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The 2024 French Legislative Elections: Maintaining Elections, Political Crisis

Abstract

The 2024 French legislative elections were called by President Macron following the severe defeat of his coalition in the 2024 European elections. Held on June 30 and July 7 after a 3-week campaign, these snap elections were part of an unexpected electoral sequence. The first round confirmed the rise of the radical right *Rassemblement National* in the European contest: for the first time in the first round of legislative elections, a radical right coalition was the largest pre-election coalition by vote. However, the second round reaffirmed the radical right was still rejected by the majority of French people, finishing third in terms of seats, behind both the left-wing coalition and the presidential coalition. A centre-right minority government was ultimately formed with 4 parties (*Les Républicains*, *Renaissance*, *Mouvement Démocrate* and *Horizons*) and the parliamentary tolerance of the *Rassemblement national*. From the realignment perspective, the legislative elections were maintaining elections, confirming the tripartition of the votes, the tripolarisation of party competition and the end of majority governments – three key features of the new electoral order that emerged after the 2019 European elections.

Keywords

France; snap elections, maintaining elections, tripolar competition; minority government

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Introduction

The calling of snap elections in France had been a recurring issue in political discussions since the 2022 legislative elections, in which the centrist presidential coalition failed to secure more than a relative majority of seats in the National Assembly (Durovic 2023). The dissolution of the lower house of parliament was eventually declared by President Emmanuel Macron on European elections night (June 9), just one hour after the results were announced. The timing was unexpected, with political leaders and analysts anticipating a dissolution in the autumn, should the government fail to pass the budget.

The main official reason for the dissolution was the surge of the *Rassemblement National* (RN) and the severe defeat of the presidential coalition *Ensemble* in the European elections. As in the two previous EU elections, the radical right party came first in the polls, but this time reached 31.4% of the vote (compared to 24.9% in 2014 and 23.3% in 2019). This was the best ever result for the radical right in French elections. During his special address on election night, President Macron said: 'At the end of this day, I can't pretend that nothing has happened.'

Internal motives within the presidential coalition were also at play. Since the 2022 legislative elections, the absence of an absolute majority in the National Assembly had forced the executive to deal with left-wing and right-wing parliamentary opposition, even if they did not prevent the passage of legislation. The lack of any culture of compromise among political elites fuelled a sense of political impotence that weakened the president within his own camp, so that Macron used the dissolution to try to discipline his party and dictate his timing. During his address on election night, he said that 'A fever has taken hold of public and parliamentary debate in recent years', acknowledging the climate of political crisis.

The 2024 legislative elections were the 17th legislative elections under the Fifth Republic, but only the sixth snap elections following a dissolution. Three types of dissolutions had previously occurred: (1) 'confidence' dissolutions, where the newly elected president calls snap elections to bring the legislative majority and the presidential majority into line; (2) 'strategic' dissolutions, where the president calls snap elections at the most favourable moment to secure the re-election of their legislative majority; (3) 'crisis' dissolutions, where the president calls snap elections to solve a political or a social crisis. While the 2024 dissolution fell into the third category, unlike the precedents of 1962 and 1968, the crisis was latent. Recent snap elections in Western Europe have been the consequence of strategic dissolutions in Spain (Vall-Prat and Rodon 2024) and the United Kingdom, but also of crisis dissolutions in Greece, the Netherlands (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2024) and Portugal (Ferrinho Lopes 2024).

The legislative elections of 2024 had three main features. First, they were crisis elections included in a sequence opened by European elections. Second, governmental power was officially at stake. And third, they took place in a new electoral order based on an unprecedented tripolar competition (Gougou 2022). Taking these elements into account is fundamental to understanding their results.

Background of the elections

President Macron announced that snap legislative elections would be held on 30 June and 7 July 2024 just one hour after the polling stations for the European elections of 9 June closed¹. Albeit unexpected, the possibility of parliamentary dissolution had been established well in advance; Macron would not have been able to give election dates otherwise. By calling new legislative elections, Macron transferred responsibility for the political crisis and the RN's possible accession to power to the French people, while at the same time trying to regain control of his camp. 'This is a serious, weighty decision, but above all an act of confidence. Confidence in you, my dear compatriots, confidence in the ability of the French people to make the right choice for themselves and for future generations', he said in his address.

