivers. Such vulnerability, which is caused by defects in drinking water municipal networks, was increased during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020: the increase in demand for drinking water in the Irbid region (in the north of the country) led civil society organizations to directly cover the needs of the inhabitants of a district with trucks⁸¹. Another issue pertains to refuse collection, a recurring problem in Jordan that has further been exacerbated in the municipalities of the north of the country since the mass arrival of the Syrian refugees (2021-2013). In 2019, it was considered a challenge for 82% of the latter and remains to date one of the main bones of contention between refugee and host communities⁸².

These municipal problems reveal the poor governance which results, as one municipality put it from decades of *laissez-aller* due in particular to failed decentralization policies or, more specifically, the governments' reluctance to empower local authorities⁸³. The 2014 and 2015 decentralization laws have attempted to promote a real decentralization process through the creation of local councils (outside the municipalities) and elected governorate citizen councils. But these newly-created bodies have not been empowered either admi-

⁷⁴ As an example, giving birth by caesarian section costs 488 JOD at the international rate, 259 JOD at uninsured Jordanian rates, 159 JOD after subsidy from UNRWA for a non-Jordanian Palestine refugee, 109 JOD for insured Jordanians.

⁷⁵ See VAF 2019, p. 52.

⁷⁶ See WFP, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

⁷⁷ According to the WFP, *op.cit.* and VAF, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

⁷⁸ See VAF 2019.

⁷⁹ See UNICEF (2020), *op.cit.*, p.6. In 2015, 88% of the inhabitants of the town of Mafraq were Syrian.

⁸⁰ WFP, *op.cit.*, pp. 84, 122 and 156.

⁸¹ Discussion with ACF, Amman, December 2 2020.

⁸² VAF 2019; Aldayyat E. et al. (2018), "Solid Waste Management in Jordan: Impacts and Analysis", *Journal of Chemical Technology and Analysis*, 52, 2, p. 455 ssq.

⁸³ See *Municipal Needs Assessment Report*, UNDP-Host communities, 2014. Discussion with the Minister for Municipal Affairs, December 21 2020.

nistratively or financially.⁸⁴ On a more positive note, the municipalities have been encouraged to work, with technical support from USAID or other international stakeholders, on the drafting of five-year strategies identifying their needs and objectives⁸⁵.

Access to justice: despite its good performance in national and international classifications on access and delivery of justice⁸⁶, Jordanian justice suffers from a number of shortcomings that have been identified since the 2000s as sources of vulnerability, more especially access to courts for single women and the poor more generally,⁸⁷ in addition to the survival in rural regions of a tribal justice, which stands in opposition with official legal texts, and was in principle banned in 1976. The mass arrival of Syrian refugees in 2012–2013 overburdened legal administrations, making it even more difficult for "vulnerable" group, also including refugees and asylum seekers, migrant workers (see *infra*).

2.2. Vulnerability as told by the “voices from below”: how is vulnerability experienced and how does it act on social cohesion?

The data on vulnerability exposed in the previous sub-section, largely based on quantitative investigations represent the working basis upon which aid agencies and their donors elaborate humanitarian interventions. However, this approach considers refugees only as hapless recipients of aid initiatives prone to negative subsistence strategies, neglecting the fact that, once the shock of exile has passed, they also develop positive individual /collective emancipation strategies by seizing any available positive opportunity, be it on Jordan's labour market, or through the other options supported by the UNHCR: return to Syria or resettlement in a third country.

Based on discussions and *focus groups* conducted with Syrian refugees of both sexes and varied professional profiles (workers, small entrepreneurs, housewives) in several localities in the north of Jordan since 2017, the following paragraphs seek to grasp, ten years after the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the way Syrian refugees define vulnerability and related (unmet) needs, identify ways to respond to them, before assessing the overall terms of their coexistence with host communities.

a) Vulnerability as uncertainty and specific needs

At the heart of the notion of vulnerability as experienced by Syrian respondents (and in other refugee populations) is the notion of *uncertainty*, nourished by a shared feeling of a lack of future prospects, whatever the available durable solutions: the return to their home country, resettlement in a third country (the only two durable solutions provided by the Memorandum of Understanding signed between HCR and the Jordanian government in 1998), or long-term integration in Jordan.

⁸⁴ A revision of the law is being considered. Discussion with the Minister for Municipal Affairs, December 21 2020 and discussion with IUCN, December 9 2020; see also *Jordan's Quest for Decentralization*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017.

⁸⁵ *Idem*. The Syrian crisis is said to have had a positive effect on the municipalities, since it highlighted the need to strengthen them.

⁸⁶ Jordan came second out of the eight countries of the Middle East in the field of the State/rule of law in 2019, 28th and 32nd out of 126 countries in the fields of reporting respectively on civil justice and criminal justice, UNICEF, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

⁸⁷ See for example *Women Entrepreneurs' Access to Justice – Study Findings: Jordan*, EBRD-IDLO Research Study, 2019 – report-we_atoj-jordan-final.pdf (idlo.int)

An illusory and less and less attractive reinstallation in a third country

The number of Syrian and non-Syrian refugees that have been resettled in third countries, mainly in Western countries, since 2017 has remained stable but low, at an average of around 5,000 persons per year⁸⁸. Contrary to Somali and Sudanese refugees, who are not authorized to work as refugees and for whom resettlement is often the only long-term option envisaged for many Syrian refugees seem to have lost interest for that option. Firstly, since 2016, the number of resettlement applications submitted by Syrian refugees has dropped from 32,405 cases to around 5,000 cases per year up to 2020⁸⁹. Secondly, difficulties encountered by family members and friends who resettled in Europe, such as racism, constraints to labour market access and social isolation, have resulted in a large number of them withdrawing their applications or even rejecting the resettlement opportunities. Living in wealthy Arab and/or Muslim societies (typically in the Gulf countries) sharing similar customs appears for many Syrian refugees as the only viable resettlement option. However; such countries have no borders with Syria and have so far refused to host them.

A yet elusive return to Syria

A large majority of Syrians claim that they wish to return to Syria despite the traumatic experiences they had before leaving the country, but recognize that the security conditions for a safe return are not yet fulfilled. According to a survey carried out in 2018, only 5% of Syrian refugees in Jordan were intent on returning to Syria in the near future⁹⁰. At the center of Syrian refugees' concerns lie the acts of violence committed by "Syrian regime agents" against refugees returning to the country, the fear of men aged from 18 to 42 that they would have to perform their military service (and those aged from 43 to 55-60 to be enrolled as reservists), as well as the difficult living conditions in Syria where unemployment (55% of the population), extreme poverty (80% of the population live with less than 1 USD per day) are prevalent⁹¹, and where a large part of the physical and housing infrastructure have been partially or totally destroyed. In addition, a certain number of refugees (generally women) admit that despite the relatively unsatisfactory living conditions in Jordan, it had become their home base. This is especially the case of refugees who have married Jordanians and children who were born and raised in Jordan and live "as Jordanians".

Despite the risks involved from 2016 to 2022, some 55,000 refugees returned to Syria.⁹² Most of them were motivated⁹³. These isolated returns do not however seem to pave the way for a future collective return: rather, as in the case of many Iraqi refugees, returnees may well leave their families safe in Jordan⁹⁴.

⁸⁸ 1,557 cases in 2020 due to the effects of travel restrictions imposed by COVID-19. In years 2015 and 2016 the number of resettlements increased (25,634 cases over the two years); see HCR site: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/84337>

⁸⁹ *Ditto*.

