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**Politische Unterstützung und Demokratie:
Konzeptualisierung, Dimensionalisierung, Trends und Determinanten
im internationalen Vergleich**

HABILITATIONSSCHRIFT

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von

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Zmerli, Sonja (2014): "Political Trust". In: Michalos, Alex C. (Hrsg.): *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*. Heidelberg: Springer, 4887-4889. **(2)**

Hooghe, Marc, Zmerli, Sonja (2011): "Introduction: The Context of Political Trust". In: Zmerli, Sonja, Hooghe, Marc (Hrsg.): *Political Trust. Why Context Matters*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 1-11. **(3)**

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Zmerli, Sonja, Newton, Ken (2011): "Winners, Losers and Three Types of Trust". In: Zmerli, Sonja, Hooghe, Marc (Hrsg.): *Political Trust. Why Context Matters*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 67-94. **(4)**

Zmerli, Sonja, Newton, Ken, Montero, José Ramon (2007): "Trust in People, Confidence in Political Institutions, and Satisfaction with Democracy". In: van Deth, Jan W., Montero, José R., Westholm, Anders (Hrsg.): *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies. A Comparative Analysis*, London: Routledge, 35-65. **(5)**

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Corneo, Giacomo, Zmerli, Sonja, Pollak, Reinhard (2014): "Germany. Rising inequality and the transformation of Rhine capitalism". In: Salverda, Wiemer, Nolan, Brian, Checchi, Daniele, Marx, Ive, McKnight, Abigail, Tóth, István György, van de Werfhorst, Herman (eds.): *Changing Inequalities and Societal Impacts in Rich Countries: Thirty Countries' Experiences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271-298. **(11)**

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1. Einleitung

1. Einleitung

Im Zuge gesellschaftlicher Wandlungsprozesse, wirtschaftlicher Instabilität sowie politischer Krisen und Antagonismen sahen zahlreiche Politiker und Wissenschaftler bereits in den 1970er Jahren das Ende demokratischer Regierungssysteme heraufziehen (vgl. Huntington 2000). Diese Besorgnis gipfelte Mitte der 1970er Jahre in einem Bericht an die so genannte „Trilateral Commission“, „The Crisis of Democracy“, der weltweite Beachtung fand (Crozier et al. 1975) und sowohl Ursachen der demokratischen Krise in den USA, Europa und Japan benannte als auch Entwicklungsperspektiven aufzeigte. Bereits zu diesem Zeitpunkt wurde der starke Rückgang politischen Vertrauens als ein wesentlicher Begleitumstand demokratischer Krisen diagnostiziert. Auch wenn sich im Nachhinein die zum damaligen Zeitpunkt weithin geteilten Befürchtungen als überzogen erwiesen, geben insbesondere die gegenwärtig in Europa beobachtbaren krisenhaften politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen Anlass zur neuerlichen Besorgnis.

Während seit Beginn der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise im Jahr 2008 und den daraus erwachsenen europaweit grassierenden Staatsschuldenkrisen zahlreiche makroökonomische Kennzahlen das wirtschaftliche Auseinanderdriften der europäischen Staatengemeinschaft signalisieren, verlieren gleichzeitig gefestigt geglaubte demokratische Errungenschaften ihre Selbstverständlichkeiten: demokratisch legitimierte Regierungen scheitern, extreme politische Parteien gewinnen an Zulauf, Bürger verlieren das Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure und die Akzeptanz politischer Alternativen jenseits demokratischer Prinzipien steigt. Auf den wirtschaftlichen folgt nunmehr ein politischer Riss, der quer durch Europa verläuft. Insofern legen gerade politische und wirtschaftliche Krisenzeiten die zentrale Bedeutung politischer Unterstützung offen, deren Verlust die Überlebensfähigkeit jeglichen demokratischen Systems in Frage stellt (Pickel, Pickel 2006: 52).

Jenseits der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Aktualität dieses Forschungszweigs, der im übergeordneten theoretischen Rahmen der Politischen Kulturforschung verortet ist, lassen sich verschiedene Forschungsstränge identifizieren, die durch die vorliegende kumulative Habilitationsschrift adressiert und um weiterführende Erkenntnisse bereichert werden. Drei zentrale empirische Forschungsbeiträge sind zu benennen: Erstens ermöglichen die weiter unten vorgestellten empirischen Analysen zur Dimensionalisierung politischen Vertrauens Einblicke in die Korrelate und Hierarchisierung politischer Vertrauensobjekte. Zweitens leisten die Untersuchungen einen maßgeblichen Erklärungsbeitrag zum Verhältnis politischen und sozialen Vertrauens und bringen drittens neue Erkenntnisse zu individuellen und kontextuellen Vertrauensdeterminanten und deren Wechselwirkungen hervor.

Diese einführende Überblicksdarstellung orientiert sich an der thematischen Strukturierung der vorliegenden kumulativen Habilitationsschrift. Den Auftakt bildet hierbei eine Einführung und konzeptionelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem Konstrukt politischer Unterstützung, nachfolgend ergänzt um empirische Erkenntnisse der Dimensionalisierung und Konsequenzen der Messung politischen Vertrauens. Diesen konzeptionellen Erkundungen schließen sich europäisch vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Niveaus und Trends politischer Unterstützungsindikatoren an. Die mithin weiteste Berücksichtigung finden in dieser Schrift hingegen Analysen zu den Grundlagen politischer Unterstützung, wobei politischem Vertrauen das besondere Forschungsinteresse zukommt. Basierend auf den geschilderten Befunden werden abschließend vielversprechende weiterführende Forschungsfragen entwickelt, die es zukünftig zu bearbeiten gilt.

Zur besseren Verortung und Bewertung der empirischen Befunde dieser kumulativen Habilitationsschrift sind den jeweiligen Ausführungen kurze Erläuterungen des "State-of-the-Art" vorangestellt.

2. Einführung in das Konzept der politischen Unterstützung

Politische Unterstützung demokratischer Regime gilt als Voraussetzung politisch und gesellschaftlich stabiler Verhältnisse. Konnte bislang kein wissenschaftliches Einvernehmen über das „rechte“ Maß politischer Unterstützung zur Legitimation demokratischer Herrschaft erzielt werden, so besteht doch weitgehende Übereinstimmung über deren grundsätzliche Bedeutung (Warren 1999), zumal insbesondere demokratische Regime zur Herstellung und Durchsetzung gesamtgesellschaftlich verbindlicher Entscheidungen auf die prinzipielle Unterstützung ihrer Bürger angewiesen sind.

Am Beispiel politischen Vertrauens, als ein Kernelement politischer Unterstützung, lassen sich verschiedene Bedeutungszuweisungen nachzeichnen, die je nach theoretischer Perspektive variieren. So setzen Vertreter der Theorien demokratischer Elitenherrschaft eine möglichst breite Basis politischen Vertrauens voraus, da politischen Eliten erst unter diesen Bedingungen effizientes Regieren ermöglicht wird. Liberale Ansätze betonen dagegen die Gefahren für Demokratien, die durch Machtmissbrauch ihrer gewählten Vertreter entstehen können. Öffentliches politisches Misstrauen wird infolgedessen als ein wirkungsvolles Instrument zum Abwenden dieser Gefahren betrachtet, zumal es politische Akteure unter Druck setzen und dazu veranlassen sollte, ihr politisches Handeln offen zu legen und zu rechtfertigen. Schließlich nehmen Vertreter eines dritten theoretischen Ansatzes eine Mittlerposition ein. Im Kern beruhen dessen Annahmen auf der Vorstellung, dass demokratische Gesellschaften durch ein Mischungsverhältnis von politischem Vertrauen und

Misstrauen geprägt sein sollten. Hierbei könnten sich sowohl Zeiten des politischen Vertrauens mit denen des Misstrauens abwechseln als auch politische Akteure und Institutionen einen unterschiedlichen Unterstützungsgrad aufweisen oder auch einzelne Bevölkerungsgruppen über ein divergierendes Niveau politischen Vertrauens verfügen (siehe Gabriel et al. 2002: 255). Dass jedoch demokratische Regierungssysteme durch längere oder auch sehr tiefgreifende Phasen des politischen Misstrauens in ihren Grundfesten erschüttert werden können, ist bereits durch Easton nachhaltig unterstrichen worden (1965).

Auf wesentliche Aspekte der Arbeiten David Eastons geht auch das mehrdimensionale Konzept politischer Unterstützung zurück (1965, 1975). Die Konzeptualisierung des Nationalstaates als politisches *System* dient laut Easton als zentraler Bezugspunkt politischer Unterstützung. Systemunterstützung basiert demzufolge auf individuellen Orientierungen gegenüber dem Nationalstaat, seinen Institutionen und Repräsentanten. „Where orientations are positive, citizens accept the legitimacy of their state to govern within its territorial boundaries. They do not challenge the basic constitutional structure and rules of the game or the authority of officeholders. Systems support is therefore understood as a psychological orientation“ (Norris 2011: S. 20).

Die konzeptionelle Mehrdimensionalität lässt sich zunächst anhand der Unterscheidung zwischen diffuser und spezifischer Systemunterstützung beschreiben, die sich entlang eines Kontinuums manifestiert. Nationale Identität als Zeichen der individuellen Verbundenheit mit dem Nationalstaat, die sich in Form von Patriotismus oder Nationalstolz ausdrückt, kennzeichnet die diffuseste Form politischer Unterstützung. Die Zustimmung zu zentralen Prinzipien und normativen Werten des herrschenden Regimes markiert die nächste weniger diffuse Stufe der Systemunterstützung. Für demokratische Regime gilt die Befürwortung demokratischer Werte und Ideale bei gleichzeitiger Ablehnung autoritärer Herrschaftsprinzipien als stabilisierendes Fundament. Die dritte Ebene politischer Unterstützung in demokratisch verfassten Regimen beschreibt hingegen die allgemeine Bewertung demokratischer Regimeperformanz. Sie nimmt eine „Mittlerfunktion“ zwischen diffuser und spezifischer Systemunterstützung ein und wird in Bevölkerungsumfragen vielfach in Form von individueller Demokratiezufriedenheit erhoben. Vertrauen in die konstitutiven Institutionen des politischen Systems zählt zum spezifischeren Ausdruck politischer Unterstützung. Diese umfassen sowohl legislative als auch exekutive und judikative Institutionen politischer Herrschaft wie Parlament, Regierung, Verwaltung, Gerichtsbarkeit, aber auch Polizei und Armee. Das spezifischste Kennzeichen der Systemunterstützung manifestiert sich schließlich in individuellen Einstellungen gegenüber gewählten Amtsträgern oder politischen Repräsentanten wie Parteiführern. Individuelle

Vertrauensbekundungen gegenüber diesem Personenkreis werden hierfür vielfach zur Messung herangezogen (Norris 2011: S. 24ff.).

Während die Entwicklung einer nationalen Identität oder die Zustimmung zu demokratischen Normen und Prinzipien als stabilere Formen der Systemunterstützung auf politische Sozialisationsprozesse zurückgeführt werden, gründen spezifischere Formen politischer Unterstützung auf individuellen Bewertungen, Erfahrungen und Informationen über politische Institutionen und Akteure (Oskarsson 2010: S. 425). Folglich ist spezifischere Systemunterstützung stärkeren zeitlichen Schwankungen unterworfen, die zudem geringere Unterstützungsgrade aufweisen kann (Dalton 1999; Holmberg 1999; Pharr, Putnam 2000). Bei konstant hoher diffuser Systemunterstützung ist jedoch prinzipiell keine Erosion der Regimelegitimation durch schwankende bzw. nur gering ausgeprägte spezifische Unterstützung zu befürchten (Campbell 2011: S. 568). Und dennoch sind die Übergänge zumeist fließend: politische Skandale, Krisen und Misserfolge können bereits schwach ausgeprägte diffuse Systemunterstützung zusätzlich beeinträchtigen. Gleichmaßen kann dauerhaft hohe spezifische politische Unterstützung auch die übergeordnete abstraktere Unterstützungsebene stärken (Norris 2011: S. 22f.; Cernat 2010).

Auch wenn insbesondere demokratische Regime auf eine breite und stabile politische Unterstützung angewiesen sind, die sich konzeptionell, wie nachfolgend erläutert, mit dem „Politischen Kultur“-Begriff verbinden lässt, gilt sie dennoch nicht als demokratisches Alleinstellungsmerkmal. In Anlehnung an Almonds und Verbas wegweisende „Civic Culture“-Studie (1963) erweist sich eine größtmögliche Kongruenz zwischen der politischen Kultur und Struktur einer Nation als Voraussetzung *jedweder* Systemstabilität. Idealtypisch akzeptieren und unterstützen Bürger die für das Regime charakteristischen Werte, Verhaltensnormen, Verfahrensregeln und Herrschaftsstrukturen (Gabriel 2005: 462). Wie aber die politische Kultur eines demokratischen Regimes beschaffen sein sollte, um ein hohes Maß an Systemstabilität zu gewährleisten, leitet sich aus diesen Prämissen nicht zwangsläufig ab.

Während folglich der Begriff der politischen Kultur grundsätzlich die gesellschaftliche Summe und Verteilung aller individuellen Einstellungen zu politischen Objekten beschreibt und insofern wertneutral ist, werden an die politische Kultur eines *demokratischen* Staates, der so genannten „Civic Culture“, konkrete Erwartungen geknüpft, die staatliche Stabilität, Effektivität und Legitimität gewährleisten sollen. Dabei zeichnet sich die „Civic Culture“ oder auch Staatsbürgerkultur durch politisch interessierte und kenntnisreiche Bürger aus, die sich dem demokratischen politischen System verbunden fühlen, demokratische Wertorientierungen verinnerlichen und befähigt und willens sind, politische Entscheidungsprozesse aktiv zu gestalten. Wie zahlreiche empirische Untersuchungen

jedoch belegen, wird dieser Anspruch des skizzierten Idealtypus einer Staatsbürgerkultur selbst in langjährig etablierten demokratischen Gesellschaften nur in Teilen eingelöst. Ferner durchlaufen politische Einstellungen zeitliche Wandlungsprozesse und spiegeln somit institutionelle und wirtschaftliche Veränderungen wider.

Maßgebend für die Bestimmung der Merkmale der politischen Kultur einer Nation sind politische Einstellungen gegenüber vier politischen Zielbereichen, wobei gemäß Icek Ajzen unter Einstellungen grundsätzlich „die **Neigung**, konsistent (positiv oder negativ) **auf Objekte**, Personen oder Ereignisse **zu reagieren**“ (Ajzen 1988: 4; zitiert nach Gabriel 2005: 464; Hervorhebungen in Gabriel), verstanden wird. Sichtbar und relevant sind Einstellungen allerdings erst, wenn sie entweder verbal geäußert werden oder zu beobachtbarem Verhalten führen. *Politische* Einstellungen sind durch ihren Bezug auf politische Objekte gekennzeichnet, ermöglichen also die Erfassung der politischen Realität, unterscheiden sich in ihren Funktionen aber nicht grundsätzlich von anderen individuellen Einstellungen.

Als ersten Zielbereich identifizieren Almond und Verba den einzelnen Bürger mit dessen politischen Überzeugungen, Interesse und Wissen. Nicht der Bezug zu politischen Objekten, sondern die Wahrnehmung des Selbst als politisch Handelnder ist die zentrale Kategorie. Als zweite bedeutsame Referenzkategorie benennen sie das politische System als Ganzes. Konzeptionell recht unscharf beziehen sich politische Einstellungen beispielsweise auf die Demokratie als Herrschaftsform oder auf politische Institutionen. Ob und inwiefern das (politische) Selbst politische Entscheidungsprozesse beeinflussen kann, äußert sich in individuellen Inputbewertungen des politischen Systems als dritten Zielbereich. Analog beeinflusst die Performanz eines politischen Systems individuelle Outputbewertungen als vierten Zielbereich politischer Einstellungen (Almond, Verba 1963; Pickel, Pickel 2006: 61).

Eine *funktionale* Kategorisierung politischer Einstellungen erfolgt hingegen im Hinblick auf individuelle Kognitionen, Affekte, Verhaltensdispositionen und Wertorientierungen. Kognitive Einstellungen, wie politisches Interesse oder politische Kenntnisse, dienen der Wahrnehmung und Systematisierung politischer Wirklichkeit. Gefühle als affektive Einstellungen beruhen auf individuellen Bedürfnissen und finden ihren Ausdruck in persönlichen Vorlieben und Abneigungen gegenüber politischen Objekten, Personen oder Ereignissen. Die individuell wahrgenommene Vertrauenswürdigkeit politischer Institutionen oder Akteure wäre dieser Einstellungskategorie zuzuordnen. Aus dem Zusammenspiel zwischen individuellen kognitiven und affektiven politischen Einstellungen ergeben sich politische Verhaltensabsichten, so genannte konative Einstellungen. Politische Wertorientierungen oder auch evaluative Orientierungen beruhen hingegen auf moralischen Standards. Oftmals spiegeln sie gesellschaftliche Vorstellungen des Wünschenswerten wider und ermöglichen individuelle Präferenzordnungen (Gabriel 2005: 465). Die Präferenz der

Demokratie als Herrschaftsform wäre ein Messbeispiel dieser Einstellungskomponente aus der empirischen Sozialforschung.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Ausführungen lässt sich der Forschungsschwerpunkt dieser kumulativen Habilitationsschrift ohne weiteres konzeptionell verorten. Empirische Analysen politischen Vertrauens sowie Demokratiezufriedenheit wären somit dem Bereich der affektiven Einstellungen zuzuordnen, die sowohl den Übergang zwischen diffuser zu spezifischer als auch spezifischere Formen politischer Unterstützung beschreiben. Die Unterstützung demokratischer Prinzipien, deren europaweite Trends im vierten Abschnitt erläutert werden, zählt zu den evaluativen Einstellungen mit diffusem und somit stabilerem Unterstützungscharakter.

Der nachfolgende Abschnitt befasst sich mit der spezifischsten Ausprägung politischer Unterstützung, genauer mit politischem Vertrauen und dessen empirisch abbildbaren Erscheinungsformen und konzeptspezifischen Besonderheiten.

3. Erkenntnisse zur Konzeptualisierung, Dimensionalisierung und Messung politischen Vertrauens

Eine der zentralen wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen, die seit nunmehr zwei Jahrzehnten in der politischen Vertrauensforschung geführt wird, befasst sich mit dem konzeptionellen wie empirischen Nexus zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen. Nicht zuletzt Putnams einflussreiche Italienstudie „Making Democracy Work“ (1993) leistete einen maßgeblichen Beitrag zu dieser bis heute intensiv geführten Debatte.

Während überwiegend Konsens über die Funktionalität und Relevanz politischen und sozialen Vertrauens in demokratischen Gesellschaften erzielt werden konnte, lag dem lebhaft geführten wissenschaftlichen Diskurs ein unterschiedliches Verständnis der konzeptionellen Reichweite des Vertrauensbegriffs zugrunde. Eines der weithin rezipierten Argumente postulierte beispielsweise einen unaufhebbaren Wechselbezug zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen, die im Grunde zwei Seiten einer "Vertrauensmedaille" darstellten (Kaase 1999). Einmal generiertes Vertrauen würde infolgedessen sowohl zur Entwicklung vertrauensvoller *sozialer* Beziehungen als auch zu vertrauensvollen Einstellungen gegenüber *politischen* Objekten führen; letzteres überdies unabhängig von individuellen Bewertungen institutioneller oder wirtschaftlicher Performanz.

Demgegenüber zogen Newton und Norris (2000) eine deutlichere Demarkationslinie. Zwar bescheinigten sie beiden Vertrauensformen eine enge wechselseitige Beziehung, die sich zumindest auf der Aggregatebene empirisch manifestiere, dennoch seien politisches und

soziales Vertrauen konzeptionell zu unterscheiden. Entgegen der von Putnam entwickelten Hypothese eines auf der Individualebene existierenden Zusammenhangs zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen konnte jedoch kein entsprechender empirischer Nachweis erbracht werden. Die identifizierten konträren empirischen Befunde der Makro- und Mikroebene ließen sich, so Newton und Norris (2000), auf den so genannten „rainmaker“-Effekt zurückführen, wonach es *gesellschaftlich* verfügbaren politischen und sozialen Vertrauens bedarf, um individuelle Vertrauensneigungen zu befördern. Trotz dieses plausiblen Erklärungsangebots ließen sich letzte Zweifel nicht gänzlich ausräumen, zumal gerade die Befunde zu den Wirkmechanismen der Individualebene den Erkenntnisgewinn aus Putnams einflussreicher Sozialkapitalstudie begründeten.

Ferner bleibt strittig, inwiefern die unterschiedlichen politischen Vertrauensobjekte als separate Analyseeinheiten zu gelten haben (Gabriel und Kunz 2002; Gabriel et al. 2002). Theoretisch begründbare Trennlinien könnten beispielsweise zwischen Vertrauen zu parteienstaatlichen Institutionen und Akteuren, wie Regierungen, Parteien, Parlamenten und Politikern einerseits sowie Vertrauen in regulative und unparteiische Institutionen, wie Polizei, Gerichtsbarkeit oder Verwaltung, andererseits gezogen werden. Eine weitere Dimension politischen Vertrauens manifestiert sich van Deth (2000) zufolge im Vertrauen in *externe* politische Akteure, wozu internationale oder supranationale politische Institutionen, wie die Vereinten Nationen oder die EU, genauso wie Institutionen und Akteure, deren politisches Handeln auf den Schutz nationaler oder territorialer Integrität gerichtet ist, zählen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund lassen sich nunmehr drei zentrale Fragestellungen entwickeln, die empirisch zu bearbeiten wären. Der konzeptionelle Nexus zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen wäre zu überprüfen, ergänzt um eine Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen auf der Mikro-Ebene sowie um Analysen zur Dimensionalität politischer Vertrauensobjekte.

Die vorliegende kumulative Habilitationsschrift leistet zur Aufklärung dieser geschilderten Fragestellungen signifikante Forschungsbeiträge, die bereits vielfach Eingang in einschlägige internationale Publikationen gefunden haben und im Folgenden überblicksartig erläutert werden.