Unpopularity of the President and latent political crisis

Since the 2022 legislative elections, a minority government loyal to President Macron had been in power in France. Two major reforms were put in place, the first on pensions, and the second on immigration. The pension reform, strongly contested by a large social movement and public opinion, was passed without a formal vote in parliament through the use of Article 49-3 of the Constitution. Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne engaged the government's responsibility on the bill and, in the absence of an absolute majority to censure the government, the law was adopted. As for the immigration reform, the law was passed with the support of both LR (*Les Républicains*, conservatives) and RN MPs.

Despite a change of prime minister in early January 2024 following the nomination of Gabriel Attal, the loss of confidence in the president was enhanced by his hesitations in international politics, particularly over the war in Ukraine, and by an insurrection in New Caledonia. The presidential coalition's campaign for the EU elections was also disrupted by unfavourable polls, which placed the RN ahead by more than 10 percentage points. This led to a change in strategy: while the start of the campaign focused on criticising the RN and its relations with Russia in particular, the tone hardened from April onwards with a strategy of total polarisation, at the risk of promoting the RN as a credible alternative for government.

European elections results

The results of the European elections came as a shock. The RN list obtained 31.4% of the vote, 8 percentage points more than in the 2019 elections and almost 17 percentage points more than the presidential coalition's list (14.6%). For the first time since 1984, a list exceeded 30% of the vote in European elections in France. The RN was the main beneficiary of the second-order elections effects, but the losses of the centrist governing coalition (-7.8 points) went first to the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) on the left and LR on the right (Martin 2024). In fact, the RN gained ground mainly at the expense of LR and the left. The left remained stable compared to the 2019 elections (32.6%, +0.1), but underwent a change in its internal balance of power, with the PS coming out on top (+7.6) ahead of *La France Insoumise* (LFI; +3.6) and the Greens (-8).

Given these results, President Macron's gamble was based on two elements: (1) with a divided left, most second rounds of the legislative elections would pit the RN against the presidential coalition *Ensemble*; and (2) in the first round of the legislative elections, second-order election effects would partly disappear, narrowing the gap between the RN and *Ensemble*.

1 The electoral system was the French classical two-round system in single-member constituencies (577).

The campaign

The dates chosen by President Macron and the prospect of a radical right victory led to a short, intense campaign that lasted 20 days, the minimum period permitted under the Constitution. Candidates had to be registered no later than six days after the dissolution, forcing political parties to act with urgency. Two major events occurred in the first two days of the campaign: on the left, an agreement was met to form a broad pre-election alliance called the *Nouveau Front Populaire* (NFP); on the right, an alliance was forged between the president of LR, Eric Ciotti, and the RN.

Alliances, party nominations and candidacies

Despite a high level of conflict during the European election campaign, which confirmed the end of the *Nouvelle Union Populaire Écologique et Sociale* (*Nupes*) alliance formed prior to the 2022 legislative elections, the left reunited almost instantly after the dissolution of parliament. The very next day, an agreement giving birth to the NFP was signed between LFI, the PS, the Greens, the Communist Party (PCF) and other minor left-wing parties. The first part of this agreement concerned the distribution of candidates, rebalancing 109 constituencies that swung in favour of the PS compared with 2022 (given its gains in the EU elections); the second part concerned a common programme, eventually published after five days of negotiations.

On the right, the campaign began with a dramatic turn at LR following the party president's decision to forge an alliance with the RN. Despite being backed by only one outgoing MP and no other party leader, LR was deeply divided, leading to a series of resignations. The RN eventually nominated 68 supporters of Eric Ciotti, forming for the first time in its history a national pre-election alliance ('*Union des droites*', UDD) with part of a mainstream party. As for LR, it could not nominate more than 381 candidates.