⁹⁰ See Yassin N., *op.cit.*, p. 131.

⁹¹ See: *10 facts about Poverty in Syria*, The Borgen Project, 2020.

⁹² See HCR site: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions

⁹³ In 2018, Syria voted the law (or Decree No.10), which allows the expropriation of the assets of absent refugees. The extent to which it was implemented is still uncertain.

⁹⁴ It must be noted that Jordan considers any departure of refugees as permanent.

The forced choice of an incomplete integration

Integration in Jordan thus remains the only viable choice in the mind of the largest number of Syrian respondents. Surprisingly, poverty is not always mentioned as the core cause of vulnerability. In this respect, the role of "social buffer" played by local and international aid networks, combined with positive (employment) and negative (indebtedness, marriage, child labour, etc.) subsistence strategies has often been underscored. Also to be taken into account is the fact that poverty is not a permanent situation: it is a fluctuating vulnerability, which changes according to the job opportunities secured by household members and the amount of household expenditure at all times during the year. Vulnerability is particularly felt when resorting to medical care, marriage celebrations, or the purchase of clothing⁹⁵.

The most mentioned permanent sources of vulnerability are more those relative to the discriminations of which the respondents feel they are the victims in many aspects of their daily life. Despite certain facilities which have been granted them since 2016 in the framework of the *Jordan Compact*, such as a free and/or flexible work permits (allowing refugees to have more than one employer), their actual status is still conditioned by restrictive legal and regulatory frameworks in the following fields:

Identification documents: despite efforts to regularize the status of Syrian refugees, entailing registration with the HCR and the MoI⁹⁶, the regularization process remains relatively rigid. The campaigns undertaken by the MI and the HCR since 2015 have targeted refugees who had crossed the border without identification papers, but have excluded those refugees who, once on Jordanian territory, have breached regulations pertaining to their displacement with the Jordanian territory, such as those who left the camps where they had been accommodated without the required authorization often by ignorance or because they did not have the necessary identification documents. The latter have been deprived of UNHCR assistance, Jordanian public services and any hope of formalizing their professional activity. They continue to live under the constant threat of deportation to Syria, as was mostly the case up to 2014–2015, but more likely of rehousing in the isolated Azraq camp – with no appeal. This situation of illegality affects the whole family, since official marriage contracts and birth certificates cannot be obtained⁹⁷. The ensuing legal void may be partially bridged by obtaining marriage documents issued by *mukhtars* (local representatives) or by religious authorities (*sheikhs*). However, being non-official, with no legal value for the authorities these informal marriage documents do not make it possible to register newborn children⁹⁸.

⁹⁵ A survey on poverty within the Jordanian population concluded in 2014 that a third of Jordan's population lived under the poverty line all year round, whereas the average rate of incidence of poverty was estimated at 14.4%; see Obeidat O., "Third of Jordan's population lives below poverty line at some point of one year – study", *The Jordan Times*, July 2, 2014.

⁹⁶ Several regularization campaigns ("urban regularization exercises") have been conducted since 2015, replacing the system of Jordanian sponsorship enforced up until then. The last regularization campaign dates back to March 2019 and concerned 20,000 people.

⁹⁷ According to the legal organization *Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development* (ARDD), some 20,000 Syrian children do not have a birth certificate (discussion January 27, 2021).

⁹⁸ The Jordanian government and the UNHCR attempted to get around this problem by establishing Islamic courts in the camps and granting "grace periods" in 2014–2015. However, such situations continue to be reported in focus groups organised NGOs; see *In My Own Hands, A Medium-Term Approach Towards Self-Reliance and Resilience of Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Jordan*, Durable Solutions Platform, January 2020, p. 9.

An unexpected aspect of the regularization process has been the pressures felt by non-refugee Syrians, namely who lived and worked in Jordan before 2011 to be registered with HCR to obtain the service card issued by the MI and continue to receive basic services such as primary education or healthcare. A procedure perceived as a "disgrace", which adds to the "refugee-ization" of Syrians after decades of unrestricted access to the local Jordanian market (see *supra* II.1.a).

Access to justice: the problems of overburdened courts and other formal/informal instruments of Jordanian justice mentioned above are unanimously recognized by disadvantaged residents, but even more among Syrian refugees⁹⁹. Syrian refugees still feel so much legally and socially inferior vis-à-vis their Jordanian counterparts (be it the owner of their housing, their employer or their partner contractor) that they tend to relinquish their legal rights for fear of retaliation in case of any dispute. Such behavior also bears witness to either the refugees' lack of familiarity with the Jordanian legal system or the absence of an adequate legal assistance system adapted to their needs¹⁰⁰.

Informal labor vs formal labor: despite the Jordanian authorities' efforts to promote the Syrian refugees' access to the formal labour market, such formalization is still seen by many of them as a threat to their refugee status and related social benefits (particularly cash assistance) and opportunities of resettlement. Moreover, the work permit only allows them to carry out vocational activities the Ministry of Labor (MoL) allows labour migrants to operate in such as menial workers in the sectors of construction, agriculture, hospitality, manufactured products, etc., thus leaving out Syrian liberal professionals or qualified technicians: these usually find themselves relegated to the informal sector of the economy or occupying menial jobs¹⁰¹. Lastly, the formalization of employment through the mere delivery of work permits does not guarantee decent working conditions either in terms of income (notably with respect to the minimum wage¹⁰²) or standard working conditions on the place of work as defined by the Labour Law, including (annual leave, safety rules, number of daily hours, etc. The weakness of most labor unions, whose presence in the field is poor¹⁰³, and the insufficiency of labour inspections in private sector establishments¹⁰⁴ just but compounds the challenge. In 2020–2021, the majority of Syrian workers did not plan for the future in terms of securing long-term careers and registering with Jordan's social security Corporation. Such self-inflicted disenfranchisement also affects many young beneficiaries of vocational training projects, who often tend to shift from one project to another, mainly interested in the "bonuses" granted by the service providers to participants

⁹⁹ See *Syrian Refugees' Perceptions and Satisfaction Regarding the Justice Sector in Jordan*, ARDD, July 2019.

¹⁰⁰ As recognized by the JRP 2020–2022, p. 72.

¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, according to the survey conducted by Fafo in 2017–2018, the percentage of Syrians in the sector of liberal professions and as managers was at 3 percent; most of the Syrian workforce, both men and women, do the same types of jobs: construction and crafts (35%), services and sales (25%) and so-called "elementary" and unqualified jobs (24%) – see Tiltnes A., H. Zhang and J. Pedersen (2019), *The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan Results from the 2017–2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps*, Fafo, p. 99.

¹⁰² Since January 2021, the legal minimum income has been 260 JOD for Jordanians and 230 JOD for non-Jordanians.

¹⁰³ An unpublished 2018 survey by Oxfam Jordan on the presence of workers' unions in medium-sized businesses of the Governorate of Irbid shows that 82% of workers had no information about union activity, and only 5 percent were unionized. The unions are most present in the largest firms, particularly in the sectors of textile and electricity.