3.1 Konzeptualisierung und Dimensionalisierung

Erstmals wurde auf der Grundlage des Mokken-Skalierungsverfahrens der Versuch unternommen, die konzeptionellen Unschärfen zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen empirisch zu ergründen. Die Untersuchungen basierend auf allen im World Values Survey

2005/07 (WVS) berücksichtigen demokratischen Gesellschaften belegen unzweifelhaft eine empirische Differenz, die Impulse zu neuerlichen konzeptionellen Überlegungen geben. Ermöglicht wurde diese international umfassende vergleichende Studie durch die erstmals im Messinstrumentarium des WVS verfügbare Bandbreite und differenzierte Antwortkodierung politischer und sozialer Vertrauensfragen. Mit Blick auf soziales Vertrauen wurde die Qualität der Vertrauensbeziehungen zu Familie, Freunden, Bekannten und Kollegen, Nachbarn, Menschen anderer Religionen, anderer Staatsangehörigkeiten sowie anderen Mitmenschen im Allgemeinen erhoben. Politische Vertrauensobjekte umfassten ferner das nationale Parlament, die Regierung, politische Parteien sowie die Gerichtsbarkeit, Verwaltung und Polizei.

Zudem konnten die eindeutigen empirischen Befunde des Mokken-Skalierungsverfahrens, die auf gepoolten Daten basierten, für einzelne Länder sowie unterschiedliche Bevölkerungsgruppen repliziert werden. Letztere wurden beispielsweise nach Geschlecht, Lebensalter, Bildung, Einkommen, Berufsprestige, Wertorientierungen oder Wohnortgröße differenziert. Demnach gilt in demokratischen Gesellschaften und deren unterschiedlichen Gruppierungen gleichermaßen, dass politisches und soziales Vertrauen konzeptionell verschiedenartig sind. Folglich wäre die zunächst wissenschaftlich befruchtende Ausgangsannahme einer „Vertrauensmedaille“ und ihrer zwei Seiten nunmehr zurückzuweisen.

Über den konzeptionellen Erkenntnisgewinn hinaus legt das Mokken-Skalierungsverfahren gleichzeitig eine mögliche Hierarchisierung der Vertrauensitems offen. Im jeweiligen Fall lässt sich demnach ermitteln, inwiefern die Einstellungsausprägung gegenüber „X“ auf der Existenz der Einstellungsausprägung gegenüber „Y“ basiert. Vertrauen in Repräsentanten des politischen Systems bzw. dessen Institutionen, wie Politiker, politische Parteien oder Parlamente, fußt auf Vertrauen in rechtsstaatliche Instanzen eines Staates, das insbesondere durch eine unabhängige Justiz und eine vertrauenswürdige Polizei gewährleistet wird. Ein Hinweis darauf, dass Rothsteins zentraler These zur Bedeutung des „Good Government“ ein empirisch belegbarer Wahrheitsgehalt zukommt (2011).

Generalisiertes soziales Vertrauen wiederum basiert auf soliden Beziehungen im interpersonalen Bereich, wie Vertrauensbeziehungen zu Familienmitgliedern, Freunden, Kollegen sowie zum nachbarschaftlichen Umfeld. Erst interpersonale vertrauensvolle Beziehungen versetzen Individuen in die Lage, ebenso ihren Mitmenschen im Allgemeinen vertrauensvoll zu begegnen: eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung für gesunde demokratische Gesellschaften, die auf die Kooperationsfähigkeit ihrer Mitglieder angewiesen sind.

Neben den robusten empirischen Belegen einer Hierarchisierung politischer Vertrauensobjekte führt die vorliegende kumulative Habilitationsschrift den empirischen Nachweis einer auch im Ländervergleich replizierbaren Dimensionalisierung politischen Vertrauens. Trotz der theoretisch begründbaren Differenzierung gemäß repräsentativer oder regulativer Funktionen deuten Hauptkomponentenanalysen lediglich auf *eine einzige* latente Vertrauensdimension hin, die der Vielzahl politischer Vertrauensobjekte zugrunde liegt.

3.2 Konsequenzen der Messung

Einen weiteren zentralen Forschungsbeitrag leistet diese Habilitationsschrift angesichts der divergierenden Makro- und Mikro-Befunde zum Zusammenhang der beiden Vertrauensformen. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass jene Divergenzen auf die Beschaffenheit der in internationalen Bevölkerungsumfragen bis dato gebräuchlichen Messinstrumente politischen und sozialen Vertrauens zurückzuführen sind.

Wurden in international vergleichenden Umfragen bis Ende der 1990er Jahre i.d.R. dichotome Messungen sozialen Vertrauens genutzt, beschränkte sich gleichzeitig die Erhebung politischen Vertrauens oftmals auf vier- bis fünffach ausgeprägte ordinale Messungen. Auf der Grundlage der elf europäische Länder umfassenden Bevölkerungsumfrage „Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy“ konnte hingegen erstmals vergleichend der empirische Nachweis über die folgenreichen Implikationen unterschiedlich gestalteter Messinstrumente erbracht werden. Insbesondere metrische Skalenniveaus politischer und sozialer Vertrauensitems belegen auch auf der Individualebene konsistent ausgeprägte positive Assoziationen, die zudem in jedem der untersuchten europäischen Länder wirksam sind.

Besonderer Nachdruck wird diesen empirischen Befunden durch eine weitere quasi-experimentelle „Versuchsordnung“ verliehen, bei der die ursprüngliche elfstufige metrische Skalierung der Vertrauensitems auf ordinale bzw. dichotome Ausprägungen zurückgeführt wird. Eine anschließende Überprüfung der Zusammenhangsstärke zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen legt eine deutliche Reduzierung offen. Ein und dieselbe Datenquelle (CID) weist somit, je nach Messniveau, unterschiedliche Zusammenhangsstärken zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen aus. In einer Folgestudie konnten die skizzierten Ergebnisse ein weiteres Mal auf der Grundlage der ersten Erhebungswelle des European Social Survey sowie der US-amerikanischen CID Bevölkerungsumfrage repliziert werden (Zmerli, Newton 2008).

4. Niveaus und Trends politischer Unterstützung im europäischen Vergleich

Die längerfristigen Trends politischer Unterstützung im europäischen Vergleich bilden den thematischen Schwerpunkt der nachfolgenden Überblicksdarstellung, wobei die Frage nach der Konvergenz bzw. Divergenz europäischer Einstellungsmuster besondere Beachtung findet. Ein zusätzlicher innerdeutscher Vergleich ermöglicht ferner, das in Transitionsgesellschaften vorhandene Potential politischer Unterstützung unter Funktionsbedingungen bewährter demokratischer Institutionen zu ermitteln.

Wie zahlreiche empirische Studien belegen, sind insbesondere postsozialistische Gesellschaften durch weit verbreitete Korruption, schleppende wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und stark anwachsende soziale Ungleichheit gekennzeichnet, die durch dysfunktionale Verwaltungspraktiken und sozialstaatliche Unterfinanzierung noch begünstigt werden (Uslaner 2008, 2011). Politische Fehlentwicklungen dieser Art werden seitens der Bevölkerung oftmals mit einem Entzug politischen Vertrauens und eingeschränkter politischer Unterstützung quittiert, im Zuge dessen politische Institutionen und Akteure an effektiven und effizienten Rahmenbedingungen politischen Handelns einbüßen (Mishler, Rose 2001, 2005; Rose, Mishler 2011). Angesichts der gegenwärtigen krisenhaften makroökonomischen Entwicklungen, von denen derzeit aber insbesondere die südeuropäischen Länder der Eurozone betroffen sind, wäre folglich eine vergleichbare rückläufige politische Unterstützung zu erwarten.

Im Rahmen der deskriptiven Analysen dienen vier Ländergruppen als Referenzkategorien: die Gruppe der skandinavischen Länder, die sich in zahlreichen Studien beständig durch hohe Unterstützungswerte auszeichnet, eine westeuropäische Ländergruppe etablierter Demokratien, die Gruppe südeuropäischer Staaten sowie eine Ländergruppe postsozialistischer Gesellschaften (Gabriel, Walter-Rogg 2008; Listhaug, Ringdal 2008; Miller et al. 2004).

Die zentralen Erkenntnisse der deskriptiven Befunde bestätigen frühere Forschungsergebnisse weitestgehend. Über den gesamten Untersuchungszeitraum hinweg lässt sich in Osteuropa zwar vielfach eine deutliche Zunahme politischer Unterstützung beobachten, dennoch bildet diese Ländergruppe im europäischen Vergleich beständig das Schlusslicht. Mehr noch: manch ausgewählter Indikator politischer Unterstützung muss in postsozialistischen Gesellschaften im Zeitverlauf sogar Einbußen hinnehmen. Infolgedessen können die seit Beginn des Transitionsprozesses bestehenden innereuropäischen Divergenzen nicht überwunden werden. Während skandinavische Gesellschaften in der Regel die höchsten Unterstützungswerte aufweisen, rangieren West- und Südeuropäer im Wechsel auf Rang zwei oder drei. Interessanterweise überwiegen selbst im deutsch-

deutschen Vergleich trotz des bereits zwanzig Jahre währenden Vereinigungsprozesses und des damit verbundenen Institutionentransfers Einstellungsdivergenzen, die zwar vielfach nur marginal ausfallen und dennoch auf fortdauernde Einstellungsunterschiede hinweisen. Ferner formiert sich den Erwartungen entsprechend entlang der Ländergruppe, die am stärksten von der aktuellen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise betroffen ist, eine weitere innereuropäische Spaltungslinie. Während in Südeuropa bereits kurze Zeit nach Einsetzen der Großen Rezession ein deutlicher Rückgang an Demokratiezufriedenheit und politischen Vertrauens erkennbar ist, folgen die drei weiteren europäischen Ländergruppen diesem Abwärtstrend nicht.

Angesichts dieser umfassenden Befunde lassen sich insbesondere für postsozialistische Gesellschaften auffallende einstellungsbezogene demokratische Konsolidierungsprobleme belegen. Entgegen den Erwartungen zeichnet sich im Zeitverlauf sogar eine Verschärfung dieser Problematik ab. Zugleich entkräftet dieser Trend die Annahme des Nachwirkens eines einstellungsbezogenen „sozialistischen Erbes“, das aufgrund des Generationenwechsels allmählich schwächer werden sollte (vgl. 5.1). Vielmehr unterstreicht dieser Befund Mishlers und Rose' Diagnose der auch für Transitionsgesellschaften zentralen Bedeutung guter Regierungsführung und wirtschaftlicher Performanz zur Entwicklung und Festigung demokratieförderlicher Einstellungen (Mishler, Rose 2001, 2005; Rose, Mishler 2011).

Gleichwohl ist allen europäischen Gesellschaften gemein, dass demokratischen Herrschaftsformen grundsätzlich der Vorzug gegeben wird. Faktisch ist diese Präferenz aber nicht mit der gleichzeitig vielfach beobachteten Bevorzugung eines starken Führers oder einer Expertenregierung zu verbinden. Insofern sollten diese Befunde auch als Beleg für das potentiell widersprüchliche Antwortverhalten europäischer Bürger betrachtet werden. Unklar bleibt, ob sich diese widersprechenden Einstellungen aus mangelnder Kenntnis demokratischer Prinzipien speisen oder vielmehr ein zwiespältiges Verhältnis europäischer Bürger zur *uneingeschränkten* Unterstützung demokratischer Prinzipien offenbaren.

5. Kontextuelle und individuelle Determinanten politischen Vertrauens im internationalen Vergleich

Die Komplexität des theoretischen Rahmens politischer Unterstützung spiegelt sich zumeist auch in der Frage nach deren Bestimmungsfaktoren wider. Die Suche konzentriert sich hierbei im Allgemeinen auf zwei Wirkungsebenen. Zum einen erweisen sich verschiedene Faktoren der Individualebene regelmäßig als effektstarke Determinanten. Zum anderen trägt die politische und wirtschaftliche Regimeperformanz zweifellos zur Erklärung politischer Unterstützung bei. Einschränkend ist jedoch anzumerken, dass bislang überwiegend

Indikatoren *spezifischer* Unterstützung im Forschungsinteresse standen. Darüber hinaus ist auf Grundlage der nachfolgend berichteten empirischen Befunde keine tatsächliche wissenschaftlichen Kriterien genügende Aussage über Kausalitäten zu treffen. Zum Schließen dieser Forschungslücke wäre die international vergleichende Sozialforschung auf international erhobene Paneldaten angewiesen, die bislang nicht zur Verfügung stehen. Zwar lassen sich mit Hilfe einschlägiger statistischer Analysemethoden, wie Regressions- bzw. Mehrebenenanalysen, Erkenntnisse über robuste Wirkungszusammenhänge, nicht aber über zugrundeliegende Wirkungsrichtungen ermitteln. Erst jüngere nationale Panelstudien ermöglichen erste empirisch belastbare erkenntnisreiche Kausalanalysen (Sonderskov, Dinesen 2014).

Infolgedessen stützt sich die nachfolgende Überblicksdarstellung ausschließlich auf Befunde, die mittels Querschnittsdaten erhoben wurden. Im Vordergrund steht der Forschungsbeitrag der vorliegenden kumulativen Habilitationsschrift, stellenweise ergänzt um Befunde weiterer vergleichender Studien.

5.1 Prädiktoren der Individualebene

Bestimmungsfaktoren der Individualebene lassen sich entlang verschiedener Kategorien einordnen und untersuchen. Nahezu ausnahmslos werden gemeinhin Effekte von sozio-demographischen und –ökonomischen Merkmalen, zumeist jedoch als sogenannte Kontrollvariablen, überprüft. Geschlecht, Lebensalter, Bildung und Individual- oder Haushaltseinkommen werden vielfach berücksichtigt. Mit Ausnahme des Einkommens, das zuweilen einen positiven Zusammenhang mit politischem Vertrauen bzw. politischer Unterstützung aufweist, lassen sich für Geschlecht, Lebensalter und Bildung über vergleichende Studien hinweg keine konsistenten Effekte ermitteln. Dabei kommt dem Faktor Bildung offenbar eine besondere Funktion zu: während höhere Bildung in etablierten und funktionsfähigen Demokratien vielfach in einem positiven Zusammenhang zu politischem Vertrauen steht, befördert sie in defekten Demokratien politisches Misstrauen (Mayne, Hakhverdian i.E.). Entgegen den Erwartungen gehen persönliche Erfahrungen der Arbeitslosigkeit sowie der Diskriminierung nicht mit geringerer politischer Unterstützung einher.

Weitere Bestimmungsfaktoren, die dem Bereich politischer Einstellungen und politischen Verhaltens zuzuordnen sind, zeichnen sich hingegen durch stabilere Assoziationen zu politischem Vertrauen aus. Politisches Interesse sowie interne und externe politische Effektivität stehen i.d.R. in einem positiven Wirkungszusammenhang zu politischem Vertrauen. Vergleichbares lässt sich für die Stimmabgabe für Regierungsparteien bei nationalen Wahlen beobachten, wobei deren Effekt vom jeweiligen Wahlsystem moderiert

wird: Mehrheitswahlsysteme mit klarer Zuordnung politischer Verantwortlichkeiten und Verhältniswahlsysteme mit größtmöglicher proportionaler Abbildung der Wählerstimmen in Mandate besitzen ein größeres Potential, politisches Vertrauen zu stärken als Mischsysteme, die wiederum ein geringeres Maß an politischer Unterstützung hervorbringen (Marien 2011). Schließlich lassen sich regelmäßig gleichgerichtete Zusammenhänge zwischen politischer Unterstützung und positiven politischen Performanzbewertungen, wie etwa im Bildungs- und Gesundheitsbereich, ermitteln. Unabhängig vom persönlichen sozio-ökonomischen Status erzielt zudem die individuelle Zufriedenheit mit der nationalen Wirtschaftslage beeindruckende Effektstärken; ein Zusammenhang, der als Beleg für die Relevanz soziotropischer Einstellungen gedeutet werden kann.

Unter den Bestimmungsfaktoren politischen Vertrauens kommt den Elementen sozialen Kapitals besondere Bedeutung zu. Insbesondere soziales Vertrauen leistet in international vergleichenden Studien kontinuierlich einen maßgeblichen Erklärungsbeitrag. Wie bereits unter 3.2 erläutert, ist es möglich, diesen Befund in einer Vielzahl demokratischer Gesellschaften zu replizieren. Insofern würden diese Wirkungszusammenhänge die so genannte „bottom-up“-Hypothese bestätigen, wonach es sozialen Kapitals bedarf, um politischen Institutionen ein tragfähiges Fundament zu verleihen. Gleichzeitig belegen Studien zu sozialem Vertrauen die besondere Relevanz politischen Vertrauens als Prädiktor. Letzteres entspräche wiederum der so genannten „top-down“-Hypothese, wonach es zunächst vertrauenswürdiger politischer Institutionen zur Entwicklung sozialen Vertrauens bedarf. Folglich verweisen diese Befunde auf eine starke Wechselwirkung zwischen beiden Vertrauensformen. Jüngste Erkenntnisse, basierend auf einer nationalen Panelstudie (Sonderskov, Dinesen 2014), stützen insbesondere die „top-down“-Hypothese. Eine Bestätigung dieses Wirkungszusammenhangs auf international vergleichender Ebene steht allerdings noch aus. Im Unterschied zur stabilen Beziehung zwischen beiden Vertrauensformen lassen sich weit weniger empirische Belege für die Relevanz der Zugehörigkeit zu freiwilligen Vereinigungen, einem weiteren Kernelement sozialen Kapitals, vorlegen. Einigen wenigen Studien mit Hinweisen auf einen möglichen Zusammenhang steht eine Fülle konträrer Befunde gegenüber.

Individuelles Mediennutzungsverhalten leistet ebenfalls einen eigenständigen Beitrag zur Erklärung politischen Vertrauens. Mit Blick auf den persönlichen Fernsehkonsum lassen sich auf der Datengrundlage des European Social Survey (ESS) allerdings Ergebnisse erzielen, die gängige Annahmen entkräften. Höherer Fernsehkonsum, so die Überlegung, führt zu einem so genannten „mean world“-Effekt, wonach aus Sicht der Rezipienten eine Übertragung der überwiegend negativen Fernsehinhalte auf die Wahrnehmung der persönlichen realen Umwelt stattfindet. Dieser Effekt sollte sich insbesondere bei hohem

Konsum von Unterhaltungsformaten, nicht aber von Nachrichtensendungen, einstellen. Tatsächlich aber ergeben die Analysen des ESS einen *positiven* Zusammenhang zwischen höherem Fernsehkonsum und politischem Vertrauen. Allerdings erlaubt der im ESS verfügbare Indikator der Fernsehnutzung keine Differenzierung des Konsums von Nachrichten- und Unterhaltungsprogrammen, was dessen Aussagekraft entsprechend schmälert. Zeitungslesern hingegen, denen größeres politisches Interesse sowie bessere kognitive Fähigkeiten zur Eigenanalyse komplexer politischer Entscheidungsprozesse zugesprochen werden, kann eine höhere politische Unterstützungsbereitschaft empirisch attestiert werden.

Mit Blick auf Besonderheiten des deutsch-deutschen Vergleichs, der im erweiterten Sinne einer Gegenüberstellung etablierter demokratischer Gesellschaften mit postsozialistischen Transitionsgesellschaften entspricht, sind Spuren eines vermeintlich sozialistischen Erbes nicht nachweisbar (vgl. 4). Europäisch vergleichende Analysen unterstützen diese Aussage, belegen sie doch allesamt, in welchem Umfang höhere politische Unterstützungsbereitschaft auf positiven individuellen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Performanzbewertungen basiert. Nicht die politische Sozialisation unter Bedingungen autoritärer Regime, sondern die Evaluation *aktueller* institutioneller und wirtschaftlicher Performanz leisten auch in Transitionsgesellschaften einen maßgeblichen Beitrag zur Systemunterstützung. Somit schöpfen demokratische Regime einen Teil ihrer Legitimität trotz der in Europa noch vielfach herrschenden ungleichen wirtschaftlichen, politischen und sozialen Verhältnisse und unterschiedlicher politischer Sozialisationen aus demselben Reservoir (Mishler, Rose 2001, 2005; Rose/Mishler 2011).

Werden die vorgenannten Determinanten auf mögliche Effektunterschiede im Hinblick auf parteienstaatliche und regulative Institutionen überprüft, ergeben sich mit Ausnahme politischen Interesses, das für regulative Institutionen weniger bedeutsam ist, keine nennenswerten systematischen Unterschiede. Insofern bekräftigen diese Gemeinsamkeiten den unter 3.1 erörterten Befund zur Dimensionalisierung politischen Vertrauens.

5.2 Prädiktoren der kontextuellen Ebene

Zur besseren Strukturierung der Gesamtergebnisse zu Prädiktoren der kontextuellen Ebene konzentriert sich die nachfolgende Darstellung auf Analysen der gemessenen Performanz politischer Institutionen, des in Anlehnung an die „rainmaker-Effekt“-Hypothese (vgl. 3) gesamtgesellschaftlich vorhandenen Vertrauensreservoirs sowie der Kennzeichen des Mediensystems. Erkenntnisse zu ökonomischen sowie sozio-strukturellen Merkmalen werden unter dem darauffolgenden Abschnitt (6) erläutert.

Vielfach belegen international vergleichende Studien, dass gute Regierungsführung in all ihren Facetten einen zentralen Beitrag zur Stärkung politischer Unterstützung leistet. Neben effektiver Regierungsführung zählen hierunter politische Stabilität, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratiequalität sowie geringe Korruption (Magalhaes 2013; Rothstein 2011; Uslaner 2008, 2011).

Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse bekräftigen zudem auf Basis mehrebenenanalytischer Untersuchungen die Erklärungskraft der „rainmaker-Effekt“-Hypothese, wonach das in einer Gesellschaft vorherrschende Vertrauensniveau einen positiven Einfluss auf die Vertrauensneigung sämtlicher Gesellschaftsmitglieder nimmt. Im Einzelnen zeigt sich ein starker Zusammenhang zwischen aggregiertem partikularem und generalisiertem Vertrauen einerseits und politischem Vertrauen andererseits.

In Erweiterung der „rainmaker-Effekt“-Hypothese lässt sich auch für den aggregierten Medienkonsum ein Zusammenhang zu politischer Unterstützung diagnostizieren. Wie bereits auf der individuellen zeigt sich auch auf der kontextuellen Ebene ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen höherem Fernsehkonsum und politischem Vertrauen, wobei allerdings auch dieser Befund auf dem aggregierten undifferenzierten TV-Messinstrument beruht. Zudem korreliert auch die Anzahl zirkulierender Tageszeitungen positiv mit politischem Vertrauen. Der stärkste aggregierte mediale Effekt geht jedoch vom Umfang nationaler Pressefreiheit aus, ein Beleg dafür, dass freie und kritische politische Berichterstattung nicht zwangsläufig politisches Misstrauen stärkt. Dagegen erweist sich ein weiteres wichtiges Merkmal nationaler Mediensysteme als wenig bedeutsam. Demnach ist es für politisches Vertrauen unerheblich, ob das Mediensystem überwiegend staatlichen Regulierungen oder marktwirtschaftlichen Gesetzmäßigkeiten unterliegt.

6. Sozialstruktur, Wohlfahrtsregime, Einkommensungleichheit und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit als Determinanten politischen Vertrauens

Innerhalb der Vertrauensforschung weist gerade in jüngster Zeit der Blick auf die Konsequenzen gesamtgesellschaftlicher Verteilungsprozesse, -grundsätze und -akzeptanz in eine neue vielversprechende Richtung. Verschiedene Faktoren, die zweifellos aufeinander bezogen sind, unterstreichen zunehmend das aus der gegenwärtig weit verbreiteten Einkommensungleichheitsentwicklung resultierende Destabilisierungspotential demokratischer Gesellschaften. Beispielsweise stehen Eric M. Uslaner zufolge Einkommensungleichheit und Korruption in einem unheilvollen Wechselverhältnis zueinander, nicht zuletzt aufgrund der beeinträchtigenden Folgen ihres Zusammenwirkens für die wahrgenommene Vertrauenswürdigkeit politischer Institutionen und Akteure (2008,

2011, i.E.). Einen vergleichbaren Standpunkt vertritt Bo Rothstein (2011), dessen empirische Studien den negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Einkommensungleichheit und Vertrauen aufzeigen, zugleich jedoch die zentrale Rolle guten Regierens zur Lösung dieses Dilemmas unterstreichen. Staffan Kumlins Forschungen verweisen wiederum auf mögliche Korrelate zwischen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Regimen und individueller Vertrauensbereitschaft (2004, 2011; siehe auch Kumlin, Haugsgjerd i.E.), wobei Gerechtigkeitsdimensionen, wie die der Verteilungs- und prozeduralen Gerechtigkeit, eine moderierende Funktion zukommt (siehe auch Grimes i.E.). Neben Legitimitätseinbußen in Form verminderter politischer Unterstützung destabilisiert das zunehmende gesellschaftliche Einkommensgefälle weitere Grundfesten demokratischer Gesellschaften. Eine auf Effekte sozio-struktureller Merkmale gerichtete Studie deckt die mit der individuellen Bereitschaft zur Wahlbeteiligung verbundenen Risiken auf (Schäfer et. al. 2014). Die empirischen Befunde liefern zum einen Hinweise auf Zusammenhänge zwischen höherer Einkommensungleichheit und geringerer nationaler Wahlbeteiligung. Analysen der Nichtwähler erfassen zum anderen das Ausmaß der gesellschaftlichen und folglich politischen Schieflage. Das demokratische Versprechen politischer Gleichheit erscheint immer weniger einlösbar, da gerade gesellschaftlich und ökonomisch marginalisierte Gruppen dem politischen System ihre durch den Wahlakt bekundete Unterstützung überproportional entziehen.

Einen Überblick über den Forschungsbeitrag dieser kumulativen Habilitationsschrift zu den vorgenannten Themenschwerpunkten bieten die beiden nachfolgenden Abschnitte.

6.1 Sozialstruktur und Wohlfahrtsregime

Aussagen über Verteilungen von Ressourcen und Restriktionen zu treffen, die für individuelles oder kollektives Handeln über verschiedene Personengruppen hinweg relevant sind sowie individuelle und kollektive Lebensziele und Interaktionsnetzwerke zu identifizieren, ist primäre Aufgabe der Sozialstrukturanalyse (Rössel 2009). Dort wo die Verteilung von Gütern und Restriktionen verzerrt ist, in anderen Worten soziale Ungleichheit überwiegt, schwindet sozialer Zusammenhalt. Vor diesem Hintergrund kommen dem modernen Wohlfahrtsstaat und dessen Umverteilungsprinzipien, die darauf abzielen, soziale Ungleichheiten zu verringern, eine zentrale Funktion zu. Angesichts der Vielfalt wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Arrangements und ihrer gesellschaftlichen Implikationen ist es jedoch kaum möglich, eine universelle Formel zum Abbau vertikaler oder horizontaler sozialer Ungleichheiten zu entwickeln. Während die vertikale Achse sozialer Ungleichheiten gemeinhin die Disparitäten von Bildung, Reichtum, Berufsprestige oder Einkommen abbildet, gehen beispielsweise mit Lebensalter, Geschlecht oder Ethnizität soziale Ungleichheiten auf der horizontalen Dimension einher. Und doch konnten jüngste Studien belegen, dass Umverteilungsmechanismen skandinavischer Wohlfahrtsstaaten, die ferner vielfach den

Erwartungen der Bürger an prozedurale Gerechtigkeit entsprechen und durch Universalität sozialstaatlicher Ansprüche geprägt sind, politisches Vertrauens und Demokratiezufriedenheit stärken (Kumlin 2004, 2011; Svallfors 2012). Tatsächlich weisen skandinavische Wohlfahrtsstaaten im internationalen Vergleich regelmäßig das geringste Ausmaß an Einkommensungleichheit und gleichzeitig die höchsten politischen Unterstützungswerte auf.

Wie die empirisch vergleichenden Befunde dieser kumulativen Habilitationsschrift jedoch nahelegen, wirken sich weder auf der Individualebene verortete vertikale noch horizontale Ungleichheitsindikatoren maßgeblich auf politisches Vertrauen aus. Demgegenüber kann kontextuellen Faktoren ein erkennbarer Einfluss attestiert werden, wobei es jedoch zu bedenken gilt, dass sich individuelle und kontextuelle sozio-strukturelle Indikatoren nicht unabhängig voneinander entwickeln.

Mittels Mehrebenenanalysen vergleichender Umfragedaten kann u.a. der negative Einfluss, der von höherer Arbeitslosigkeit auf politisches Vertrauen ausgeht, identifiziert werden. Zudem zeigt sich, dass sich individuelle positive Bewertungen der nationalen Wirtschaftslage in Zeiten hoher Arbeitslosigkeit vergleichsweise stärker auf politische Unterstützung auswirken. Dagegen tragen ein höheres Bruttonationalprodukt (BNP) oder ein höheres Wirtschaftswachstum zur Vertrauensstärkung bei (Delhey, Newton 2005). Vielfach existiert jedoch eine enge Verzahnung zwischen objektiven wirtschaftlichen und sozialstaatlichen Kennzahlen und ihren entsprechenden individuellen Bewertungen. Ein positiver Trend des Bruttoinlandsprodukts bei gleichzeitiger Zunahme realer Sozialstaatsausgaben *verringert* jeweils den Einfluss individueller positiver Performanzbewertungen, ohne als kontextueller Faktor selbst Wirkungskraft zu erzielen.

Des Weiteren entfalten wohlfahrtsstaatliche Arrangements postsozialistischer Prägung, gemessen an ihren skandinavischen Pendants, negative Effekte. Ferner zeigt sich mit Blick auf Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen dessen größere Abhängigkeit von kontextuellen Faktoren. Dies lässt sich insbesondere anhand der Prädiktoren des BNP, des Human Development Index sowie der Wohlfahrtsstaatstypologie exemplarisch veranschaulichen. Ethnische Fraktionalisierung steht hingegen in keinem nennenswerten Zusammenhang zu politischem Vertrauen.

6.2 Einkommensungleichheit und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit

Wie jüngste Studien der OECD (2008, 2011) und weitere international vergleichende Forschungsergebnisse (Nolan et al. 2014) belegen, sind zahlreiche konsolidierte demokratische Gesellschaften zunehmend einem Trend steigender Einkommensungleichheit ausgesetzt, der mancherorts bereits vor mehr als drei Jahrzehnten einsetzte. Die

Entwicklung in Deutschland markiert insbesondere von Ende der 1990er bis Mitte der 2000er Jahre eine deutliche Zunahme des Einkommensgefälles. Der durch verschiedene Reformen der Arbeits- und Steuergesetzgebung induzierte Trend zog gerade in Ostdeutschland noch zusätzliche über den Wiedervereinigungsprozess hinausgehende sozio-strukturelle Veränderungen nach sich.

Im gleichen Zeitraum verringern sich verschiedene Systemunterstützungsparameter, deren rückläufige Entwicklung zeitlich mit der zunehmend ungleichen Einkommensverteilung zusammenfällt. Beispielsweise sind die vergangenen zehn Jahre durch ein rückläufiges Vertrauen in den deutschen Bundestag geprägt. Gerade die ostdeutsche untere Bildungsschicht büßt erheblich an politischer Vertrauensbereitschaft ein und erreicht schließlich ein Niveau, das treffender als ausgeprägtes politisches *Misstrauen* beschrieben werden müsste. Ähnliches gilt auch für die ostdeutsche mittlere Bildungsschicht, deren Vertrauen in den deutschen Bundestag bis zum Ende des Untersuchungszeitraums auf einem der unteren Bildungsschicht vergleichbarem Niveau anlangt. Demgegenüber zeichnen sich für die ostdeutsche obere Bildungsschicht im Zeitverlauf zwar Schwankungen ab, diese deuten jedoch keinen tiefgreifenden politischen Vertrauensverlust an. Zum Ende des Erhebungszeitraums verschärft sich in Ostdeutschland infolgedessen die „Vertrauenskluff“ zwischen der höheren Bildungsschicht auf der einen und den weniger Gebildeten auf der anderen Seite.

Im Unterschied zu diesen gegenläufigen ostdeutschen Einstellungsveränderungen ist gleichzeitig deutschlandweit eine nahezu parallel zur ansteigenden Einkommensungleichverteilung verlaufende Einschätzung einer zu großen gesellschaftlichen Einkommensdivergenz zu beobachten. Trotz dieses gemeinsamen Trends übersteigt der Anteil ostdeutscher Bürger, die diese Einschätzung teilen, den der westdeutschen um knapp zwanzig Prozentpunkte.

Am Beispiel Lateinamerikas, der Region mit der weltweit höchsten Einkommensungleichheit, kann schließlich ein empirischer Zusammenhang zwischen objektiv messbaren Einkommensdivergenzen (hier am Beispiel des Gini-Koeffizienten) und subjektiven Wahrnehmungen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit einerseits sowie politischem Vertrauen andererseits ermittelt werden. Während sowohl höhere Einkommensungleichheit als auch eine subjektiv wahrgenommene unfaire Einkommensverteilung mit Einbußen des politischen Vertrauens einhergehen, führt ein höheres Einkommensgefälle nicht zwangsläufig zu einer Zunahme der Effektstärke der subjektiven Verteilung(s)gerechtigkeit. Entgegen den

Annahmen, die auf den Prämissen der sogenannten „conflict theory“¹ beruhen, geht eine höhere Einkommensungleichverteilung sogar mit einer *Verringerung* des Zusammenhangs zwischen wahrgenommener ungleicher Einkommensverteilung und politischem Vertrauen einher.

Verschiedene psychologische Erklärungsansätze halten mögliche Antworten auf die aus diesem unerwarteten Befund resultierenden Fragen bereit. So könnte beispielsweise die individuelle Neigung, den eigenen niedrigeren sozio-strukturellen Status durch eine persönliche Aufwertung zu kompensieren, indem wahrgenommene Schichtunterschiede minimiert werden, einen Erklärungsbeitrag leisten. Die „Anpassungshypothese“ („adjustment hypothesis“) verweist wiederum auf die individuelle Neigung, sich gegebenen Umständen anzupassen, demzufolge eine höhere Einkommensungleichheit nicht zwangsläufig einen stärkeren Zusammenhang zwischen wahrgenommener Verteilungs(un)gerechtigkeit und politischem Vertrauen bedingen würde. Des Weiteren erscheint es plausibel, dass demokratische Gesellschaften mit ausgeprägten Einkommensgefällen diesen Umstand zwar beklagen mögen, ihn aber nicht im staatlichen Lösungskompetenzbereich verorten, sondern vielmehr auf ihr persönliches Geschick und marktwirtschaftliche Mechanismen vertrauen. Ein weithin unbeschadetes politisches Vertrauen wäre die Folge.

7. Fazit und zukünftige Herausforderungen

Politische Unterstützung ist Lebenselixier eines jeden demokratischen Regimes, das zur gewaltfreien Durchsetzung kollektiv verbindlicher Entscheidungen auf Akzeptanz und gesetzeskonformes Verhalten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger angewiesen ist. Angesichts der legitimitätsgenerierenden Funktion politischer Unterstützung in gegenwärtigen schwierigen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Zeiten kommt diesem politikwissenschaftlichen Forschungszweig besondere Bedeutung zu. Hierbei eröffnet sich ein weites Forschungsfeld, dem man sich aus unterschiedlichen konzeptionellen und empirisch-analytischen Blickwinkeln nähern kann.

Die einführende Überblicksdarstellung dieser kumulativen Habilitationsschrift verfolgte vor diesem Hintergrund zwei Ziele. Zum einen sollte eine konzeptionelle Einführung sowie der gegenwärtige Forschungsstand zu verschiedenen Fragestellungen erläutert, zum anderen die Forschungsbeiträge dieser kumulativen Habilitationsschrift dargelegt und in deren jeweiligen Bedeutungszusammenhängen verortet werden.

¹ Die „conflict theory“ geht von einem größeren Verteilungskonfliktpotential in Gesellschaften mit höherer Einkommensungleichheit aus (Karakoc 2013).

Drei zentrale Diskussionsstränge werden durch die skizzierten Befunde um weiterführende Erkenntnisse ergänzt. Erstens ermöglichen die empirischen Analysen zur Dimensionalisierung politischen Vertrauens Einblicke in die Korrelate und Hierarchisierung politischer Vertrauensobjekte. Zweitens leisten die Untersuchungen einen maßgeblichen Erklärungsbeitrag zum Verhältnis politischen und sozialen Vertrauens und bringen drittens neue Erkenntnisse zu individuellen und kontextuellen Vertrauensdeterminanten und deren Wechselwirkungen hervor.

Ausgehend vom aktuellen Forschungsstand zeichnen sich verschiedene Pfade für zukünftige Erkundungen ab. In Anlehnung an die Prämisse der Politischen Kulturforschung, wonach politische Unterstützung zwar systemstabilisierend nicht aber zwangsläufig demokratisch ausgerichtet sein muss, wäre es wünschenswert, politische Vertrauensforschung mit Nachdruck aus demokratiethoretischer Perspektive zu betreiben. Trotz des missbräuchlich genutzten Gewaltpotentials autoritärer Regime sind auch diese auf politische Unterstützung angewiesen. Vertrauenseinstellungen, die aber nicht gleichzeitig auf der Unterstützung demokratischer Prinzipien beruhen, festigen somit auch autoritäre politische Strukturen. Darüber hinaus legen insbesondere Studien zum Wesen politischer Unterstützung in demokratischen Gesellschaften widersprüchliche Strukturen offen. Stabiles politisches Vertrauen zu demokratisch legitimierten Objekten geht auch in diesen Gesellschaften nicht zwangsläufig mit einer demokratischen Gesinnung einher. Entsprechend sollte nicht nur überwiegend performanzinduziertes Vertrauen, sondern ebenso dessen wünschenswertes normatives Fundament und deren gemeinsame Schnittstelle in den Fokus gerückt werden.

Des Weiteren verspricht eine umfassendere und differenziertere Suche nach den individuellen und kontextuellen Grundlagen politischen Vertrauens einen zusätzlichen Erkenntnisgewinn. Jüngste Studien belegen beispielsweise die bislang wenig beachtete Rolle von Persönlichkeitszügen und Emotionen (Mondak et al. i.E.; Theiss-Morse, Barton i.E.). Angesichts der mit kontextuellen Indikatoren des guten Regierens verbundenen stabilen Erklärungskraft ginge mit einer deutlicheren theoriegeleiteten empirischen Differenzierung dieser Indikatoren und der anschließenden Überprüfung ihrer Effektstärken eine weitere Ausdehnung des zu erkundenden Terrains einher. Daneben erscheint es ratsam, neben der Berücksichtigung wirtschaftlicher und sozialstaatlicher Performanzindikatoren zusätzliche Ereignisse, wie beispielsweise politische Skandale oder Ereignisse mit weitreichenden politischen oder sozialen Auswirkungen, in die Analysen zu integrieren. Im idealen Fall basierten entsprechende Untersuchungen auf international vergleichend erhobenen Paneldaten.

Ferner werfen gerade aktuelle wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen die Frage auf, ob und in welchem Umfang individuelle demokratische Grundüberzeugungen durch die Nachbeben

schwerer Wirtschaftskrisen erschüttert werden können. Wären angesichts der sich seit 2010 in zahlreichen europäischen Ländern massiv verschlechternden wirtschaftlichen Situation weitere Einbußen politischer Unterstützungsbereitschaft zu erwarten und gar als Vorboten demokratischer De-Konsolidierungsprozesse zu werten? Aufgrund des in international vergleichenden empirischen Studien vielfach belegten Zusammenhangs zwischen hoher subjektiver Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit eines demokratischen Systems und einer höheren Akzeptanz demokratischer Institutionen sowie der individuellen Ausprägung demokratischer Wertorientierungen ließen sich zweierlei Annahmen formulieren: Erstens wäre zu erwarten, dass die mittel- bis langfristige Akzeptanz, Unterstützung und gesellschaftliche Verankerung demokratischer Regierungssysteme in einem engen Wechselverhältnis zu deren politischer, wirtschaftlicher und sozial-integrativer Effektivität stehen. Zweitens wäre anzunehmen, dass die für die individuelle politische Unterstützung zentrale Systemeffektivität im Zeitverlauf in den Hintergrund rücken und um die Anerkennung der demokratischen Ordnung mit ihrem Wertekanon als nun eigenständiger Wert ergänzt würde; ein Szenario, das nicht zuletzt durch die Entwicklung der Politischen Kultur in der jungen Bundesrepublik anschaulich belegt wurde. Im Umkehrschluss wäre gleichermaßen auch und gerade angesichts der Großen Rezession mit ihren tiefgreifenden wirtschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen Herausforderungen an die süd- und osteuropäischen Krisenländer eine gegenläufige Entwicklung vorstellbar. Fraglich wäre, ob diesen „Verfallserscheinungen“ allein durch die Rückkehr zum ursprünglichen wirtschaftlichen Leistungsvermögen wirksam begegnet werden könnte. Vielmehr weisen die eindeutigen Befunde zur Stärkung politischer Unterstützung durch effektive Kontrolle korrupter Praktiken einen Weg, der über rein wirtschaftliche Kennzahlen hinausweisen und stattdessen das Primat der Politik wiederherstellen würde.

Ein weiterer vielversprechender Forschungsansatz könnte zudem die empirisch abbildbaren Implikationen politischer Unterstützung stärker in den Blick rücken. Derzeit wird insbesondere die politische Vertrauensforschung ihrer theoretisch hergeleiteten Relevanz von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen empirisch nur unzureichend gerecht. Eine deutlichere Fokussierung beispielsweise auf die *Folgen* politischen Vertrauens bzw. Misstrauens für politisch, wirtschaftlich oder sozial wirksames Handeln könnte den Kreis eindrucksvoll schließen.

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2. Einführung in das Konzept der politischen Unterstützung

(1)

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Politisches Vertrauen und Unterstützung

Sonja Zmerli

1 Die Funktion politischen Vertrauens in Demokratien

Zur elementaren Grundvoraussetzung für den Aufbau und Erhalt demokratischer Regierungssysteme zählt eine breite Unterstützung seitens der Staatsbürger. Nur äußerst repressive Regimes sind auf Dauer in der Lage, mittels staatlicher Gewalt ihr Überleben zu sichern. Allerdings zeigt gerade die jüngere Geschichte, dass auch diesem bewussten Verzicht auf politische Unterstützung deutliche Grenzen gesetzt sind.

Politische Unterstützung wiederum kann auf vielfältige Weise zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Sie reicht von verschiedenen Formen politischer Teilhabe bis hin zu individuellen politischen Orientierungen, wie z.B. politischem Vertrauen. Dabei wird überwiegend angenommen, dass in Demokratien ein Mindestmaß an politischem Vertrauen seitens der Bürger unerlässlich ist, um politischen Akteuren notwendige Handlungsfreiheiten einzuräumen (siehe Warren 1999).

Obwohl politischem Vertrauen anerkanntermaßen eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Umsetzung politischer Prozesse zugestanden wird, sind zu dieser Forschungsthematik bislang noch keine umfassenden und empirisch überprüfbaren Theorien erarbeitet worden (siehe Rohrschneider und Schmitt-Beck 2003; Gabriel et al. 2002).