The presidential coalition renewed and expanded the *Ensemble* alliance, formed in 2022, of *Renaissance*, *Horizons*, the *Mouvement démocrate* (MoDem) and the *Parti radical* by including the centre-right *Union des démocrates et indépendants* (UDI) – a move that had already been made for the European elections. It also decided not to put forward candidates in 96 of the 577 constituencies, where the risk of a RN victory was deemed too high.

Due to the suddenness of the dissolution, the short timeline for candidates to register for the first round and the broadening of alliances, only 4,009 candidates ran in the 2024 elections, significantly fewer than in previous elections. The average number of candidates by constituency was 6.9, compared to 10.9 in 2022, 13.7 in 2017, 11.4 in 2012, 13.2 in 2007, and 14.6 in 2002.

Issues and debates

No public policy issue was salient in the campaign, with the debate focusing on the government's record and the RN's ability to secure an absolute majority in the National Assembly in order to govern. Tensions ran high throughout the campaign, with a strong mobilisation of the left on the ground. Fear dominated.

The RN campaign was led by Jordan Bardella, the party chairman, while the *Ensemble* campaign was led by Prime Minister Attal. As for the NFP, nobody was put forward for the post of prime minister, while the rejection of LFI leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon remained a major issue in public opinion. Two televised debates pitted the three forces against each other. In the first, the NFP was represented by Manuel Bompard, coordinator of LFI; in the second by Olivier Faure, leader of the PS.

The results of the first round

The first round was mainly about the opportunity for alternation in power. It resulted in an impressive increase in voter turnout, a confirmation of the radical right's surge following its victory in the European elections and a decline of the governing coalition (albeit to a lesser extent than in the European contest). Global results for the 577 constituencies are detailed in Table 1.

Turnout: an impressive increase

Turnout for the first round was 66.7%, the highest rate for legislative elections since 1997 and a 20-percentage point increase compared to the two most recent first-round turnouts (47.5% in 2022 and 48.7% in 2017). However, this remained below the first-round turnouts for recent presidential elections, which stood at 73.7% in 2022 and 77.8% in 2017.

The main explanation for such an impressive increase in voter turnout was the institutional setting. For the first time since the 1997 elections, the 2024 elections did not follow a presidential election. Admittedly, they were also part of a sequence, but they were not preceded by a first-order election in which voters felt they were making the most important choice². The 2024 legislative elections were thus the only elections of the year in which government power at the national level was at stake.

According to opinion polls³, the social logics of voter turnout differed from previous elections. Education had no effect on participation and age revealed new patterns: the elderly were still participating in greater numbers (80% of people over 70), but younger people were more likely to vote than usual (57% of the 18–24 age group). At the same time, new political logics were at play. Unlike the 2022 legislative elections, when the electorate of the presidential majority participated more than other electorates, it was the electorate of the left that mobilised the most in 2024.

The overall balance of power: a surge in support for the right

Since the 2007 presidential and legislative elections, French politics can no longer be reduced to a conflict between the left and the right (Gougou 2022). Emmanuel Macron's victory in 2017 led to the establishment of a tripolar configuration of political competition, with a central pole capable of winning elections (Gougou and Persico 2017). The first round of legislative elections confirmed this tripolar configuration, albeit a surge of the right (44.1%, +6.4 percentage points) in comparison with 2022. The centre suffered a significant decline (23.3%, -3.9), while the left remained stable (31.2%, +0.3). As in the European elections, the left-wing opposition did not benefit from the unpopularity of the outgoing government.

However, the surge of the right was less impressive than in the European elections, in which it reached 48.4%, an 8.5-percentage point increase on the 2019 results. Despite a non-negligible decline since the 2022 legislative elections, the centre was able to recover (14.6% in the European elections) thanks to its incumbents and the overdramatization of the campaign.

2 The elections of 1958 and 1962 were included in a sequence opened by a referendum. In 1958, turnout fell from 85% in the referendum to 78.2% in the first round of the legislative elections; in 1962, it dropped from 77.2% to 68.7%. In both sequences, the most important choice was the referendum (Lancelot 1998).

3 Ipsos election study, 'Sociologie des électorats et profils des abstentionnistes', (27–28 June 2024; N=10286; online study) [<https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/legislatives-2024/sociologie-des-electorats-legislatives-2024>].

