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Hye Young Kim

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To Be or To Have the Body: Husserl's Intersubjectivity and *Itda* in Korean

Hye Young Kim (ENS)

hye.young.kim@ens.fr

In the heart of Husserl's discussions on intersubjectivity lies the question concerning the body. The condition of the possibility of intersubjectivity is my experience of the lived body of another (HUA XIII, 83; XIV, 252; XV, 158-159). This experience necessarily presupposes that the body I perceive is the same body as the one that is lived by the other. How to understand the body is crucial to understanding the self, the other, and the we. For Husserl, the body is the core of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, yet is a curious case, because it is not fully subjective nor fully objective but is subjective-objective (HUA XIV, 6). The body is part of the world, part of nature, and at the same time, the center of my experiences. Husserl distinguishes the lived or animate body (*Leib*) (HUA IV, §18) from the body as a physical body (*Körper*), which is part of nature.

Gabriel Marcel and Merleau-Ponty distinguish the difference between the body that we 'are' and the body that we 'have.' The body that we are is the lived body, and the body that we have is the body as a physical body. This differentiation offers us a perspective that helps to approach the question of intersubjectivity with a body.

These two verbs 'to be' and 'to have' are often used interchangeably in various languages, in terms of expressing existence or designating relationship. This phenomenon is found in Korean as well, but also with its own characteristics. Although there are two separate verbs each of which means 'to be' and 'to have' in Korean, the 'to be' verb in Korean, *itda* [eet-da] (있다) signifies also both the 'to be' and 'to have.' In this paper I will explore this verb *itda* in relation to the body and the notion of the we. In doing so, I will revisit Husserl's idea of transcendental intersubjectivity and the body.

We will start with the issue of mind and body separation. Then we will turn to the *Leib* and *Körper* distinction; related to this distinction, we can have a closer look at the two verbs, 'to be' and 'to have', and then I will explain how the verb *itda* in Korean functions. The discussion will continue with an analysis of the dative form in German in comparison to the functions of *itda*. Afterwards, we will talk about the other and intersubjectivity by Husserl and my interpretation. In this context, we will briefly explore Husserl's ideas on transcendental intersubjectivity, monads, harmony, pairing, space, and embodied intersubjectivity. Parallel to these ideas, I will introduce my idea of self and presubjectivity. And in the conclusion, I will discuss the meaning of this research with respect to Husserlian phenomenology and the tradition of philosophy.

Mind and Body

There was a centipede who could dance beautifully. One day a toad asked the centipede how she danced, she started thinking about how she moves her legs and that was it. She couldn't dance anymore.

Are we the body or do we have the body? Or both are true? This is the question we begin with. Whether we have the body or are the body, we are corporeal. We often talk about how my mind (head) wants one thing, but the body (heart) does another thing. There are imaginations where the mind survives in a jarred brain without a body. We imagine the opposite situation too. Zombies have become quite a popular topic both in philosophy and in entertainment. Zombies are the bodies without mind. They appear to be acting without consciousness but only under the control of the virus that occupied their body. Sometimes in nature we come across zombie-like phenomena, like the frogs who are infected by a certain virus and act like a zombie to spread the virus because the virus controls the frog. It looks so likely that the mind and the body are two different elements that are separable. We are bodily beings; without the body, we do not exist. Death is the termination of the functioning body. Even if one believes in the immortality of the

soul, we cannot imagine a soul without a bodily figure. The irony of the pain in the hell after death is that the pain is still described as corporeal pain.

The mind-body separation has become the norm of our self-perception. One of the reasons that this assumption could be accepted easily and widespread is because even my own body appears to be not under my control. We do not know nor control our own body fully. We do not understand exactly what is happening in our body. Often, we are not aware of the illness of our own body, and we do not know why and how our body ended up in such a state. We recognize our body parts as if they were the parts that I possess and control. It is true that we can live without some parts of the body such as arms, legs, fingers, some parts of the inner organs, and even some parts of the brain. Sometimes we find out that the condition of our body holds sway over our cognitive abilities, feelings and emotions. We know of the ways to learn how to 'listen' to your own body or even 'manipulate' your body, as if the body were another subject with its own will separate from my consciousness.

A phenomenological investigation is centered on the phenomenal description of the given. In this context, to whom it is given and 'how' is the question. Although we exist as a corporeal being and therefore our perception and experience are possible through bodily sensations, the body is also given to us as something that we can perceive and experience. It is quite curious. Or does it become curious when we consider our consciousness as our being? *Cogito ergo sum?* As a conscious subject, we perceive our body. This gives us the impression that the body and consciousness are two different elements, one as an observer, the other as the observed.

The body we observe is not only my body. We live in the world in which there are others apart from ourselves. In effect, we see the other's body first before learning about our own. After all, we cannot even see our own face with our own eyes unless reflected on another object's surface. It is the others' faces that we see first. We see, run into, and face other subjects. The other whom I encounter appears to me as a body, because the other is, like myself, a corporeal being. This other is another subject, just as I am a subject. Thus, the other is another consciousness who comes with (or in) the body, through which the other perceives me as well. The other is, therefore, different than an object which I perceive but which cannot perceive me. This face-to-

face encounter with another subject is a practical starting point of the formation of my ego, while the ego of cogito (ergo sum) is a theoretical – methodological starting point.