Dagegen lassen sich verschiedene demokratietheoretische Ansätze anführen, die politischem Vertrauen eine unterschiedliche Gewichtung zuweisen. Vertreter der Theorien demokratischer Elitenherrschaft setzen eine möglichst breite Basis politischen Vertrauens voraus, da erst unter diesen Bedingungen politischen Eliten effizientes Regieren ermöglicht wird. Dagegen betonen liberale Ansätze die Gefahren für Demokratien, die durch Machtmissbrauch ihrer gewählten Vertreter entstehen können. Als ein wirkungsvolles Instrument zum Abwenden dieser Gefahren wird öffentliches politisches *Misstrauen* betrachtet, das politische Akteure unter Druck setzen und dazu veranlassen soll, ihr politisches Handeln offen zu legen und zu rechtfertigen. Schließlich nehmen Vertreter des dritten Ansatzes eine Mittlerposition zwischen diesen beiden entgegengesetzten Bewertungen politischen Vertrauens ein. Im Kern beruhen deren Annahmen auf der Vorstellung, dass die politische Kultur einer demokratischen Gesellschaft durch ein Mischungsverhältnis zwischen politischem Vertrauen und Misstrauen geprägt sein sollte. Hierbei können sich sowohl Zeiten des politischen Vertrauens mit denen des Misstrauens abwechseln als auch politische Akteure und Institutionen einen unterschiedlichen Unterstützungsgrad aufweisen oder auch einzelne Bevölkerungsgruppen über ein divergierendes Niveau politischen Vertrauens verfügen (siehe Gabriel et al. 2002: 255). Dass jedoch demokratische Regierungssysteme durch längere oder auch sehr tiefgreifende Phasen des politischen Misstrauens in ihren Grundfesten erschüttert werden können, ist bereits durch Easton nachhaltig unterstrichen worden (1965).

Im Zuge gesellschaftlicher Wandlungsprozesse, wirtschaftlicher Instabilität sowie politischer Krisen und Antagonismen sahen bereits in den 1970er Jahren zahlreiche Politiker

und Wissenschaftler das Ende demokratischer Regierungssysteme heraufziehen (siehe Huntington 2000). Diese Besorgnis gipfelte Mitte der 1970er Jahre in einem Bericht an die ‚Trilateral Commission‘, ‚The Crisis of Democracy‘, der weltweite Beachtung fand (Crozier, Huntington und Watanuki 1975) und sowohl Ursachen der demokratischen Krise in den USA, Europa und Japan als auch Entwicklungsperspektiven aufzeigte. Der starke Rückgang politischen Vertrauens wurde zu diesem Zeitpunkt als einer der wesentlichen Begleitumstände dieser demokratischen Krisen diagnostiziert.

Auch 25 Jahre nach Erscheinen dieses Berichts ist ein Rückgang politischen Vertrauens zu beobachten, so dass diese Thematik wenig an Aktualität verloren hat. Dies ist umso erstaunlicher, als sich seitdem eine Vielzahl wirtschaftlicher und politischer Koordinaten grundlegend verschoben hat und, wie es scheint, eine Krise der Demokratien zunächst abgewendet werden konnte (Pharr und Putnam 2000).

Der nächste Abschnitt wird sich daher zunächst mit den theoretischen Aspekten politischen Vertrauens befassen. Dabei steht insbesondere der Kontext sowie die Differenzierung politischen Vertrauens im Vordergrund.

1.1 Definitionen politischen Vertrauens

Politisches Vertrauen, als Ausdruck politischer Unterstützung, kann als ein konstitutives Element in einer Reihe aufeinander bezogener politischer Orientierungen konzeptionalisiert werden. So schlagen Rohrschneider und Schmitt-Beck beispielsweise vor, institutionelles Vertrauen, als eine Form politischen Vertrauens, auf einem Kontinuum zwischen konstitutionellen Idealen einerseits und der Bewertung der Regierungsperformanz andererseits zu verorten (2003: 37). Institutionenvertrauen ist demzufolge sowohl in Präferenzen und Bewertungen demokratischer Verfassungen als auch in die Zufriedenheit mit der demokratischen Performanz und der Bewertung der Regierungsarbeit eingebettet. Nach Levi und Stoker (2000: 484f.) hingegen stützt sich politisches Vertrauen auf eine positive Bewertung derjenigen Merkmale, die politischen Institutionen Vertrauenswürdigkeit verleihen. Hierzu zählen Glaubwürdigkeit, Fairness, Kompetenz, Transparenz des politischen Handelns sowie Aufgeschlossenheit gegenüber konkurrierenden Meinungen. Politisches in Form von institutionellem Vertrauen beruht aber auch auf der persönlichen Überzeugung, dass Institutionen weder willkürlich noch diskriminierend agieren, sondern vielmehr allen Bürgern eine gleiche, faire und gerechte Behandlung zukommen lassen (Zmerli, Newton und Montéro i.E.). An der grundlegenden Bedeutung institutionellen Vertrauens lassen auch Newton und Norris keinen Zweifel, wenn sie feststellen, dass „confidence in institutions ... (is) the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity“ (2000: 53).

Die unterschiedlichen Definitionen politischen Vertrauens bedingen aber gleichzeitig eine differenzierende Betrachtung dieses Untersuchungsgegenstandes. Gabriel et al. identifizieren zwei bzw. drei Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens, die als separate Analyseeinheiten genutzt werden könnten (Gabriel und Kunz 2002; Gabriel et al. 2002). Die Trennlinien verlaufen hierbei zwischen Vertrauen zu parteienstaatlichen Institutionen, wie Regierungen, Parteien, Parlamenten und Politikern und Vertrauen zu regulativen oder auch Output-Institutionen, wie Bundesverfassungsgericht, Polizei, Gerichte sowie Behörden. Sofern entsprechende Angaben in Bevölkerungsumfragen verfügbar sind, sollte auch Vertrauen zu kommunalen Institutionen, wie Ämtern, Stadtverwaltung, Bürgermeister, Gemeinderat und

Kommunalpolitikern, in empirische Analysen einbezogen werden. Van Deth (2000) wiederum identifiziert noch eine weitere Dimension politischen Vertrauens, nämlich die des Vertrauens zu externen politischen Akteuren. Dieses kann sich einerseits auf internationale oder supranationale politische Institutionen beziehen, andererseits aber auch auf Institutionen und Akteure, deren politisches Handeln insbesondere auf den Schutz nationaler oder territorialer Integrität gerichtet ist. Als Beispiele wären hierbei die Europäische Union, die Vereinten Nationen, aber auch nationale Armeen zu nennen.

Schließlich schlägt Göhler eine stufenweise Betrachtung politischen Vertrauens vor, welche die „evolutionär fortgeschrittene Form der politischen Ordnung“ (2002: 235) reflektieren soll. Die erste Stufe politischen Vertrauens repräsentiert das persönliche Vertrauen zu Politikern als gewählte Repräsentanten. Auf der zweiten Stufe erfolgt der Schritt vom personalen zum funktionalen Vertrauen. Hierbei steht Vertrauen zu Institutionen im Vordergrund, die aber durch politische Akteure repräsentiert werden. Schließlich bildet sich die dritte Stufe politischen Vertrauens im symbolischen Handeln politischer Akteure als „beanspruchte(r) Ausdruck geltender gemeinsamer Werte“ (Göhler 2002: 234) ab.

Auf der Grundlage dieser theoretischen Ausführungen zu Definition und Verortung politischen Vertrauens werden im nächsten Schritt die im *European Social Survey* enthaltenen Fragen zu politischem Vertrauen einer genauen Betrachtung unterzogen.

1.2 Politisches Vertrauen im *European Social Survey*

Die erste Welle des in mehr als zwanzig europäischen Ländern eingesetzten *European Social Survey* (ESS) beinhaltet sechs Fragen zu politischem Vertrauen. Die entsprechenden Fragen lauten:

„Bitte sagen Sie mir zu jeder öffentlichen Einrichtung oder Personengruppe, die ich Ihnen nenne, wie sehr Sie persönlich jeder einzelnen davon vertrauen. Verwenden Sie dazu diese Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet, dass Sie dieser Einrichtung oder Personengruppe überhaupt nicht vertrauen und 10 bedeutet, dass Sie ihr voll und ganz vertrauen. Wie ist das mit...

- dem Bundestag?
- der Justiz?
- der Polizei?
- den Politikern?
- dem Europäischen Parlament?
- den Vereinten Nationen?“

Diese Fragen politischen Vertrauens beziehen sich überwiegend auf den in Abschnitt 1.1 skizzierten Bereich des Institutionenvertrauens bzw. funktionalen Vertrauens. Die ebenfalls erhobene Frage nach dem Vertrauen in Politiker erfasst hingegen den Bereich des personalen politischen Vertrauens. Neben diesen beiden unterschiedenen Ebenen politischen Vertrauens lässt sich das berücksichtigte Institutionenvertrauen weiter ausdifferenzieren. Nach Gabriel et al. (2002) können die Fragen nach dem Vertrauen in das nationale und Europäische Parlament eindeutig dem Bereich der parteienstaatlichen Institutionen zugeordnet werden, während Vertrauen in das nationale Rechtssystem sowie die Polizei den Bereich der regulativen Institutionen abdeckt. Vertrauen zu den Vereinten Nationen nimmt dagegen eine Zwischenposition ein. Als Vertretung der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft bzw.

ihrer Regierungen erscheint eine Zuordnung dieser Vertrauenskategorie zum Bereich parteienstaatlicher Institutionen zunächst nachvollziehbar. Aufgrund der Vielzahl beobachtender, administrativer, aber auch militärisch intervenierender Missionen, die durch UN-Mandate in Krisengebieten der Erde legitimiert und als solche klar erkennbar sind, erscheint es aber auch als gerechtfertigt, Vertrauen in die Vereinten Nationen dem Bereich der regulativen Institutionen zuzuordnen. Als internationaler Akteur ergibt sich für die UN aber noch eine dritte Unterscheidungsmöglichkeit, nämlich die des externen Akteurs, dessen Handlungsrahmen außerhalb des nationalen Kontextes angesiedelt ist. Sofern dieses Merkmal der externen politischen Institution herangezogen würde, könnten sowohl das Vertrauen zum Europäischen Parlament als auch zu den Vereinten Nationen eine Subkategorie politischen Institutionenvertrauens abbilden.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich demnach festhalten, dass sich die im ESS enthaltenen Ausprägungen politischen Vertrauens zunächst den Bereichen des Institutionenvertrauens und dem personalen politischen Vertrauen zuordnen lassen. In einem weiteren Schritt erscheint eine dreifache Differenzierung des Institutionenvertrauens sinnvoll. Hierbei lassen sich die Ordnungskategorien der parteienstaatlichen, der regulativen sowie der externen Institutionen nutzen. Welche Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens sich tatsächlich in Europa nachzeichnen lassen, sollen die empirischen Befunde des folgenden Abschnitts klären.

1.2.1 Zur Dimensionalität politischen Vertrauens in Europa

Zur Untersuchung der Dimensionalität politischen Vertrauens in Europa wird im folgenden das Verfahren der Hauptkomponentenanalyse genutzt. Zwei unterschiedliche methodische Herangehensweisen lassen sich hierbei anwenden, deren Ergebnisse im folgenden kurz dargestellt werden. Der rein explorative Ansatz verfolgt dabei die Absicht, die Dimensionalität politischen Vertrauens zu erfassen, ohne einer a priori vorgenommenen theoretischen Festlegung zu folgen.

Entgegen den in 1.2 formulierten Erwartungen lässt sich bei dieser Vorgehensweise nur eine *einzig*e Dimension politischen Vertrauens für alle untersuchten Länder mit Ausnahme Österreichs ermitteln.¹ Sofern die Hauptkomponentenanalyse auf die Ermittlung eines einzigen Faktors beschränkt bleibt, kann aber auch für die österreichischen Daten eine eindimensionale Konzeptualisierung von politischem Vertrauen vertreten werden. Die erzielten Faktorenladungen aller sechs Items politischen Vertrauens bewegen sich in allen europäischen Ländern in überaus akzeptablen Wertebereichen (von .55 bis .86). Ferner unterstützen sowohl die prozentualen Anteile erklärter Varianzen (von 51% bis 65%) als auch die ermittelten KMO-Gütekriterien (von .77 bis .87) eine eindimensionale Betrachtung politischen Vertrauens.

Sofern jedoch die Hauptkomponentenanalyse aufgrund der in 1.2 erläuterten theoretischen Überlegungen auf zwei Dimensionen bzw. Faktoren festgelegt wird, treten bemerkenswerte Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern West- und Osteuropas hervor.² Für alle europäischen Länder gilt jedoch zunächst, dass die Dimensionen nicht entlang der theoretischen Unterscheidung zwischen personalem politischem Vertrauen und Institutionen-

¹ Die Ergebnisse dieser Hauptkomponentenanalyse werden hier aus Platzgründen nicht dargestellt.

² Die Ergebnisse dieser Analysen werden hier nicht in Tabellenform aufgeführt und basieren auf Varimax- bzw. obliquen Rotationsverfahren.

vertrauen verlaufen, sondern vielmehr die Ausdifferenzierung des Institutionenvertrauens unterstreichen. Analog zu den empirischen Erkenntnissen von Gabriel et al. (2002: 183ff.) weisen die westeuropäischen Bevölkerungen mit wenigen Ausnahmen eine politische Vertrauensstruktur auf, die zwischen parteienstaatlichen Institutionen und politischen Akteuren einerseits und regulativen Instanzen andererseits differenziert. Die osteuropäischen Länder hingegen lassen eine nationale und eine internationale bzw. externe Komponente erkennen. Während osteuropäische Bevölkerungen in ihrer Vertrauensbereitschaft nicht zwischen politischen Akteuren sowie parteienstaatlichen und regulativen Institutionen unterscheiden, stellen das Europäische Parlament sowie die Vereinten Nationen für sie hiervon klar abgegrenzte Vertrauensobjekte dar. Dieser empirische Befund stützt die Annahme, dass regulative Institutionen in postsozialistischen Gesellschaften nach wie vor als politisierte Instanzen wahrgenommen und bewertet werden. Vertrauen zu den Vereinten Nationen und zum Europäischen Parlament speist sich hingegen aus einer anderen Quelle, die unabhängig vom politischen Erbe des Sozialismus zu sein scheint. Die ostdeutschen empirischen Befunde lassen sich jedoch nicht in dieses klare Bild postsozialistischer Gesellschaften einfügen, sondern decken sich mit der in Westdeutschland sowie den westeuropäischen Ländern identifizierten Dimensionalisierung politischen Vertrauens. Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass sich in Ostdeutschland die regulativen Institutionen aufgrund ihrer westdeutschen bzw. demokratischen Prägung schneller vom Makel der politischen Instrumentalisierung befreien konnten, was sich nun in einer entsprechenden Struktur politischen Vertrauens widerspiegelt.

Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass europaweit keine Dimensionalisierung politischen Vertrauens ermittelt werden kann, die den theoretischen Annahmen genügen würde. Weder scheinen personales Vertrauen zu politischen Akteuren und Institutionenvertrauen zwei unterschiedliche Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens zu markieren, noch lässt sich eine allgemeingültige Differenzierung zwischen Vertrauen zu parteienstaatlichen und regulativen Institutionen vornehmen. Dagegen verweisen die Ergebnisse der explorativen Hauptkomponentenanalyse darauf, dass sich europaweit eine *eindimensionale* Konzeptualisierung politischen Vertrauens für die folgenden Untersuchungen durchaus vertreten lässt. Dadurch wird zudem bei der Interpretation der in Abschnitt 3 präsentierten Erklärungsmodelle politischen Vertrauens ein vereinfachter Länder- bzw. Regionenvergleich ermöglicht.

2 Das Niveau politischen Vertrauens in Europa

In den folgenden Analysen wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob und in welchem Umfang politisches Vertrauen in bezug auf die sechs verschiedenen Vertrauensobjekte variiert, und ob hierbei vergleichbare länderübergreifende Strukturen aufgedeckt werden können.

Ausgangspunkt der vergleichenden Analysen wird die deutsche Bevölkerungsumfrage des ESS sein, wobei hier insbesondere ein Ost-West Vergleich im Zentrum des Interesses stehen wird. Anschließend werden die Befunde der weiteren europäischen Länder diskutiert und zusammen mit den ost-westdeutschen Ergebnissen einer Gesamtbewertung unterzogen.

Mit der deutschen Wiedervereinigung im Oktober 1990 trafen nach mehr als vierzig Jahren zwei Gesellschaften aufeinander, deren politisches Erbe unterschiedlicher kaum hätte ausfallen können. Die Teilung Deutschlands, die mit der Beendigung des Zweiten Weltkrieges faktisch eingeleitet wurde, ebnete auch den Weg für eine gegenläufige Ent-

wicklung politischer Erfahrungen, politischer Orientierungen sowie politischer Teilhabemöglichkeiten unter der ost- und westdeutschen Bevölkerung. Während die demokratische Staatsform der Bundesrepublik den Aufbau und die Funktionsweise ihrer politischen Institutionen prägte und ihren Bürgern ein breites und selbstbestimmtes politisches Betätigungsfeld bot, verhinderte die repressive sozialistische Staatsform der DDR die Entfaltung derjenigen politischen Orientierungen, die für die Legitimierung der geltenden politischen Ordnung notwendig gewesen wäre. Der Zusammenbruch des sozialistischen Regimes setzte diesem Prozess schließlich ein Ende.

Seitdem wurde in zahlreichen empirischen Studien der Frage nachgegangen, ob es den beiden deutschen Teilgesellschaften seit der Wiedervereinigung tatsächlich gelungen ist, ihre aus der Trennung resultierenden strukturellen und kulturellen Unterschiede zu überwinden (Priller und Winkler 2002; Gensicke 2000; Zapf 2000; Kaase 1999). Analyse und Vergleich der politischen Kultur in Ost- und Westdeutschland bilden hierbei einen wesentlichen Bestandteil sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung (siehe Kapitel 1).

Empirische Befunde belegen jedoch durchweg, dass diese gesellschaftliche Annäherung bis dato noch nicht vollständig vollzogen wurde. Ganz offenkundig können in den neuen Ländern Spuren des sozialistischen Erbes nachgezeichnet werden. Inwiefern diese Erkenntnisse auch von den Daten des ESS gestützt werden, sollen die folgenden Analysen klären. Zunächst wird jedoch ein Überblick über die Entwicklung politischen Vertrauens in Deutschland im Zeitverlauf gegeben. Diese Resultate stützen sich auf Daten des ALLBUS³ der Jahre 1984, 1994, 2000 und 2002. Ein unmittelbarer Vergleich dieser empirischen Befunde mit den Ergebnissen des ESS ist allerdings nicht möglich, da sowohl die Art der Fragestellung als auch die Wertebereiche der Antworten in beiden Umfrageformaten nicht identisch sind. Im Anschluss daran erfolgt ein Überblick über das aktuelle Niveau und die Differenziertheit der verschiedenen Elemente politischen Vertrauens im vereinten Deutschland auf der Grundlage des ESS.


2.1 Politisches Vertrauen in Deutschland

2.1.1 Politisches Vertrauen im Zeitverlauf

Mit Hilfe der Untersuchung politischen Vertrauens im Zeitverlauf lassen sich Entwicklungstrends aufzeigen, die neben Erkenntnissen über Veränderungen der Niveaus auch Rückschlüsse über etwaige Annäherungs- bzw. Entfremdungsprozesse der beiden deutschen Teilgesellschaften zulassen. Wie den Abbildungen 1 und 2 zu entnehmen ist, deckt ein Ost-West-Vergleich tatsächlich interessante Trends auf. Sofern man zunächst für die Bewertung der westdeutschen Resultate die Umfrage des Jahres 1984 als Ausgangsbasis zugrunde legt, ist festzustellen, dass bis zum Jahr 2002 sowohl Vertrauen in den deutschen Bundestag als auch in die Justiz gewisse Einbußen hinnehmen mussten. Der Vertrauenswert für die Polizei bleibt hingegen konstant. Auch Vertrauen in das Europäische Parlament, das allerdings nur in den Jahren 1994 und 2000 gemessen wurde, bleibt nahezu unverändert, erzielt allerdings die niedrigsten Werte. Den zweitniedrigsten Wert weist Ver-

³ Die in diesem Beitrag genutzten Daten entstammen der kumulierten *Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften* (ALLBUS) aus den Jahren 1980-2000 sowie 2002. Für nähere Informationen zum ALLBUS siehe auch: <http://www.gesis.org/Dauerbeobachtung/Allbus/>.

Abbildung 1: Politisches Vertrauen in Westdeutschland (Allbus; Mittelwerte)




trauen in den Bundestag auf und wird mit deutlichem Abstand von Justizvertrauen gefolgt. Die Polizei verfügt jedoch ohne Ausnahme über den größten Vertrauensbonus. Bei einer Werteskala von 0 bis 7 weisen diese Ergebnisse in der Tendenz auf eine Klima politischen Vertrauens hin. Zudem stärken diese Befunde auch die Annahme, dass zumindest seit dem Jahr 1994 eine Ausdifferenzierung politischen Vertrauens stattgefunden hat. Denn für das Jahr 1984 ist eine vergleichbare Differenzierung zwischen den einzelnen Aspekten politischen Vertrauens in parteienstaatliche Institutionen einerseits und regulative Institutionen andererseits noch nicht gegeben.

Die ostdeutschen Befunde weisen dagegen in eine entgegengesetzte Richtung. Denn bis auf Vertrauen in das Europäische Parlament zeigen alle weiteren erhobenen Items deutlich ansteigende Tendenzen. Den größten Anstieg seit 1994 erfährt hierbei Vertrauen in die Polizei. Dennoch erweisen sich ostdeutsche Bürger durchweg als weniger vertrauensvoll gegenüber ihren staatlichen Institutionen als Westdeutsche. Trotz dieses bestehenden Unterschieds herrscht auch in den neuen Ländern im Jahr 2002 ein überwiegend vertrauensvolles Klima. Ebenso scheint sich auch im Osten eine differenzierende Wahrnehmung von parteienstaatlichen und regulativen Institutionen zu vollziehen.