¹⁰⁴ MoL inspection services have often been criticized for the lack of human resources: less than 200 inspectors poorly trained to cope with difficult issues such as child labor and occupational safety and hygiene rules. They do not cover domestic workers and agricultural workers. To improve their efficiency, they will soon be equipped with electronic tablets which will enable them to manage such cases more efficiently. See ILO, *Decent Work Country Programme The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2018–2022*, <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro->, p. 13 and interviews with MoL staff, June 1, 2019.

in the form of free transportation, meals and financial incentives¹⁰⁵. Refugee workers who formalized their status through the acquisition of a work permit have tended to be motivated less by the prospect of a long-term reinstallation in Jordan than the protection formalization provides vis-à-vis MoL inspectors and the Jordanian police, and the risk of deportation or of being rehoused in the Azraq camp. Syrian worker respondents generally consider that their integration in the labor market is constrained by many administrative constraints, including non-access to jobs outside the sectors of activity accessible for labour migrants that the Jordanian are reluctant to practice, mainly in agriculture, construction, hospitality, general services, etc.,¹⁰⁶ and the prohibition against operating regular motor vehicles.

Another obstacle to the professional integration of Syrian refugees, which also affects the displaced person from Gaza and other foreign nationals, is the administrative difficulties and high costs incurred by the acquisition of the investor status, which grants right to do business in Jordan and get a valid driving license: a 50,000 JD deposit and partnership with a Jordanian citizen under which the enterprise will be registered: this has given Jordanian partners the possibility to abuse their advantageous position in the partnership.

b) Vulnerability and social cohesion

Both Jordanians and Syrian refugee respondents admit that the social tensions that emerged in 2013–2014 in certain localities in the north of the country with high concentrations of Syrian refugees,¹⁰⁷ have since then been subsided, leaving room for a more or less harmonious coexistence through the gradual development of neighborly ties and professional relations. This trend has also been identified by several aid organizations that indicate, in the example of the NGO Care, that three-quarters of their Syrian beneficiaries described their relations with their Jordanian neighbors as positive and that more than 9 out of 10 of them had had no particular problem with their local neighborhood¹⁰⁸.

Social cohesion, here defined as the extent to which communities are connected and maintain relations of solidarity, see feelings of sharing similar destinies, remains an issue: At the most, Syrian refugees and their host communities refer to "stabilized relationships" that have improved first thanks to greater governmental consideration for the latter's material needs (see section III.1). Moreover, Jordanians have come to acknowledge that

¹⁰⁵ As confirmed by the representatives of agencies active in the vocational training of young Syrians, such as *Education for Employment* (EFE), the *Business Development Center* (BDC) or *Mercy Corps*. It requires a lot of time and effort to convince Syrian trainees that it is in their interest to complete their training and get a diploma to be able to do carry out professional activities in the formal economy. Discussions with EFE (November 22 2020), *Mercy Corps* (November 25 2020) and BDC (December 2, 2020).

¹⁰⁶ The Jordanian labour law provides for the employment of non-Jordanians only in case of dearth of Jordanian or of specialized professionals with the local workforce (see article 12 du Labor Law).

¹⁰⁷ These consist mainly of hostile slogans posted on walls, insults in public areas and in the workplace and protests. In 2014, Jordanians in the town of Mafraq founded a symbolic "Public Rescue Committee" which built a "Jordanian refugee camp" to highlight the problems faced by the local population when trying to secure decent housing in the face of soaring rents following the massive arrival of Syrian refugees in the city; see (i) Kuhnt; J. et al (2017), *Social cohesion in times of forced displacement – the case of young people in Jordan*, Econstor, Discussion paper 243, p. 16, et (ii) Ababsa M. (2020), *Le financement du logement abordable en Jordan: diagnostic et perspectives d'interventions*, AFD. Physical violence was above all observed between children in and around schools. See *Mercy Corps, Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan, May 2013*.

¹⁰⁸ Care, *op.cit.*, p. 90. WFP reports that 98% of registered refugees felt more or less, or very comfortable with their Jordanian neighbours. This is also the case for the other refugee populations, apart from the Sudanese refugees of whom 7 per cent of whom considered in 2018 that they felt extremely uneasy with their immediate environment – see WFP, *op.cit.*, 40, 87.

despite the international assistance they received, mainly in the form of cash assistance provided by the UNHCR and the WFP, many Syrian refugees remained needy persons; what is more the Syrians also contributed to the development of local economies thanks to their professional capabilities, as workers the food, sales and vocational jobs sectors or as entrepreneurs. However, their grievances towards Syrian refugees, due to the unfair competition that they impose on informal and/or unskilled Jordanian workers due to their acceptance of lower wages, to the deterioration of the social and physical infrastructure, and the increase in rent in the host localities, are still present in people's minds. The issue of their long-term integration is still pending.

In past years, increasing tensions have rather been reported the host communities and local authorities, triggered by the Syrian refugee crisis, increased unemployment and poverty and a poor public economic governance¹⁰⁹. Since the outbreak of the *Jordanian Spring* in 2012 a series anti-governmental mass protests, including strikes by employees of the private and public sectors (notably the months-long strike of teachers in the public sector, and "collective suicides"¹¹⁰ and marches on Amman organized by the unemployed youth from rural governorates¹¹¹), have publicly exposed the extent of the malaise amongst Jordanians. In order to assuage these tensions, the authorities have since the mid-201s launched employment campaigns including rapid vocational training and job placement for unskilled unemployed workers (see III.1) the promotion of the recruitment of academics and qualified technicians in Gulf countries¹¹². The COVID-19 pandemic has made it possible to alleviate intra and intercommunal tensions, as Jordanians demonstrated a sense of respect for the state's "defense orders" as well as interfamily/tribal solidarity. Relationship with Syrian refugees improved as well during this period¹¹³.

The social vulnerability of the Syrian refugees may also have been caused by the absence of strong intra-solidarity networks. Several informal Syrian self-help associations providing emergency relief, informal education for dropout children and legal aid, across the country, supported by Jordanians and non-refugee Syrians belonging to the same tribes, were established, but their capacity for action have remained limited. Moreover, within closely-knit refugee communities in and outside camps, a certain form of internal organization has emerged, *mukhtars* (dignitaries/representatives of the community) playing the role of intermediaries with host country institutions. More specifically, the *shawish*, namely labor brokers tasked to facilitate, for a fee, have inclusion of workers in the labor market. Again, the influence of these intracommunity structures has been limited, not least because a large majority of Syrian refugees have ended up living within their host communities without marked relations with other Syrian households. In this respect, as stated by many refugees, the vicissitudes of day-to-day life and the social and police control exerted on them by the host authorities have contributed to disintegrating the Syrian

¹⁰⁹ The 2011-2020 National Employment Strategy also observes the feeling of discontent within the Jordanian population due to persistent nepotism and favoritism that affect recruitment in the public sector ; *Jordan's National Employment Strategy*, MoPIC, p. 52, 76 (<https://jordankmportal.com/resources/jordans-national-employment-strategy-2011-2020>).

¹¹⁰ A fifth of the suicides in Jordan are caused by unemployment and hardships; a collective attempted suicide by five unemployed youths aroused a great deal of emotion in Jordan, prompting the Jordanian government to deal more efficiently with the youth unemployment problem. See (i) "21% of suicide cases are among the unemployed", *Amman News*, September 9, 2015, et (ii) "Collective suicide attempt by 'unemployed' youth sounds alarm", *The Jordan Times*, March 11, 2016.

