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Are the Upwardly-Mobile More Left-Wing?

**Andrew E. Clark
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JEL Codes: A14, C25, D31, D63, J28, J62.

Keywords: Social Mobility, Voting, Redistribution, Satisfaction, Fairness.



Are the Upwardly-Mobile More Left-Wing? *

Andrew E. Clark[†] and Maria Cotofan[‡]

Abstract

It is well-known that the wealthier are more likely to have Right-leaning political preferences. We here in addition consider the role of the individual's starting position, and in particular their upward social mobility relative to their parents. In 18 waves of UK panel data, both own and parental social status are independently positively associated with Right-leaning voting and political preferences: given their own social status, the upwardly-mobile are therefore more Left-wing. We investigate a number of potential mediators: these results do not reflect the relationship between well-being and own and parents' social status, but are partly linked to the individual's beliefs about how fair society is. We replicate these findings using US data and show that, in both countries, the choice of specification when controlling for the respondent's own status is crucial and may help explain some of the mixed findings in the literature.

Keywords: Social Mobility, Voting, Redistribution, Satisfaction, Fairness.

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1 Introduction

Preferences for redistribution have been studied extensively, partly because they are linked to individuals' actual voting behaviour. Research has underlined the role played by individual social standing in determining these preferences over the allocation of welfare and the structure of taxation. We contribute to this literature, with the innovation that we have social standing information (measured by occupational prestige) for both individuals and their parents. We can thus determine whether the starting position in life (captured by parents' social standing) matters, holding own social status constant, and so whether social mobility relative to parents is linked to political behaviour and preferences for redistribution.

There is already a flourishing literature on the link between political preferences and the individual's own economic position. The wealthier are more Right-wing and less open to redistribution than are the poorer.¹ This is often thought to reflect self-interest, with the richer having more to lose from redistributive policies.

Regarding the role of inter-generational mobility, and therefore parents' status, the predictions from theory are more mixed. On the one hand, [Piketty \(1995\)](#) argues that not only current income but also mobility determine views on redistributive taxation, with Left-wing dynasties of lower social standing believing less in the importance of effort, and thus being more in favour of redistribution. The upwardly-mobile may revise their beliefs about how society works, but are also more likely to come from more Left-wing dynasties. Piketty argues that the latter effect predominates, so that ceteris paribus those with lower economic backgrounds are more Left-wing.²

On the other hand, [Benabou and Ok \(2001\)](#) assert that due to the "prospect of upward mobility" it may be rational for low-income voters to be anti-redistribution if they believe that they (or their offspring) will be above the median in the future, even if they are currently below the median. Here it is not the past experience of mobility that matters, but rather expectations of its likely occurrence in the future. Both [Piketty \(1995\)](#) and [Benabou and Ok \(2001\)](#) emphasise that support for redistribution depends to some extent on beliefs about the prevalence of social mobility, where these beliefs are shaped by either past experiences or the perceived probability of moving up in the future.

Much of the empirical work on mobility and preferences for redistribution has focused on the role of beliefs about own social standing or the prospect of upwards mobility ([Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000](#); [Corneo, 2001](#); [Corneo and Grüner, 2002](#); [Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005](#); [Alesina and Giuliano, 2011](#); [Guillaud, 2013](#); [Alesina et al., 2018](#)). Overall, the findings suggest that those who are relatively well-off tend to be more optimistic about the extent of social mobility, and less likely to vote for Left-wing parties or support redistributive policies.

But the beliefs that individuals have may not necessarily match the economic reality, either in terms of the individual's position in the income distribution ([Norton and Ariely, 2011](#); [Cruces](#)

¹The estimated individual-income coefficient is generally negative in regressions where the dependent variable is a measure of support for redistribution. For recent surveys of this literature see [Alesina and Giuliano \(2011\)](#) and [Mengel and Weidenholzer \(2023\)](#)

²He concludes that "parents' income class determines one's political attitudes as much as one's current income" (pages 552-553).

et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017) or their mobility prospects (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Kraus and Tan, 2015; Davidai, 2018). Some research has found that beliefs about mobility tend to be correlated more strongly with political preferences than are objective mobility measures (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina et al., 2018), while other analyses have not had objective measures available in order to carry out this direct comparison (Corneo, 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Guillaud, 2013). However, recent experimental evidence has cast doubt on the superior predictive power of perceived rather than objective measures (Weisstanner and Armingeon, 2022), and in Choi (2021) objective measures of social status perform better at predicting preferences for redistribution than do subjective ones.³ And while beliefs about mobility may affect political preferences differently from shifts in the actual distribution of income or social status in society, it is also worth underlining that economic policy in this respect is almost solely focused on observable outcomes, and does not as such attempt to change individuals' beliefs (while holding the actual outcomes constant).

Our contribution here is to estimate the link between observed intergenerational social mobility and political preferences at the individual level. There is currently only little evidence in this respect. A small number of papers have used a variety of objective social-mobility measures to this end, producing mixed findings. Siedler and Sonnenberg (2012) analyse data on father-son earnings distributions, and show that upward mobility relative to one's father results in less support for redistribution. In data from transition post-socialist economies, Gugushvili (2016) reveals on the contrary no correlation between redistributive preferences and objective mobility (via measures such as the respondent's occupational mobility relative to their father) but a positive correlation when mobility is measured subjectively. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) analyse social-mobility data from the US, and find a positive correlation between preferences for redistribution and mobility with respect to father's education, but a negative correlation for mobility with respect to father's occupation.

One drawback of some of the work above is that it evaluates the effect of some kind of measure of mobility on redistributive preferences but often without controlling for the respondent's own social status, despite its confounding role: the upwardly-mobile are on average richer.⁴ The research we propose here is one of the first to systematically evaluate the link between *actual* social mobility (relative to one's parents) and political preferences, while holding the respondent's own social status fixed. We in addition not only consider the individual's stated preferences, but also their actual political behaviour (as measured by their vote in past General Elections in the UK data we analyse).

We use 18 waves of UK panel data, which include information on the social status of both the respondent and their parents (with this latter referring to parental status when the respondent was aged 14), voting behaviour, and stated political preferences. Our results show that higher own status and higher-status parents independently produce Conservative voters. But upward mobility (controlling for own social status) is associated with more Left-wing voting and preferences. Those who move up in life are on average more pro-redistribution, as they started from a lower level (as in Piketty (1995)); this is consistent with the upwardly-mobile being more em-

³Although objective and subjective measures of income perform similarly.

⁴Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) control for the respondent's own income in their analysis, but do not include comparable measures of both respondent and parental social status.

pathetic towards those with lower social status. It also provides a potential political-preferences explanation for the well-known Great Gatsby Curve (Corak, 2013) of a negative relationship at the country level between social mobility (the estimated intergenerational elasticity of income) and inequality.

We show that not controlling for own social status when estimating the effect of social mobility on political preferences for redistribution leads to a substantial change in the estimated coefficients (as those who are socially-mobile end up having higher status on average). We replicate these results using US data, and show that this confounding of the individual's own status level and their change relative to their parents may help explain some of the conflicting findings in the existing literature.

We carry out mediation analyses to evaluate two of the channels that may lie behind this relationship. The first mediator is subjective well-being. There is a substantial literature on the link between well-being and some measure of status, with the latter being measured by own income relative to that of a reference group. One natural reference group for the evaluation of the individual's own situation is their parents. While the relationship between own well-being and own income is very typically positive, that with comparison income (which acts as a deflator) is expected to be negative (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Easterlin, 2001; Clark et al., 2008). As such, both own status and status relative to one's parents may be associated with higher well-being. Given that a number of recent papers have underscored the relationship between well-being and political behaviour (Ward, 2020; Ward et al., 2021), well-being may well mediate the relationship between social mobility and political preferences.

