Financial, Democratic and Institutional Challenges of the Ecological Transition: What matters most?

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> Achieving a cost-benefit tradeoff (Nordhaus 2019).

The DICE model calculates an optimal strategy at +3.5°C by 2100. Other strategies are possible but require a higher carbon price and therefore an overall lower consumer welfare.

The carbon price is calculated in line with its social cost, which reveals an objective shadow price.

The unicity of the carbon price creates incentive into decarbonization of the economy through its effect on demand, supply and innovation. The carbon price reduces the need for information.

The calculation of the carbon price depends on numerous parameters (damage evaluation and discount rate especially).

A deeper critique is that damage functions monetize all human and non-human activities, which is correct. People might not object to monetizing the losses of wheat that are replaced by soybeans, or houses damaged by hurricanes. But they have firmer grounds for moral objections when studies put a price on human health impairments or monetize the submergence of entire island cultures. The economists' response is usually that we attempt to put all costs and benefits in a common metric so that we can balance the losses in one area with losses in others. We should be attentive to imputing appropriate prices, but it is better to include some values on health damages than to omit them from the analysis. As Keynes may have said, it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.

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* 1/ Public Policies Objectives

Social cost of carbon 2018\$ per ton of CO ₂				
2015	2020	2050	2100	
970	966	917	665	
497	515	614	657	
219	236	349	544	
93	104	179	361	
44	49	93	207	
23	27	55	126	
36	43	105	295	
	970 497 219 93 44 23	2018\$ per 2015 2020 970 966 497 515 219 236 93 104 44 49 23 27	2018\$ per ton of CO ₂ 2015 2020 2050 970 966 917 497 515 614 219 236 349 93 104 179 44 49 93 23 27 55	

(damage evaluation and discount rate especially).

- > To limit ecological damages with the transformation of the economy.
 - ✓ Stick to the Paris Accord of $+2^{\circ}$ C by 2100.
 - ✓ Refuse the cost-benefit calculation because of non-substitutable natural capital (Neumayer 2007).
 - Consider other environmental damages than GHG emissions.

Preference for mandatory regulations over market incentive mechanisms.

Agreement to limit economic growth in rich countries to avoid further ecological destruction (degrowth approach).

♦ 2/ How to face the cost of the green transition?

Green transition implies an investment effort of more than 2% of GDP for at least one decade (Pisany-Ferry Mahfouz 2023). It means an overall reduction of consumer welfare (Y = C + I).

This investment growth is the consequence of three problems:

- > Green investments are less productive than brown investments (electrification needs high infrastructure costs and electrified production goods are more expensive).
- > Well-functioning brown capital must be replaced before maturity.
- > Bottlenecks effects (for example the ability to produce more batteries depends on the availability of raw material). Cf. Hache and Roche 2024.

- ♦ 2/ How to face the cost of the green transition?
 - > Mainstream economics: the carbon price will produce the necessary incentives to discourage the financing of brown projects and promote green investments.
 - The cost is limited to the carbon price (which goes from \$43 in 2020 to \$105 in 2050 in the optimal base model with limited damage).

Table 1—Social Cost of Carbon Alternative Concepts, DICE 2016-R3 Model (2018\$)

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	Social cost of carbon 2018\$ per ton of CO ₂				
	2015	2020	2050	2100	
Base	37	15	100	304	
Optimal	36	43	105	295	
Optimal (alt dam)	91	108	249	584	
$T \le 2.5 (200 yr)$	41	49	123	379	
$T \le 2.0 (200 \text{yr})$	49	59	153	511	
$T \leq 1.5 (200 \text{yr})$	69	84	226	776	
$T \le 2.5 (100 \text{yr})$	76	93	260	755	
$T \le 2.0 (100 \text{yr})$	130	158	413	1,013	
$T \leq 1.5 (100 \text{yr})$	236	279	682	1,191	
$T \le 2.5$	95	118	361	477	
$T \leq 2.0$	225	275	749	459	
$T \le 1.5$	NF	NF	NF	NF	


Notes: Base = no controls. Optimal = cost-benefit maximum with base and alternative damage function. $T \le 2.5 (200 \text{yr}) = \text{temperature limited } 2.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ for a 200-year average (and the parallel notation for different temperature limits and averaging periods). $T \le 2.5$ is temperature limited to 2.5°C as a hard constraint. In the table, "NF" indicates not feasible.

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2020 to


- ♦ 2/ How to face the cost of the green transition?
 - > Mainstream economics: the carbon price will produce the necessary incentives to discourage the financing of brown projects and promote green investments.
 - The cost is limited to the carbon price (which goes from \$43 in 2020 to \$105 in 2050 in the optimal base model with limited damage).
 - ➤ Heterodox economics: the cost of the green transition necessitates an alternative financial and monetary system.
 - Green transition should be part of monetary policies objectives and central banks actions (Scialom 2022, 2023).
 - Money creation should help financing green investments (Couppey-Soubeyran et al. 2024).

- ♦ The logic of a market economy and the mainstream view
 - > A decentralized mechanism that produces collective decisions from individual market choices.



A representation of the neoliberal logic (Cayla 2023, p. 49)

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 - > A decentralized mechanism that produces collective decisions from individual market choices.




A representation of the neoliberal logic (Cayla 2023, p. 49)

The real questions: how to cope with the social cost of the green transition?

- ♦ The single price issue: how do we prevent agents from emitting GHG?
 - > If the price is too high, some legitimate uses of carbon emissions will not be fulfilled (ex: production of vital goods)... whereas the wealthiest can continue to overconsume.
 - > If the price is too low, there is no guarantee that zero emission consumption will prevail and that the green transition will happen.
- ♦ The social acceptance of constraints.
 - > From a "cap and trade" (CAT) principle to a "cap and organize" (CAO) logic.
 - > Implementing a limited purchasing power of money (cf. complementary money, Olk et al. 2023)

An institutional perspective to implement the green transition



Thank you for your attention