***Leib* and *Körper*: To Be and To Have the Body**

When I encounter another subject, first, this person is given to me as a body. I perceive and apperceive this person through what is given – their body, which is different than the body that I am. Husserl differentiates these bodies: *Leib* and *Körper*. The other's body that is given and I perceive firsthand is *Körper*. Husserl refers to *Körper* as a physical body that occupies space and is subject to causal laws. But this body is also *Leib*, just as my body is *Leib* which denotes a lived body or an animate body (HUA IV, § 18). The lived body is the body as a living organic entity, the center of my sensations through which I experience the given.

Husserl explains that the body is my body. It is, however, experienced not as ego itself but as something over (*gegenüber*) – as in the sense of facing over – or my object (*mein Gegenstand*) like a house is my object, something that is visible to me (HUA IV, 212) standing against me. Here, the object refers to something that 'stands against' me as the German word *Gegenstand* literally represents. The lived body is a bearer of sensations (HUA IV § 36) and an organ of my will and the bearer of free movements (HUA IV, § 38). I am the body, and the body is mine at the same time. The body is, therefore, *Leibkörper* (HUA IV, 144).

In *Être et Avoir*, Gabriel Marcel distinguishes *être* (to be) from *avoir* (to have) in relation to the body.¹ For Marcel, incarnation is the essence of our being. He writes that “incarnation is the situation of a being who appears to be himself, as it were, *bound* to a body.” Incarnation is the central 'given' of the metaphysics which stands in opposition to the *cogito*. About the body, Marcel argues, one can neither say that it is I, nor that it is not I, nor that it is for me. Here, the opposition of subject and object is transcended from the start.² Properly speaking, according to Marcel, one cannot say that one has a body, but “the mysterious relation uniting me to the body

¹ Gabriel Marcel, *Être et Avoir*. Paris: Fernand Aubier, 1935.

² Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, translated by Katharine Farrer (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1949), 11-12.

is at the foundation of all my powers of having.”³ Being and having, however, is indispensable for each other. He explains, “in order to have effectively, it is necessary to be in some degree, that is to say, in this case, to be immediately for one’s-self, to feel one’s-self, as it were, affected or modified.”⁴ He refers to this as a mutual interdependence of having and being.

Merleau-Ponty approaches ‘to be’ and ‘to have’ in a different yet not completely incompatible way with that of Marcel in *Phénoménologie de la Perception*. He lends ‘to be’ a weak sense of existence or predication, while considering ‘to have’ as something in relation to the subject that projects itself in the sense of having an idea, a desire, fear etc.⁵ For Merleau-Ponty, the difference between ‘I am my body’ and ‘I have my body’ designates the relation between my bodily being and my subjectivity:⁶ my body is an expressive being that expresses my subjectivity.⁷

Thomas Fuchs also differentiates *Körper* from *Leib* based on the distinction between *haben* (to have) and *sein* (to be). They both mean ‘body’ in German, but *Leib* refers to the vital body in which we are incarnated, while we have and use the *Körper*.⁸ Thus, *Leib* is what we *are*, while *Körper* is what we *have*.⁹

Itda

The core concept for understanding the *τί ἐστι* (being) of *τόδε τι* (this one) by Aristotle¹⁰ was *εἶναι* (to be). This verb is translated into Korean as *itda* [eet-da] or *ida* [ee-da]. The latter one, *ida*, is used when the verb functions as a copula, in the same way that ‘is’ is used in the sentence

³ Marcel, *Being and Having*, 84.

⁴ Marcel, *Being and Having*, 134.

⁵ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 203.

⁶ Evan Thompson, *Mind in Life. Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 247; Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, 203-232.

⁷ Thompson, *Mind in Life*, 246; Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, 203-232.

⁸ Thomas Fuchs, “Zwischen Leib und Körper,” in *Leib und Leben. Perspektiven für eine neue Kultur der Körperlichkeit*, ed. Martin Hähnel and Marcus Knaup, Darmstadt: WBG, 2013, 82.

⁹ The paragraphs about Gabriel Marcel, Merleau Ponty, Thomas Fuchs and the analysis of *itda* and presubjectivity are taken from the book *We as Self* (Kim, 2021) with partial modifications.

¹⁰ Aristotle, *Categories*.

‘the tree *is* green.’ The former one, *itda*, focuses on the existence of the thing that is talked about, like *ἔστί(v)* with the accent on the first syllable to emphasize the being of the subject over the predicates that signify the properties of the subject.

The meaning of the word *itda* is very similar to those of the ‘to be’ verbs in European languages, but *itda* also means ‘to have.’ The expression ‘to have someone’ is rarely used in Korean. Instead, one uses the verb *itda* to express ‘I have somebody,’ somebody can be anyone related to the I, such as a family member, a friend, a teacher, a colleague, a neighbor, etc. The only exception is when someone is pregnant, then one can say, ‘I have a baby.’ Other than that, ‘to have someone’ with the verb *gajida* [ka-jee-da]¹¹ (to have) is almost never said for a person that, in other languages, would take the person as the object of the verb, ‘to have.’ On the other hand, there is another verb in Korean that is used as ‘to act’ and ‘to have’: *hada*. The first meaning of this verb is ‘to act,’ but colloquially it is used as ‘to possess.’

Let me explain more precisely how the *itda* verb is used in Korean with an example. To express “I have a brother” in Korean, one says:

I [my] brother *itda* (to be). (나는 동생이 있다.)

In this sentence, there are two subjects: I and brother. Some declare that it is more proper to say ‘to me, a brother is’ in Korean but colloquially one usually and normally says, ‘I, brother, *itda*’.

In this sentence, ‘I’ is ‘I’ and ‘to me (mir)’ at the same time. I have a brother; the brother is there to me. These two ‘I’s are the same ‘I,’ yet different. In the case of the brother, he is another ‘I’. In the formulation of ‘I brother *itda*’, the brother is not converted to ‘him’. He is designated as another subject.