The results of the main coalitions: a victory of the radical right

The most dynamic force within the right was the radical right coalition around the RN. With 33.4% of the vote, the RN shattered its record result for a first round of legislative elections, far exceeding its previous peak, which dated back to the 2022 elections (+14.8 percentage points). Such an impressive surge was the result of three factors: (1) a global surge of the right; (2) a lower demobilisation of the RN electorate because unlike in 2022, the RN had not just lost the first election of the sequence; (3) a collapse of other radical right (*Reconquête* 0.7%, -3.5 percentage points) and sovereigntist parties (*Debout la France* 0.3%, -0.8). Compared to the European elections, the first round was a 2-percentage point increase for the RN but a 6.8-percentage point decrease for the total of the radical right; the second-order effect of the European elections had faded. The RN coalition secured 39 seats thanks to its incumbents (34/39), while 447 candidates qualified in the 501 constituencies where a second round was necessary (259 front-runners).

The NFP coalition came second (28.3%), a 2.1-percentage point increase compared to Nupes in 2022. Given the general stability of the left, this increase was mainly a result of the political offer: the NFP included more parties and produced fewer dissident candidates than Nupes. The NFP won 31 seats, mainly in large cities, and qualified 419 candidates for participation in the second round in the 501 remaining constituencies (132 front-runners).

The presidential coalition *Ensemble* came third, dropping from 25.9% in 2022 to 21.8% (-4.1 percentage points). Its decline was not consistent across constituencies: the vote for incumbents was mostly stable compared to 2022, whereas the vote for non-incumbent candidates collapsed. The impact of incumbents was crucial to understand *Ensemble's* recovery from the European elections, where it fell below 15%. *Ensemble* won 2 seats and could not qualify more than 321 candidates for the second round (only 67 front-runners).

Behind the three dominant coalitions, the *Union de la droite et du centre* (UDC) around LR came fourth with 8.6%, a 3-percentage point decrease compared to 2022. As in the European elections, this score confirmed the existence of an autonomous mainstream right-wing electorate situated politically between *Ensemble* and the RN, even if it was once again in decline. Only 151 UDC candidates gained more than 10%, and 79 advanced for the second round (24 front-runners).

The results of the second round

The second round was all about a *barrage* against the RN. First, there were massive withdrawals from both NFP and *Ensemble* candidates when they came third behind the RN in the first round. Second, most of voters who chose eliminated candidates in the first round re-established a *cordon sanitaire* against the RN by voting for whichever opposition candidate remained in the second round. Results are detailed in Table 2.

The candidates: the return of the *cordon sanitaire*

As early as first-round election night, NFP leaders called on all left-wing candidates to withdraw if they came third behind the RN. *Ensemble* leaders initially hesitated, some refusing to withdraw when the NFP candidate was a LFI member. In the end, mutual withdrawal became the rule, though no formal agreement was signed. This implicated 130 of 421 NFP candidates (31%) and 81 of 321 *Ensemble* candidates (25%). UDC candidates refused to participate in this *front républicain*.

Such a number of withdrawals without a pre-election agreement was unparalleled in contemporary French politics. Under the Fifth Republic, there had been only one case of so many mutual withdrawals between pre-election opponents – in the 1962 legislative elections between the Communists, the Socialists and the *Radicaux* against the Gaullists. In both cases, withdrawals were opportunistic and based on a negative perspective – preventing a party to win the elections.

While 1318 candidates could advance for the second round, 1093 candidates eventually ran. This resulted in a massive decrease in more-than-two-candidate contests. Had withdrawals not happened, the second round would have seen five four-candidate runoff, 306 three-candidate runoff and 190 two-candidate runoff; what actualised was one *quadrangulaire*, 90 *triangulaires*, 409 *duels* and one single-candidate runoff. The second round was therefore mainly about duels against the RN.