¹¹¹ Particularly in 2019; see for example "Why Jordan's young and jobless men are marching on the kingdom's capital", March 2, 2019, *The National News* – <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/why-jordan-s-young-and-jobless-men-are-marching-on-the-kingdom-s-capital-1.836077>

¹¹² *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective* (MISMES), *op.cit.*

¹¹³ Discussion with Mercy Corps, December 25, 2020.

refugee communities into a plethora of household units isolated from each other, whose claims bear essentially on individual/household needs: obtaining a driving license, lower rents, cheaper medical services, easier access to entrepreneurship and a wider choice of accessible jobs in the formal economy.

3. Assistance policies and programs: for whom and how?

This section re-examines the experience of the *Jordan Compact* by replacing it in the wider context of the moves made by Jordan since the early 2000s to revitalize its society and economy. In so doing, it provides answers, or at least a Jordanian interpretation, to a question that lies at the center of the current discussions within the Jordanian society around the response to the Syrian refugee crisis: for whom are the humanitarian and more developmental policies elaborated? It also looks more closely into the setting up and implementation of related projects, such as those funded by the AFD within its Minka initiative, identifying their main outcomes and shortcomings.

3.1. Assistance policies in Jordan: for whom?

a) The Jordan First context

To properly understand Jordan's rationale behind its response to the Syrian refugee crisis, it is necessary to return to the Jordanian context of the early 2000s. The suspension of the peace process between Israel and the PLO in the summer of 2000, which made the achievement of a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue even more elusive, prompted King Abdallah II to launch a package of key political, economic and social reforms that had so far been delayed due to the uncertain status of the Jordanians of Palestinian origin as "citizens/refugees". The generic name given to these initiatives *Jordan first* (2001) and *We are all Jordan* (2006), bear witness to their ideological underpinning: to reassert a unified national identity centered on a proper Jordanian agenda, free of any responsibility in the settlement of the Palestinian issue: The reform proposals put forward in the two initiatives were encapsulated in the *2006-2015 National Agenda* (NA) that was presented as the main guideline of domestic politics for the decade to come. Based on eight themes, including employment, social protection, education, justice, political development, investment, and the improvement of infrastructures.¹¹⁴

Ultimately, the political and administrative obstacles, combined with the limited operational capacity of the local authorities and the successive Iraqi refugee crisis (in 2006 specifically) and the Syrian refugee crisis (since 2011-2012) marginalized the NA. However, the NA did pave the ground for two sectoral strategies, which will be discussed below: First, the 2006-2016 National Education Strategy that aimed at modernizing the educational infrastructure and put an end to the double-shift in public schools. Second, the National Employment Strategy 2011-2020 (NES) that aimed at resolving the main contradictions of the Jordanian labor market, notably very low economic participation rates amongst Jordanians, more particularly among women¹¹⁵ and high unemployment rates through the replacement of Egyptian or Asian labour migrants by inactive or unemployed Jordanians.

¹¹⁴ See: <http://www.jordanpolitics.org/en/documents-view/65/national-agenda/41>

¹¹⁵ Amongst the lowest in the world, the economic participation of the Jordanian population in 2011 was 40 percent, with participation of the male population of 65 percent (against a world average of 78 percent) and a female participation of 15 percent (against a world average of 52 percent); in *Jordan's National Employment Strategy*, MoPIC, p. 8 – <https://jordankmportal.com/resources/jordans-national-employment-strategy-2011-2020>. It stood at 33.4 percent in 2022 according to the Jordanian Department of Statistics (http://www.dos.gov.jo/owa-user/owa/emp_unemp_y.show_tables1_y?lang=E&year1=2022&t_no=18).

In 2015, in a context marked by the Syrian refugee crisis, the Jordanian authorities launched a new general reform package : *Jordan Vision 2025*, which intended to continue the "Jordan-focused" objectives of the NA, while taking into account the presence on the territory of 1,300,000 "brethren Syrians, which is depleting our limited resources and creating enormous pressures on our infrastructure and national economy"¹¹⁶. In addition, most of them are farmers and craftsmen with a relatively poor education, and hail from rural regions of Syria: a population that therefore seemed not likely to participate significantly in the economic development of Jordan, such as planned by the *Jordan Vision* ¹¹⁷. In accordance with the spirit of NES, the authorities long opposed the formal employment of the Syrian refugees (similarly to other refugee groups), even preventing international assistance organizations from setting up vocational training or livelihoods programs on their behalf¹¹⁸.

b) The Jordan Compact: a genuine shift?

The change in the policy on Syrian refugees was formalized in the February 2016 *Jordan Compact* signed between Jordan and its main donor countries, including the European Union. Designed to "make Syrian refugees a development opportunity", it was welcomed by the international community as a pragmatic and innovative approach, inducing a "humanitarian assistance – development aid" nexus likely to durably improve the living conditions of refugees and host communities while contributing to the renewed growth of the Jordanian economy. More specifically, the *Jordan Compact* provides for the inclusion in the formal labor market (i.e. recognized by the MoL through the delivery of a work permit) of some 200,000 Syrian refugee workers through the creation of jobs in labour intensive in "industrial development areas", the formalization of their present informal jobs, and the replacement of migrant workers by Syrian refugees in sectors of low Jordanian participation, such as construction, agriculture, industry, personal care services and municipal jobs. As a measure likely to integrate durably the Syrians in Jordan, the formalization of the latter's employment status also served the interests of the European Union that had been striving to curb immigration towards its country members since the European "migration crisis" of 2015/2016. In return, and this was the main stake from the Jordanian perspective, the EU and other international donor parties committed to help Jordan boost its economy through concessional loans, investments in job creation and the facilitation of the exportation of goods produced in Jordan towards the EU market.¹¹⁹ Overall, international assistance was to help the implementation of *Vision 2025*¹²⁰, while creating jobs likely to employ Syrian workers at the required level (of 200,000 persons)¹²¹.

Because of the disregard by its signatories of Syrian refugees' aspirations and the limited capacities of absorption of a largely informal private sector, the implementation of the *Jordan Compact* has not yet reached its targets. Despite the government's efforts to

¹¹⁶ *Jordan Vision 2025 – A National Vision and Strategy, 2015* – <https://jordankmportal.com/resources/jordan-2025-a-national-vision-and-strategy>

¹¹⁷ Discussion with the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply, June 2017. This is confirmed by the Fafu Survey which shows that around 69% of Syrian refugees are from rural areas; see Tiltnes A., H. Zhang and J. Pedersen (2019), *op.cit.*, p. 21.

¹¹⁸ As asserted by the international assistance agencies before March 2016.

¹¹⁹ The relaxation of the rules of origin for potential exporters concerned those enterprises that employed a minimum of 15 percent of Syrian refugees. See *The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis*, February 7 2016 – <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>

¹²⁰ See for example JRP 2017-2019, p. 2.