The second potential mediator, in line with the broader literature on social mobility and redistribution, refers to beliefs about how fair society is. Own mobility may change beliefs about the relative importance of luck and effort, and these beliefs themselves inform individuals' attitudes to how much redistribution there should be.

In the mediation analysis, we show that own status is positively associated with well-being, and parental status negatively so, consistent with parents being a reference group for social comparisons. As such, the correlation between upward mobility and well-being is positive. There is however no mediating effect of wellbeing: the relationship between social mobility and political preferences does not reflect that the former increases subjective wellbeing. The second mediation concerns fairness. Both own status and parental status are positively correlated with the individual's beliefs that society is fair, while the correlation between upward mobility and fairness is negative. These fairness beliefs do partly mediate the relationship between mobility and political preferences.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 discusses our estimation approach. Section 4 then presents the UK regression results, and Section 5 those from the US data. Last, Section 6 concludes.

2 UK Data

We use data from all 18 waves (1991 - 2008) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),⁵ which is the longest-running representative household panel survey in the UK. These data will allow us to estimate the relationship between (1) own social status, (2) parental social status, and (3) social mobility relative to one's parents, and a number of different measures of political preferences: voting behaviour, position on the political spectrum, and preferences for redistribution.

Our key right-hand side variable is social status: this is measured in all waves of the BHPS by the Hope-Goldthorpe Scale (HGS), an index defined over a continuous scale from lower to higher occupational prestige, ranging between values of 17.52 and 82.05. The HGS index is derived from a survey of the social standing of occupations reflecting their social desirability. As an occupational-based measure of social mobility, the HGS index automatically excludes the unemployed. As such, our results represent the relationship between social mobility and political preferences for those in employment.⁶ It was originally devised for men, but is now applied for both sexes (see Goldthorpe and Hope, 1974).

There are 142 occupational categories, which are ranked in order of desirability, from low-prestige occupations such as street vendors to high-prestige occupations such as lawyers and accountants. To make the estimated coefficients easier to interpret, we standardise the Hope-Goldthorpe Scale to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one throughout our analysis. The breadth of the HGS scale allows for substantial variation in both own and parental occupational status.

We calculate upwards social mobility by comparing the individual's own status to that of their parents. Although it would be possible to do this via some measure of income or income rank, the BHPS does not include information on the income history of the respondent's parents.⁷ However, the BHPS does record the social status of both the respondent's mother and father, measured on the same HGS scale, when the respondent was aged 14. It is this information that we will use to construct our measure of social mobility.⁸

Recent findings comparing actual intergenerational income mobility across countries shows that this is higher in the UK than in the US, but comparable to (or perhaps a little lower than) the figures in France, Italy and Sweden.⁹ On the contrary, beliefs about mobility are less optimistic

⁵While Understanding Society, the successor to the BHPS, has been running since 2009, this does not include information on either the respondent's own social status or that of their parents.

⁶By design, the HGS excludes 44% of the original sample. The demographics of the excluded sample differ in a similar way in which those who work differ from those who do not: the former are more likely to be male (56% vs 44%), younger (on average 39 as opposed to 54) and more likely to have a slightly higher household income (7.8 log of monthly income as opposed to 7.2)

⁷We can only match own and parents' income for the small number of BHPS respondents whose children subsequently become BHPS respondents themselves. These individuals are obviously not representative, for age reasons.

⁸We analyse mobility relative to mother and father separately. In our estimation sample, mother's HGS was higher than father's HGS for 30% of respondents.

⁹A fairly similar ranking is found for the intergenerational correlation of income levels in Table 2 of Blanden (2013).

in European countries (Alesina et al., 2018).¹⁰ Within the UK, research has found that upward mobility from the bottom of the earnings distribution is more likely than is downward mobility from the top (Blanden et al., 2002; Ermisch et al., 2006). The estimated UK intergenerational correlation coefficient for years of education is 0.31 (Hertz et al., 2008) and that for income is 0.27 (Blanden et al., 2009). We can here provide comparable figures for the intergenerational correlation in status: in our BHPS data, the correlation between own HGS and that of one's father is 0.25 with a corresponding figure for mothers of 0.20. As such, there appears to be roughly as much mobility in the HGS as there is in income, likely making the comparison between own and parents' HGS a good proxy for the (unobserved) differences in own and parental income.

The dependent variables refer to the respondent's political behaviours and preferences for redistribution. We have four variables here. The first two capture voting behaviour and political position, and the second two individual attitudes with respect to first the income distribution and then the public sector. Voting itself is measured by a question that appears in BHPS Waves 2, 5 and 7 through 18: "Which political party did you vote for?", which is asked to individuals who reported voting in the last General Election. For this part of the analysis, we retain respondents who voted for the Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat parties. The other (smaller) parties are excluded from the analysis, as they are more difficult to rank consistently in terms of a Left-Right political spectrum. In our sample, 84% of respondents who voted in the last General Election chose one of these three main parties.¹¹

The second political-position measure comes from a question not about recent voting but rather a more-general statement about which political party the individual supports (this appears in all waves apart from Wave 2). As above, and for the same reasons, we exclude the other (smaller) political parties from the analysis. As with our voting outcome, 84% of respondents report supporting one of these three parties. This information is coded to produce a political ranking with values 1 for the Conservatives, 2 for the centre Liberal Democrat party, and 3 for the Labour party.

There are two distinct questions about preferences for redistribution in the BHPS. The first is "People have different views about the way governments work. The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money that any one person can make". Answers here are on a 1-5 scale, from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree". We reverse code this variable, which appears in Waves 2, 4, 6, 8, 11 and 13, so that higher values correspond to greater preferences for redistribution by the Government.

The second redistribution question is: "People have different views about society. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership", with the same response scale as that for the earnings-ceiling question above. This variable appears in Waves 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 14, with again recorded higher values reflecting greater support for Government intervention.

¹⁰The observed probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the first quintile when adult is 7.8% in the US and 11.4% in the UK. The corresponding perceived probabilities in Alesina et al. (2018) are 11.7% and 10%.

¹¹Of the remaining respondents, over two-thirds voted for regional-specific parties in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, so that our analysis of the three main parties may not be overly-biased in terms of Left-Right political preferences in the UK.

In the second part of the analysis we will investigate two potential mediation channels for the relationship between political preferences and social status. The first is subjective wellbeing and the second individual beliefs about fairness and mobility.

We consider two measures of well-being in the first mediation channel: job satisfaction and life satisfaction. These come respectively from the following BHPS questions: “All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the 1-7 scale?”, and “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall”. Here 1 corresponds to not satisfied at all, and 7 to completely satisfied. Job satisfaction is available in all eighteen waves, while life satisfaction data are available in Waves 6 to 10, and then Waves 12 to 18. We drop Wave 1 in the analysis of job satisfaction, as the labels on the response categories are different there from those in all of the other waves (which has been shown to make a substantial difference to the distribution of responses: see [Conti and Pudney \(2011\)](#)).

For the fairness mediation channel, the first question is: “People have different views about society. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth”. The second asks about agreement with the following statement: “There is one law for the rich and one for the poor”. Both questions are answered on a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”, and appear in Waves 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, and 17. We recode both questions such that higher values correspond to a more-negative view of fairness in society.