Turnout: a mobilisation against the RN

Turnout in the second round remained high compared to previous legislative elections, reaching 66.6% in the 501 constituencies where a runoff was needed, a 0.3-percentage point decrease compared to the first round. In the 443 constituencies where a radical-right candidate ran, turnout was stable, with a 0.1-percentage point decrease compared to the first round. In the 58 constituencies where no radical-right candidate ran, turnout had a 1.6-point decrease. Fear of a RN victory was still a powerful motive for participation.

Due to the sharp reduction of the political offer, blank and invalid votes were on the rise (3.6% compared to 1.8% in the first round). This shift was, however far less pronounced than in the second round of the 2017 (8.6%) and 2022 (6.6%) presidential elections.

The results: the defeat of the radical right

The second round resulted in a severe defeat for the radical right. Despite an increase in votes compared to the same constituencies in the first round (37.2%, +4.2 percentage points), which is usual in second rounds given the reduction of the political offer, the UDD only managed to win 104 of the 443 constituencies in which it was still competing: 94 of the 354 *duels*, 9 of the 87 *triangulaires*, and one of

the two *quadrangulaires*. The three-candidate runoffs did not represent the least favourable contests for the UDD, as withdrawals had taken place where its chances to win were the highest.

The performance of the radical right varied based on its opponent (Table 3). The UDD won 40% of its duels against the NFP but only 17% against *Ensemble* and 14% against the UDC. In duels with the NFP, it was more successful facing LFI and the PCF (50% of wins) than the Greens (44% of wins) and the PS (37% of wins). In terms of votes, UDD candidates increased their share by 10 percentage points against the NFP, 5.5 against *Ensemble* and 4.2 against the UDC. Such results confirm opinion polls: the *barrage* against the radical right was dominant in all electorates, but stronger among left-wing voters.

The seats: the NFP as front-runner

Against all expectations, the NFP ultimately came out on top in terms of seats (Table 4). However, with 185 MPs (32% of the seats in the National Assembly), it was still a long way from securing an absolute majority; never in the Fifth Republic had the first coalition in terms of seats obtained such a small number of MPs. Within the NFP, the restructuring in favour of the PS was confirmed, but LFI managed to retain the lead, winning 69 seats (-2) compared to 58 seats for the PS (+33).

The governing coalition *Ensemble* came second with 167 seats, 81 fewer than in 2022. The defeat was unquestionable. Within the coalition, *Renaissance* confirmed its leadership ahead of the MoDem and *Horizons*, but both partners obtained a sufficient number of MPs to form a parliamentary group in the National Assembly and pursue an autonomous strategy.

The outcome for the radical right in terms of seats was positive: 55 gains compared to 2022, including 34 for the RN. With 143 MPs, the radical right has never been so well represented in French politics. However, following its breakthrough in terms of votes in the first round, the second round was a defeat.

The mainstream right-wing coalition UDC came fourth with 56 seats (-12 compared to 2022). LR lost 10 MPs and became the fifth party in the National Assembly. Following the dissent of the party leader at the beginning of the campaign, it could have disappeared.

The consequences of the elections

New patterns of government formation: the end of majority cabinets

Following the elections, President Macron acknowledged the defeat of his coalition. The NFP demanded the post of prime minister, but was divided over which name to propose before agreeing on Lucie Castets, a senior civil servant unknown to the public and the leaders of other parties. However, by refusing any compromise, and (repeating Mélenchon's formula on election night) by stating the next government would implement 'the platform, nothing but the platform, but all the platform of the NFP', NFP leaders did not show any willingness to govern. The very same day of her nomination by the NFP, on July 23, only three days before the Paris Olympic Games, President Macron denied the appointment of Lucie Castets in the name of 'institutional stability'.

Former candidate for the LR nomination before the 2022 presidential election and EU Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier was eventually appointed as prime minister by President Macron on September 5, two months after the elections. It was the longest delay for a president to make the appointment of the PM under the Fifth Republic, testifying to the difficulties of forming a stable cabinet. Since 1962, elections in France have traditionally resulted in a parliamentary majority for a pre-election coalition, leaving little room for post-election bargaining, with the 1988 and 2022 legislative elections being the only instances of minority governments. The legislative elections of 2024 were the second in a row not to result in a majority cabinet.