Itda is used to express ‘to be’ as ‘to exist’ equally as much as ‘to have.’

¹¹ 가지다.

I *itda*. (I am – to be/ to exist: 나는 있다)

Tree *itda*. (Tree is – There is a tree: 나무가 있다).

But, when *itda* functions as ‘to have’ there is another being.

I tree *itda*. (I have a tree: 나는 나무가 있다).

Between ‘I’ and *itda*, the blank is the room for the world: the others, whether as subject of object, in the world.

I _____ *itda*.

Let’s fill out this blank with a few various items to see how it works as a ‘to have’ verb.

- (a) me (I have me)
- (b) arm (I have an arm)
- (c) thought (I have a thought)
- (d) feeling (I have a feeling)
- (e) hope (I have a hope)
- (f) pencil (I have a pencil)
- (g) brother (I have a brother)

The first example (a) 'I have me' does not sound sensible. One can say this but this is not what one usually says in a normal situation. It sounds awkward in Korean too. The second example (b) is interesting. If the arm that I have is a part of my own body, it is something I have and not something that I have at the same time. My arm is not the whole 'I,' but it is a part of me. This is only a part of my body, a part of me, but it could represent the whole of me too. Even a tiny piece of my skin and a hair have my entire biological information that represents the whole 'I'.

In the next three, (c), (d), (e), the I is manifested as a conscious subject that 'can' reflect, feel, believe, think, etc. In (f), the pencil that I have is an object that cannot be considered as another subject. I can possess this pencil. I have ownership over this pencil. I can use this pencil.

But in the case of (g), a brother is not an object. He is another subject. Here *itda* is translated as 'to have' in English, but it is different than possessing a pencil. I am in the world where my brother is, or my brother is in the world where I am also in. And we are related.

When the brother is the first subject the same verb is used without conjugation:

Brother I *itda*. (My brother has me: 동생은 내가 있다).

When the brother speaks, it will be:

I sister *itda*. (I have a sister: 나는 누나가 있다).

My brother can talk about me having him:

[My] sister I *itda*. (My sister has me: 누나는 내가 있다).

In all four sentences, there are two subjects, a brother and a sister. They are in the world. They exist in the world, and they have each other. The *itda* verb is used for expressing their being in the world and having one another (being related to one another). When the ‘be’ verb is used to denote ‘to exist’, it could mean ‘to exist’ and ‘to exist in the world.’ Can a person exist somewhere that is not the world? Somewhere where there are no other entities? If not, for a human being ‘to be’ as ‘to exist’ would always mean ‘to be in the world.’ And when one is in the world, one as a subject always exists in the way of ‘having’, because being in the world means being related to others – whether wanted or not, whether being aware of or not. ‘Having’ represents this ‘relation’ to the world, or more precisely, to the others in the world. The being of a subject that is in the world as a transcendental subject necessarily is bound to its ‘having’ – or being able to ‘have.’ The process of going to ‘having’ from the state of ‘being’ is a process of becoming a conscious subject. In ‘real’ life, ‘being’ and ‘having’ are not separable in the subject, and no priority is given to any one side. The priority or precedence of ‘having’ or ‘being’ is only theoretical. This world is not only where I am, but also what I constitute. We could read *Itda*, as to be and to have, as representing this.

Subject(s) of *Itda*

In Korean, it is possible to say, ‘a brother is to me’ without ‘to me.’ One often says, ‘a brother is’ meaning ‘I have a brother.’ The verb *itda* functions as a ‘to have’ verb that does not require an object. When one says, ‘I have a brother’ in the form of ‘to me, is a brother,’ or ‘a brother is,’ it implies that ‘I and my brother are there (together)’ rather than ‘I have a brother,’ where ‘a brother’ stands as an object to the subject ‘I.’

In fact, in Korean, the majority of native speakers do not say ‘a brother is to me,’ but rather ‘I, a brother is.’ Some insist that this expression in Korean should be considered grammatically

incorrect, and therefore it ought to be said as ‘to me, a brother is.’ However, in everyday conversation and in literature, ‘I, a brother is’ sounds more natural both in oral and written form. Especially when it comes to other people in relation to me, this double-subject sentence structure is ordinarily and frequently used. Usually one would say ‘a brother is’ or ‘I, a brother is’ as an answer to the question of whether one has siblings, but also mostly without ‘I.’

One can say something similar in German as well: *mir ist ein Bruder* for ‘I have a brother.’ But at the same time, the expression ‘there is’ in German is made with the ‘to have’ verb as *es gibt* (it gives [it is given [that]...]). In French as well, one uses *avoir* (to have) in the expression *il y a*, to say ‘there is.’ It is not an extraordinarily odd linguistic phenomenon that the ‘to be’ and the ‘to have’ verbs have cross-usage, not only in Korean, but cross-culturally. Yet the ‘to have’ verb in Korean is never used in the way it is in German and French. In *es gibt*, and *il y a*, the impersonal pronoun ‘it’ is used as a dummy subject or placeholder, while in Korean, the subject – and especially a pronoun in the place of the subject – is usually omitted in sentences.

As I mentioned, in the structure of the sentence ‘I, [a] brother is,’ the brother is not an object to the I. It is different than ‘I have a brother,’ where I as the subject has an object of the verb, the brother. I think that this sentence structure of ‘a brother is’ for ‘I have a brother’ reflects the difference between ‘to be’ and ‘to have.’ Marcel talks about *avoir* in the sense of possession as ‘I have something’ while he takes *être* in the sense of existential ‘belongingness’ as ‘I am my body’ or ‘I am my life.’ But for Merleau-Ponty, *avoir* reveals the status of the subject that is reflective and conscious, while *être* is taken in the sense of ‘a tree is there’ or ‘it is green.’ The verb ‘to have’ in ‘I have a brother’ refers to the possession of something.