We last control for a set of demographic variables: sex, age in five-year intervals, birth decade, whether the respondent is of White ethnicity, and wave and region fixed effects (the latter covering the 19 standard regions in the UK). These may act to confound the relationship between social status and political preferences (for example, older respondents likely have lower social status but also more-Conservative political preferences). We do not control for individual income or education, as these are very-strongly correlated with the individual’s own social status. ¹²

3 Specification and Estimation

Our main question concerns the relationship between inter-generational mobility in social status (as measured by a socio-occupational prestige scale) and political behaviour and preferences for redistribution. We consider three social-status measures: own social status, parental social status, and upward social mobility (higher social status than one’s parents).

The first of these, the individual’s own socio-economic position, is the most standard, especially to the extent that it has been proxied by individual income in many empirical analyses. Following this latter literature, we expect own status to be associated with more-Conservative attitudes, either because those who have succeeded in life may attribute their success to their own hard work (and so others’ lesser success to their lack of effort), or because those towards the top of the distribution have more to lose from any redistribution.

¹²Table A1 in the Appendix shows that income and education are not good proxies of own social status. Our results remain unchanged if we do control for education and income (either separately or simultaneously). These results are available upon request.

The second status variable refers to the individual’s background, as measured by their parents’ social status. We consider the role of parental status while continuing to control for the individual’s own social position (so that parents’ social status is not acting as an instrument for that of the respondent). There is a substantial literature in Political Science on this inter-generational transmission (Hyman, 1959; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Flanagan et al., 1991; Nieuwebeerta and Wittebrood, 1995), finding a strong correlation in political preferences across generations. It is likely that at least part of this transmission reflects parents transmitting their social position to their children. Controlling for the respondent’s own social position turns this channel off. Our empirical analysis then evaluates, given the individual’s current social position, the effect of having had parents who were of higher or lower social class.

Last, we compare own and parental status via a dummy variable for social mobility.¹³ Upward social mobility could lead respondents to adopt more-Conservative political positions, if they believe that this mobility is due to greater effort; alternatively the mobile could think that mobility is facilitated by government policy. A second channel is via wellbeing, with upward status mobility producing higher wellbeing, and happier people tending to vote Right-wing.

There are then three specifications for each political dependent variable: one with the respondent’s own status, the second adding parental social status (one each for the mother and father), and the last with the respondent’s own status and a dummy variable for upward social-mobility (again, one for each parent).¹⁴

The first specification for each political dependent variable $Y_{i,r,t}$ is:

$$Y_{i,r,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 HGS_{i,r,t} + \beta_2 X_{i,r,t} + \gamma_r + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,r,t} \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{i,r,t}$ is in turn voting behaviour, political-party preferences, and preferences for redistribution. The subscripts refer to individual i living in region r at time t . The β_1 coefficients reveal the relationship between the political variables and individual i ’s own social status (from the Hope-Goldthorpe scale). The $X_{i,r,t}$ are individual demographic variables, and γ_r and τ_t are region and wave dummies. As the BHPS is a panel, we have repeated observations on the same individual: we will thus cluster the standard errors at the individual level.

The second specification adds parents’ social status:

$$Y_{i,r,t} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 HGS_{i,r,t} + \delta_2 HGS_i^{parent} + \delta_3 X_{i,r,t} + \gamma_r + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,r,t} \quad (2)$$

where the δ_2 coefficient captures the effect of parents’ social status at the time when the respondent was aged 14. This equation is estimated separately for the respondent’s mother and father.

The last specification replaces parents’ social status above by a dummy for upward social mobility relative to one’s parents, the effect of which is captured by λ_2 :

¹³Section 4.2 shows that the results are robust to a number of alternative specifications of mobility.

¹⁴The analysis of origin, destination and mobility is analogous to that of age, period and cohort: the three are multicollinear. We here control for either origin and destination, or for destination and mobility.

$$Y_{i,r,t} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 HGS_{i,r,t} + \lambda_2 Mobility_{i,r,t}^{parent} + \lambda_3 X_{i,r,t} + \gamma_r + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,r,t} \quad (3)$$

We subsequently consider potential mediation via subjective well-being and beliefs about fairness. We do so by first estimating equations where the dependent variable is fairness beliefs or subjective well-being in order to see how these are related to the social-status variables. Second, we re-estimate Equations (1) to (3) including the mediating variables: this will reveal the extent to which the main estimated coefficients of β_1 , δ_1 , δ_2 , λ_1 , and λ_2 are accounted for by fairness and wellbeing.

For ease of interpretation, all of the equations are estimated via OLS. As all of the dependent variables are ordered, the Appendix lists the results from ordered-probit estimation, and shows that the main results are robust to this alternative specification.

4 UK Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 lists some sample descriptive statistics. Overall, about 50% of respondents voted Labour at the last General Election, 20% Liberal Democrat, and 30% Conservative. Equally, the average score on the 1-3 Right-Left spectrum is a little over 2, corresponding to an average view that is somewhat Left-Wing.¹⁵ In terms of redistributive preferences, the average respondent in the sample somewhat disagrees with a earnings ceiling (with a score of 2.45 on the 1-5 scale) but very slightly agrees with the State ownership of public services (3.10 on the 1-5 scale).

The mean HGS score in our sample is 48. This average (which covers both men and women) is slightly higher than the figure for respondents' fathers (as measured when the respondent was aged 14) of 46, and notably above the analogous figure for their mothers (39). 67% of respondents exhibit social mobility relative to their mother (in the sense that their HGS score is higher than hers was) and 54% relative to their father. Figure 1 plots the distribution of the respondent's own HGS, as well as that of both of the parents.

In terms of wellbeing, respondents report average life-satisfaction scores of 5.25 and job-satisfaction scores of 5.38, both on a 1-7 scale. Respondents believe that UK society is somewhat unfair, on average disagreeing that ordinary people share in the nation's wealth (with a score of 2.38 on the 1-5 scale) and agreeing that there is one law for the rich and one for the poor (3.64 on the 1-5 scale). Last, the sample is almost equally split between men and women, with an average age of 40, and 78% of respondents are from a White ethnic background.

¹⁵Labour was in power for 11 of the 18 years corresponding to BHPS data collection (1991-2008). Also note that these figures only refer to those who support Labour, the Liberal Democrats or the Conservatives.

4.2 Main Estimates

Tables 2 to 5 show the results from estimating Equations (1) to (3). The first column includes the respondent's own HGS score, while columns 2 and 3 add parental social status, and columns 4 and 5 add social mobility relative to each parent. All of the dependent variables and social-status scores are standardised, with means of zero and standard deviations of one. ¹⁶

The dependent variable in Table 2 is having voted for the Labour Party in the last General Election. ¹⁷ In column 1, own social status is negatively correlated with Left-wing voting: a one standard-deviation rise in the HGS index reduces the probability of voting for the Labour party by 0.1 standard deviations (corresponding to about five percentage points, from Table 1). This is consistent with the existing literature, and with individuals voting in their own self-interest: given the strong relationship between income and social status, those with lower social status are likely to gain more from redistribution.

In columns 2 and 3, parental social status also reduces the probability of Left-wing voting, with an effect that is similar in size to own status. There is a well-known intergenerational correlation in social status, but the results in columns 2 and 3 reveal the correlation between own voting and parental status when holding own social status constant. As such, someone in a managerial position with lower-status parents is more likely to be a Left-wing voter than someone in the same position with higher-status parents. In practice, the estimated coefficient on own status is only about 20% smaller when we hold parental social status constant, revealing that parent status is not a major confounder of own status. The final two columns explicitly refer to social mobility and show that, holding one's own social status constant, upwards social mobility relative to one's parents translates into a significantly higher probability of voting Left-wing. The social-mobility coefficients relative to mother and father are similar in size. The conclusion from Table 2 is then that higher-status individuals vote Right-wing, but to a lesser extent when they have experienced upward social mobility.