Prime Minister Barnier, aged 73, succeeded in forming a centre-right minority coalition cabinet including four parties in government: LR, *Renaissance*, the MoDem, and *Horizons*. Alternation was partial: the main parties of the former governing coalition were still represented in the cabinet, *Renaissance* claiming the largest number of portfolios as the largest parliamentary group within the coalition. The government had a relative majority of seats in the National Assembly but an absolute majority in the Senate, the upper house of parliament.

Maintaining elections in a new electoral order

Despite the impressive surge of the RN and the defeat of the presidential majority, the 2024 elections were consistent with the electoral order in place since 2019. From a realignment perspective, these elections can be considered as maintaining elections (Gougou 2022).

To characterize the electoral order of 2019, Gougou *et al.* (2024) have recently proposed the notions of both tripartition and tripolarisation to describe the balance of power in the electoral arena and the logics of access to power in the parliamentary arena, respectively. Accordingly, simple measures for the phenomenon are the number of pre-election coalitions needed to reach the threshold of 66.6% of votes in the electoral arena and the number of pre-election coalitions needed to reach the threshold of 80% of seats in the parliamentary arena.

Regarding the electoral balance of power, voter support for parties has in fact changed little since the 2022 elections. The presidential election pits a better point of comparison than the legislative elections because government power at the national level was also officially at stake. However, not all constituencies allow for a rigorous comparison: only those with a similar structure of candidacies should be taken into account. In the first round of the 2024 legislative elections, 147 constituencies had the

four major elements of the offer of the first round of the 2022 presidential election: an *Ensemble* incumbent, a NFP candidate, a UDC candidate and a UDD candidate. In these constituencies, the legislative vote replicated the presidential vote: 27% vs. 29% for the NFP, 30.5% vs. 32.2% for *Ensemble*, 8.6% vs. 5.6% for the UDC, 29.6% vs. 29.2% for the UDD⁴; Moreover, the results confirmed the tripartition typical of the new electoral order: to reach the threshold of two-thirds of the vote, the top three pre-election coalitions were needed.

Regarding the distribution of seats, the 2024 elections confirmed the tripolarisation regarding access to power. For the second time in a row, the first two coalitions did not capture 80% of the seats in the National Assembly (61% of seats for the NFP and *Ensemble*) and the top three coalitions were needed to reach this threshold (85% of seats for the NFP, Ensemble, and the UDD).

Finally, regarding government formation, the 2024 legislative elections confirmed a major consequence of the 2022 elections: minority governments seem to have become the rule in the new electoral order. This is a critical shift for the institutions of the Fifth Republic, and the next few months will be crucial for understanding how elites and voters adapt to the unexpected parliamentarisation of the regime.

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4 The second round told the same story. In 2024, 118 constituencies had the two major elements of the offer of the second round of the 2022 presidential election: an *Ensemble* incumbent and a UDD candidate. In these constituencies, the *Ensemble* candidate obtained 58.7% of the vote in 2024, while Macron gained 57.9% in 2022.

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Table 1. Results of the first round of French legislative elections 2022–2024 (*French Election Results Database*)