Sofern man, der direkten Vergleichbarkeit willen, auch in den alten Ländern den Entwicklungstrend seit 1994 zugrunde legt, sind lediglich für Vertrauen in die Justiz sowie die Polizei marginale Einbußen festzustellen. Vertrauen in den deutschen Bundestag erfährt sogar einen leichten Anstieg. Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass im Westen Deutschlands die stärksten und nachhaltigsten Verluste politischen Vertrauens zwischen 1984 und 1994 erfolgt sein müssen.

Abbildung 2: Politisches Vertrauen in Ostdeutschland (Allbus; Mittelwerte)




2.1.2 Politisches Vertrauen auf der Grundlage des ESS

Über den gegenwärtigen Stand politischen Vertrauens in Deutschland geben auch die Daten des ESS näheren Aufschluss. Sofern man der Untersuchung zunächst den Durchschnittswert eines Gesamtindex politischen Vertrauens⁴ zugrunde legt, ergibt sich mit einem Wert von 5,02 ein sehr ausgewogenes Bild (Abbildung 3). Erst ein Blick auf die einzelnen Werte der gemessenen Bezugsobjekte politischen Vertrauens verdeutlicht eine gewisse Variationsbreite auf der 11-Punkte Skala. Diese bewegen sich zwischen 3,5 und 6,7 und erlauben eine gewisse Zuordnung und Abgrenzung zwischen den zuvor theoretisch identifizierten Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens. So lässt sich beispielsweise festhalten, dass Vertrauen in Politiker, also personales politisches Vertrauen, die mit Abstand schwächste Ausprägung erfährt. Die Vertrauenswerte in den deutschen Bundestag, das Europäische Parlament sowie die Vereinten Nationen, die in Westeuropa gemäß der in Abschnitt 1.2.1 dargestellten Analysen überwiegend dem Bereich der parteienstaatlichen Institutionen zugeordnet werden können, weichen relativ geringfügig voneinander ab und nehmen eine mittlere Werteposition ein. Das größte Vertrauen in Deutschland genießen das nationale Rechtssystem sowie die Polizei, beides Institutionen, die nach Gabriel et al. der regulativen Dimension politi-

⁴ Dieser Index politischen Vertrauens basiert auf der Addition der sechs Vertrauensitems, deren Summe wiederum für jeden Befragten durch die Anzahl der gültigen Angaben zu den Items dividiert wurde. Die Werte reichen von 0 (niedrigster Wert) zu 10 (höchster Wert).

Abbildung 3: Politisches Vertrauen in Deutschland (Mittelwerte)



schen Vertrauens zugeordnet werden können (2002: 192). Diese Ergebnisse legen die Vermutung nahe, dass Bürger demokratischer Gesellschaftsformen ihren politischen Institutionen kein blindes Vertrauen entgegenbringen, sondern ihnen tatsächlich auch mit einem gewissen Maß an Misstrauen begegnen. Einen Vertrauensbonus genießen hierbei allerdings diejenigen Institutionen, die gesamtgesellschaftlich als unparteiisch eingestuft werden. Der Bereich des personalen politischen Vertrauens zeigt dagegen deutlich auf, dass das Verhältnis der Bürger zu ihren politischen Repräsentanten nahezu krisenhafte Züge besitzt. Die oftmals zitierte Politikverdrossenheit erscheint vielmehr als ein Ausdruck des Misstrauens gegenüber politischen Akteuren.

Wie die westdeutschen Mittelweltergebnisse aufzeigen, lässt sich auch hier eine Dreifachzuordnung der Vertrauensitems vornehmen (siehe Abbildung 3). Personales politisches Vertrauen nimmt ein weiteres Mal den letzten Platz in der Vertrauensrangfolge ein. Es folgen die Vertrauenswerte der parteienstaatlichen Institutionen. Die ersten Ränge belegen jedoch die Vertrauenswerte der regulativen Institutionen. Das gemessene Niveau der politischen Vertrauensobjekte lässt allerdings leichte Abweichungen zu den gesamtdeutschen Mittelwerten erkennen. Für jedes Item gilt, dass in Westdeutschland ein höheres Ausmaß politischen Vertrauens vorliegt als im gesamtdeutschen Vergleich. Dieser Befund spiegelt sich auch im höheren westdeutschen Wert des politischen Vertrauensindex wider.

Auch ein Blick auf die ostdeutschen Mittelwerte politischen Vertrauens bestätigt zunächst die Struktur, die sich bereits auf gesamtdeutscher Ebene sowie in den alten Bundesländern abzeichnete (siehe Abbildung 3). Während regulative Institutionen das höchste Vertrauen genießen, werden politische Akteure von ostdeutschen Bürgern mit einem aus-

geprägten Misstrauen bedacht. Trotz dieser vordergründigen Parallelen ist unverkennbar, dass im Osten die Trennlinien zwischen den unterschiedlichen Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens viel geringer ausgeprägt sind als im Westen. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Differenzierung zwischen parteienstaatlichen und regulativen Institutionen. Während der Bereich der parteienstaatlichen Institutionen mit den Vereinten Nationen einen Höchstwert von 4,77 erreicht, liegt der Durchschnittswert des Vertrauens in das Rechtssystem als ein Vertreter der regulativen Institutionen mit 4,94 nur knapp darüber.

Führt man ferner Mittelwertvergleiche politischen Vertrauens durch, lässt sich festhalten, dass sich sämtliche ostdeutschen durchschnittlichen Vertrauenswerte signifikant von denjenigen westdeutscher Bürger unterscheiden und in jedem Fall weit schwächer ausgeprägt sind. Der deutlich und signifikant geringere ostdeutsche Mittelwert des politischen Vertrauensindex unterstreicht dieses Ergebnis.

Drei grundsätzliche Erkenntnisse lassen sich aus diesem deutsch/deutschen Vergleich gewinnen. Erstens wird die auf beiden Hauptkomponentenanalysen basierende Annahme gestützt, dass sich die ostdeutschen Strukturen politischen Vertrauens nur geringfügig von denjenigen der alten Länder unterscheiden. Erkennbare Unterschiede sind dennoch vorhanden, denn zweitens wurde ersichtlich, dass politisches Vertrauen in Ostdeutschland weit schwächer ausgeprägt ist als im Westen. Diese Vertrauensdiskrepanz betrifft insbesondere die parteienstaatliche Institution des deutschen Bundestages sowie die regulativen Institutionen des Rechtssystems sowie der Polizei. Während sich die ostdeutschen Durchschnittswerte des Vertrauens in die regulativen Institutionen noch in einem mittleren Wertebereich bewegen, begegnen ostdeutsche Bürger dem deutschen Bundestag mit erkennbarem Misstrauen. Allerdings legt die Untersuchung des Zeitverlaufs die Vermutung nahe, dass hier ein Aufwärtstrend vorliegen könnte. Inwiefern dieser niedrige Vertrauenswert noch durch die Erfahrungen der ehemaligen Bürger der DDR mit ihrem höchsten Vertretungsorgan, der Volkskammer, beeinflusst wird oder bereits auf aktuelle Bewertungen des deutschen Bundestages und enttäuschte Hoffnungen zurückzuführen ist, kann mit Hilfe der vorliegenden Daten nicht näher geklärt werden. Schließlich ist festzuhalten, dass individuelle politische Orientierungen nur einen allmählichen Wandlungsprozess vollziehen, selbst wenn, wie in den neuen Ländern geschehen, eine übergangslos etablierte demokratische Staatsform mit ihren in Westdeutschland bewährten politischen Akteuren und Institutionen die besten Chancen für eine zügige Anpassung bieten. Bereits die *Civic Culture* Studie (Almond und Verba 1963) belegte für die späten 1950er Jahre vergleichbare defizitäre politische Dispositionen seitens der Bürger der damals noch jungen Bundesrepublik. Zweifellos spiegeln sich die vergleichsweise geringen Erfahrungen mit demokratischen Institutionen und Prozessen auch in den durch Misstrauen geprägten politischen Orientierungen der Bundesbürger der neuen Länder wider. Sie legen die Vermutung nahe, dass das politische Erbe totalitärer Regimes nachhaltig fort dauert und mittel- bis langfristigen Sozialisationsprozessen bedarf, um allmählich demokratischen Orientierungen zu weichen. Im äußersten Fall wäre ein Wandel politischer Einstellungen nur mit Hilfe eines Generationenwechsels möglich. Die Veränderungen politischer Orientierungen in ehemals totalitären Gesellschaften könnte in jungen Demokratien auch dadurch erschwert werden, dass ehemalige politische Eliten nach wie vor einflussreiche politische Funktionen wahrnehmen. Sofern diese Annahme zuträfe, sollten sich die ebenfalls posttotalitären Gesellschaften Polens, Ungarns, Tschechiens und mit Einschränkungen Sloweniens von den ostdeutschen Befunden erkennbar unterscheiden, da deren demokratische Institutionen im Unterschied zu Ostdeutschland auf einer eigen-

ständigen Entstehung basieren und frühere politische und Funktionseliten nicht vollständig aus dem öffentlichen Leben getreten sind. Erste Anhaltspunkte dafür lieferten bereits die Ergebnisse der konfirmatorischen Hauptkomponentenanalyse. Untersuchungsgegenstand des folgenden Abschnitts wird daher die Verortung politischen Vertrauens Westdeutschlands in Westeuropa sowie Ostdeutschlands in Osteuropa sein.

2.2 Politisches Vertrauen in West- und Osteuropa

2.2.1 Westeuropäische Befunde

Betrachtet man zunächst die einzelnen Items politischen Vertrauens im Ländervergleich, wird ersichtlich, dass Vertrauen in die Polizei als regulative Institution in 14 von 15 westeuropäischen Ländern den höchsten Durchschnittswert erzielt (siehe Abbildung 4 bis 6). Lediglich Portugal bildet hierbei eine Ausnahme. Ein ähnlich homogenes Bild kann mit nur wenigen Ausnahmen für den geringsten Mittelwert politischen Vertrauens im westeuropäischen Vergleich erzielt werden. Dieser wird mehrheitlich vom personalen politischen Vertrauen, nämlich vom Vertrauen in Politiker eingenommen. In fünf Ländern hingegen rangiert Vertrauen in das Europäische Parlament an letzter Stelle. Für die übrigen erhobenen Items politischen Vertrauens können keine ausgeprägten Besonderheiten festgestellt werden. Ohne unmittelbar ersichtliche Systematik wechseln sich im Ländervergleich die verbleibenden drei Items politischen Vertrauens in ihren Rangfolgen ab.

Insgesamt betrachtet, kann für die Länder Westeuropas festgehalten werden, dass der politische Vertrauensindex einen Wert aufweist, der leicht über dem Messskalendurchschnitt liegt (siehe Abbildung 7).

Trotz dieser zahlreichen Gemeinsamkeiten ergeben Varianzanalysen, dass die 15 untersuchten und in den folgenden Abschnitten als westeuropäische Bevölkerung zusammengefassten Gesellschaften eine beachtliche Bandbreite an politischem Vertrauen aufweisen.⁵ Dabei ist aber auch zu beobachten, dass die Heterogenität in Abhängigkeit zu den jeweiligen Objekten politischen Vertrauens zu stehen scheint. Die geringsten Abweichungen sind im westeuropäischen Vergleich demnach in Bezug auf das Vertrauen in Politiker festzustellen. Vertrauen in das Rechtssystem sowie in die Vereinten Nationen sind dagegen durch stärker divergierende Vertrauensbekundungen gekennzeichnet.⁶ Auch die Varianzanalyse des politischen Vertrauensindex spiegelt in ihren Ergebnissen diese heterogenen Dispositionen westeuropäischer Gesellschaften wider.

⁵ Die Ergebnisse der entsprechenden Varianzanalysen sowie der Scheffé-Tests werden hier aus Platzgründen nicht präsentiert.

⁶ Die durchschnittlichen Standardabweichungen betragen 2,29 für Vertrauen in Politiker sowie 2,50 bzw. 2,46 für Vertrauen in das Rechtssystem sowie in die Vereinten Nationen. Die durchschnittlichen Standardabweichungen der übrigen Items politischen Vertrauens bewegen sich zwischen diesen Mittelwerten.

Abbildung 4: Vertrauen in nationales Parlament und Politiker (Mittelwerte)




Abbildung 5: Vertrauen in Rechtssystem und Polizei (Mittelwerte)




Abbildung 6: Vertrauen in EP und Vereinte Nationen (Mittelwerte)





Abbildung 7: Politischer Vertrauensindex (Mittelwerte)



2.2.2 Osteuropäische Befunde

Wie zu erwarten war, weicht das Bild der vier osteuropäischen Länder von demjenigen Westeuropas in zumindest einem wesentlichen Punkt deutlich ab: An die Stelle des Vertrauens in die Polizei, welches in den allermeisten westeuropäischen Ländern an erster Stelle rangiert, tritt in den Ländern Osteuropas ausnahmslos das Vertrauen in die Vereinten Nationen (siehe Abbildung 4 bis 6). Außer in Ungarn folgt das Vertrauen in die Polizei jedoch sogleich auf dem zweiten Rang. Gemeinsam ist den Bevölkerungen Ost- und Westeuropas allerdings, dass beide Gruppierungen Politikern das geringste Vertrauen entgegenbringen. Ein ausgeprägtes Misstrauensklima scheint außerdem gegenüber den nationalen Parlamenten zu herrschen. Allerdings bildet Ungarn auch hier eine Ausnahme. Vertrauen in das Europäische Parlament nimmt wiederum mit Ausnahme Ungarns den dritten Rang ein und wird von Vertrauen in das jeweilige Rechtssystem auf Rang vier gefolgt.

Varianzanalysen legen nahe, dass zumindest drei der vier osteuropäischen Gesellschaften weitgehend homogene Ausprägungen besitzen.⁷ Eine Erklärung für diese Homogenität könnte in der geringeren osteuropäischen Länderfallzahl begründet sein, welche auf einer breiteren osteuropäischen Datenbasis möglicherweise nicht mehr nachweisbar wäre. Ungarn hingegen nimmt im Osteuropavergleich mit nur einer Ausnahme *immer* eine Sonderstellung ein. Dessen Vertrauenswerte lassen sich viel eher den westeuropäischen Befunden zuordnen. Lediglich beim Vertrauen in die Polizei zeigt die ungarische Bevölkerung eine deutliche Parallele zu den übrigen osteuropäischen Mittelwerten.

Betrachtet man im europäischen Vergleich neben den Rangfolgen und den Varianzen politischen Vertrauens auch dessen Niveau, so vermittelt der Durchschnittswert des politischen Vertrauensindex eine erkennbare Diskrepanz zwischen den west- und osteuropäischen Werten (siehe Abbildung 7). Nach wie vor sind die hier untersuchten postsozialistischen Gesellschaften durch eine eher misstrauische Haltung gegenüber ihren politischen Institutionen und Akteuren geprägt. Sofern man jedoch das west- und osteuropäische Niveau der einzelnen Vertrauensindikatoren miteinander vergleicht, wird ersichtlich, dass das Vertrauen der osteuropäischen Bevölkerungen in das Europäische Parlament sogar stärker ausgeprägt ist als im westlichen Teil des europäischen Kontinents. Als mögliche Erklärung könnte hierbei die Hoffnung der Befragten auf wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung und politische Stabilität zum Tragen kommen, die mit einem Eintritt in die Europäische Union oftmals verbunden ist. Eine weitere Erklärung könnte allerdings auch in der mangelnden unmittelbaren Erfahrung der Osteuropäer mit den Institutionen der Europäischen Union begründet liegen, die sie bis dahin auch vor Enttäuschungen bewahren konnte. Die größte west-/osteuropäische Diskrepanz ist allerdings im Vertrauen zur Polizei zu beobachten.

2.2.3 Deutschland im europäischen Spannungsfeld

Aus den Analysen des Abschnitts 2.1 ging bereits hervor, dass sich die Vertrauenskultur der beiden deutschen Teilgesellschaften signifikant voneinander unterscheidet. Als wichtigstes Ergebnis kann zusammengefasst werden, dass die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft selbst nach zwölf Jahren gelebter demokratischer Erfahrungen weit mehr Ähnlichkeiten mit den

⁷ Die Ergebnisse der entsprechenden Varianzanalysen sowie der Scheffé-Tests werden hier aus Platzgründen nicht präsentiert.

osteuropäischen Ländern als mit den westeuropäischen Bevölkerungen aufweist. Tatsächlich unterscheiden sich die ostdeutschen Vertrauensmittelwerte in Bezug auf Politiker sowie auf das nationale Parlament nicht signifikant von denjenigen der osteuropäischen Bevölkerungen.⁸ Auch der Mittelwertvergleich des gebildeten Index politischen Vertrauens ermittelt keine signifikanten Abweichungen zwischen Ostdeutschland und Osteuropa. Diese Gemeinsamkeiten werden darüber hinaus durch den Befund unterstrichen, dass die übrigen Mittelwerte der ostdeutschen Gesellschaft auch von denjenigen der westdeutschen sowie der westeuropäischen Bevölkerungen signifikant verschieden sind. Die vorliegenden empirischen Ergebnisse widerlegen somit die Annahme, dass sich das politische Vertrauen der ostdeutschen Gesellschaft aufgrund der unmittelbaren Übernahme bewährter demokratischer Institutionen gegenüber den übrigen postsozialistischen Ländern deutlich stärker entwickeln konnte.

Westdeutschland weist hingegen lediglich im Bereich des Vertrauens zum Europäischen Parlament eine Parallele zur zusammengefassten Kategorie der Gesellschaften Westeuropas auf. Mit den osteuropäischen Bevölkerungen verbindet es sogar das Vertrauen in die Vereinten Nationen.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass die ostdeutsche Bevölkerung nach wie vor zahlreiche Merkmale einer postsozialistischen Gesellschaft aufweist. Obwohl zwölf Jahre demokratischer Erfahrungen bereits einen beachtlichen Zeitraum darstellen, spiegelt sich diese Zeitspanne politischer Sozialisation nur bedingt in der ostdeutschen politischen Vertrauenskultur wider. Grundlegende Veränderungen wären demnach insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit dem Heranwachsen jüngerer Generationen zu erwarten.

Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft weicht in manchen Fällen erkennbar von den westeuropäischen Mittelwerten ab. Beachtet man jedoch die ausgeprägte heterogene westeuropäische Kultur politischen Vertrauens und unternimmt man den Versuch, Westdeutschland in die Vertrauensbandbreite der *einzelnen* westeuropäischen Länder einzuordnen, so ist dies ohne weiteres möglich. Die scheinbare Sonderstellung Westdeutschlands im westeuropäischen Kontext wäre somit ein Artefakt der gebildeten Analyseeinheit ‚Westeuropa‘.

3 Zur Erklärung politischen Vertrauens

Vor dem Hintergrund der in Abschnitt 2 dargestellten Heterogenität politischen Vertrauens in Ost- und Westeuropa ist es umso wichtiger, der Frage nachzugehen, inwieweit auch die Mechanismen der politischen Vertrauensbildung über die europäischen Gesellschaften hinweg variieren. Zu diesem Zweck werden nachfolgend drei Erklärungsmodelle angewandt, die in leicht abgewandelten Formen bereits in vergangenen Studien zur Erklärung politischen Vertrauens genutzt wurden (Rohrschneider und Schmitt-Beck 2003; Gabriel und Kunz 2002; Newton und Norris 2000) und die *mittelbar* sowohl den Einfluss der Mikro-, der Meso- sowie der Makroebene auf die Bildung politischen Vertrauens aufdecken sollen.

Das zunächst vorgestellte Erklärungsmodell der individuellen politischen Orientierungen und Kompetenzen ist eindeutig auf der Mikroebene angesiedelt, und gibt über die Größe des Effekts individueller Dispositionen auf die Stärkung politischen Vertrauens Aufschluss. Das Sozialkapitalmodell beleuchtet hingegen mögliche Einflüsse, deren Bezugs-

⁸ Diese Befunde beruhen auf Varianzanalysen, die hier aus Platzgründen nicht aufgeführt werden.

punkte, wie z.B. freiwillige Vereinigungen oder soziale Netzwerke, auf der Mesebene zu verorten sind. Das Systemperformanzmodell schließlich beschreibt die Effekte der Makroebene und untersucht insbesondere die Rolle der Wirtschaft, der Regierung sowie der Demokratie im eigenen Land für die Stärkung politischen Vertrauens.

3.1 Individuelle politische Orientierungen und Kompetenzen

Das Erklärungsmodell individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen zeigt die Effekte einer Vielzahl persönlicher Merkmale, Orientierungen und Einschätzungen auf politisches Vertrauen auf, die sich überwiegend den drei Bereichen politischen Engagements, nämlich dem kognitiven und dem affektiven Bereich sowie politischer Teilhabe, zuordnen lassen. Dem kognitiven Bereich können die Bestimmungsfaktoren des politischen Interesses und der subjektiven Bedeutsamkeit von Politik zugeordnet werden, die den Grad der Aufmerksamkeit beschreiben, welcher politischen Vorgängen entgegengebracht wird. Dies gilt auch für die Ausprägungen individueller politischer Kompetenzen, die sich in den subjektiven Einschätzungen der Kompliziertheit von Politik, der Möglichkeit politischer Beteiligung in einer Gruppe sowie der empfundenen Schwierigkeit, sich eine politische Meinung zu bilden, ausdrücken. In den kognitiven Bereich fallen auch die Bewertungen der Responsivität des politischen Systems, hier auch externe politische Effektivität genannt, die ebenfalls in das Erklärungsmodell aufgenommen werden. Diese umfassen die persönliche Einschätzung, dass Politiker sich für die Meinungen der Bürger, wie die des Befragten, interessieren sowie die persönliche Bewertung, dass Politiker sich nur für die Stimmen der Wähler, nicht aber für deren Meinungen interessieren. Aufgrund der nachweisbaren starken linearen Beziehung zwischen diesen beiden Messinstrumenten externer politischer Effektivität wurden diese in einem Index zusammengefasst und entsprechend in das Erklärungsmodell aufgenommen.⁹

Die Determinanten der Links-Rechts-Skala sowie der Kirchengangshäufigkeit sind dem Bereich der individuellen Einstellungen und Orientierungen zuzuordnen, geben Aufschluss über die Bedeutung konservativer Werte für den Befragten und decken somit den affektiven Bereich politischen Engagements ab.