When it is not a thing but a person who is related to me, though, ‘to have’ is not a very plausible way of expressing the interpersonal relation, because a relationship with other human beings is not the same as a proprietary relationship with things. When the subject ‘I’ is not uttered, what is placed in the forefront of the utterance is the relatedness of myself with my brother, which is revealed by the verb ‘to be.’ It is the same in the case of ‘I, a brother is.’ The I in ‘I, a brother is,’ cannot be considered the same as the I in ‘I have a brother.’

Marcel explains that ‘to have’ comes with the notion of ‘to contain’: “The haver is the subject insofar as it carries with it a container.”¹² But in ‘being,’ a ‘non-autonomy’ which he calls “very freedom” is rooted, which transcends all possible possessions, “at a point either short of self or beyond self.”¹³

In principle, in order to have a brother, one has to be there first, and to be able to say that ‘a brother is,’ one has to ‘know’ the relationship between myself and the brother, which necessarily comes with ‘knowing’ that I myself am there first. This subjectivity of the ‘I’ as the subject of ‘knowing’ is clearly expressed in ‘I have a brother.’ This I, the subject, is the subject of knowing, understanding, and speaking. ‘A brother is’ means ‘the brother is my brother’ which points at the relationship between my brother and I, which also implies the ‘being’ of myself and the brother and our relatedness. Unlike in ‘I have a brother,’ in ‘a brother is,’ the subject I is not expressed as a pre-condition for expressing the selfness, otherness, and the relation between the two, both grammatically and phenomenologically.

The Dative Case and the Embodied Ego

For example, when one says “*mir ist mein Bruder*” (to me is my brother), this ‘mir’ as ‘to me’ implies there is a *Gegenstand* (either object or subject) over and against me. A *Gegenstand* is something that stands *gegen* (against) and *gegenüber* (over) me. This *Gegenstand* could be another subject with consciousness or an object without consciousness, either way it is there ‘to me’. If this *Gegenstand* is another subject, this subject can have ‘me’ as the object of their perception, i.e. *mich* in German. But even when the other subject doesn’t have ‘me’ as the accusative *mich*, I can become ‘to me’ (*mir*) against and over the other subject. In other words, the other subject *is* (there, so and so) to me (for /against /over me).

From where I stand, thus, here, it is:

¹² Marcel, *Being and Having*, 84.

¹³ Marcel, *Being and Having*, 174.

I → the other subject X (I am I to X)

I ← the other subject X (X is X to me)

The dative form *mir* manifests the objectification process of ego, in the sense that I obtain the position of being *mir* (to me) through the being of the other subject. Namely, the state of being *mir* arises when there is another subject. To be a conscious subject, I ought to be able to have myself over and against myself. This is the premise of *cogito*. I should be able to say that I am the one who says ‘I,’ in order to be ‘I.’ Or, I can say ‘I,’ when I call myself ‘I.’ I am ‘I’ to me over and against the other subject. The other subject is also ‘I’ to herself over and against me.

When I see the other subject, I can ‘see’ myself as appearing ‘to me’ (*mir*) as ‘I’, through which I can be self-conscious. In other words, the formation of ‘*mir ist*’ represents the process of the ‘standing over and against the other’ (*Gegenstand-werden*: becoming an object), a subject-becoming process, through which a subject can be a subject.

The following passage from Husserl sounds like a compact description of this situation concerning self-consciousness, the other, the body, and *mir*.

I have “self-consciousness,” I appear (*erscheine*) to me (*mir*). I have an “external appearance (*Erscheinung*: phenomenon)” of others, first of all, an external physical (*körperliche*) appearance, whose object (*Gegenstand*) I interpret (*zudeute*), “agree” (*einverstehe*), a “self.” (HUA XIII, 252).¹⁴

¹⁴ Ich habe „Selbstbewusstsein,“ ich erscheine mir selbst. Ich habe vom Anderen eine „äußere Erscheinung,“ zunächst eine äußere körperliche Erscheinung, deren Gegenstand ich zudeute, „einverstehe,“ ein „Selbst.“ (HUA XIII, 252).

When I encounter another subject, first of all, their body is given to me (*mir*) as a phenomenon. Their body standing over and against (*gegen*) me as a *Gegenstand* (object). My intentionality is directed ‘to’ (*zu*) the given, in this case, the other’s body, to ‘interpret’ them (*zudeuten*). The word *zudeuten* is not a commonly used expression in modern German. I read the *zu* that is equivalent to ‘to’ in English as the indicator that reveals the directedness of the intentionality of the subject.

In this context, it is obvious that body plays a crucial role, because the other’s body is given, and therefore, ‘I see myself’ is *verkörperlicht*: incarnated or represented in our bodily being. I am the body and I have the body at the same time. Through this subjective-objective situation of the body, I can be ‘I’ and ‘*mir*’. The ego transcends the body, but I am the body, and therefore immanent transcendence.

The essence of the body for Gabriel Marcel is incarnation, in which ‘I am the body’ rejects cogito. Incarnation is the Word becoming flesh. Language is the body. Merleau-Ponty interprets body as speech.¹⁵ When I interpret (*zudeuten*) the body, I experience the body as language in which I constitute my subjectivity as ‘I’.