577 constituencies	2024				2022			
	Candidates	Votes	%	Seats	Candidates	Votes	%	Seats
Rassemblement national – Républicains à droite (RN-RAD)	570	10,714,568	33.4	39	566	4,231,687	18.6	
Union de la gauche Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) / Nupes	557	9,083,115	28.3	31	558	5,955,341	26.2	4
Ensemble ! Majorité présidentielle (ENS)	481	6,996,712	21.8	2	562	5,887,376	25.9	1
Union de la droite et du centre Les Républicains - Les Centristes (UDC)	381	2,762,103	8.6	1	507	2,643,847	11.6	
Miscellaneous left (DVG)	149	378,272	1.2		459	744,456	3.3	
Lutte Ouvrière (LO)	550	352,352	1.1		554	229,844	1.0	
Miscellaneous centre (DVC)					199	301,524	1.3	
Reconquête ! (REC)	330	240,407	0.7		551	965,597	4.2	
Regionalists (REG)	89	218,974	0.7		163	205,423	0.9	
Miscellaneous right (DVD)	87	204,361	0.6	1	192	257,585	1.1	
NFP outside the alliance / Nupes outside the alliance	12	171,624	0.5	1	29	72,775	0.3	
Miscellaneous ecologists (ECO)	158	170,870	0.5		750	591,496	2.6	
ENS outside the alliance	53	169,974	0.5	1				
Debout la France (DLF)	107	88,082	0.3		396	245,194	1.1	
Others (DIV)	214	66,505	0.2		524	154,709	0.7	
Extreme right (EXD)	26	49,856	0.2		28	42,973	0.2	
UDC outside the alliance	10	47,809	0.1		52	112,385	0.5	
Resistons ! (RES)	18	26,978	0.1		57	73,176	0.3	
Extreme left (EXG)	103	13,570	0.0		143	29,320	0.1	
Left (EXG-LO-NFP-DVG)	1,371	9,998,933	31.2	32	1,743	7,031,736	30.9	4
Centre (ENS-DVC)	598	7,468,498	23.3	3	761	6,188,900	27.2	1
Right (UDI-UDC-DLF-RES-RN-RAD-REC-EXD)	1,579	14,134,164	44.1	41	2,349	8,572,444	37.7	
Others (DIV-ECO-REG)	461	456,349	1.4		1,437	951,628	4.2	
Electorate		49,332,709				48,953,748		
Voters		32,908,657	66.7			23,256,207	47.5	
Valid votes		32,057,944	65.0			22,744,708	46.5	

Note: Percentages for parties and alliances are based on valid votes; percentages for voters (turnout) and valid votes are based on the electorate (registered voters).

Table 2. Results of the second round of the French legislative elections 2024 (*French Election Results Database*)

501 constituencies	Second round				First round			
	Candidates	Votes	%	Seats	Candidates	Votes	%	Qualified
Rassemblement national – Républicains à droite (RN-RAD)	443	10,144,024	37.2	104	496	9,301,798	33.0	447
Union de la gauche Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) / Nupes	288	7,120,825	26.1	153	486	7,811,339	27.7	419
Ensemble ! Majorité présidentielle (ENS)	240	6,942,375	25.4	165	419	6,342,194	22.5	321
Union de la droite et du centre Les Républicains - Les Centristes (UDC)	76	2,069,651	7.6	55	337	2,566,448	9.1	79
Miscellaneous left (DVG)	9	207,978	0.8	6	127	338,493	1.2	13
Lutte Ouvrière (LO)					476	304,591	1.1	0
Miscellaneous centre (DVC)	8	167,824	0.6	3	100	292,353	1.0	10
Reconquête ! (REC)					289	212,333	0.8	0
Regionalists (REG)	7	208,076	0.8	4	84	213,955	0.8	7
Miscellaneous right (DVD)	7	99,485	0.4	2	82	180,769	0.6	7
NFP outside the alliance / Nupes outside the alliance	8	175,113	0.6	6	10	128,950	0.5	8
Miscellaneous ecologists (ECO)					133	144,382	0.5	0
Union des Démocrates et Indépendants (UDI)	4	67,788	0.2	2	26	90,734	0.3	4
Debout la France (DLF)	1	18,672	0.1	0	104	86,785	0.3	1
Others (DIV)					193	61,652	0.2	0
Extreme right (EXD)	1	18,091	0.1	0	26	49,856	0.2	1
UDC outside the alliance	1	26,393	0.1	1	10	47,809	0.2	1
Resistons ! (RES)	1	13,419	0.0	0	18	26,978	0.1	1
Extreme left (EXG)					72	9,111	0.0	0
Left (EXG-LO-NFP-DVG)	305	7,503,916	27.5	165	1,171	8,592,484	30.5	440
Centre (ENS-DVC-UDI)	252	7,177,987	26.3	170	545	6,725,281	23.8	335
Right (UDC-DLF-RES-RN-RAD-REC-EXD)	530	12,389,735	45.4	162	1,362	12,472,776	44.2	537
Others (DIV-ECO-REG)	7	208,076	0.8	4	410	419,989	1.5	7
Electorate		43,328,508				43,322,294		
Voters		28,867,759	66.6			28,961,891	66.9	
Valid votes		27,279,714	63.0			28,210,530	65.1	

Note: Percentages for parties and alliances are based on valid votes; percentages for voters (turnout) and valid votes are based on the electorate (registered voters).