The results in Table 2 referred to reported voting behaviour in General Elections. One common measure of political attitudes instead comes from asking respondents to place themselves on a Right-Left (or Left-Right) political spectrum. Table 3 shows similar results regarding own and parental social status and mobility from the analysis of this political-spectrum information from the BHPS.

Tables 4 and 5 turn to explicit measures of stated redistributive preferences. The results are consistent with those for voting and political preferences in Tables 2 and 3. For both measures, own HGS is negatively correlated with preferences for redistribution, as in previous work. ¹⁸ The estimated own-status coefficient for the earnings-ceiling question in Table 4 is substantially larger than that for State ownership in Table 5: own status is then more salient for issues of income taxation and redistribution than for more-general questions of how goods and services should be provided in an economy. Parental status is also negatively correlated with preferences

¹⁶Our conclusions in Tables 2 to 5 remain both qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged when we restrict the sample in all columns to respondents for whom both mother and father HGS information is available.

¹⁷Using a cardinal measure of R-L voting, with 1 for the Conservatives, 2 for the Liberal Democrats and 3 for Labour produces very-similar results.

¹⁸See [Piketty \(1995\)](#), [Persson and Tabellini \(1994\)](#), and [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#)

for redistribution, and social mobility relative to parents increases the probability of being pro-redistribution markedly, albeit to a lesser extent than its effect on political behaviour.

Social mobility relative to one's parents then translates into stronger support for redistribution. These results are opposite to those in [Siedler and Sonnenberg \(2012\)](#), where upwards mobility in earnings reduces support for redistribution, and partially in contrast to those in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) who find the same for upward mobility in occupation.

To help understand how our main results can be placed in the existing literature, we estimate Equation (3) without controlling for the individual's own social status. We expect the estimated social-mobility coefficient in this specification to be more negative, as (omitted) own social status is negatively correlated with preferences for redistribution but positively correlated with social mobility. This is what is found in Table 6. The estimated social-mobility coefficients in the voting, stated political support and state ownership regressions are now insignificant and close to zero, and that for the earnings ceiling is negative and significant: almost all of these coefficients were positive and significant in our main results.¹⁹ As such, not controlling for a comparable measure of own status when considering the effects of social mobility substantially changes the estimates: this may partly explain the conflicting findings in previous work, and the negative estimates in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) and [Gugushvili \(2016\)](#). Section 5 investigates this question in more detail by applying our choice of specification to the US data in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#).

The estimation results in the main Tables come from OLS regressions, but Appendix Tables A2 to A5 show that the results continue to hold in ordered probit estimation. In Appendix Tables A6 to A9 we repeat the analysis but drop the demographic variables: again, the conclusions are unchanged. To account for the fact that social mobility may be subject to floor and ceiling effects (e.g. moving up is virtually automatic for those with very low status parents, and moving down very likely for those with the highest-status parents), we also estimate our main results without the top and bottom deciles of parental HGS. The results in Tables A10 to A13 show that our results are not driven by these outliers.

Finally, we address concerns regarding measurement error in the HGS values, such that respondents whose HGS is very close to that of their parents may have not actually experienced social mobility. We thus drop respondents whose HGS is within 5 points²⁰ of that of their parents: this exercise can be thought of as the comparison of upward to downward mobility. The results in Tables A14 to A17 for this restricted sample are unchanged in nature (and are sometimes even stronger).

4.3 Mediation

We begin our mediation analysis by seeing whether the social-status variables help explain the mediating variables of subjective wellbeing and beliefs about fairness in society. Tables A18 to

¹⁹Table A1 in the Appendix includes controls for mobility, income and education (the latter replacing own social status). The estimated mobility coefficients in this specification are all less positive than their counterparts in Tables 2-5, so that education and income are not perfect substitutes for own HGS.

²⁰This is equivalent to roughly 0.3 standard deviations in parental HGS. We have also experimented with other intervals to define "close", and find similar coefficients.

A21 in the Appendix present these results.

Own social status is positively correlated with both life and job satisfaction, although the effects are fairly small in size: a one standard-deviation rise in HGS increases wellbeing by 0.025 standard deviations. As social status is likely highly correlated with individual income, this positive correlation is unsurprising. The coefficients on parental status are negative and significant, while those on social mobility are positive and often significant (although only small in size).²¹ Parental social position then reduces well-being, while doing better than one's parents (slightly) increases well-being. This is in line with the large literature on the comparison of one's own position to that of a reference group, with higher-status parents producing a higher "reference level" against which their children judge their own achievement.

Tables A20 and A21 show that own social status is positively correlated with fairness beliefs, with a higher probability of believing that ordinary people share the nation's wealth and a lower probability of believing that there is one law for the rich and one for the poor. Parental social status works in the same direction, with the children of higher-status parents being more likely to believe that society is fair. The estimated coefficient on social mobility relative to one's parents is negative: the socially-mobile are less likely to believe that society is fair. This is contrary to the argument that social mobility will lead people to think that they are more able to influence their outcomes via their own effort and will therefore be less supportive of redistribution.

We next investigate the extent to which individual wellbeing and beliefs about societal fairness mediate the relationship between social mobility and political preferences. Table 7 presents the analysis with Life Satisfaction as a mediator, Table 8 those with Job Satisfaction, and last Tables 9 and 10 those with the two fairness variables.

Overall, individual wellbeing does little to mediate the relationship with either own status, parental status, or social mobility. On the other hand, beliefs about fairness do play a mediating role.²² Believing that ordinary people share in the nation's wealth mediates about 10% of the effects of own HGS and mobility for voting, and about 30% of the effect of own HGS for State ownership. Believing that there is one law for the rich and one for the poor is the strongest variable in this respect, mediating 25% of the effect of one's own status on voting, 33% of that on the right-left spectrum, and fully mediates the relationship with State ownership. It also mediates between 10% and 50% of the effect of parental social status on the various outcome variables, and between 15% and 100% of the effect of mobility on political preferences.

Our findings are in line with [Kim et al. \(2018\)](#), where high levels of perceived inequality of opportunity weaken the link between socio-economic status and preferences for redistribution: we similarly find that those from relatively humble backgrounds (who are more likely to be wealthier than their parents) support redistribution when controlling for their own social status, even though this may be against their self-interest. Our analysis shows that this is partly because

²¹A small number of other contributions have considered the relationship between social mobility and well-being, holding the respondent's own social status constant. [Kaiser and Trinh \(2021\)](#) find no relationship in Western Europe but a positive relationship in Eastern Europe in their analysis of ESS data. [Chan \(2018\)](#) analyses BHPS and Understanding Society data, with three social classes, finding no strong evidence that mobility affects life satisfaction (see his Appendix Table 9). [Dolan and Lordan \(2021\)](#) find little strong evidence that social mobility affects life satisfaction in the British Cohort Study data.

²²As there is no overlap in the relevant questions across waves, we cannot look at any mediation of fairness in the analysis of the Earnings-Ceiling variable.

they perceive society as unfair and, consequently, believe that the government should do more to address this lack of opportunity.

The fact that fairness beliefs are stronger mediators for redistributive preferences than political position likely reflects that the latter includes many domains (such as crime, immigration, urban policy and education), of which fiscal policy is only one.

The overall conclusion from the empirical analysis is that those who do better than their parents, given their own current status, likely remain more concerned about the mobility prospects of those of lesser means, and are more likely to support Left-wing policies as a result.