Eine Zwischenstellung nimmt dagegen die Determinante der Wahl der amtierenden Partei oder Parteien ein, da sie gleichzeitig das politische Beteiligungspotential sowie die affektive Einstellung gegenüber den Regierenden zum Ausdruck bringt. Politische Teilhabe wird dagegen eindeutig durch die Bestimmungsfaktoren der politischen Beteiligung sowie der politischen Diskussionshäufigkeit repräsentiert.

Schließlich erscheint der Faktor Lebenszufriedenheit zwar auf den ersten Blick nicht unmittelbar politischen Orientierungen zugeordnet werden zu können; als individuelle Disposition, deren Einfluss auf politisches Vertrauen in früheren Untersuchungen nachgewiesen werden konnte, erscheint dessen Berücksichtigung in diesem Modell der Mikro-Ebene dennoch gerechtfertigt (Zmerli, Newton und Montéro (i.E.)).

Neben diesen oben aufgeführten Determinanten der individuellen politischen Orientierungen und Kompetenzen werden die sozioökonomischen Merkmale Geschlecht, Alter,

⁹ Dieser Index externer politischer Effektivität basiert auf der Addition dieser beiden gemessenen Items, deren Summe wiederum für jeden Befragten durch die Anzahl der gültigen Angaben zu den Items dividiert wurde. Die Werte reichen von 1 (niedrigster Wert) zu 5 (höchster Wert).

Bildung und Berufsprestige in dieses und in die nachfolgenden Erklärungsmodelle aufgenommen. Dieses Vorgehen dient der Kontrolle der empirischen Befunde, die durch ein Fehlen dieser relevanten Einflussfaktoren an Aussagekraft einbüßen könnten.

Als abhängige Variable fungiert der Index politischen Vertrauens. Aufgrund des starken linearen Zusammenhangs zwischen Vertrauen in Politiker und dem Index externer politischer Effektivität wurde auf diesen Aspekt politischen Vertrauens bei der Bildung der abhängigen Variable verzichtet.

In einem ersten Analyseschritt werden zunächst die west- und ostdeutschen Ergebnisse zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt. Anschließend erfolgt deren Zuordnung in das Gesamtbild der west- und osteuropäischen Befunde.

Wie ein Blick auf den Anteil der erklärten Varianz zeigt, entfaltet dieses lineare Regressionsmodell in beiden deutschen Teilgesellschaften eine beachtliche Erklärungskraft (Tabelle 1). Ihre korrigierten R^2 -Koeffizienten weichen dabei nur unwesentlich voneinander ab. Daneben zeigt dieses Erklärungsmodell weitere höchst relevante deutsch/deutsche Gemeinsamkeiten auf.

So lässt sich die externe politische Effektivität als die effektstärkste Determinante sowohl in den alten als auch in den neuen Ländern identifizieren. Beide unstandardisierten Koeffizienten weisen in Ost und West nahezu identische Einflussstärken auf, und in beiden Modellen ist politische Effektivität die jeweils aussagekräftigste Determinante.

Auch der Bestimmungsfaktor der Lebenszufriedenheit übt in beiden Landesteilen einen höchst signifikanten und erklärungsstarken Einfluss auf die Bildung politischen Vertrauens aus. Erkennbar ist aber auch, dass in Ostdeutschland der Stellenwert der Lebenszufriedenheit für politisches Vertrauen höher einzuschätzen ist als im Westen der Republik. Der standardisierte Koeffizient der Determinante Geschlecht ist in beiden deutschen Modellen ebenfalls vergleichbar stark ausgeprägt. Die unstandardisierten Koeffizienten weisen allerdings darauf hin, dass dieser Faktor in Ostdeutschland effektstärker ist als im Westen. Für den Bereich individueller politischer Kompetenzen lassen sich dagegen Ost/West-Divergenzen feststellen. So übt die Einschätzung der Kompliziertheit von Politik nur in Westdeutschland einen signifikanten Einfluss auf politisches Vertrauen aus. Die Schwierigkeit der politischen Meinungsbildung ist dagegen in beiden Landesteilen effektstark, wobei der Einfluss für den Osten etwas schwächer ausfällt. Für die alten Länder sind hier allerdings zwei gegenläufige Beziehungsstrukturen zu erkennen. Während die Einschätzung, dass Politik *nicht* zu kompliziert sei, einen signifikanten und positiven Einfluss auf politisches Vertrauen erkennen lässt, ist dieser positive Effekt ebenfalls für die persönliche Bewertung, dass es schwierig sei, sich eine politische Meinung zu bilden, zu beobachten. Die Wahl der amtierenden Partei oder Parteien trägt nur in den alten Ländern zu einer statistisch relevanten Stärkung politischen Vertrauens bei. Ebenso verhält es sich mit dem Indikator der Kirchengangshäufigkeit, der außer in den alten Ländern keinen signifikanten Einfluss erzielt.

Interessanterweise erweisen sich alle übrigen Bestimmungsfaktoren in diesem ost-westdeutschen Vergleich als statistisch insignifikant.

Die westeuropäischen Ergebnisse zeigen in wichtigen Aspekten Parallelen zu den westdeutschen Befunden auf. Dies wird insbesondere durch einen nahezu identischen Anteil erklärter Varianz sowie eine vergleichbare Aussagekraft der erklärungsstärksten Determinanten der externen politischen Effektivität sowie der Lebenszufriedenheit belegt. Auch für die Bestimmungsfaktoren Geschlecht und Kirchengangshäufigkeit lassen sich für Westeu-

ropa signifikante, allerdings etwas schwächere Koeffizienten ermitteln als im westdeutschen Modell. Trotz dieser Gemeinsamkeiten sind auch deutliche Unterschiede nachweisbar. Während in Westdeutschland sowohl die Wahl der amtierenden Partei oder Parteien, die wahrgenommene Kompliziertheit von Politik sowie die Schwierigkeit der politischen Meinungsbildung erklärende Funktionen einnehmen, kann dies auf der Grundlage der westeuropäischen Daten nicht in diesem Umfang belegt werden. Umgekehrt gilt, dass politisches Interesse, Bedeutsamkeit von Politik sowie politische Beteiligung zwar im westeuropäischen Modell erklärungsstark sind, dieser Befund durch die westdeutschen Daten jedoch nicht bestätigt wird. Interessanterweise steht politisches Interesse in Westeuropa wie

Tabelle 1: Individuelle politische Orientierungen und Kompetenzen als Determinante politischen Vertrauens (OLS)

Bestimmungsfaktoren	unstandardisiert				standardisiert			
	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O
Geschlecht	-.10***	-.19*	-.24*	-.07	-.03***	-.06*	-.07*	-.02
Alter	-.01**	.00	.00	.00	-.03**	-.04	-.01	.02
Bildung	.01***	.03	.00	.01	.03***	.06	-.01	.02
Berufsprestige	-.01*	.00	.00	.00	-.02*	-.06	.03	.00
Politisches Interesse	.12***	.06	-.10	-.05	.06***	.03	-.05	-.02
Bedeutsamkeit von Politik	.07***	.04	.02	.07***	.10***	.06	.03	.09***
Links-Rechts-Skala	.05***	.02	-.05	-.04***	.06***	.03	-.06	-.05***
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	.05***	.12***	.08	-.02	.05***	.10***	.06	-.02
Lebenszufriedenheit	.16***	.10***	.14***	.16***	.17***	.13***	.19***	.20***
Wahl der amtierenden Parteien	.05*	.29**	.12	.17**	.01*	.09**	.04	.05**
Politische Beteiligung	-.07*	-.17	-.21	-.14**	-.02*	-.05	-.06	-.04**
Politische Diskussionshäufigkeit	-.03**	.01	-.07	-.04**	-.03**	.01	-.08	-.04**
Politik zu kompliziert	.01	.14**	.06	.08**	.00	.08**	.04	.04**
Könnte in Gruppe polit. aktiv werden	.04***	-.03	.07	.01	.04***	-.02	.06	.00
Schwierigkeit polit. Meinungsbildung	-.02	-.22***	-.16*	.02	-.01	-.12***	-.08*	.01
Externe politische Effektivität	.72***	.74***	.76***	.76***	.40***	.39***	.39***	.34***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	24,8	24,3	23,9	22,0				
N (ungew.)	15.293	1.127	701	4.913				

Als abhängige Variable wird hier der zuvor gebildete politische Vertrauensindex genutzt, wobei Vertrauen in Politiker aufgrund der hohen Korrelation mit externer politischer Effektivität entnommen wurde. Kodierung: Geschlecht: 0 = Mann 1 = Frau; Alter: Geburtsjahr; Bildung = abgeschlossene Bildung in Jahren; Berufsprestige: ISCO Codes; Politisches Interesse: 1 = sehr interessiert bis 4 = überhaupt kein Interesse; Politik zu kompliziert: 1 = oft bis 5 = nie; Mögliche politische Teilhabe in Gruppe: 1 = sicherlich nicht bis 5 = sicherlich ja; Schwierigkeit der politischen Meinungsbildung: 1 = sehr schwierig bis 5 = sehr einfach; Externe politische Effektivität: siehe Fußnote 13; Wahl der amtierenden Partei/Parteien: 0 = nein, 1 = ja; Links-Rechts-Skala: 0 = links bis 10 = rechts; Lebenszufriedenheit: 0 = sehr unzufrieden bis 10 = sehr zufrieden; Persönliche Bedeutsamkeit von Politik: 0 = äußerst unwichtig bis 10 = äußerst wichtig; Häufigkeit politischer Diskussionen: 1 = nie bis 7 = täglich; Kirchgangshäufigkeit: 1 = nie bis 7 = täglich; Politische Beteiligung setzt sich aus den allen Fragen zu politischer Beteiligung der letzten 12 Monate aus dem ESS zusammen: 0 = nicht beteiligt 1 = beteiligt. Signifikanzniveaus: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

in Westdeutschland in einem *negativen* Zusammenhang zu politischem Vertrauen.¹⁰

Auch für die osteuropäischen Ergebnisse gilt, dass sie sich in den wichtigsten Bereichen mit den ostdeutschen Befunden decken. Dies wird durch einen vergleichbaren Anteil erklärter Varianzen sowie den nahezu gleichwertigen Koeffizienten der externen politischen Effektivität sowie der Lebenszufriedenheit belegt. Allerdings sind auch einige Abweichungen erkennbar. So üben in Ostdeutschland das Merkmal Geschlecht sowie die Schwierigkeit der politischen Meinungsbildung einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Bildung politischen Vertrauens aus, während das osteuropäische Modell diesen Effekt nicht aufweisen kann. Dagegen treten in letzterem die Bedeutsamkeit von Politik, die Links-Rechts-Skala, die Wahl der amtierenden Partei oder Parteien, politische Beteiligung, politische Diskussionshäufigkeit sowie die wahrgenommene Kompliziertheit von Politik als signifikante Bestimmungsfaktoren hervor.

Bei der Bewertung des Erklärungsmodells individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen sind mehrere Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen. Zunächst ist auf den europaweit akzeptablen Umfang erklärter Varianzen hinzuweisen, der die Angemessenheit sowie Allgemeingültigkeit dieses Modells unterstreicht. Letztere kommt ebenfalls in den effektstärksten Determinanten zum Ausdruck, die in allen gebildeten Untersuchungseinheiten identisch sind. Dieses homogene Bild wird allerdings von einer Reihe abweichender Koeffizienten getrübt. Daneben ist auffallend, dass die Bereiche politischer Kompetenzen und Orientierungen eine uneinheitliche Erklärungskraft ausüben und einen vergleichbar geringen Erklärungsbeitrag leisten. In einem nächsten Schritt wäre es vor diesem Hintergrund ratsam, nur ausgewählte Prädiktoren dieses Erklärungsmodells individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen zu nutzen. Die Frage, ob das westdeutsche Modell überwiegend Parallelen mit Westeuropa aufweist und die ostdeutschen Befunde eher den osteuropäischen Ergebnissen entsprechen, kann mit Hilfe des Erklärungsmodells individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen nicht eindeutig beantwortet werden. Lediglich einige wenige Bestimmungsfaktoren, wie Kirchgangshäufigkeit für den Westen sowie die Links-Rechts-Skala für den Osten, lassen nach wie existierende Trennlinien erkennen. Aber auch eine Sonderrolle Deutschlands lässt sich vor dem Hintergrund der ermittelten Befunde nicht gänzlich ausschließen. Denn es zeigt sich, dass die Bedeutsamkeit von Politik zwar im Westen wie auch im Osten Europas erklärungsstark ist, in den beiden deutschen Teilsellschaften jedoch ohne signifikanten Einfluss bleibt. Umgekehrt besitzt die individuelle Schwierigkeit der politischen Meinungsbildung in Ost- wie in Westdeutschland eine beträchtliche Erklärungskraft, die aber im übrigen Europa in dieser Form nicht nachweisbar ist.

3.2 Sozialkapital

Die berücksichtigten Bestimmungsfaktoren des Sozialkapitalmodells lassen sich mit Ausnahme der sozioökonomischen Kontrollvariablen den strukturellen und kulturellen Elementen sozialen Kapitals, nämlich sozialen Netzwerken, Vertrauen und Normen zuordnen (siehe Putnam 1993). Mitgliedschaft in freiwilligen Vereinigungen sowie Häufigkeiten der Treffen mit Freunden, Verwandten oder privat mit Arbeitskollegen gelten als strukturelle Bestandteile sozialen Kapitals. Zu dessen kulturellen Bestandteilen werden hingegen Nor-

¹⁰ Der scheinbar positive Zusammenhang ist der Kodierung dieser Variable geschuldet.

men der Solidarität und der Reziprozität hinzugezählt, die u.a. mit Fragen nach der persönlichen Bedeutung, anderen Menschen zu helfen, denen es schlechter geht als einem selbst, anderen Menschen zu helfen und sich um deren Wohlergehen zu kümmern sowie der Relevanz von Aktivität in Vereinen, gemessen werden können. Die Häufigkeit der tatsächlich geleisteten Hilfe wird als weiterer Bestimmungsfaktor in das Erklärungsmodell aufgenommen. Hierbei soll insbesondere überprüft werden, inwiefern Effektrichtung sowie Effektstärke von Normen der Solidarität und tatsächlich geleisteter Solidarität, also Handlungsorientierung und tatsächlicher Beteiligung, zur Übereinstimmung kommen. Schließlich wird auch soziales Vertrauen als kulturelle Komponente sozialen Kapitals und Bestimmungsfaktor in das Modell aufgenommen.

Ein innerdeutscher Vergleich der erklärten Varianz des linearen Regressionsmodells belegt, dass beide korrigierten R^2 -Koeffizienten zwar kein hohes Niveau erreichen, die Erklärungskraft des ostdeutschen Modells allerdings noch etwas geringer ausfällt als diejenige des westdeutschen Modells (Tabelle 2). Bereits der Bereich sozioökonomischer Bestimmungsfaktoren legt erste ost-/westdeutsche Wirkungsunterschiede offen. Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl höheres Lebensalter als auch höheres Berufsprestige westdeutscher Bürger

Tabelle 2: Sozialkapital als Determinante politischen Vertrauens (OLS)

Bestimmungsfaktoren	unstandardisiert				standardisiert			
	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O
Geschlecht	-.06*	-.05	-.19	-.02	-.02*	-.02	-.05	-.01
Alter	.00	-.01**	.00	.01***	.01	-.08**	-.04	-.06***
Bildung	.02***	.02	.01	.04***	.05***	.03	.01	.07***
Berufsprestige	-.01***	-.01**	.00	.00	-.04***	-.09**	-.04	-.02
Vereinsmitgliedschaft	.16***	-.08	-.05	.03	.04***	-.02	-.01	.01
Treffen mit Freunden, etc.	.00	.06	-.01	.03	.00	.05	-.01	.02
Soziales Vertrauen	.24***	.19***	.17***	.24***	.31***	.26***	.24***	.29***
Bedeutsamkeit, anderen Menschen zu helfen	.08***	.02	.06*	.02	.08***	.02	.07*	.02
Bedeutsamkeit in Verein aktiv sein	.04***	.04*	.07**	.04***	.05***	.06*	.11**	.06***
Bedeutsamkeit anderen zu helfen	-.02	.06	-.06	.04	-.01	.04	-.03	.02
Tatsächlich geleistete Hilfe	-.04***	-.04	.01	-.02	-.04***	-.05	.01	-.02
Korrigiertes R^2 in %	13,5	10,1	8,3	10,9				
N (ungew.)	19.328	1.449	949	6.597				

Als abhängige Variable wird hier der politische Vertrauensindex genutzt, vgl. Tabelle 1.

Kodierung: Sozioökonomische Variablen siehe Tabelle 1; Soziales Vertrauen: 0 = kein Vertrauen bis 10 = sehr vertrauensvoll; Häufigkeit der tatsächlich geleisteten Hilfe: 1 = täglich bis 7 = nie; Mitgliedschaft in freiwilligen Vereinigungen setzt sich aus allen Fragen zu Mitgliedschaft im ESS zusammen: 0 = keine Mitgliedschaft 1 = Mitgliedschaft; Häufigkeit der Treffen (soziales Netzwerk) mit Freunden, Verwandten oder privat mit Arbeitskollegen: 1 = nie bis 7 = täglich; Soziale Normen: Was macht einen guten Bürger aus? Was meinen Sie: Wie wichtig ist es, (1) Menschen zu unterstützen, denen es schlechter geht als einem selbst? (2) in Vereinen, Verbänden oder Organisationen aktiv zu sein? 0 = äußerst unwichtig bis 10 = äußerst wichtig; Im folgenden werden Menschen kurz beschrieben. Bitte lesen Sie jede Beschreibung und kreuzen Sie das Kästchen an, das beschreibt, wie sehr diese Person wie Sie oder nicht wie Sie ist: Es ist sehr wichtig für sie/ihn, anderen Menschen in ihrer/seiner Umgebung zu helfen. Sie/er möchte sich um deren Wohlergehen kümmern: 1 = überhaupt nicht wie ich bis 6 = genau wie ich.

Signifikanzniveaus: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

einen signifikanten und positiven Einfluss auf politisches Vertrauen ausüben, während diese Effekte für Ostdeutschland nicht nachweisbar sind.

Der Bereich der strukturellen Bestandteile sozialen Kapitals erlangt weder im Westen noch im Osten der Republik signifikante Erklärungskraft.

Der kulturelle Aspekt sozialen Kapitals, der sich auf soziales Vertrauen bezieht, weist deutliche ost-/westdeutsche Gemeinsamkeiten auf. Sowohl in den neuen wie in den alten Ländern übt dieser Bestimmungsfaktor einen höchst signifikanten und positiven Effekt auf politisches Vertrauen aus, dessen Koeffizienten außerdem die jeweils höchsten Werte in den Erklärungsmodellen erzielen.

Weitere ost-/westdeutsche Gemeinsamkeiten lassen sich auch für den Bereich der im Modell berücksichtigten Normen ermitteln. Die subjektiv empfundene Bedeutsamkeit von Vereinsaktivitäten übt in beiden Landesteilen einen signifikanten positiven Einfluss auf die Bildung politischen Vertrauens aus. In den neuen Ländern wird politisches Vertrauen außerdem durch eine höhere Bedeutungszuweisung, anderen Menschen zu helfen, denen es schlechter geht als einem selbst, signifikant verstärkt. Die Umsetzung dieser sozialen Normen in tatsächlich geleistete Hilfe führt dagegen weder in den neuen noch in den alten Bundesländern zu einer statistisch relevanten Verbesserung des Erklärungsmodells. Im nächsten Analyseschritt soll nun nachgezeichnet werden, inwiefern sich die ermittelten ost-/westdeutschen Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten auch in Ost- bzw. Westeuropa ermitteln lassen.

Auch das zweite Erklärungsmodell zeigt in wesentlichen Bereichen deutliche Übereinstimmungen zwischen den westeuropäischen und westdeutschen Ergebnissen. Wiederum bewegen sich die Anteile erklärter Varianzen auf vergleichbarem Niveau und ist die erklärungsstärkste Determinante, soziales Vertrauen, in beiden Untersuchungseinheiten identisch. Dennoch sind verschiedene bedeutsame Abweichungen erkennbar. Während beispielsweise in Westdeutschland ein höheres Lebensalter einen signifikanten Effekt auf politisches Vertrauen ausübt, gilt dies in Westeuropa für höhere Bildung. Zudem kann für Westeuropa ein positiv signifikanter Effekt von Vereinsmitgliedschaft, der strukturellen Komponente sozialen Kapitals, ermittelt werden. Dies gilt auch für die Bedeutsamkeit, anderen Menschen zu helfen. Schließlich liefert der westeuropäische Befund zum Einfluss der Häufigkeit tatsächlich geleisteter Hilfe ein erstaunliches Bild. Entgegen den Erwartungen zeigt sich auf westeuropäischer Ebene, dass politisches Vertrauen in einer signifikant *negativen* Beziehung zur Umsetzung sozialer Normen steht. Eine mögliche Ursache könnte darin begründet liegen, dass der Staat bei individuellen sozialen Problemlagen oftmals nur ungenügende Hilfestellung leistet, die in der Folge von Angehörigen oder Nahestehenden erbracht werden muss. Eine Frustration seitens der Helfenden könnte aufgrund dieser Diskrepanz zwischen notwendigem persönlichen Bedarf und nicht ausreichend vorhandenen staatlichen Dienstleistungsangeboten zweifellos entstehen.

Auch das osteuropäische Modell stimmt in den wichtigsten Punkten mit dem ostdeutschen überein. Sowohl die Höhe des Anteils erklärter Varianz als auch die erklärungsstärksten Determinanten, soziales Vertrauen sowie die Bedeutsamkeit von Vereinsaktivitäten, zeigen klare Parallelen. Geringfügige Abweichungen lassen sich allein für den sozioökonomischen Bereich ermitteln, da Alter und Bildung in Osteuropa im Gegensatz zum ostdeutschen Ergebnis signifikante Effekte ausüben.