Table 3. Results of the duels including the radical right in the second round of the 2024 legislative elections

N		Result of the duel for the radical right			Mean of scores of the radical right candidate			Mean of scores of the main opponent		
		Wins	Defeats	% wins	First round	Second round	Evolution	First round	Second round	Evolution
151	Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP)	61	90	40	36.8	46.8	+ 10.0	32.4	53.2	+ 20.8
48	<i>La France Insoumise (LFI)</i>	24	24	50	37.4	48.3	+ 10.9	31.4	51.7	+ 20.3
60	<i>Parti socialiste (PS)</i>	22	38	37	37.5	46.8	+ 9.3	32.4	53.2	+ 20.8
16	<i>Europe Ecologie les Verts (EELV)</i>	7	9	44	36.6	47.1	+ 10.5	31.5	52.9	+ 21.4
10	<i>Parti communiste français (PCF)</i>	5	5	50	41.2	49.5	+ 8.3	33.2	50.5	+ 17.3
8	<i>Miscellaneous Overseas</i>	1	7	13	23.8	36.9	+ 13.1	38.8	63.1	+ 24.3
5	<i>Miscellaneous left</i>	1	4	20	34.5	43.7	+ 9.2	34.0	56.3	+ 22.3
1	<i>Other ecologists</i>	0	1	0	34.1	40.8	+ 6.7	38.6	59.2	+ 20.6
3	<i>Extreme left</i>	1	2	33	36.7	47.3	+ 10.6	29.5	52.7	+ 23.2
134	Ensemble (ENS)	23	111	17	37.4	42.9	+ 5.5	31.2	57.1	+ 25.9
51	Union de la droite et du centre (UDC)	7	44	14	39.1	43.3	+ 4.2	32.7	56.7	+ 24.0
354	Total	94	260	36						

Table 4. Results of French legislative elections 2022–2024 in seats (*French Election Results Database*)

	L2024	L2022	Evolution
Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) / Nupes	185	141	+ 44
<i>La France Insoumise (LFI)</i>	69	71	- 2
<i>Parti socialiste (PS)</i>	58	25	+ 33
<i>Europe Ecologie Les Verts (EELV)</i>	24	16	+ 8
<i>Miscellaneous left</i>	21	12	+ 9
<i>Parti communiste français (PCF)</i>	8	12	- 4
<i>Other ecologists</i>	3	4	- 1
<i>Extreme left</i>	2	1	+ 1
Ensemble ! Presidential majority (ENS)	167	248	- 81
<i>Renaissance (REN)</i>	95	146	- 51
<i>Mouvement démocrate (MoDem)</i>	34	45	- 11
<i>Horizons (HOR)</i>	25	28	- 3
<i>Miscellaneous centre</i>	6	8	- 2
<i>Miscellaneous right</i>	6	14	- 8
<i>Miscellaneous left</i>	1	7	- 6
Union des droites (UDD)	143	88	+ 55
<i>Rassemblement national (RN)</i>	122	88	+ 34
<i>Républicains à droite (RAD)</i>	18		+ 18
<i>Miscellaneous radical right</i>	3		+ 3
Union de la droite et du centre (UDC)	56	68	- 12
<i>Les Républicains (LR)</i>	52	62	- 10
<i>Union des Démocrates et Indépendants (UDI)</i>	ENS	4	- 4
<i>Les Centristes (LC)</i>	3	1	+ 2
<i>Miscellaneous right (DVD)</i>	1	1	=
Miscellaneous left, NFP outside the coalition	13	16	- 3
Miscellaneous centre, ENS outside the coalition	6	4	+ 2
Miscellaneous right, UDC outside the coalition	4	4	=
Miscellaneous radical right, sovereigntist right	0	3	- 3
Regionalists	3	5	- 2
Seats	577	577	