Then Husserl writes that “...*deren Gegenstand ich...einverstehe*”. In modern German, normally, the verb *einverstehen* is used in the form of *einverstanden sein*, the passive form to express “I am agreed.” What is the particularity of this verb in the active voice? What is it that I do when I “*einverstehe*”? This unusual way of using this word gives a clue to understand Husserl’s idea of transcendental intersubjectivity.

In *einverstehen*, we see the verb *verstehen* which means ‘to understand.’ Understanding is a conscious act of a subject. But for a subject to be a subject, a subject must not only *verstehen* but also *einverstehen*. Through the act of understanding, a subject becomes ‘one’ (*eins*) with the other subject that is standing over and against me. In other words, for an ego to be an ego, it needs another ego. Think about the formation of the ‘I’ by Fichte: *Ich = Ich* (I = I), where the second I appears to the first I as the objectified self that the first I can ‘see’, through which the self becomes a subject.

¹⁵ Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, Gallimard: Paris, 1945, 203-232.

The quoted paragraph by Husserl begins with “I have ‘self-consciousness’” and it moves on to “I appear to myself,” and then he explains what I do with the given of the other to me. In the end, it comes back to “a self” (*ein Selbst*). The structure of this description reveals how I can be a subject that has self-consciousness.

I have self-consciousness.

↓

I appear to me.

↓

I have the phenomena of the others.

↓

My intentionality is directed to them, then I interpret them and ‘agree’ with them.

↓

A self: having gone through the previous steps, I become conscious of a ‘self’.

↓

I have self-consciousness.

Marcel wrote in his journal of metaphysics: “it is impossible to exaggerate how much better the formula *es denkt in mir* is than *cogito ergo sum*, which lets us in for pure subjectivism. The ‘I think’ is not the spring of inspiration. Far from it, it actually dams the flow.”¹⁶ When there is *mir*, it means that there is another subject that stands over and against me. This other subject could be my objectified self or another subject, or both. To whom does the ‘*es*’ (it) refer, then, in ‘*es denkt in mir*’ (it thinks in me)? This ‘*es*’ represents the objectivity that transcends the subjective ego, but this objectivity lies ‘in’ the ego too – in *mir*. What is this objectivity that is transcendental and immanent? The clue for this question is found in the other egos.

¹⁶ Marcel, *Being and Having*, 27.

Body-Consciousness

Husserl's transcendental subjectivity is cogito with the body, i.e., subject with the body. Why cogito? Because, methodologically, it starts from my consciousness to perceive and apperceive the given. Therefore, it is cogito with – or rather, in the body. The subject perceives the given in time and space, yet without a priori categories. The objectivity of the subject's interpretations is not found in the a priori categories but in transcendental intersubjectivity. Husserl thinks cogito is a methodological starting point, but Husserl does not separate cogito from the body. It starts from a subject, not from objects. Therefore, it is idealism, not realism. But it is transcendental idealism because cogito, the consciousness of a subject, apperceives the given phenomena.

A conscious subject experiences the given phenomena by apperceiving them, i.e., perceive them with what is not given. A subject perceives and apperceives through the body. 'I' as subject interprets the given transcendently, but it is *immanente Transzendenz* because this happens through the body which is subjective and objective. Normally *immanente Transzendenz* is translated as 'transcendence *in* immanence' in English, but perhaps the expression 'transcendence *as* immanence' is more suitable in this situation, because *consciousness is body*, even if body is not always consciousness. This does not mean, however, that body is not conscious. Body is not unconscious, but it is often un-self-conscious. Body is more than where my will resides. Body *is* the will itself. Therefore, it is not 'cogito with the body' but 'cogito *is* the body'. Yet, body is not always cogito, because we cannot say that body is self-reflective.

What does it mean? Does it mean that the body has a consciousness? Or consciousness has a body? Are body and consciousness separated? The verbs 'to have' and 'to be' reveal the situation of the mind-body separation. In everyday life, we are both 'having the body' and 'being the body'. For example, as when we ride a bicycle, we do things without knowing or without being self-aware or/and self-conscious. We do not understand the mechanism of the bicycle nor how my body moves to stay on and ride a bicycle, but we learn it by riding it. It is like the body learns it without me consciously understanding how. Riding a bicycle is the moment of being the body. So is the learning process. But when I succeed to learn how to ride a bicycle and realize that I am capable of riding a bicycle, I think to myself, "I can ride a bicycle!", and the moment of

being the body flips to the moment of having the body. In life, we are in constant flux between these two moments: being the body and having the body. Being conscious as body is going from the state of 'having' to the state of 'being'. It is an ego-separating process between being the body and having the body.

Transcendental Intersubjectivity

The other is not an object that one can have. The other does not have me either. This situation resembles our being embodied. My body is mine, but at the same time, it is I. I experience my body and other's body. The body of the other that I experience is the lived body of the other as another subject. This means I experience the other transcendently, hence transcendental intersubjectivity. According to Husserl, transcendental egos constitute the world 'for themselves' and 'for each other' (*füreinander*) (HUA VIII, 505-506).

Husserl calls "the transcendental structure of intercommunicating subjects" transcendental intersubjectivity, through which the experience of an objective, common shared world and the realm of culture and language is possible.¹⁷ The world is, in this sense, according to Husserl, "the achievement of transcendental intersubjectivity" (HUA I, § 49).