5 Replication in the US

The literature on the relationship between objective measures of social mobility and political preferences is only scarce, and has produced mixed results. In this section we compare our main estimates to those from [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#), who also consider objective mobility (comparing the respondent's occupational prestige score to that of his/her father when the respondent was growing up). We consider below how their results are affected by different choices of specification.

[Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) analyse 1978-1991 data from the General Social Survey (GSS), a representative repeated cross-section survey of the US population. Their dependent variable is preferences for redistribution, from the question “the government should reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor”. Responses are on an ordered 1–7 scale, from 1 (“should”) to 7 (“should not”), so that higher numbers correspond to greater preferences for redistribution. In their Table 4, the estimated coefficient on status mobility (own job prestige being greater than father's prestige) is significant (and negative) in one out of the four specifications. By way of contrast, our main estimated mobility coefficient, controlling for own status, is positive in the regressions for voting Labour (Table 2), the Right-Left spectrum (Table 3), imposing an earnings ceiling (Table 4), and State Ownership (Table 5). All four of these estimated coefficients then become either insignificant or negative and significant when own status is not held constant (Table 6).

There are a number of potential explanations for the difference between our positive estimated mobility coefficients and the negative or insignificant ones in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#): different datasets, the time periods covered, and the regression specifications. We will show below that it is the latter, and in particular our inclusion of an own-status variable that measured in the same way as that for social mobility with respect to parents.

Our replication focuses on the estimates in column (4) of their Table 4. This specification includes a broad set of demographic variables, and two intergenerational mobility variables: a dummy for the respondent's occupational prestige being larger than their father's, and the difference between the respondent's own years education and that of their father. Column 1 in Table 11 replicates the [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) results from column (4) of their Table 4. Using an Ordered Probit estimation, as they do, we find a similar coefficient of roughly

-0.030 that is however insignificant in the first column of Panel A. This is also the case in the OLS estimation in the first column of Panel B. While the results are qualitatively the same, the estimate is slightly different from that in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#). This reflects their inclusion of State dummies, while our version of the GSS only allows us to include region dummies.

We can also analyse a measure of political support in the GSS, where higher numbers correspond to a stronger preference for the Democratic party. This political support question was asked in more waves than that on redistribution (and there was also less non-response), so that the sample size is larger. In column (3) of Table 11 there is a negative but close to zero and insignificant mobility coefficient for Democratic party support when using the [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) specification. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 11 refer to the specification used in Section 4.2 above by adding the respondent's own occupational status. The 1978-1991 GSS results reveal that higher-status individuals are against redistribution and less likely to support the Democrats, but that occupational mobility is positively and significantly associated with Left-wing views. These results are the same as those for the UK above.

Table 12 extends the analysis to all of the currently-available GSS waves, initially controlling for a restricted set of demographics as in Table 2. In Panel A, occupational mobility again switches sign for both redistribution and Democrat support once we control for the respondent's own status. In Panel B we add controls for respondent's income and education and for their father's education. While these variables do attenuate the own status and mobility coefficients (as to be expected, as they partly proxy for both), our conclusions are unchanged: at a given occupational status score, the individual who experienced mobility is more pro-redistribution and more likely to support the Democrats.

Last, Table 13 compares a number of specifications where instead of the respondent's occupational status and their mobility relative to the father, we instead include respondent and father occupational status variables. This specification corresponds to that in column (3) of Table 2. The first column includes the set of controls in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#), the second that in our Table 2, the third adds respondent income and education, and the last adds father's education to the controls in column (3). In line with Table 2, the coefficients on both own and parental status are always negative and almost always statistically significant at the one per cent level.

We conclude that the difference between the results in our paper and [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) is not due to differences between the US and the UK, in the sample period the data cover, or the choice of control variables. In both countries, holding the respondent's current status constant, those who experienced mobility are more Left-wing. This finding is also consistent with the results regarding the second mobility variable, education, in [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#): education gap between respondents and their fathers is positively correlated with the children's attitudes towards redistribution, whereas the respondent's own education (which is introduced at the same time) attracts a negative and significant estimated coefficient.

6 Conclusion

This paper aimed to provide a unified analysis of social status and social mobility (relative to one's parents), and political behaviour and preferences for redistribution. We considered three social-status measures: one's own, that of one's parents, and a dummy variable for upward social mobility relative to one's parents.

The estimation results from eighteen waves of BHPS data confirm the well-established finding that higher social status goes together with Conservative political preferences and opposition to redistribution. We also show that, holding own social status constant, parental status affects political attitudes in exactly the same way: the individuals with the most Right-wing attitudes (and votes) are then those with high social status whose parents were also of high social status.

Following on from the role of parental status above, perhaps our most-striking finding is that of the link between social mobility and political preferences. Contrary to much of the previous literature, upwards social mobility attenuates the effect of own status rather than reinforcing it. In other words, the wealthy are more Conservative, but less so when they come from a lower social background.

Our findings do not always match those in the existing literature. We believe that this may be partly because the latter has not consistently controlled for measures of own and parental status at the same time. This is central to understanding the effects of social mobility. Social mobility can be thought of in a pure sense as "doing better" than some benchmark, independently of where the individual finally ends up. But empirical analyses of a social-mobility dummy on its own will not only capture this effect of "doing better" but also that of the individual's final social status (or, depending on the specification, the social status of the group defining social mobility, here the individual's parents).

We show this confounding effect in our empirical analysis using both UK and US data. Social mobility, without controlling for own status, has either no effect or produces Right-wing preferences. Controlling for own social status (measured in an analogous way to parental status) consistently indicates that social mobility conditional on the final outcome is associated with Left-wing preferences.

We investigate two specific channels of subjective wellbeing and fairness beliefs. Higher-status respondents are both happier and more likely to believe that society is fair, with the latter correlation being in line with the literature on social standing and beliefs about the role of effort relative to luck. But the socially mobile, despite being happier, are concerned about fairness in society. The mediation analysis shows that our findings are not explained by the relationship between status and wellbeing, but do on the contrary partly reflect fairness beliefs. The socially-mobile are more likely to believe that society is unfair for those who (like their parents) have lower social status.

Our results thus suggest the possibility of a self-perpetuating cycle: with low levels of social mobility fewer will support redistribution, maintaining the gap - in both actual status and beliefs about fairness in society - between the wealthy and the poor. As such, we provide a potential explanation of the well-known Great Gatsby Curve of a negative relationship at the country level between social mobility (the estimated intergenerational elasticity of income) and inequality.

The fact that social mobility is associated with Left-wing preferences may well lead to more redistribution in practice, and therefore less inequality.

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7 Tables and Figures

Figures




Figure 1: Distribution of the Hope-Goldthorpe scale for the respondent and their parents (BHPS 1991-2008)

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable Name	Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size
Outcome Variables			
Voted Conservative	0.31	0.46	53,163
Voted Liberal Democrat	0.19	0.39	53,163
Voted Labour	0.50	0.50	53,163
Right-Left spectrum (3-point scale)	2.17	0.89	68,409
Earnings ceiling (5-point scale)	2.45	1.07	40,354
State ownership (5-point scale)	3.10	0.98	39,391
Explanatory Variables			
Hope-Goldthorpe scale (17.52-82.05)	48.43	15.72	106,925
Hope-Goldthorpe scale mother (17.52-82.05)	39.55	14.71	46,969
Hope-Goldthorpe scale father (17.52-82.05)	46.20	14.78	76,753
Upward mobility compared to mother (binary)	0.67	0.47	46,969
Upward mobility compared to father (binary)	0.54	0.50	76,753
Mediators			
Life Satisfaction (7-point scale)	5.25	1.10	73,830
Job Satisfaction (7-point scale)	5.38	1.30	92,794
Sharing Wealth (5-point scale)	2.38	0.89	39,391
One Law Rich (5-point scale)	3.64	0.96	39,391
Controls			
Female (binary)	0.47	0.50	106,925
Age (ordinal)	39.97	11.97	106,925
Birth year	1960	12.43	106,925
White (binary)	0.78	0.41	106,925

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991-2008).