¹²¹ According to MoPIC officials met in May 2017.

facilitate the access of Syrian refugee workers to formal jobs (work permits free of charge; special "flexible" work permits allowing Syrian workers in the sectors of agriculture and construction to work for more than one employer as¹²² ; temporary permits for workers in *cash-for-work* projects –see below III.2.b), only some 50,000 Syrian workers held a work permit in 2021¹²³. Moreover, this figure does not specify the type of work undertaken, the working conditions or the durability of the job¹²⁴. In this respect, it appears that the *Jordan Compact*, has been a hasty arrangement between political decision-makers under pressure and unfamiliar with the realities of the Jordanian labor market. As it has been observed, no representative of civil society organizations operating in the field was involved in its elaboration.¹²⁵ Conversely, Jordan's economic returns according to the Compact have so far been less than expected: its exports to the countries of the EU and their economic fallout have remained well below expectations. Whereas the successful model of the Free Trade Agreement between Jordan and the United States had involved over 200 businesses generating around 1.9 Bn USD in 2020, only around ten firms had obtained export contracts towards EU countries, generating under 50 M EUR by 2020¹²⁶. What is more, the international donor contributions to the Jordanian refugee crisis per se never reached the required level, with a maximum of 51% of the budget required in 2019¹²⁷. These mixed outcomes of the *Compact* has been widely considered by Jordanian authorities and civil society of a breach of commitment by international donor community, and that have placed their own migration concerns before the vital interests of Jordan and its inhabitants¹²⁸. Moreover, the pressure international donors and governments continue to exert on Jordan to open up access of the Syrian workers to the entire labour market (beyond the vocational professions labour migrants are restricted to) appears to Jordanians as a total disregard for the spirit and the letter of the labor legislation, as well as for the country's internal social and economic agendas¹²⁹.

Confronted to a rise in unemployment rates amongst Jordanians (above 20 percent since 2020), Jordan has for that matter intensified its efforts to "Jordanize" the local workforce by narrowing job opportunities to non-Jordanians¹³⁰. However, Syrians have so far not been affected. In line with the Compact approach, it has extended the distribution of special flexible work permits for Syrian workers, first limited to the agriculture and construction sectors another 21 sectors. Jordan has also continued to exclude Syrian refugees from its restrictive policies towards labour migrants. The 2018 National Empowerment and Employment Programme (NEEP), which intended to boost the economic participation and employment of Jordanians by having them replace labour migrants at a rate of 10 to 25%

¹²² In principle, foreign workers are usually contractually linked to their employer for one year (minimum).

¹²³ The Jordanian authorities have a tendency to refer to the number of work permits issued since 2016, an accumulated total of 215,668 permits at the end of December 2020. See: <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/syrian-refugee-unit-work-permit-progress-report-december-2020>. The number of work permits delivered reached about 40,000 during 2016-2021, and 60,000 in 2022.

¹²⁴ Discussion with MoL, June 2020; also see *Independent Monitor's Assessment Report Jordan Compact and Brussels meetings*, Agulhas Applied Knowledge, March 7, 2019.

¹²⁵ See Huang C. et al. (2018), *Designing refugee compacts: lessons from Jordan*, Fmr 57, pp. 52-54.

¹²⁶ Discussion with MoPIC, December 23, 2020. What is more, most of the firms concerned were already exporting to Europe before the agreement on the relaxation of the rules of origin with the EU.

¹²⁷ *JRP 2020-2022*, p. 1.

¹²⁸ Discussion with MoPIC, December 23, 2020.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ The number of jobs which are inaccessible to foreigners has risen from 19 to 22 in 2021, and includes hairdressers, drivers, sales operators, administrative clerks and, more recently, mobile phone repairers; see: "More professions to be closed to foreigners", *The Jordan Times*, October 8 2019; discussion with *Mercy Corps*, November 25, 2020.

over five years did not target Syrian refugees.¹³¹ Moreover, Syrian refugees have been included in the project financed by the World Bank aimed to improve the digital skills of Jordanian students, unemployed and inactive persons in order to facilitate their insertion in the labor market¹³². However, the spike in unemployment rates among Jordanians (from 19.1 to 23.2% between the third quarters of 2019 and of 2021¹³³), following the lockdown measures relative to the COVID-19 pandemic, may well question the Syrian workers' privileged treatment: Five years after the signing of the *Jordan Compact*, Jordanian and international actors agree on the fact that despite its disappointing outcomes in the fields of Syrian refugee employment and Jordan's economic returns, it had nevertheless contributed to remobilize the international community on the issue of the Syrian refugees, and reduced several vulnerabilities:

- *Education* : Jordan has remained faithful to a less noticed) objective of the *Jordan Compact*: its commitment to enroll all Syrian children in its school system and increase the opportunities for higher academic or technical education. Because it did not receive the necessary international financial backing to establish new school for Syrian refugees residing outside camps,¹³⁴ the Jordanian government has had to give up one of the traditional objectives of its national education strategy, namely putting an end to the double-shift system in public schools across the territory: in order to accommodate the new Syrian students in primary schools of localities with a high concentration of Syrian refugees, the double-shift system became the rule. However, as seen above, (II.1.c), the percentage of Syrian children out of school in 2020 remained higher than the average national percentage, a significant proportion of them being unable to enroll, either because they are ineligible according to Jordanian legislation, having for example missed three years of compulsory schooling or more, or because they are intrinsically ill-adapted to formal schooling, by developing a non-formal (but certified) education program, where lessons are home-based or given in special education centers: about 4,000 Syrian refugees were receiving such non-formal education in 2020.¹³⁵
- *medical insurance for refugees*: as previously mentioned, since 2019/2020, Syrian refugees as well as the other national refugee groups covered by the UNHCR and the *ex-Gazans* over 6 years old, have been placed under the "uninsured Jordanian" regime with lower treatment costs than those imposed on foreign residents.

¹³¹ This program has been suspended for the time being, as the Jordanian government recognized that there are not many Jordanians capable of or willing to replacing migrant workers, despite the recent launching of large training projects for young inactive or unemployed people such as the *Khidmet Watan* project ("Serving the country") launched in 2019, which aimed at training and employing some 20,000 Jordanians.

¹³² See *Social Assessment Study – Jordan: Youth, Technology and Jobs Project*, Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship (MoDEE), November 7, 2019.

¹³³ i.e. an increase of 17.1 to 21.2 percent for men and 27.5 to 30.8 percent for women over the period of time under survey. The trend is more limited for non-Jordanian men (from 9.7 to 14.1%) and is even positive for non-Jordanian women (from 10.6 to 8.8%). See: http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/linked-html/Emp&Un.htm

¹³⁴ Under the pretext that humanitarian assistance framework does not provide for the establishment of new schools (discussion with the Ministry of Social Development, January 14, 2021).

¹³⁵ 136,000 Syrian children were in school in September 2020 out of an estimated total population of 233,000 (i. e. 97,000 children in school). This figure is lower than in August 2019 when there were 150,000 children were in school (36% of children out of school), resulting probably from the social crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. To be compared with the percentage of children out of school which was much higher in 2014: 55% (figures from HCR). See Nimmari, Nadeen, "Non-Formal Education offer space of Hope for School Dropouts to complete their Education, Al-Ghad *النظامي فسحة التعليم* أمل أمام المتسربين من المدارس لاستكمال تعليمهم", July 19, 2019.

- *home-based businesses*: in November 2018, Jordan authorized Syrian refugees to set up home-based businesses in the sectors of food processing, tailoring and handicraft, with no obligation to partner with Jordanians and with simplified procedures. Nevertheless, the idea of formalization has remained an issue for many Syrian refugees, who find the procedures costly and complex¹³⁶. One year later, whereas 200 Jordanian home-based businesses had been registered, no Syrian firms had yet been registered¹³⁷;
- *Redefining the distribution of social projects between refugee and host community beneficiaries for the sake of social cohesion*: in order to assuage the host communities' growing resentment at the fact that Syrian refugees allegedly received more cash and social assistance from international sources than they did from Jordanian sources, the Jordanian authorities reversed the initial quota of beneficiaries for internationally-funded social projects implemented by local and international NGOs (30% for Jordanians against 70% for Syrian refugees) in 2016: since then, the Jordanians have become the main beneficiaries of such social projects¹³⁸.