The objective world is constituted in "an intersubjective sphere of ownness (*intersubjektives Eigenwesen*)" of "transcendental intersubjectivity" which has a "constitutive intentionality" (HUA I, 137). Husserl claims that this transcendental 'We' is a subjectivity for the world. (HUA I, 137).¹⁸ The objective world does not transcend the intersubjective sphere of ownness, but rather inheres in it as an immanent transcendence (HUA I, 138). For Husserl, the essence of transcendental idealism is the a priori correlation between objectivity and subjectivity.¹⁹ The

¹⁷ Husserl Lexicon 331

¹⁸ "Die transzendente Intersubjektivität hat durch diese Vergemeinschaftung eine intersubjektive Eigenheitssphäre, in der sie die objektive Welt intersubjektiv konstituiert und so als das transzendente Wir Subjektivität für diese Welt ist und auch 30 für die Menschenwelt, in welcher Form sie sich selbst objektiv verwirklicht hat." (HUA I, 137).

¹⁹ Husserl Lexicon, 330

immanent transcendency of transcendental intersubjectivity reveals this a priori correlation between objectivity and subjectivity: 1) the objective world is constituted intersubjectively, and 2) the intersubjectivity is in the fundamental sphere of each ego. In transcendental subjectivity that is grounded in transcendental intersubjectivity, objectivity and subjectivity are fundamentally correlated, because the objectivity lies in the essence of subjectivity, and the subjectivity of this intersubjectivity is the foundation of the objectivity of the world. This a priori correlation is founded and revealed in the body that is in essence subjective-objective.

Husserl explains his ideas of intersubjectivity in terms of monad and monadology. Egos constitute a communitive ego community (HUA VIII, 506) with each other and for each other which is, Husserl calls, “ultimately a community of monads” (HUA I, 137). This community constitutes “the one identical world” (HUA I, 137). In constituting this world, “harmony” of the monads is essential. Husserl writes:

Consequently *the constitution of the world essentially involves a “harmony” of the monads*: precisely this harmony among particular constitutions in the particular monads; and accordingly it involves also a harmonious generation that goes on in each particular monad. (HUA I, 137).

What is monad for Husserl? He says, “a monad is an individual, living, a concrete unity (Hua I, 157; *eine lebendige Einheit*, XIV, 34).”²⁰ However, Husserl’s idea of a monad is different from that of Leibniz, even if obviously Husserl has taken the notion from him. If a Leibnizian monad is “windowless” in the sense that “they do not communicate outside of themselves” and “exhibit a pre-established harmony,”²¹ Husserl writes that his monads have windows (HUA XIV, 260), and they have an “intersubjective, communicating, open community of monads” (HUA I, §55-56), namely transcendental intersubjectivity.²² All monads are in harmony belonging to the one world (HUA I, §60), one single community of monads. In fact, the common world is the “achievement of the harmony of the community of monads.”²³

²⁰ Husserl Lexicon 210

²¹ Husserl Lexicon 211

²² Husserl Lexicon 211

²³ Husserl Lexicon 211

Each monad is an individual as an absolutely solitary entity (*reell eine absolut abgeschlossene Einheit*) (HUA I, 157), but at the same time, each monad is connected to the others through communalization (*Vergemeinschaftung*) (HUA I, 160). Husserl talks about a single being and a collective being:

The single absolute being is, however, subject-being, as primordially constituted being for oneself, and the collective absolute being is that of the universes of transcendental subjects that stand in actual and possible community with one another. (HUA VIII, 190).²⁴

Monads have beings for themselves and for one another (*füreinander*) and through their reciprocal communal relations with each other, they can have an open community of monads (HUA I, 157),²⁵ which refers to transcendental intersubjectivity. How does an absolutely solitary, *abgeschlossen*, closed up monad have a relation to and with other monads? What is this harmony of monads?

The ‘window’ of monads is provided by empathy,²⁶ and the key component of empathy is pairing (*Paarung*). Husserl states that over and against the active ego, there is a passive ego. When the ego is active, it is always also passive (HUA IV, 213).²⁷ There is always a passivity in experience that “precedes all activity.”²⁸ Pairing is an archetype of passive synthesis (HUA I, 142):

pairing is a universal phenomenon of the transcendental sphere. Two phenomena are passively apprehended as similar before active intentionality does anything to synthesize the appearances. These things (e.g., two colors) simply stand out as being similar in experience. Pairing is a key component of empathy. Pairing occurs when we link through an ‘apperceptive transfer’ one presentation with another, e.g., the gesture of another’s

²⁴ Das einzige absolute Sein ist aber Subjektsein, als für sich selbst ursprünglich Konstituiertsein, und das gesamte absolute Sein ist das des Universums transzendentaler Subjekte, die miteinander in wirklicher und möglicher Gemeinschaft stehen. (HUA VIII, 190).

²⁵ Husserl Lexicon 212

²⁶ Husserl Lexicon 211

²⁷ Dem aktiven steht gegenüber das passive Ich, und das Ich ist immerfort, wo es aktiv ist, zugleich passiv (HUA IV, 213).

²⁸ Husserl Lexicon 237

body are paired with gestures of my body (see Hua XV 27; XV 249) through an apperceptive transfer or ‘carrying over’ (*Übertragung*). My lived body is sensually prominent for me, but the other’s body is grasped similarly through a pairing association: ‘Ego and alter ego are always and necessarily given in an original “pairing”’ (CM 112; Hua I, 142).²⁹

I read the passivity of pairing as the core notion of transcendental intersubjectivity in the sense that it shows the ontological condition of a subject that exists in the world with other entities, which is the ‘relation’ of the subject to/with the others. This relation precedes subjectivity, because we are already in relation as we are born to the world, before we ‘fully’ become a subject as a subject of activity with self-conscious and self-reflective free will. Relation is, therefore, pre-subjective, which presents self as not only ‘I’ but also ‘we.’