Main Results

Table 2: Regression analysis: Voted Labour in the Last General Election

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.110*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.014)	-0.082*** (0.011)	-0.124*** (0.016)	-0.146*** (0.013)
Mother HGS		-0.092*** (0.016)			
Father HGS			-0.108*** (0.012)		
Mobility Mother				0.145*** (0.033)	
Mobility Father					0.150*** (0.025)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.103	0.113	0.113	0.108	0.106
N	53,163	24,021	39,496	24,021	39,496

Source: British Household Panel Survey (fourteen waves between 1992 and 2008).

Notes: These are OLS regressions. Demographic variables include sex, age dummies in intervals of 5 years, decade of birth fixed effects, and a dummy variable for the respondent being of White ethnicity. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Regression analysis: Right-Left Spectrum

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.091*** (0.009)	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.011)	-0.096*** (0.016)	-0.122*** (0.013)
Mother HGS		-0.081*** (0.016)			
Father HGS			-0.096*** (0.012)		
Mobility Mother				0.111*** (0.032)	
Mobility Father					0.136*** (0.025)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.098	0.102	0.105	0.097	0.100
N	68,409	30,548	50,536	30,548	50,536

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seventeen waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Regression analysis: Earnings Ceiling

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.147*** (0.007)	-0.123*** (0.011)	-0.127*** (0.009)	-0.147*** (0.013)	-0.173*** (0.011)
Mother HGS		-0.045*** (0.012)			
Father HGS			-0.066*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				0.066** (0.026)	
Mobility Father					0.113*** (0.020)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.053	0.048	0.056	0.046	0.055
N	40,354	17,460	28,683	17,460	28,683

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2003 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Regression analysis: State Ownership

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.061*** (0.010)
Mother HGS		-0.022* (0.012)			
Father HGS			-0.042*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				0.013 (0.026)	
Mobility Father					0.056*** (0.020)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.011	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.014
N	39,391	17,499	29,058	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Regression Analyses Without Controlling For Own Status

	Vote	Right-Left	Right-Left	Earnings	Earnings	Ownership	Ownership
Mobility Mother	0.012 (0.029)	0.008 (0.028)		-0.088*** (0.022)	-0.019 (0.023)		
Mobility Father	0.005 (0.021)		0.015 (0.021)	-0.060*** (0.017)		-0.005 (0.017)	
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.098	0.091	0.089	0.031	0.033	0.012	0.012
N	24,021	39,496	30,548	17,460	28,683	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (various waves between 1991 and 2008: see notes to Tables 2 to 5). OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Life Satisfaction as a Mediator

	No Status	Mother HGS	Father HGS	Mother Mob	Father Mob
Voting Labour					
HGS	-0.109*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.015)	-0.080*** (0.012)	-0.125*** (0.017)	-0.142*** (0.014)
Life Satisfaction	-0.006 (0.009)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.010)
Parental Status		-0.093*** (0.017)	-0.109*** (0.013)	0.153*** (0.035)	0.143*** (0.027)
R-squared	0.091	0.100	0.100	0.095	0.093
N	41,130	18,623	30,150	18,623	30,150
Right-Left Support					
HGS	-0.081*** (0.009)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.053*** (0.011)	-0.084*** (0.016)	-0.107*** (0.014)
Life Satisfaction	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.022** (0.010)
Parental Status		-0.074*** (0.016)	-0.092*** (0.013)	0.100*** (0.034)	0.124*** (0.027)
R-squared	0.093	0.096	0.096	0.092	0.091
N	47,522	21,201	34,243	21,201	34,243
Earnings Ceiling					
HGS	-0.150*** (0.008)	-0.132*** (0.013)	-0.130*** (0.010)	-0.151*** (0.015)	-0.176*** (0.012)
Life Satisfaction	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.030*** (0.010)
Parental Status		-0.037*** (0.014)	-0.065*** (0.011)	0.050 (0.031)	0.114*** (0.023)
R-squared	0.058	0.052	0.062	0.052	0.060
N	23,078	9,893	15,877	9,893	15,877
State Ownership					
HGS	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.039*** (0.013)	-0.050*** (0.010)	-0.049*** (0.014)	-0.079*** (0.012)
Life Satisfaction	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.017* (0.009)
Parental Status		-0.022* (0.013)	-0.053*** (0.011)	0.025 (0.029)	0.064*** (0.023)
R-squared	0.009	0.010	0.016	0.010	0.014
N	24,547	10,759	17,131	10,759	17,131

Source: British Household Panel Survey (various waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Job Satisfaction as a Mediator

	No Status	Mother HGS	Father HGS	Mother Mob	Father Mob
Voting Labour					
HGS	-0.111*** (0.010)	-0.076*** (0.015)	-0.085*** (0.011)	-0.122*** (0.017)	-0.145*** (0.014)
Job Satisfaction	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.009)
Parental Status		-0.082*** (0.017)	-0.107*** (0.013)	0.128*** (0.035)	0.136*** (0.027)
R-squared	0.104	0.114	0.117	0.110	0.109
N	46,356	21,139	34,185	21,139	34,185
Right-Left Spectrum					
HGS	-0.093*** (0.009)	-0.058*** (0.014)	-0.069*** (0.011)	-0.097*** (0.016)	-0.127*** (0.013)
Job Satisfaction	-0.042*** (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.010)	-0.053*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.051*** (0.008)
Parental Status		-0.078*** (0.016)	-0.099*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.033)	0.131*** (0.026)
R-squared	0.100	0.107	0.111	0.103	0.105
N	59,480	26,801	43,573	26,801	43,573
Earnings Ceiling					
HGS	-0.146*** (0.008)	-0.126*** (0.012)	-0.128*** (0.010)	-0.148*** (0.014)	-0.173*** (0.011)
Job Satisfaction	-0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.008)
Parental Status		-0.042*** (0.013)	-0.065*** (0.011)	0.058** (0.028)	0.109*** (0.022)
R-squared	0.053	0.049	0.057	0.048	0.055
N	35,195	15,295	24,741	15,295	24,741
State Ownership					
HGS	-0.036*** (0.008)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.059*** (0.011)
Job Satisfaction	-0.045*** (0.007)	-0.061*** (0.010)	-0.055*** (0.008)	-0.061*** (0.010)	-0.054*** (0.008)
Parental Status		-0.021 (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.011)	0.009 (0.027)	0.046** (0.021)
R-squared	0.012	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.016
N	34,319	15,323	25,083	15,323	25,083

Source: British Household Panel Survey (various waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Share Wealth as a Mediator