Insgesamt betrachtet, kann aber das Erklärungsmodell des Sozialkapitals einen nicht annähernd so großen Erklärungsbeitrag zu politischem Vertrauen leisten wie das Modell

individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen. Dennoch wäre damit zu rechnen, dass der äußerst relevante Einfluss sozialen Vertrauens auf politisches Vertrauen auch in einem kombinierten Erklärungsmodell erhalten bliebe und somit zu einem weiteren Erkenntnisgewinn beitragen würde. Ein weiteres Mal lässt sich zudem die Frage nicht eindeutig beantworten, ob Westdeutschland in der Tendenz westeuropäischen sowie Ostdeutschland osteuropäischen Gegebenheiten entsprechen. Lediglich die Determinante Berufsprestige verweist auf eine ausgeprägte Parallele zwischen dem Westen Deutschlands und Europas. Dagegen verweist die Determinante Alter erstaunlicherweise auch auf Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Westdeutschland und Osteuropa sowie die Bedeutsamkeit, anderen Menschen zu helfen, auf Parallelen zwischen Ostdeutschland und Westeuropa. Eine Sonderrolle nimmt Deutschland wiederum in Bezug auf den Faktoren Bildung ein, der hier zwar ohne signifikanten Einfluss bleibt, in beiden Teilen Europas jedoch statistisch relevante Erklärungskraft besitzt.

3.3 Systemperformanz

Der Systemperformanz wird gemeinhin ein erheblicher Einfluss auf die Bildung politischen Vertrauens zugesprochen (Newton und Norris 2000; Gabriel und Kunz 2002). Im Blickpunkt des Interesses steht dabei oftmals die Bedeutung der wirtschaftlichen Lage eines Landes für die politischen Orientierungen der Bürger. Bereits das Clinton-Präsidentenschaftswahlkampfteam des Jahres 1992 entwickelte mit dem Slogan: „It's the economy, stupid!“, ein politisches Schlagwort, das bis heute Gültigkeit in der politischen Kommunikation besitzt. Zur Messung der Systemperformanz werden im nachfolgenden Erklärungsmodell neben der Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Lage im eigenen Land auch die Zufriedenheit mit der nationalen Regierung sowie der Demokratie des eigenen Landes einbezogen.

Ein Blick auf die erklärten Varianzen des Regressionsmodells scheint tatsächlich zu belegen, dass Systemperformanz als Determinante politischen Vertrauens den beiden vorangegangenen Modellen überlegen ist (Tabelle 3). Wie aber eine nähere Betrachtung der ost- und westdeutschen Resultate sofort aufdeckt, liegt die größte Erklärungskraft nicht in der Bewertung der wirtschaftlichen Lage des Landes begründet, sondern vielmehr in der Zufriedenheit mit der Regierung sowie mit der Demokratie des eigenen Landes, wobei letztere in beiden deutschen Teilgesellschaften die mit Abstand größte Erklärungskraft entfaltet.¹¹ Innerdeutsche Unterschiede lassen sich dagegen in der leicht abweichenden Koeffizienztärke der Zufriedenheit mit der nationalen Regierung feststellen sowie insbesondere in der Signifikanz des Effekts der Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Situation. Erstaunlicherweise steht politisches Vertrauen in den neuen Ländern weit weniger mit der Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im eigenen Land im Zusammenhang als in den alten Bundesländern.

Die Effekte der sozioökonomischen Variablen unterscheiden sich außer beim Merkmal Geschlecht nur äußerst geringfügig voneinander. Auch der ost- wie westdeutsche Umfang erklärter Varianzen unterstreicht die weitgehende Homogenität der empirischen Befunde. Es kann demnach festgehalten werden, dass das Systemperformanzmodell nicht nur die

¹¹ Dieses Ergebnis stützt zudem die Befunde von Lawrence (1997), welcher der wirtschaftlichen Performanz eine untergeordnete Rolle bei der Erklärung politischen Vertrauens beimisst.

Tabelle 3: Systemperformanz als Determinante politischen Vertrauens (OLS)

Bestimmungsfaktoren	unstandardisiert				standardisiert			
	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O
Geschlecht	.06**	.03	-.09	-.04	.02**	.01	-.03	-.01
Alter	.01*	-.01*	.00	.00	.01*	-.05*	-.03	.00
Bildung	.02***	.03*	.01	.03***	.04***	.06*	.01	.05***
Berufsprestige	-.01***	-.01**	.00	-.01***	-.04***	-.08**	-.04	-.04***
Zufriedenheit mit:								
Wirtschaft	.08***	.08***	.05	.08***	.10***	.10***	.05	.09***
Regierung	.17***	.15***	.19***	.18***	.22***	.19***	.23***	.22***
Demokratie	.27***	.27***	.30***	.30***	.34***	.38***	.39***	.37***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	33,8	31,1	33,5	34,2				
N (ungew.)	23.554	1.501	958	7.743				

Als abhängige Variable wird hier der politische Vertrauensindex genutzt.

Kodierung: Sozioökonomische Variablen siehe Tabelle 1; Und wie zufrieden sind Sie - alles in allem - mit der gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftslage in Deutschland? Wenn Sie nun einmal an die Leistungen der Bundesregierung in Berlin denken. Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit der Art und Weise, wie sie ihre Arbeit erledigt? Und wie zufrieden sind Sie - alles in allem - mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in Deutschland funktioniert? Alle drei Zufriedenheitsvariablen sind wie folgt kodiert: 0 = äußerst unzufrieden bis 10 = äußerst zufrieden.

Signifikanzniveaus: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

vergleichbar größte Erklärungskraft entfaltet, sondern darüber hinaus eine gesellschafts-unabhängige Allgemeingültigkeit zu besitzen scheint. Ein Vergleich mit den Ergebnissen der Länder Ost- und Westeuropas unterstützt diese Annahme ohne Ausnahme. Dennoch ist bei der Beantwortung der Frage nach der Zugehörigkeit Westdeutschlands zu Westeuropa sowie Ostdeutschlands zu Osteuropa eine interessante Feststellung zu treffen. Während sich die Effekte der Determinanten in beiden Teilen Europas sowie in Westdeutschland nur kaum voneinander unterscheiden, nimmt Ostdeutschland insbesondere bei Bildung und Berufsprestige sowie der Zufriedenheit mit der Wirtschaft eine Sonderrolle ein.

3.4 Synthese

Eine Integration dieser drei Erklärungsmodelle soll im Anschluss klare Aussagen über die tatsächliche statistische Relevanz und Effekttärke der einzelnen als besonders erklärungsstark identifizierten Determinanten ermöglichen.

Das integrierte Gesamtmodell beinhaltet die erklärungsstärksten Bestimmungsfaktoren der drei einzelnen bereits dargestellten Analysemodelle. Neben den sozioökonomischen Faktoren umfasst es aus dem Bereich individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen die Aspekte Kirchengangshäufigkeit, Lebenszufriedenheit sowie externe politische Effektivität. Daneben berücksichtigt es soziales Vertrauen aus dem Bereich sozialen Kapitals sowie alle drei Determinanten der Systemperformanz.

Im integrierten Gesamtmodell bewahren erstaunlicherweise nahezu alle aufgenommenen Bestimmungsfaktoren ihre zuvor bereits ermittelten unabhängigen Effekte auf die Bildung und Stärkung politischen Vertrauens (Tabelle 4).

Der innerdeutsche Vergleich des Gesamtmodells mit den Ergebnissen des Erklärungsmodells individueller politischer Orientierungen und Kompetenzen verdeutlicht, dass dessen wesentliche Erkenntnisse durch das integrierte Modell weitestgehend bestätigt wer-

Tabelle 4: Gesamtmodell als Determinante politischen Vertrauens (OLS)

Bestimmungsfaktoren	unstandardisiert				standardisiert			
	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O
<i>Ind. politische Orientierungen</i>								
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	.09***	.07*	.07	.03**	.07***	.05*	.04	.02**
Lebenszufriedenheit	.02***	.07***	.04	.05***	.03***	.10***	.05	.07***
Externe politische Effektivität	.40***	.46***	.50***	.49***	.21***	.23***	.24***	.21***
<i>Sozialkapital</i>								
Soziales Vertrauen	.10***	.07***	.07***	.10***	.14***	.11***	.10***	.12***
<i>Systemperformanz</i>								
Zufriedenheit mit:								
Wirtschaft	.04***	.04	.03	.03**	.05***	.05	.03	.04**
Regierung	.14***	.11***	.14***	.15***	.18***	.14***	.16***	.18***
Demokratie	.23***	.22***	.22***	.25***	.29***	.30***	.30***	.30***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	40,4	38,7	39,9	40,3				
N (ungew.)	23.322	1.486	955	7.636				

Als abhängige Variable wird hier der politische Vertrauensindex genutzt.

Variablenkodierung vgl. Tabellen 1, 2 und 3. Es werden ausschließlich die signifikanten Koeffizienten aufgeführt. Signifikanzniveaus: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

den. Die zuvor erklärungsstärkste Determinante der externen politischen Effektivität übt in diesem Teilbereich des Gesamtmodells nach wie vor den stärksten Einfluss auf politisches Vertrauen aus. Dagegen verliert die zuvor relativ erklärungsstarke Determinante der Lebenszufriedenheit in Ostdeutschland an Signifikanz und büßt auch im Westen der Republik deutlich an Erklärungskraft ein. Vergleichbares gilt in den alten Ländern auch für den Bestimmungsfaktor der Kirchgangshäufigkeit.

Der Einfluss sozialen Vertrauens kann aufrecht erhalten werden und ist in beiden Landesteilen mit einem vergleichbaren positiven Koeffizienten vertreten. Allerdings büßt auch dieser Prädiktor erkennbar an Erklärungskraft ein.

Die Analyse der Determinanten der Systemperformanz liefert weitere Erkenntnisse. Wie zu beobachten ist, übt die Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Lage im eigenen Land nun nicht mehr nur in den neuen, sondern auch in den alten Ländern *keinen* signifikanten Effekt auf politisches Vertrauen aus. Dagegen bewahren die Zufriedenheit mit der nationalen Regierung sowie mit der Demokratie im eigenen Land in Ost wie in West ihre statistische Relevanz. Letztere ist, wie bereits im eigenständigen Systemperformanzmodell, die bedeutendste Determinante im Gesamterklärungsmodell der beiden deutschen Teilsellschaften. Auch der Zufriedenheit mit der nationalen Regierung kann insgesamt eine bedeutende Rolle zugesprochen werden.

Im westeuropäischen Vergleich ist erkennbar, dass sämtliche Determinanten ihre statistische Signifikanz in den drei Teilmodellen beibehalten, obwohl sie vielfach erkennbar an Erklärungskraft einbüßen.

Der osteuropäische Vergleich bestätigt diese Befunde mit der Ausnahme, dass für die zuvor insignifikante Variable der Kirchgangshäufigkeit nun ein signifikanter und positiver Effekt ermittelt werden kann. Allerdings ist deren Koeffizient sehr schwach ausgeprägt.

Schließlich ist festzuhalten dass die west- und osteuropäischen erklärten Varianzen einen nahezu identischen Wert annehmen.

Im gesamten Ländervergleich sind als wichtigste Gemeinsamkeiten unbestritten die vergleichbaren Effektstärken der Determinanten der externen politischen Effektivität, des sozialen Vertrauens, der Zufriedenheit mit der nationalen Regierung sowie der Demokratie zu nennen. Auch die äußerst hohen Anteile erklärter Varianzen, die im Gruppenvergleich nur marginal differieren, unterstreichen die Generalisierbarkeit dieses integrierten Erklärungsmodells. Aufgrund dieser zahlreichen Gemeinsamkeiten kann nun klar festgestellt werden, dass zwischen den west- und osteuropäischen Gesellschaften, inklusive der beiden deutschen Bevölkerungen, keine tiefgreifenden Unterschiede bei der Erklärung politischen Vertrauens existieren. Lediglich in Bezug auf die Determinante der Zufriedenheit mit der Wirtschaft scheint Deutschland eine Sonderrolle einzunehmen. Allerdings lassen die entsprechenden niedrigen Koeffizienten West- und Osteuropas vermuten, dass deren Signifikanz aus den hohen Fallzahlen resultieren könnte.

Die Kombination aller drei Erklärungsansätze zeigt sehr deutlich, dass wichtige Bestandteile jedes einzelnen Modells im Kern ihre Bedeutung und eigenständige Erklärungskraft bewahren. Dies gilt sogar für das erklärungschwächste Modell des Sozialkapitals, das seine Relevanz durch den Effekt sozialen Vertrauens unterstreicht.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass sich politisches Vertrauen *gleichzeitig* aus Elementen der Mikro-, Meso- und Makroebene zu speisen scheint. Die europaweit eindrucksvollen Werte der erklärten Varianzen bestärken diesen Eindruck. Daraus folgt, dass bei Individualdatenanalysen trotz der ermittelten unterschiedlichen Erklärungskraft der drei Modelle nach Möglichkeit auf keinen dieser Untersuchungsansätze verzichtet werden sollte.

4 Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa

Das übergeordnete Leitmotiv dieses Sammelbandes befasst sich mit der Frage, inwiefern die deutsche Gesellschaft im europäischen Kontext eine Sonderrolle einnimmt. Sicherlich konnte mit Hilfe der hier vorgestellten empirischen Ergebnisse über politisches Vertrauen ein weiterführender Einblick in diese Thematik gewonnen werden.

Deutlich konnte aufgezeigt werden, dass die Sonderrolle Deutschlands im europäischen Gefüge insbesondere dann erkennbar ist, wenn sich die Analysen auf die beiden deutschen Teilsellschaften richten. Erst mit diesem differenzierenden Vorgehen ist es möglich, die Divergenzen zu erfassen, die bis heute die politische Kultur in Ost- und Westdeutschland kennzeichnen und insofern als europäische Besonderheit gelten können.

Sofern diese Gegebenheiten der unterschiedlichen Niveaus politischen Vertrauens allerdings anerkannt werden, scheint die Bewertung nach wie vor Gültigkeit zu besitzen, Westdeutschland als westeuropäisches sowie Ostdeutschland als osteuropäisches Land zu betrachten.

Im europäischen Vergleich können darüber hinaus weder die Erwartungen demokratischer Elitentheorien noch die Prämissen liberaler Ansätze bestätigt werden. Vielmehr erscheint politisches Vertrauen als vielschichtiges Konzept, welches sich aus verschiedenen Elementen zusammensetzt, die zum einen großes Vertrauen unter den Bevölkerungen genießen und zum anderen großes Misstrauen erregen.

So groß die innerdeutschen und darüber hinaus die europäischen Gegensätze politischer Vertrauensausprägungen auch sein mögen, verdeutlichen die drei Erklärungsmodelle

doch, dass die zugrundeliegenden Wirkungsmechanismen europaweit große Gemeinsamkeiten aufweisen. Trotz aller Niveauunterschiede basiert politisches Vertrauen, sei es in etablierten Demokratien oder in postsozialistischen Gesellschaften, in großen Teilen auf externer politischer Effektivität, sozialem Vertrauen sowie Zufriedenheit mit der Regierung und der Demokratie des eigenen Landes.

Das sozialistische Erbe osteuropäischer Gesellschaften erscheint daher nicht zwingend als nur schwer überwindbares Hindernis auf dem Weg zu einer politischen Vertrauenskultur demokratischer Staatsbürger. Vielmehr zeigt sich, dass eine ausgeprägte Beziehung zwischen der wahrgenommenen Performanz des demokratischen Systems und der individuellen Bereitschaft, politisches Vertrauen zu schenken, besteht.

Entgegen den Erwartungen konnte schließlich aufgezeigt werden, dass die wahrgenommene Situation der wirtschaftlichen Lage im eigenen Land deutlich geringeren Einfluss auf die individuelle Bereitschaft zu politischem Vertrauen ausübt als bislang angenommen. Dieses Ergebnis erstaunt umso mehr, als gerade die osteuropäischen Gesellschaften, und nicht zuletzt Ostdeutschland, ausgeprägte wirtschaftliche Schwierigkeiten im europäischen Angleichungsprozess zu überwinden haben. Sollte man bis dato der wirtschaftlichen Situation eines Landes tatsächlich einen zu großen Stellenwert im Hinblick auf die Entwicklung politischer Orientierungen wie des politischen Vertrauens eingeräumt haben? Wenn ja, so müsste die Prämisse analog zum amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlkampf des Jahres 1992 nun lauten: „It's the democratic performance, stupid!“

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Political Trust

Synonyms

Political confidence, Institutional trust

Definition

In its broadest sense, political trust refers to citizens' assessments of the core institutions of the polity and entails a positive evaluation of the most relevant attributes that make each political institution trustworthy, such as credibility, fairness, competence, transparency in its policy-making, and openness to competing views. As a conceptual device, political trust is conceived as a midrange indicator of support between political actors in charge of each institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity.

Description

Political trust is a key component of any well-functioning democratic society. The legitimacy and stability of democratic regimes depend strongly on citizens' support of the system. When institutions and political actors of democratic regimes are perceived to be trustworthy, citizens are more willing to abide by the laws, are more interested in politics, and get more involved in civic affairs (7). Political trust also provides the basis for political actors to act and decide without restraint (8). Signs of absent or decreasing political trust have therefore long been a matter of serious concern.

In the wake of the diagnosis of a "crisis of democracy" proclaimed by the "Trilateral Commission" in the 1970s (1), a number of comparative studies investigated the developments, causes, and consequences of political trust. Since then, however, the empirical evidence of ever declining levels of political trust has been at best mixed and has varied significantly between countries.

As to the origins of political trust, two explanatory approaches have proven to be particularly useful. The first approach reflects a top-down perspective and stresses the relevance of institutional performance for the formation of political trust. The second approach adopts a bottom-up view, claiming that the erosion or even the complete absence of [social capital](#) leads to a severe degrading of political trust (5, 6).

According to the top-down approach, the trustworthiness of political institutions is assumed to be a function of their ability to provide citizens with a political and economic environment that

Proponents of the bottom-up perspective argue that features of [social cohesion](#) that are embodied in the prevalence of a spirit of cooperation, trust, and solidarity provide the basis for citizens to shift their focus from narrow self-interest to the common good, become interested in politics, and participate in it, and, consequently, become supportive of the political system as a whole. Therefore, two levels of analysis need to be distinguished that are both relevant for the formation of political trust. The aggregate level indicates the extent to which a society can draw on social capital, e.g., [social trust](#) as a resource for cooperation. The individual level describes whether people as individuals have a trustful and cooperative attitude. In fact, this twofold differentiation of social capital as a societal and individual resource is also positively associated with a number of indicators of [quality of life](#) at both levels of analysis. As several cross-country studies suggest, macro indicators that measure high levels of quality of life in a given society, such as social or economic equality, aggregated [life satisfaction](#), or [subjective well-being](#), are positively correlated with social and political trust. At the individual level, citizens who possess more material and immaterial resources, such as higher [income](#) and [status](#), better [education](#) and [health](#), or higher levels of [happiness](#) or life satisfaction, are socially and politically more trustful than those who are less well off (9, 10).

Declining levels of political trust are thus explained by deteriorating institutional performance, such as inefficacy, inefficiency, or high levels of [corruption](#), and societal malfunction, with its macro- and micro-level implications.

Yet another explanation for decreasing levels of political trust is put forward by modernization theorists. With ever-increasing numbers of well-educated citizens and post-materialists in modern societies, the number of politically knowledgeable and interested but critical citizens is also growing (2, 4). Political distrust is, therefore, perceived as the expression of the individual orientation of reflective citizens.

With regard to its consequences, political trust can also be perceived as a source of institutional and societal performance. Where people are trustful of their political institutions, they are more likely to act in accordance with the law, which in turn reduces the need for monitoring or sanctions and the associated costs. Diminishing these transaction costs results in an accumulation of resources, which are now available for further more efficacious institutional action (7). In addition, high levels of political trust strengthen people's willingness to cooperate with their fellow citizens because they trust that political institutions will impose effective sanctions on aberrant behavior (9).

Measurement and Dimensionality

As an empirical indicator, the majority of studies follows the World Values Survey and uses the question:

“Please look at this card and tell me for each item how much confidence you have in them.”

Although the items vary from one questionnaire to another, they generally address trust in the national parliament, government, politicians, political parties, the police, the legal system, the civil service, the army, the UN, and other international organizations.

From a theoretical perspective, the items on political trust in this set can be differentiated according to criteria relating to the actors and institutions of representative party-based democracy, on the one hand, and criteria relating to institutions of the “Rechtsstaat” on the other (3). Empirically, however, a number of comparative studies suggest that there is just one dimension of political trust underlying most of these items.


Cross-References

Corruption, education, equality, happiness, health, income, life satisfaction, quality of life, social capital, social cohesion, social status, social trust, subjective well-being

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chapter one | introduction: the context of political trust

Marc Hooghe and Sonja Zmerli

Recent election results suggest that political incumbents are facing an uphill struggle in quite a few Western democracies. The most obvious example might be the May 2010 general elections in the United Kingdom that ended thirteen years of Labour government, leaving the party with only twenty-nine per cent of the vote. If there is one general trend in recent election results in Western Europe, it is that governing parties tend to lose votes in favour of the opposition. In various countries, populist and anti-system parties, too, seem to be on the rise. The most telling example here might be the result of the September 2010 elections in Sweden, a country that usually, and rightly, prides itself on a strong democratic political culture. In those elections, the extreme right Swedish Democrats won 5.7 per cent of the vote and entered Parliament. For most Swedes, this was quite a shock, as the extreme right had been virtually absent from the recent political history of their country. Developments in Eastern Europe, however, are by no means more encouraging. Although a number of Central and Eastern European societies have been experiencing democratic rule for twenty years or more, political trust has neither attained levels comparable to those in established democracies, nor are these societies less prone to extremist voting behaviour.