3.2. Case studies: NGO projects to fight vulnerability through livelihoods (employment and training)

A large number of social projects implemented by local and international NGOs have accompanied the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis, including those funded by AFD/Minka and/or the EU within the framework of its *Madad* Trust Fund. Some projects have been tagged as supporting the 2016 *Jordan Compact*: those pertaining to vocational training and/or employment on behalf of the Syrian refugees and their host communities, including *cash-for-work* interventions designed to rehabilitate the municipal infrastructure and services.

These projects have been generally limited in time (one to three years on average, and one to three months on average for *cash-for-work* interventions) and in space (in general limited to a locality or a governorate). They have also been monitored and evaluated based on the traditional performance indicators developed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) –including the relevance of the actions implemented, their coherence, efficiency, impact and lastly their sustainability. While the projects have generally achieved their expected objectives, neither the NGOs in charge of their implementation nor the Jordanian authorities have been able to measure their sustainability and long-term effects: have the actions survived following the end of international funding? Have they had a multiplier effect? Ultimately, have they contributed to the humanitarian-development nexus induced by the promoters of the *Jordan Compact*, or are they only represent a form of "improved humanitarian aid"?

¹³⁶ According to all the NGOs consulted for this report and the Jordanian authorities in the 2020-2022 JRP, p.54. The approaches include registration with the municipality, a commercial account; registration with the Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (with fees at each stage).

¹³⁷ Discussion with MoPIC, December 23, 2020. Since then, the number of Syrian home-based businesses has risen to 30 (in 2021) compared with 300 registered Jordanian home-based businesses.

¹³⁸ An equal distribution (50/50) between Syrian refugees and host communities is possible, and actually the rule in *cash-for-work* projects.

a) A limited Jordanian governance

In principle, Jordan is the main actor and coordinator of assistance on behalf of the Syrian refugees and their host communities. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) chairs, under the authority of the Prime Minister, the Platform of the Jordanian response to the Syrian crisis, which is segmented into thematic groups (*task forces*): the thematic groups involve all ministries, donor agencies as well as the implementing agencies concerned and aim to ensure the compliance of the projects and actions with Jordan's priorities as laid out in the Jordan Response Plan (JRPs) elaborated by the MoPIC every two years in general. The projects selected are filtered and monitored using an interactive software, the *Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis* (JORISS), which enables MoPIC to monitor their performance. The information collected is expected to guarantee effectiveness and efficiency and avoid duplication of projects.¹³⁹

In reality, the overall monitoring of livelihoods projects (probably the most difficult projects to monitor given the volatile and informal nature of employment in Jordan) is very limited, because MoPIC and the line ministries do not have the means to control and intervene directly on the implementation processes of the projects and evaluate their long-term effects. This is demonstrated by the fact that, according to the MoPIC itself, several international NGOs have sometimes resort to placing Syrian refugees in the informal labor market (particularly in *cash-for-work* projects) to meet their objectives, thus opposing the spirit and operational objectives of the *Jordan Compact* and contravening the labor law. Moreover, the support provided to Syrian refugees wishing to set up their home-based business has not always included its registration, here again in breach of several laws, including the law on trade and industry and the municipalities¹⁴⁰.

Furthermore, the Jordanian government does not have the necessary human and financial resources to assess the global impact of livelihoods projects, namely their multiplier effect on the economy and society¹⁴¹. The fragmentation of the response to the Syrian refugee crisis into many sectors actually makes it difficult to conduct global assessments and/or prioritize or seek complementarities amongst projects. Such fragmentation favors the disorderly dissemination of the international assistance into a plethora of various projects, which in turn reduces its efficiency, coherence and visibility¹⁴². It looks more as a desperate attempt to respond to a protracted humanitarian emergency situation rather than a planned exercise designed to induce a humanitarian-development nexus likely to support and boost national development policies. Nevertheless, internationally-supported projects have played an important political role in reassuring the Jordan's government and vulnerable populations that the international community still cared for the country's socioeconomic and political stability – a role UNRWA has played in the case of Palestine refugees.

¹³⁹ See JRP 2020-2022, p. 17.

¹⁴⁰ Discussion with MoPIC, December 23, 2020. The Jordanian government has not imposed sanctions on the international NGOs concerned.

¹⁴¹ Discussions with the Dutch embassy (December 1, 2020), MoPIC (December 23, 2020) and the Ministry of Social Development (January 14, 2021).

¹⁴² This is an observation which often comes up in MoPIC remarks (December 23, 2020) and the Jordan INGO Forum, (January 20, 2021). See also *Evaluation of EUTF Syria-funded Programmes and Projects for Livelihoods*, Particip Consortium, July 2019 – https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/system/files/2019-07/final_eutf_1lh_evaluation_report_22.07.2019.pdf

b) Questioning the economic relevance livelihoods project initiatives

Assessment of the first generation of livelihood projects aimed to better integrate Syrian refugees and their host communities in the labor market which accompanied the 2016 *Jordan Compact* highlight the efforts made by their promoters to ensure the relevance of the interventions and their coherence with national socio economic strategies – not always, however, when it comes to the formalization of the Syrian refugee workforce. A common concern has been to target more xxxxx especially segments deemed the most vulnerable (and the most inclined to unemployment and economic inactivity) such as women, the youth, and persons with disabilities.¹⁴³ Most projects have nevertheless suffered from a bias also observed at the level of national employment policies: a focus on the labor supply (the refugees and host communities), with often short, theoretical vocational training often little in line with the demands of the private sector, at the expense of the demand side of the labour market, namely the provision of durable job opportunities, the direct creation of jobs, including through the promotion of entrepreneurship¹⁴⁴. In addition, the interventions have proven unsustainable, as they terminated at the end of the project without being continued by local governmental or civil society organizations.¹⁴⁵ In this regards, Jordanian stakeholders recognize the spirit of "dependence" on international assistance that prevails in Jordan, including in ministries.

Stories of durable initiatives are therefore quite rare. They include, for instance, the emblematic *Water Wise Plumbers* project. Launched by GIZ in cooperation with the royal NGO platform, the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), and the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC), the project first aimed at promoting vocational training in poor communities of the governorates of Amman and Irbid, targeting more specifically Jordanian women (2007-2015) and then Jordanian and Syrian men and women (since 2016) as semi-qualified plumbers in order to provide them with income opportunities. The sustainability of the project, presented by GIZ as its main success criteria, does not lie so much in its quantitative outcomes: an estimated 350 Jordanian women were trained between 2007 and 2015, and only a few of them were subsequently able to engage in related professional activities. Around twenty of them partnered to form a cooperative and to set up a plumbing microenterprise¹⁴⁶. Since 2016, the job opportunities for the some 100 trained Jordanian and Syrian women (out of 150 qualified) have remained limited, especially for Syrian women since, as Syrians, they are not allowed to create their own businesses without a prior investment of 50,000 JOD. The reason why the *Water Wise Plumbers* project gained some recognition in Jordan and beyond, winning in Kuwait in 2018 the Best Water Conservation project, it is more that, besides the fact that it tackles Jordan's recurring problems of loss of domestic water and water stress, it deals with issues that lie at the heart of the Jordanian government's social agenda, namely the economic participation of women, the promotion of vocational training and jobs, and more recently the social integration of Syrian refugees through employment¹⁴⁷. The project showed that

¹⁴³ See *Evaluation of EUTF Syria-funded Programmes and Projects for Livelihoods*, op.cit.