	No Status	Mother HGS	Father HGS	Mother Mob	Father Mob
Voting Labour					
HGS	-0.101*** (0.010)	-0.059*** (0.016)	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.105*** (0.018)	-0.129*** (0.014)
Share Wealth	-0.142*** (0.009)	-0.144*** (0.014)	-0.146*** (0.011)	-0.146*** (0.014)	-0.149*** (0.011)
Parental Status		-0.089*** (0.017)	-0.098*** (0.013)	0.123*** (0.036)	0.134*** (0.027)
R-squared	0.125	0.138	0.133	0.133	0.127
N	18,286	8,181	13,570	8,181	13,570
Right-Left Spectrum					
HGS	-0.081*** (0.009)	-0.039*** (0.014)	-0.057*** (0.011)	-0.079*** (0.016)	-0.108*** (0.012)
Share Wealth	-0.219*** (0.008)	-0.225*** (0.011)	-0.230*** (0.009)	-0.226*** (0.011)	-0.232*** (0.009)
Parental Status		-0.078*** (0.015)	-0.082*** (0.012)	0.107*** (0.033)	0.118*** (0.024)
R-squared	0.148	0.154	0.163	0.150	0.159
N	27,668	12,411	21,025	12,411	21,025
State Ownership					
HGS	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.050*** (0.010)
Share Wealth	-0.151*** (0.007)	-0.149*** (0.011)	-0.154*** (0.008)	-0.149*** (0.011)	-0.155*** (0.008)
Parental Status		-0.019 (0.012)	-0.036*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.025)	0.047** (0.020)
R-squared	0.033	0.034	0.037	0.033	0.037
N	39,391	17,499	29,058	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (various waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: One Law for Rich as a Mediator

	No Status	Mother HGS	Father HGS	Mother Mob	Father Mob
Voting Labour					
HGS	-0.086*** (0.010)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.088*** (0.018)	-0.112*** (0.014)
One Law for Rich	0.153*** (0.009)	0.144*** (0.014)	0.142*** (0.011)	0.148*** (0.014)	0.147*** (0.011)
Parental Status		-0.082*** (0.017)	-0.094*** (0.013)	0.109*** (0.036)	0.126*** (0.027)
R-squared	0.128	0.139	0.132	0.135	0.127
N	18,286	8,181	13,570	8,181	13,570
Right-Left Spectrum					
HGS	-0.061*** (0.009)	-0.024* (0.014)	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.058*** (0.016)	-0.082*** (0.013)
One Law for Rich	0.208*** (0.008)	0.192*** (0.012)	0.208*** (0.009)	0.195*** (0.012)	0.212*** (0.009)
Parental Status		-0.071*** (0.016)	-0.073*** (0.012)	0.090*** (0.033)	0.101*** (0.025)
R-squared	0.143	0.141	0.152	0.138	0.149
N	27,668	12,411	21,025	12,411	21,025
State Ownership					
HGS	-0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.023** (0.010)
One Law for Rich	0.189*** (0.007)	0.182*** (0.011)	0.194*** (0.008)	0.183*** (0.011)	0.195*** (0.008)
Parental Status		-0.011 (0.012)	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.025)	0.029 (0.020)
R-squared	0.045	0.044	0.049	0.044	0.049
N	39,391	17,499	29,058	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (various waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Replication of Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Democrat	Democrat
Panel A: Ordered Probit (1978-1991)				
Mobility Father	-0.029 (0.025)	0.059** (0.030)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.056* (0.029)
Own Status		-0.090*** (0.016)		-0.061*** (0.016)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7,742	7,742	8,284	8,284
Panel B: OLS (1978-1991)				
Mobility Father	-0.027 (0.023)	0.049* (0.027)	-0.012 (0.022)	0.044* (0.026)
Own Status		-0.079*** (0.015)		-0.058*** (0.015)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7,742	7,742	8,284	8,284

Source: General Social Survey (10 waves between 1978 and 1991).

Notes: Regressions include the set of demographics as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), namely age, sex, marital status, race, education, number of children, the logarithm of real income, self-employment status, experience of unemployment in the last 5 years, and the difference in years of education between the respondent and their father. While Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) control for state fixed effects, our data only allows us to control for region fixed effects. The dependent variable and the respondent status are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's occupational status being higher than that of their father. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Alternative Specifications using the GSS

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Democrat	Democrat
Panel A: Table 2 Specification in the GSS				
Mobility Father	-0.050*** (0.013)	0.085*** (0.015)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.069*** (0.011)
Own Status		-0.125*** (0.008)		-0.071*** (0.006)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	24,306	24,306	44,873	44,873
Panel B: Additional Controls				
Mobility Father	-0.002 (0.013)	0.029* (0.015)	0.005 (0.010)	0.031*** (0.011)
Own Status		-0.032*** (0.009)		-0.027*** (0.006)
Years of education	-0.026*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
(log) Real Income	-0.142*** (0.007)	-0.139*** (0.007)	-0.077*** (0.005)	-0.075*** (0.006)
Father years of education	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	24,237	24,237	44,707	44,707

Source: General Social Survey (1973-2016).

Notes: Regressions include the set of demographics from Table 2, namely sex, age dummies in intervals of 5 years, decade of birth fixed effects, and a dummy variable for the respondent being of White ethnicity. The dependent variable and the respondent status are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's status being higher than that of their father. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Alternative Specifications using the GSS: own and father status

	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own Status	-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.093*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)
Father Status	-0.041*** (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.006)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8,785	24,306	24,237	24,237
	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own Status	-0.037*** (0.012)	-0.044*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)
Father Status	-0.035*** (0.011)	-0.047*** (0.005)	-0.040*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.005)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9,332	44,873	44,707	44,707

Source: General Social Survey (1973-2016).

Notes: Regression model (1) includes the set of demographics as used in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), model (2) includes control variables as added in Table 2 of this paper, model (3) adds personal education and income, while model (4) additionally includes father education. The dependent variable, respondent status, and father status are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

8 Appendix

Table A1: Regression Analyses Without Controlling For Own Status and With Controls for Education and Income

	Vote	Right-Left	Right-Left	Earnings	Earnings	Ownership	Ownership
Mobility Mother	0.053* (0.030)	0.030 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.024)			
Mobility Father	0.051** (0.023)	0.055** (0.022)		-0.012 (0.018)	0.005 (0.019)		
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.104	0.104	0.097	0.039	0.046	0.015	0.014
N	21,731	34,998	44,227	15,520	24,910	15,458	25,061

Source: British Household Panel Survey (various waves between 1991 and 2008: see notes to Tables 2 to 5).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Results with ordered probit

Table A2: Voting Labour with Ordered Probit

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.150*** (0.012)	-0.102*** (0.019)	-0.113*** (0.015)	-0.171*** (0.022)	-0.200*** (0.018)
Mother HGS		-0.126*** (0.022)			
Father HGS			-0.147*** (0.017)		
Mobility Mother				0.201*** (0.045)	
Mobility Father					0.205*** (0.035)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	53,163	24,021	39,496	24,021	39,496

Source: British Household Panel Survey (fourteen waves between 1992 and 2008).

Notes: Ordered probit models including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. To avoid convergence issues, the first and second decade of birth (1907-1930) are combined in one category. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Right-Left Spectrum with Ordered Probit

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.118*** (0.011)	-0.074*** (0.017)	-0.082*** (0.013)	-0.127*** (0.020)	-0.156*** (0.016)
Mother HGS		-0.103*** (0.020)			
Father HGS			-0.122*** (0.016)		
Mobility Mother				0.146*** (0.041)	
Mobility Father					0.173*** (0.031)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68,409	30,548	50,536	30,548	50,536

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seventeen waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: Ordered probit models including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. To avoid convergence issues, the first and second decade of birth (1907-1930) are combined in one category. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Earnings With Ordered Probit

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.168*** (0.008)	-0.143*** (0.013)	-0.148*** (0.010)	-0.171*** (0.015)	-0.201*** (0.012)
Mother HGS		-0.051*** (0.014)			
Father HGS			-0.077*** (0.011)		
Mobility Mother				0.077*** (0.029)	
Mobility Father					0.134*** (0.023)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	40,354	17,460	28,683	17,460	28,683

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2003 waves).