Pre-subjective Self-in-Relation³⁰

When the self is we, the self-ness of the self is not dependent on the self-representation of the self because of the irreducible distinction between self and other within the we. A self can be aware of a relation without reflection on its self-ness based on the self-objectifying or self-representing system of the I, the subject. Pre-subjective self refers to the fundamental-ontological condition of the self that is necessarily in relation with others.

I suggest that we approach the we neither from a self-centered nor a self-less point of view in which the we is only either a collection of individuals or an anonymous whole, but based on ‘relation.’ This relation is pre-subjective, by which I mean that the conscious, reflective, subjective self with intentionality is not the conceptual basis of the relation. Relation is there, even if one does not conceptually posit oneself as a subject and stand in contrast to another. The pre-subjective relation is prior to the consciousness of the distinction between self and other, and

²⁹ Husserl Lexicon 235

³⁰ This paragraph about presubjective Self-in-Relation is taken from the book *We as Self* (Kim, 2021) with partial modifications.

is not formed by separate individual subjects coming together and consciously relating to each other.

In the sense that a pre-subjective self is not conscious of a differentiation between subject and object, it is comparable to pre-reflective consciousness. Pre-reflective experience refers to the experience without a differentiation between subject, object, and their relation. But pre-subjectivity is not a subject's state of experience. Rather, the pre-subjective state of self is what a pre-reflective subject can be aware of. In the experience of a pre-reflective subject, relation with the other does not play a crucial role, but relation is the core of the pre-subjective self as we.

A subject can be aware of the pre-subjective state of self that is fundamental-ontologically in relation, and the awareness of relation can be prior to the awareness of distinction between self and other, even though relation already presumes that there is a distinction. If the we-ness is pre-distinction, it falls right back into the we-ness as the undifferentiated anonymous whole. The distinction in the awareness of relation is not obliterated, but the distinction can be conceived posteriorly, meaning that the awareness of distinction is not the pre-condition of the awareness of relation. When a baby and the mother are aware of each other as 'one,' this oneness does not point at an undifferentiated oneness. Rather it is a recognition of the relation between the two. We can be in relation and be aware of it without being conscious of the difference between self and other as well as *my* self-ness as subject. Although the distinctness of self is present in relation, the consciousness of self-ness in contrast to not-self is not the beginning nor the basis of the awareness of relation. Existing in any social form, in any culture, in any style of life, or in any existential ideology, we never experience our self in the midst of an undifferentiated anonymous whole. Even the fetus in a mother's womb is not an unseparated entity from the mother. They are connected as if they were one body, but they are not an undifferentiated whole. There is a primary relation. We are in relation in the we that is not a collection of individuals who convey the concept of self as the I as subject, but of the we that we are born into: the world.

I call this world the *web* of relation. The awareness of an irreducible metaphysical distinction between self and other comes after or simultaneously with the awareness of the relation in which we are born, but not prior. The reason that I call it 'relation' and not 'world' is to have us notice the *web* in which I am placed in inter-mingled relation with the others which is there prior to *my*

consciousness of it. It is important to remark here that pre-subjective does not mean a-subjective, which rejects subjectivity entirely. Now, let us see how this relates to our discussion of the body and *itda*.

Embodied Intersubjectivity: *So etwas wie Leiblichkeit*

Husserl talks about culture and the collective humanity (*vergemeinschaftete Menschheit*, HUA XIV, 205), where he calls this whole of the collective subject bodily (*leiblich*). It is something like corporality (*so etwas wie Leiblichkeit*, HUA XIV, 206), a community with personality, subjectivity, and consciousness. David Carr discusses this in the realm of plural subject and intersubjective embodiment.³¹ Carr explains that a community or a mass with a collective mind, interest, goal etc. could look like and act like one giant body with a shared intentionality. This is one way of understanding embodied intersubjectivity. Another way of understanding the embodiment of intersubjectivity is the face-to-face relation between subjects. The verb *itda* as used in the context of ‘being related to another’ as ‘I have a brother’ might lead us to another way of understanding “*so etwas wie Leiblichkeit*” of the we.

Culture and history – as history of culture as Husserl declares (HUA XIV, 207) – are the *web* of relations into which I am born and within I live. All our individual and personal lives are, in fact, the lives in the realm of the culture and community in which we live. Husserl also states that this is an inevitable condition of being human. It is me with other subjects who create and maintain the sphere of culture and history, and this he describes as something embodied. It is a whole (*das Ganze*) that is something like a body (HUA XIV, 205-206).

As we are the body and have the body, and these two are inseparable, our relatedness to others can be corporally understood. Being the body intersubjectively refers to being in the culture, history, or community that exists with collective memory, collective goal, and collective mind. We are ‘blood-related’ to our parents and extended members of the family, which is a quite

³¹ Carr, David, “Intersubjectivity and Embodiment,” *Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*, Edited by Frode Kjosavik, Christian Beyer, and Christel Fricke, Routledge, 2019.

corporeal way of being related. But even when not blood related, we are always related to others. directly or indirectly, with or without intentionality directed to them, simply by being in the community in which we live. We are (*itda*) in the community constituting the body of the community. And we have (*itda*) people in the sense of being in relation to them. To have somebody is not possessing that person by holding that person in my hand, but it is to form the web of relation that constitutes the community, culture, and history. When we are conscious of this relation, i.e., our intentionality is directed to the relation and the person to whom I am related, we can say that we ‘have’ that person: I have a friend, I have a teacher, I have a significant other, I have a child, I have an aunt, I have a neighbor, etc.