¹⁴⁴ Discussions with *Mercy Corps* (November 25, 2020) and with *Durable Solutions Platform* (November 24, 2020).

¹⁴⁵ Discussion with *Jordan INGO Forum* (January 20, 2021). See also *Evaluation of EUTF Syria-funded Programmes and Projects for Livelihoods*, op.cit.

¹⁴⁶ According to Juliette Bureau, who conducted a research on the first phase of this project (March 2021). Some of these businesses receive technical and financial assistance from international cooperation agencies such as the ILO and USAID; see ILO (March 14, 2019), *Building skills and promoting employment for Jordan's female plumbers* – https://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/fs/WCMS_676547/lang--en/index.htm

¹⁴⁷ Prieto A. (2018), "Johud's 'Water Wise Women' wins best water conservation project", *The Jordan Times* – <https://www.johud.org.jo/News/40189>

women from "traditional/conservative" communities that are *a priori* not very open to their socioeconomic enfranchisement could nevertheless be engaged in a male-dominant working job, if the training appeared to be serious, safe and considered the female apprentices not only as future (semi-)professionals but also as "actors of social development". The direct involvement of the German Cooperation Development Agency (GIZ) in the training and its awarding of a German diploma to the graduates also seem to have played a predominant role in the involvement of the female participants.¹⁴⁸

Controversial debates also took place on the relevance of *cash-for-work* initiatives. Generally considered a rapid and convenient source of income for unskilled and poor Jordanians and Syrians, these temporary public interest initiatives (roads repairs, maintenance of municipal buildings and schools, afforestation, and activities in social centers for women) were promoted by the *Jordan Compact* as one of the key employability tools likely to contribute to meeting its objectives¹⁴⁹. Unlike traditional *cash-for-work* experiences across the world which, even when supervised, are still limited to the informal sector, in the case of the Syrian refugees, participation has been formalized through a working contract (offering the minimum wage and relatively well protected working conditions supervised by the ILO¹⁵⁰), a work permit and registration the social security for the duration of the project. Cash-for-work has also been considered as a social cohesion instrument that gets members of the Syrian and Jordanian communities working hand in hand for the common good of all. Conversely, however, *cash-for-work* has also been criticized for perpetuating the participants' vulnerable professional status and, according to some MoL staff, for distorting the labor market, as the beneficiaries tend to specialize in precarious jobs rather than devoting their time to search more durable jobs. The mayor of Mafraq recently opposed their continuation, requesting that efforts be rather placed on the search for more stable jobs, including through the development of microcredit¹⁵¹. In order to address these criticisms, the promoters of cash-for-work projects have sought to elevate its standing by supporting participants in the transition towards a more sustainable integration into the labor market.

Two other instruments have recently been considered for durably combating vulnerability. The first instrument is the "graduated approach" which aims at tackling household vulnerability altogether through various interventions combining, where appropriate, financial assistance, vocational training, financial education, job placement and technical support for microcredit amongst other tools. Promoted in particular by the World Bank and the UNHCR, this multivariate but relatively expensive approach is about to be proposed for Jordan¹⁵². The second instrument, which aims at the dynamization of the labor market, is the "platform economy" or "digital intermediation" generated by the increasing digitalization of work relations. Implemented for the last few years in Jordan and Lebanon, this approach seeks to facilitate employment through the development of virtual connections between

¹⁴⁸ See: *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective* (MISMES), European training Foundation, June 2017, *op.cit.*; *Water sector in Jordan: more women being trained as skilled workers*, GIZ – <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/64272.html> Gauri V. et al. (2019), *Measuring Social Norms About Female Labor Force Participation in Jordan*, World Bank.

¹⁴⁹ The 2016 *Jordan Compact* specifies that the *Partnership for Prospects* (P4P) project, managed by the German government, is in charge of performing *cash-for-work* activities. See *Partnerships for Prospects – Cash for Work*, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019.

¹⁵⁰ The ILO calls the cash-for-work projects under its supervision "Employment Intensive Investment Projects". They are also implemented in Lebanon.

¹⁵¹ Discussions with the MoL (April 2019) and NRC (December 9, 2020).

¹⁵² Discussions with HCR, January 27, 2021.

local or international employers and job seekers through the use of digital platforms (crowd work) or the promotion of on-location digital platforms linking vocational workers, craftsmen and drivers to customers (Uber for instance).¹⁵³ The "platform economy" has various drawbacks: it does not remove bans on Syrian refugees' access to certain professions (as taxi drivers, the main gateway for many unskilled Jordanians, for instance); moreover, work through digital platforms remain totally unregulated and may well remain so given the difficulty in controlling globalized digital connections. This poses the question the informality of the status of online or on-location platform workers and its impact on their livelihoods despite the relatively good reputation as decent work this sector has in the general public. The socioeconomic crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic has swept away many of these uncertainties: since 2020, many assistance and vocational training institutions have adopted the "platform economy" as a privileged professional outlets for their beneficiaries.

¹⁵³ In Jordan for example, a program conducted by Mercy Corps and funded by *Google.com* between 2018 and 2020 provided financial and technical aid to around ten digital small businesses and *start-ups* that connect poor Jordanian and Syrian active in home-businesses to consumers (such as the *Mrayti start-ups* in the sector of beauty care, *Bilforon* in the restaurant trade sector, or *Carers* in home care, for example). The World Bank also plans to financially support this platform economy with an identification of the *start-ups* in the fields of home-based businesses; see: *Evaluation of EUTF Syria-funded Programmes and Projects for Livelihoods*, July 2019, p. 22; The World Bank, *Youth, Technology, and Jobs*, July 23, 2019, p. 7 – <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/444151565725910948/text/Concept-Project-Information-Document-PID-Youth-Technology-and-Jobs-PI70669.txt>

4. Recommendations for a repositioning of assistance programs

In this context, how should international actors involved in the response to the Syrian crisis reposition their actions to address vulnerability more efficiently and sustainably, or at least contribute to limiting its different symptoms in partnership with the main stakeholder: the Jordanian government? The preponderance of job creation in the government's agenda since the Jordanian spring of 2011/2012 and the signing of the 2016 Jordan Compact should first and foremost encourage international actors to promote the decent character of these jobs. "Decent" employment does not only aim at improving working conditions and livelihoods, but also at boosting the participation of Jordanians and Syrians (particularly women) in the labor market.

New projects promoting decent jobs should take more into consideration the aspirations and adaptation strategies of workers among refugees and their Jordanian hosts, including their inclination (and that of their employers) to work informally. The mass formalization of informal workers is first and foremost the responsibility of the local authorities as it implies regulatory and legislative measures. As seen above, Jordan has adopted incentive measures for Syrian refugees in that direction. In order to support this formalization effort (which could also be extended to other informal migrant workers), also including sectors of the economy/the labor market that have been neglected for several decades, including the agricultural sector. Amongst the steps being taken in this regard are the establishment of a data bank listing all agricultural businesses and their Jordanian and foreign employees (later to be covered by the Social Security Corporation) and the modernization of the means of agricultural production means through their digitalization and the use of innovative water-saving techniques¹⁵⁴. The AFD/International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) project, which aims at supporting innovative farms in the *Badia* employing Syrians and Jordanians in decent conditions deserves to be pursued and duplicated.