Notes: Ordered probit models including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. To avoid convergence issues, the first and second decade of birth (1907-1930) are combined in one category. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: State Ownership With Ordered Probit

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.042*** (0.008)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.011)
Mother HGS		-0.023* (0.013)			
Father HGS			-0.044*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				0.013 (0.027)	
Mobility Father					0.059*** (0.021)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	39,391	17,499	29,058	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 waves).

Notes: Ordered probit models including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. To avoid convergence issues, the first and second decade of birth (1907-1930) are combined in one category. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Results with no demographics

Table A6: Voted Labour in the Last General Election

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.105*** (0.009)	-0.063*** (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.011)	-0.117*** (0.017)	-0.150*** (0.013)
Mother HGS		-0.097*** (0.016)			
Father HGS			-0.126*** (0.013)		
Mobility Mother				0.155*** (0.035)	
Mobility Father					0.184*** (0.026)
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.011	0.015	0.026	0.010	0.017
N	56,450	24,350	39,998	24,350	39,998

Source: British Household Panel Survey (fourteen waves between 1992 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Right-Left Spectrum

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.092*** (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.014)	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.090*** (0.016)	-0.125*** (0.013)
Mother HGS		-0.083*** (0.016)			
Father HGS			-0.111*** (0.013)		
Mobility Mother				0.120*** (0.034)	
Mobility Father					0.164*** (0.026)
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.009	0.010	0.018	0.006	0.012
N	73,149	30,943	51,145	30,943	51,145

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seventeen waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Earnings Ceiling

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.165*** (0.007)	-0.136*** (0.011)	-0.144*** (0.009)	-0.164*** (0.013)	-0.200*** (0.010)
Mother HGS		-0.052*** (0.012)			
Father HGS			-0.081*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				0.076*** (0.026)	
Mobility Father					0.142*** (0.020)
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.028	0.024	0.033	0.022	0.031
N	43,575	17,730	29,097	17,730	29,097

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2003 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: State Ownership

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.056*** (0.010)
Mother HGS		-0.014 (0.012)			
Father HGS			-0.037*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				0.001 (0.026)	
Mobility Father					0.051** (0.020)
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.002
N	42,537	17,699	29,355	17,699	29,355

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Results without the top and bottom decile of parental HGS

Table A10: Voted Labour in the Last General Election

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.092*** (0.011)	-0.123*** (0.017)	-0.158*** (0.015)
Mother HGS	-0.094*** (0.018)			
Father HGS		-0.115*** (0.016)		
Mobility Mother			0.132*** (0.035)	
Mobility Father				0.155*** (0.028)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.112	0.111	0.108	0.106
N	22,602	35,084	22,602	35,084

Source: British Household Panel Survey (fourteen waves between 1992 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Right-Left Spectrum

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.073*** (0.011)	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.141*** (0.014)
Mother HGS	-0.089*** (0.018)			
Father HGS		-0.111*** (0.016)		
Mobility Mother			0.104*** (0.034)	
Mobility Father				0.157*** (0.028)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.103	0.105	0.099	0.101
N	28,746	44,928	28,746	44,928

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seventeen waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Earnings Ceiling

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.122*** (0.012)	-0.127*** (0.009)	-0.144*** (0.014)	-0.173*** (0.011)
Mother HGS	-0.048*** (0.014)			
Father HGS		-0.066*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother			0.059** (0.028)	
Mobility Father				0.113*** (0.020)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.047	0.056	0.046	0.055
N	16,471	28,683	16,471	28,683

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2003 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: State Ownership

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.023** (0.012)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.061*** (0.010)
Mother HGS	-0.023* (0.014)			
Father HGS		-0.042*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother			0.014 (0.027)	
Mobility Father				0.056*** (0.020)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.014
N	16,536	29,058	16,536	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Results without very similar own and parental HGS

Table A14: Voted Labour in the Last General Election

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.081*** (0.015)	-0.080*** (0.012)	-0.127*** (0.018)	-0.137*** (0.015)
Mother HGS	-0.095*** (0.017)			
Father HGS		-0.105*** (0.013)		
Mobility Mother			0.164*** (0.042)	
Mobility Father				0.167*** (0.032)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.114	0.111	0.109	0.104
N	19,146	30,406	19,146	30,406

Source: British Household Panel Survey (fourteen waves between 1992 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Right-Left Spectrum

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.058*** (0.011)	-0.103*** (0.018)	-0.103*** (0.015)
Mother HGS	-0.084*** (0.016)			
Father HGS		-0.088*** (0.013)		
Mobility Mother			0.147*** (0.041)	
Mobility Father				0.131*** (0.031)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.102	0.102	0.098	0.097
N	24,413	38,882	24,413	38,882

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seventeen waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Earnings Ceiling

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.122*** (0.012)	-0.125*** (0.010)	-0.154*** (0.015)	-0.175*** (0.013)
Mother HGS	-0.047*** (0.013)			
Father HGS		-0.064*** (0.011)		
Mobility Mother			0.115*** (0.033)	
Mobility Father				0.151*** (0.026)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.047	0.054	0.046	0.053
N	13,924	22,138	13,924	22,138

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2003 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A17: State Ownership

	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.037*** (0.013)	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.045*** (0.012)
Mother HGS	-0.028** (0.013)			
Father HGS		-0.031*** (0.011)		
Mobility Mother			0.021 (0.033)	
Mobility Father				0.046* (0.026)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.012
N	13,879	22,263	13,879	22,263

Source: British Household Panel Survey (1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004 waves).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Results with Life and Job Satisfaction

Table A18: Regression analysis - Life Satisfaction

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	0.023*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.015* (0.008)	0.018 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.010)
Mother HGS		-0.026** (0.011)			
Father HGS			-0.019** (0.009)		
Mobility Mother				0.039 (0.025)	
Mobility Father					0.043** (0.019)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.015	0.017
N	73,830	32,222	51,296	32,222	51,296

Source: British Household Panel Survey (twelve waves between 1996 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A19: Regression Analysis - Job Satisfaction

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	0.028*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.022** (0.011)	0.018** (0.009)
Mother HGS		-0.021** (0.010)			
Father HGS			-0.025*** (0.008)		
Mobility Mother				0.049** (0.022)	
Mobility Father					0.038** (0.017)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.024	0.021	0.027	0.021	0.026
N	92,794	40,903	65,834	40,903	65,834

Source: British Household Panel Survey (all waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Results with Fairness Beliefs

Table A20: Regression analysis - Share Wealth

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	0.054*** (0.007)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.073*** (0.010)
Mother HGS		0.019 (0.012)			
Father HGS			0.040*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				-0.013 (0.025)	
Mobility Father					-0.059*** (0.020)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.023	0.024	0.025	0.023	0.025
N	39,391	17,499	29,058	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seven waves between 1996 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A21: Regression analysis - One Law for Rich

	Eq (1)	Eq (2)	Eq (2)	Eq (3)	Eq (3)
HGS	-0.155*** (0.007)	-0.137*** (0.011)	-0.141*** (0.009)	-0.168*** (0.012)	-0.198*** (0.010)
Mother HGS		-0.057*** (0.012)			
Father HGS			-0.087*** (0.010)		
Mobility Mother				0.086*** (0.025)	
Mobility Father					0.137*** (0.019)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.047	0.046	0.054	0.044	0.050
N	39,391	17,499	29,058	17,499	29,058

Source: British Household Panel Survey (seven waves between 1991 and 2008).

Notes: OLS regressions including the standard set of demographics and time and region dummies. The dependent variable and the respondent and parental HGS are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mobility variables are dummies for the respondent's HGS being higher than that of her parents. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$