Pre-subjective relation (*itda* as to be) and intersubjective relation (*itda* as to have) are not separable: they both constitute the fundamental condition of our being human. *Itda* as to have reveals my intentionality and relatedness to the world (intersubjective) while already being (*itda*) in the world (pre-subjective).

Here and There: Corporality and Spatiality

We cannot think of a thing without also thinking about the space in which the thing is given.³² This also applies to our being. When I *am* in the sense of existing, I am here or there. However, I cannot be here and there at the same time. This is how Husserl explains how a subject can have the other who is given to me as a physical body, over and against me as an object, as another subject.

If I am here now, I cannot be there at the same time. Another subject with their body (*Leib*) is like imagining my being somewhere else (HUA XIII, 263), i.e. the other is there as if I were there. Husserl writes:

³² Husserl Lexicon, 328

That “if I would be there, I would look like that from there, I would have the look of myself from there” is a contradictory imagination, and yet, just as contradictory imaginations [do], it has a good sense (e.g., in geometry), namely, it has a good sense that a “doubling” of the ego is possible, as is a doubling of another real [one]. By the performance of this contradictory imagination, namely, the possibility of two subjects with two bodies becomes clear. (HUA XIII, 263).³³

The reason that I cannot be here and there at the same time, is because we are the body. A body occupies space, and that space constitutes one’s being. Being is always being in a place with a location. If I am on this side, I cannot be on that side; when I am on the inside, I cannot be on the outside. Being here and there at the same time is a paradox. Being with another subject is a paradoxical situation, because I am the subject to whom the objects of the world is given, and I am the monad who is absolutely solitary and self-contained (*abgeschlossen*). However, there are others as subjects, and not only are they there, but they constitute the world together with me, the world where I am included and involved.

Husserl mentions that the contradictory imagination of a double subject has a good sense, just as one can do in geometry. Indeed, I can imagine a situation where I can be here and there at the same time, on the inside and on the outside: a Mobius band. It is a ring with a twist. The distinction between inside and outside as self and other in imaginary space is a bodily imagination. If I walk on a Mobius band, I am on the inside and the outside of the band at the same time. I started walking on the outside but when I am back to the twist, I am on the inside. Being in the world as an embodied subject with the others who are also embodied subjects is a contradictory idea, but we are in the world with the others for real, just as the mobius band is a real thing that physically exists – that we can easily make with a physical material like paper, not only an imaginary figure that is impossible to exist in reality. One of the clues to understand the curious case of the corporality of the we, *so etwas wie Leiblichkeit*, is here. The space of the

³³ Das „wäre ich dort, so würde ich von dort so aussehen, ich würde von dort aus für mich den und den Anblick haben“ ist eine widersprechende Vorstellung, und doch hat sie wie ähnlich widersprechende Vorstellungen einen guten Sinn (z.B. in der Geometrie), nämlich sie hat den guten Sinn, dass eine „Verdoppelung“ des Ich möglich ist, so wie eine Verdoppelung eines sonstigen Realen. Nämlich: Es wird nämlich bei Vollzug dieser widersprüchlichen Vorstellung klar die Möglichkeit zweier Subjekte mit zwei Körpern.

world where the embodied egos coexist is that of something that is like corporality: space of the physical bodies that are the lived bodies of the subjects, subjects in relation.

Home, for example, is a micro world with the characteristic of embodiment of self in spatiality. We as bodily selves stand in relation with others beyond our bodily boundaries. Each individual person is there standing in open space, yet in necessary relation with others. Home could be regarded as primitive, in the sense that most of us are born into a home, but it is not always the case. We all need home, but we leave home and lose home too. The absence of home does not mean not having a place to put your head down and store your things, but it means to be separated from relation, standing outside of the sphere of the *web*. Home is not a fixed property that cannot be created again or changed. It is a dynamic and open space within the boundary of connection, and this boundary is constantly in formation.

Conclusion: The World, Cultures, Philosophy

Lastly, I want to briefly discuss the meaning of a philosophical investigation of *itda*. There are two points that I want to mention. First, ‘transcending’ or overcoming Husserl is not the purpose of this research, nor is it to blindly defend or back up Husserl and accept all his ideas uncritically by interpreting everything within the framework offered by Husserl. Rather, it is an attempt to have ‘transcendence in immanence’ by finding and placing myself in the history of philosophy. We are in the tradition of philosophy where Husserl also developed his ideas of phenomenology. That is what we do too, after Husserl but also with Husserl, but also not only with Husserl – to join in the flow of the history of philosophy with our own flow of history, time, and space.

Second, investigating *itda* is the most natural thing to do for me as a philosopher from the culture of *itda*. The task of transcendental philosophy is found in the idea of transcendental intersubjectivity. In a genuine community that is open and harmonious, the uniqueness and personality of an individual are reserved, in effect, the harmony of the community is grounded in the diverse colors of individuals with their cultures and the histories in the community.

Transcendental philosophy sets a task for the whole of humanity (Hua VII 236), the task of becoming universal, self-conscious, rational beings in a community and world that is recognized as its own accomplishment. Husserl considers the breakthrough into transcendental philosophy and to the ‘transcendental attitude’ as producing a permanent reorientation of human culture towards higher, more rational, and more self-aware goals, even to the extent of producing a new universal humanity.³⁴

One universal community does not mean a unicolor world with no differences, no characteristics, or no personalities. Diversity, in fact, is the key to a genuine community, because each of us is an absolutely unique being. This points at the goal and the starting point of phenomenology: starting from where I stand to go towards a universal humanity as an open home for everyone.

³⁴ Husserl Lexicon, 333