The expansion of decent work in Jordan could also be supported in a more centralized manner through the following orientations:

- Technical assistance to the MoL inspection officers, via the digitalization of inspection procedures and their training (in partnership with the Ministry of Social Development) on handling vulnerable working groups, such as children, women and persons with disabilities.;
- The digitalization of procedures related to the working relations between employers and employees, in the fields of occupational safety and health services and payment procedures in the private enterprises¹⁵⁵ ;

¹⁵⁴ See "Agriculture Ministry unveils 2020-2025 strategy worth JD591m to revive sector", *The Jordan Times*, August 24, 2020: <https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/agriculture-ministry-unveils-2020-2025-strategy-worth-jd591m-revive-sector>. This strategy is based on the *2018-2022 Jordan Economic Growth Plan* which recommends the reorganization of the rural economy in its different dimensions (<https://www.ssif.gov.jo/UploadFiles/JEGProgramEnglish.pdf>).

¹⁵⁵ Since the 2010s, the digitalization of procedures for paying salaries (*e-wallet*), which guarantees the adequate payment of wages and the social rights of salaried workers, has been generalized in the public sector, but is still fragmented in the private sector, covering about a third of the people employed in 2019; see: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) (February 28, 2020 – <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/544751585015347579/pdf/Jordan-Youth-Technology-and-Jobs-Project.pdf>; "Wallets are not easy to create pool finds", *The Jordan Times*, May 11, 2020 – <https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/e-wallets-are-not-easy-create-pool-finds>

- Facilitate the access to justice of vulnerable workers opposed to their employer through the promotion of local specialized legal counselling institutions such as the *Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development* (ARDD), which has acted as the legal arm of HCR and its registered refugees, and promotes women's rights, the *Justice Center for Legal Aid* (JCLA), Tamkeen, which works in favor of migrant workers, or international organizations targeting refugees more specifically, such as the *Norwegian Refugee Council* (NRC) or the *Danish Refugee Council* (DRC);
- Include insofar as possible vulnerable refugees of other non-Syrian nationalities (Sudanese, Somalians, Iraqis, displaced persons from Gaza, etc.) in social projects financed as a response to the Syrian crisis.¹⁵⁶

Is there, nearly ten years after the start of multi-sectoral assistance on behalf of the Syrian refugees and their host communities, a specific sector of intervention to favor? The institutions consulted during the preparation of this study gave a negative answer. The strong dependence of refugees and host populations on international aid as a whole remain high, particularly for financial assistance, education and legal protection. The so-cioeconomic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which created new vulnerabilities in all the sectors, conformed reinforced that dependence¹⁵⁷. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the fragmentation of assistance into different sectors of intervention combined with the absence of a general and comparative evaluation of such assistance makes it problematic to establish any prioritization. Rather, international actors ought to be more strategic in the selection of their interventions and the modalities of their implementation, whatever the sector:

- *the choice of sustainable local partners*: the structural weakness of the Jordanian civil society (apart from the "royal" NGOs and some NGOs with strong technical skills but who operate on a contractual basis¹⁵⁸) should lead international actors to strengthen partnerships with state or corporatist bodies to ensure durability of interventions. Reinforced partnerships would also make it possible to engage dialogues on sensitive subjects, such as the opening of entrepreneurship to refugees and the extension, where relevant, the range of formal jobs open to non-Jordanians, whatever their nationality. However, the de-institutionalization approach favoring stronger partnerships with civil society organizations is advisable in sectors such as legal assistance, where the possibilities of a top-down reform seem unlikely and where civil society organizations have proven their efficiency¹⁵⁹.
- *coordination/co-financing*: coordination/partnerships between international actors should be strengthened and steered towards synergies in order to reduce redundancy of interventions and reinforce their impact, more especially in the field of employment and vocational training. The recent launch in Jordan of the *Prospects* programme, led by the Netherlands and involving the Jordanian government, the World Bank, the UNHCR, UNICEF and the ILO for interventions in the fields of education, employment and protection. This initiative, whose final target is to contribute to a more inclusive and productive society, fully using the potential

¹⁵⁶ This is *de facto* the case for some projects addressing social ills contravening Jordan's legislation such as child labor for instance.

¹⁵⁷ Discussion with ACF (December 2, 2020) and NRC (December 9, 2021).

¹⁵⁸ Such as BDC and EFE that AFD has financed for small vocational training and access to employment projects, which are still in progress.

¹⁵⁹ Discussion, particularly with ARDD, January 27, 2021. Among these organizations: ARDD, Tamkeen and JCLA.

of vulnerable communities, might also involve other stakeholders such as the AFD and/or serve as a model of “resources pooling” to be duplicated in the future in other sectors of international assistance with a strong livelihoods/social cohesion component, including: (i) safe access to water, hygiene and sanitation associated with community intermediation to support social cohesion, and (ii) green economy projects favoring recycling and the production of renewable energy, electric cars, and hydroponics, etc., which are also likely to generate job creation and vocational training, in line with the National Green Growth Plan¹⁶⁰.

¹⁶⁰ *A National Green Growth Plan for Jordan, 2017* – <https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/project/gggi-jordan-national-green-growth-plan>

Appendix

Meetings

| | |
|---|-------------------|
| Durable Solutions Platform | November 24, 2020 |
| Mercy Corps | November 25, 2020 |
| Education for Employment (EFE) | November 27, 2020 |
| Netherlands Embassy | December 1, 2020 |
| Business Development Center (BDC) | December 2, 2020 |
| Action Against Hunger (AAH) | December 2, 2020 |
| Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) | December 9, 2020 |
| International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) | December 9, 2020 |
| Ministry of Municipalities | December 21, 2020 |
| <i>INGOs Platform</i> | December 23, 2020 |
| Luminus | December 24, 2020 |
| Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) | January 14, 2021 |
| INGOs Platform | January 19, 2021 |
| High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) | January 27, 2021 |
| Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD) | January 27, 2021 |

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|---------------|--|
| AAH | Action Against Hunger |
| AFD | Agence Française de Développement |
| ARDD | Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development |
| BDC | Business Development Center |
| Bn | Billion(s) |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DRC | Danish Refugee Council |
| EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| EFE | Education for Employment |
| EU | European Union |
| EUR | Euro |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German cooperation agency for development) |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| HCR | UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| HILF | High-Intensity Labor Force |
| IDLO | International Development Law Organization |
| IFPO | Institut français du Proche-Orient |
| ILO | International Labor Organization |
| IReMMO | Institut de Recherche et d'Etudes Méditerranée Moyen-Orient |
| IUCN | International Union for Conservation of Nature |
| JCLA | Justice Center for Legal Aid |
| JOD | Jordanian dinar |
| JOHUD | Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development |
| JORISS | Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis |
| JRP | Jordan Response Plan |
| JRPSC | Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| M | Million(s) |
| MoI | Ministry of the Interior |
| MISMES | Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective |
| MoDEE | Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship |
| MoL | Ministry of Labor |
| MoPIC | Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation |
| MoSD | Ministry of Social Development |
| NA | National Agenda (2006–2015) |
| NAF | National Aid Fund (<i>Aid fund for Jordanians living below the poverty line</i>) |
| NEET | Not in Education, Employment or Training |
| NEP | National Employment Program |
| NES | National Employment Strategy 2011–2020 |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| pp | Percentage point |
| PRS | Palestine refugees from Syria |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNICEF | United Nations Fund for Children |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USD | American Dollar |
| VAF | Vulnerability Assessment Framework |
| VTC | Vocational Training Corporation |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation, Hygiene |
| WFP | World Food Program (United Nations) |

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