A number of authors have interpreted these election results as a symptom of a more structural political malaise and of disenchantment with liberal democracy as we know it. It is claimed that there is a lack of connection between citizens' political preferences and the way political parties and political decision-makers work. This is not a recent concern. As early as the 1960s a number of authors argued that Western political systems no longer adequately represent the preferences of the population and thus cause citizens to lose confidence in the system. Four decades ago, authors also decried what was called the crisis of the current system of liberal democracy. For the United States in particular there is abundant empirical evidence for this rather pessimistic outlook on contemporary politics. First, there is a structural trend toward declining levels of voter turnout as fewer US citizens care to participate in elections. Apparently, a growing number of eligible voters in the US no longer feel that their current two-party system adequately reflects their preferences and opinions (Franklin 2004; Blais 2006). Secondly, observations show that political trust has been declining in the US since the early 1970s. This not only refers to the president and government in general, but also to other elements of the political system, such as Congress or political parties. It is clearly a phenomenon that affects political institutions across the board.

This decline in political trust has important social and political consequences. It has been argued that low levels of political trust are one of the main reasons why

the United States has not yet developed an elaborate system of social protection and social services as found in most other Western societies (Hetherington 2005). Developing such a system involves government agencies assuming a larger role in, for example, managing health care systems or pension plans. If, however, people strongly distrust these agencies to use their new authority wisely, this may fuel opposition against plans to develop a more comprehensive social security system. Indeed, some of the recent opposition against the health care reform plans under President Obama's administration can be traced back to feelings of distrust toward 'big government'. The impact of political trust goes even further. A number of recent studies have demonstrated that low levels of political trust are associated with illegal or risk-taking behaviour, like the illegal use of alcohol or drugs (Lindström 2008). Other studies show that low levels of political trust are associated with a greater willingness to condone various forms of illegal behaviour (Marien and Hooghe 2011). In both cases, the underlying logic seems to be that if citizens feel the authorities can no longer be trusted, there is less reason to comply with social norms or with the laws of the country. While earlier studies have demonstrated that the presence of generalised social trust has important positive effects on the functioning of society, the associated literature suggests that political trust, too, can have more or less comparable social outcomes.

These studies demonstrate that political trust does remain an important resource for liberal democracies. In recent years, a number of authors have argued that trust in the political system has been overrated in the academic literature. They assert that citizens should in fact be able to distrust their political leaders (Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999; Rosenvallon 2008). This claim reflects a structural transformation of public attitudes in liberal democracies. Especially among younger age cohorts, respect for authority has eroded and a more critical outlook on political decision-makers seems to prevail. With the traditional linkage mechanisms between citizens and the political system disintegrating, voting patterns have become much more volatile and voters rely less on ideologically-structured cues to make up their minds about politics and politicians. By itself, this more critical outlook can be seen as a positive development in a mature and healthy democracy, as indeed citizens are expected not to simply accept the authority of office-holders, but to scrutinise their actions. This does mean, however, that among this group political trust by itself would be lower. Almost all available studies document a positive relationship between a person's level of education, political knowledge and political sophistication on the one hand, and their political trust on the other hand (Newton 2007). While there is empirical evidence for the rise of a new generation of 'critical citizens', they are not necessarily distrusting citizens. While it is assumed that citizens should display a critical attitude towards political office-holders, support for the principles of liberal and democratic government has in general only tended to grow in Western societies. Studies by Ronald Inglehart and others have indeed amply demonstrated that public support for authoritarianism, or a rejection of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy, has been on the decline in Western democracies for the last few decades.

There is a relatively strong consensus in the literature about the importance

of political trust. Much less agreement, however, can be found about the theoretical status of the concept, its actual meaning, the causes and the consequences of political trust.

The theoretical status of the concept of 'political trust' remains highly dubious. Some authors would even argue that it does not make sense to talk about 'trust' at all when analysing citizens' attitudes toward the political system. The notion of trust implies specific knowledge about the likelihood of trustworthy behaviour by someone else. For example, based on my previous experiences and my field knowledge, I can decide whether or not to trust a neighbour or colleague. Following this logic, it could be argued that the concept of 'political trust' as such is meaningless (Hardin 1999). As we usually do not have sufficient information about the trustworthiness of leading politicians or about civil servants in general, we lack the ability to decide whether or not we will trust the 'system'. We might still develop other attitudes toward the political system, but from this perspective they should not be seen as falling under the category of 'trust', which is seen as a form of experience-based encapsulated trust. Following this line of thinking, political trust appears here much more as a kind of general expectation that on the whole, political leaders will act according to the rules of the game as they are agreed upon in a democratic regime. Whether or not this expectation is experience-based does not make a difference then.

This view of political trust can be related to a notion that was already developed in the 1960s by David Easton (1965), who assumed that the attitudes of citizens toward the political system function as a source of diffuse support for the system. Even if citizens do not agree with a certain decision made by the political elite, they are still willing to support the regime in general and to comply with its decisions. Political trust means that the legitimacy of the political regime is acknowledged and that there is a high degree of willingness to accept the decisions of politicians and government agencies. Thus this notion rather refers to a general recognition of authority and a benign attitude towards political institutions. It is clear, therefore, that political trust should be distinguished from other, much more intense forms of trust. At best, political trust is a very thin form of trust, and it should rather be seen as the expectation that political actors generally behave in a fair manner. This expectation that democratic procedures will be followed is closely related to the concept of legitimacy, and as such it can indeed function as a form of diffuse support for the political system as a whole.

The origins and determinants of this attitude, however, are far from clear. The most straightforward assumption would be that political trust is developed as a reaction to the perceived performance of the political institutions. From a rational point of view, it can be expected that citizens will display higher levels of political trust in institutions that deliver, compared with regimes that do not succeed in reaching clear policy goals. Indeed, political trust tends to correlate quite strongly with government performance, to the extent that performance can be measured in a more or less objective manner. This correlation, however, does not explain the causal mechanisms at work.

The argument that political trust should primarily be seen as a reaction to the

performance of government institutions creates further problems. First, not all citizens directly experience how these institutions work. For example, most citizens have very little first-hand experience with the way the courts in their home countries operate. Nevertheless, they will have some perception of the trustworthiness of these institutions. If political trust was really experience-based, there would be more 'don't know' and missing answers relevant to those institutions where respondents have less direct experience compared to those institutions that they do experience directly. This, however, is not the case. Most surveys show that respondents simply answer all the items on the political trust scale with very little variation across the different items.

A second problem is that the experience perspective also implies that we should observe significant differences across institutions. For example, I might have a very favourable perception of the way the local administration functions, as I have had only good experiences with this administration. My experiences with political parties, on the other hand, are far less positive. If my trust judgment depended on actual experience and performance levels, we would observe great variation in my responses to the various political institutions as not all of them reach equal levels of output and performance (Fisher *et al.* 2010). This, however, proves not to be the case, as the political trust scale in most surveys is strongly one-dimensional. Put another way, if respondents have a rather favourable view of political parties, they most likely have a positive attitude to their parliament, the police, the courts and other political institutions as well. To some extent, this might be attributed to a form of cognitive laziness. Since respondents do not take the trouble to carefully consider for each and every institution separately whether or not it is trustworthy, they simply make up one overall judgment for all institutions that more or less represents their general feeling towards the system. However, if the one-dimensionality of the political trust scale was the result of insufficient information or political sophistication, we should find that the dimensional structure of the scale is not the same across different groups in the population. We would then observe that those with little political interest or political knowledge simply lump all elements together (and this would lead to a one-dimensional scale), while those with high levels of political sophistication actually make the effort to judge individual institutions separately. Again, however, this proves not to be the case. Among those with high levels of political sophistication, the one-dimensional structure of the scale is just as strong as among those with low levels of political sophistication. This means that the judgments made on the political trust scale are not necessarily based on the actual performance of individual institutions, but rather reflect a kind of general assessment of the prevailing political culture within a country. This culture is indeed shared by all institutions, as it is a characteristic that is tied to the political system as a whole. It is difficult to imagine a system, for example, where the police would be highly corrupt while the courts are completely trustworthy. Corruption is usually so pervasive that a condoning attitude towards bribery usually extends to all political institutions rather than being limited to one or a few. Thus, political trust can be considered as a general assessment of the political culture in a country that guides the behaviour of politicians and civil servants alike.

By conceiving political trust as an assessment of the political culture in general, we can also explain the observed stability of this attitude. At least with regard to Europe, all the available evidence suggests that political trust levels remain relatively stable across the continent. While the Scandinavian countries, in general, enjoy high levels of political trust, they are much lower in Southern and Eastern Europe. What is more, they tend to remain lower. Despite the fact that most countries in Central and Eastern Europe became parliamentary democracies more than two decades ago, political trust levels remain structurally lower than in the more established democracies of Western Europe. This stability of political trust also supports the fact that trust levels do not reflect the performance of government institutions in a direct and straightforward manner. If that was the case, political trust levels would have been considerably more volatile in Central and Eastern Europe given the political transformations there.

It makes sense, therefore, to consider political trust in a much more comprehensive and qualified manner than in earlier research. Context clearly makes a difference in the development of political trust. It is not only the political culture in general that matters in understanding political trust, but also historical traditions and the way politics and the economy work. The complex interplay of these elements makes it extremely difficult to deliver straightforward answers about the future development of political trust in European societies. Thus far, trust levels have remained rather stable in Europe, but this stability can by no means be taken for granted. Economic and cultural changes might easily challenge this stability any time.

Structure of the book

The issue of political trust is approached from several perspectives. In the first chapters, we look at empirical evidence describing the nature and evolution of political trust. We then go on to explore how political trust can be explained and what elements seem to have the strongest influence on the level of trust. More specifically, we take a comparative approach and ask why people evaluate the trustworthiness of political institutions the way they do. Another focus of the empirical comparative studies in this volume is post-communist societies and countries in transition. The extent to which support of welfare state reforms is at the origins of, but also subject to, political trust is explored in the concluding chapters.

To commence, Sofie Marien takes a cross-country approach to investigate the construct validity of a one-dimensional concept of political trust. Observing that political trust has previously been studied as a one-dimensional as well as a multi-dimensional concept, she draws on the four recent waves of the European Social Survey to explore the dimensionality of political trust in established and new democratic societies. Although some authors oppose a one-dimensional conceptualisation of political trust, arguing that people make distinct trust judgments when assessing the trustworthiness of political institutions, others suggest that citizens' evaluations of the performance of individual political institutions are closely related. Using confirmatory factor analysis, Marien demonstrates that the objects

of political trust typically measured in population surveys, such as trust in parliament, politicians, political parties, police, and the legal system, do indeed load on a single dimension and that this one-dimensional conceptualisation of political trust holds for all European democracies alike. She then proceeds to determine to what extent the general concern about decreasing levels of political trust is effectively substantiated by current European trends. According to Marien's findings, however, there are no general and persisting declining trends with regard to political trust, except for a very limited number of countries. Distinct differences can be observed in the levels of political trust between established and new democracies. Not only does political trust turn out to be lower in new democratic societies, but it is also significantly more volatile, which is assumed to be due to insufficient institutional performance in those countries. In conclusion, while contextual factors do not impact on the way political trust is measured as a one-dimensional concept, they significantly determine the level of political support.

A close inspection of the trends in political trust in established Western democracies and an investigation of the underlying factors are the focus of Chapter 3 by Mark Bovens and Anchrith Wille. In the light of a myriad of studies that maintain a widespread trend of declining political trust in the United States, the authors conclude that Western European societies do by no means experience any such continuous and irreversible decline. Although sharp drops in political trust were observed in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, the figures soon returned to their original high levels. As Bovens and Wille argue, these developments can be attributed to an increasing volatility of political opinion, which results from structural factors that explain long-term changes, on the one hand, and factors related to short-term trends on the other. A better informed, politically more interested but less aligned citizenry, national governments facing the challenges of globalisation, as well as the pervasiveness of the media and the internet, with their ensuing tendencies of democratisation, all reflect reactions to long-term changes. Short-term trends, by contrast, reflect in particular fluctuating levels of consumer confidence, individual perceptions of political processes and an upsurge of dramatic events or crises. Given the extraordinary sharp decline in political trust in the Netherlands at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Bovens and Wille take a comparative approach to analyse the trends there. Their empirical findings are based on various Dutch population surveys and several waves of Eurobarometer surveys. They, unequivocally, suggest persistently high levels of political trust that might experience short-term drops, but yet provide the basis for the legitimacy of political decision making.

In Chapter 4, Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton take on a broader perspective on trust by attempting to explain how different sorts of trust, i.e. political, particular and general social trust, relate to each other and to elucidate what sorts of people in what sorts of circumstances express trust in other people and in political institutions, and why. Their empirical results based on the most recent wave of the World Values Survey and comprising twenty-two democratic nations around the world reveal distinct patterns of trust and sketch the social, economic and political characteristics of different trust groups. As a result, these findings open up a set of

related questions about the connections between different forms of trust and the structural characteristics of modern societies, most notably their wealth, income equality, the quality of their political and civil institutions, and the heterogeneous nature of their populations. As Zmerli and Newton argue, particular social trust is the foundation on which general social trust and political trust are based. However, particular trust is a necessary but not sufficient cause of general trust, and both particular and general trust are a necessary but not sufficient cause of political trust. So-called ‘winners’ in society, those with money, socio-economic status and education, who are happy and satisfied with their life and in good health and who view the political system as giving them a chance of being on the winning side of society, are the most likely to extend their willingness to trust people they know personally to those they meet for the first time, or who are unlike themselves, and to political institutions. One of the main theoretical implications is that particular trust, or in-group trust, is not incompatible with general trust, or out-group trust, and that the heterogeneous nature of modern societies and low levels of general and political trust are not necessarily connected. The practical lesson, however, suggests that the larger the ‘loser’ percentage in the population, the lower the trust levels are likely to be. As a consequence, a growing share of those who perceive themselves as the ‘losers’ in society can pose a serious threat to social cohesion and political stability.

In Chapter 5, Tom van der Meer and Paul Dekker explore which aspects of the relationship between citizens and the state determine political trust. Presuming that political trust is a relational concept, they argue that former research failed to take the mediating links between political institutions and citizens into account. Instead, these studies either focused on specific features of political institutions or on individual characteristics. Van der Meer and Dekker, by contrast, extend established theoretical and empirical research designs by investigating the mechanisms that affect citizens’ attitudes to and perceptions and evaluations of political institutions. Thus, their study aims at re-testing traditional models with regard to which contextual characteristics explain political trust, as well as at expanding an understanding of the macro-micro mechanisms that link context factors and political trust. Their principal argument is that citizens assess the trustworthiness of political institutions by evaluating four central features: competence, care, accountability and reliability. The authors’ analyses are based on the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) and a set of country-specific indicators and multi-level regression techniques. The main contextual factors affecting political trust that van der Meer and Dekker identify are corruption, the type of electoral system, and what seems to be the economic and political underperformance shared by all post-communist societies. As for the linking mechanisms between political institutions and citizens, the assessment of competence and care appear to be of particular relevance. However, as the authors point out, the ESS dataset provides only a limited set of useful variables. As a consequence, the empirical testing of their assumptions remains partly incomplete. In conclusion, van der Meer and Dekker suggest several solutions to counter these shortcomings in future research.

On the basis of a time series analysis covering the time span from 1993 to

2004 and encompassing sixty-seven New Europe Barometer surveys in fourteen post-communist countries, Richard Rose and William Mishler, in Chapter 6, run multilevel analyses and test theories that aim at explaining the variability of political trust in different national, temporal and social structural contexts. In particular, they address the question: to what extent can societies that were socialised under communist rule ‘learn’ to trust political institutions that have proven to be trustworthy over time? Reaffirming the conceptualisation of political trust as a relational entity, Rose and Mishler’s empirical findings depict distinct between-country differences in the levels of political trust and provide additional empirical evidence for the assumption that trustworthiness of political institutions is assessed through macro-political and economic performance, but concomitantly mediated at the micro-level by value-laden attitudes and perceptions of individuals. As a consequence, their results suggest that macro-institutional theories advocating direct pathways of influence need to be complemented by the insights into the complex interplay with mediating micro-level factors. Most importantly, the authors conclude that the notion of a fatal legacy of socialisation under communist rule that continues to inhibit the development of political trust is a myth. As they argue, changes in trust do not require decades or generations of re-socialisation in order to transform a national political culture. Although the effects of institutional and economic performance are contingent upon mediating individual attitudes and perceptions, citizens can ‘learn’ to trust as they accumulate experience in how they are governed. In the same vein, however, political institutions can also generate political distrust in as much as they are ineffective and prone to corruption. Given the persistence of corruption in a number of Central and Eastern European societies, the prevalence of low levels of political trust is certainly rather the outcome of bad performance than of an insurmountable communist legacy.

In Chapter 7, Eric M. Uslaner elaborates on this effect of corruption, by elucidating its origins and consequences in transition countries. As Uslaner lays out, corruption affects rules of fairness, privileges some people over others, acts as an extra tax on citizens, leaves less money to invest in public goods, slows economic growth, and leads to ineffective government. In contrast to most theoretical accounts that attribute corruption to institutional deficiencies, the author offers an alternative explanation. According to his line of argument, corruption stems from an unequal distribution of resources and reinforces greater inequality. Uslaner describes this self-perpetuating process as the ‘inequality trap’, where inequality leads to low levels of generalised trust, which in turn results in more corruption, and then to even more inequality. In addition, inequality and corruption lead to lower levels of service delivery, such as electricity or water supply, which aggravate inequality. Based on data from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey conducted in twenty-eight transition countries, Uslaner provides empirical evidence for the detrimental effects of inequality, corruption and insufficient service delivery: low levels of trust in government, tax evasion, and weak infrastructure. While the link between corruption and trust in government is straightforward, with citizens distrusting their leaders whom they believe to be dishonest, the link with inequality is less direct – through economic evaluations more generally. Notwithstanding, the

individual assessment of the trustworthiness of government is also contingent on citizens' socio-economic background and as such Uslaner's findings resonate well with the empirical insights of preceding chapters. The wealthy take up a moral stance on government and judge it more by its level of corruption. The less well-off, by contrast, want government to get involved in reducing inequality and judge government performance more by how well leaders have steered the economy rather than by how honest they are.

In the final two chapters, the relationship between political trust and the welfare state is examined. In Chapter 8, Staffan Kumlin explores the effect of welfare state policies on political trust. While there exists a wide range of studies pertaining to the welfare state or political support, both strands of literature go mostly unrelated. By contrast, Kumlin argues that welfare state retrenchment and its ensuing less generous policies may engender increasing numbers of dissatisfied democrats. Unlike most 'policy feedback' studies that address the ramifications of policy outcomes, Kumlin assumes that dissatisfaction with democracy can arise from attention to the policies themselves. In a cross-country study, the author investigates the repercussions of benefit generosity in three realms of social security: pensions, sickness insurance and unemployment insurance generosity. Empirical analyses are based on Eurobarometer surveys from 1976 to 2001, cover eleven Western European countries and also comprise macro-level indicators. Applying multilevel regression techniques, Kumlin discloses the extent to which systematic measures of benefit generosity account for within-country over-time variation in democratic dissatisfaction. However, the impact of the three tested types of social security benefits differs considerably as only less generous unemployment benefits appear to be a universal generator of democratic dissatisfaction. Interestingly, these effects can be observed across broad groups in Western Europe and are thus *not* contingent on individual employment status, socio-economic background or value orientations. With higher unemployment rates, however, citizens' attention to public expenditures and budget deficits associated with unemployment benefit generosity increases. As Kumlin's 'visible costs hypothesis' suggests, positive effects of generous unemployment benefits become weaker as unemployment rates increase. As a consequence, generous benefits can lose their beneficial impact if they go along with high unemployment rates and associated costs.

While the preceding chapters implicitly acknowledge the importance of political trust as a promoter and stabiliser of democratic societies, Eva-Maria Trüding and Uwe Bollow, in Chapter 9, investigate whether political institutions and actors do indeed benefit from politically trustful citizens. More specifically, the authors explore the ramifications of political trust or the lack thereof for the support of welfare state reforms and their implementation. They examine which effects political trust exerts on people's evaluation of reforms in three sub-domains of the German welfare state that has undergone significant changes during the last few years: pension, health care and family policy. They hypothesise that politically trustful citizens are more supportive of their government's decisions and actions and, as a consequence, also more supportive of welfare state reforms. This holds even (or particularly) true when people themselves are confronted with material

or ideological losses. Based on a German population survey carried out in 2007, Trüdinger and Bollow test these assumptions and arrive at several far-reaching conclusions. First, being politically trustful affects the evaluation of welfare state reforms in all three policy domains. Thus, the greater the stock of political trust, the easier it is for governments to legitimise the implementation of new policies. Secondly, their empirical evidence suggests that material and/or ideological costs moderate the influence of political trust on reform evaluations. Thirdly, these moderating effects, however, are contingent on the type of policy domain. While the relevance of material costs for the influence of political trust prevails with the assessment of pension reforms, ideological costs moderate the impact of political trust on the evaluation of health care reforms. Assessments of changes in the realm of family policy, by contrast, are affected by political trust that is moderated by material and ideological costs alike. In sum, Trüdinger and Bollow provide substantial evidence for political trust as a cultural resource that can potentially be exploited by politicians to back up welfare state reforms and identify specific circumstances under which political trust is likely to guide policy evaluations.

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chapter | winners, losers and three types four | of trust

Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton

Introduction: Three types of trust and their interrelationship

According to Confucius, the three essential components of successful government are trust, food and weapons. Many since him have repeated, in one way or another, the general theme that trust is a crucial basis of social integration and of stable government. From Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Adam Smith and de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Toennies, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and all the way to current theories of social capital and civil society, writers have emphasised that modern social, economic and political relations are ultimately dependent upon the willingness of citizens to take the risk of trusting others (Misztal 1996). Modern research shows that trust is closely associated with things as diverse as economic growth, health, happiness, life satisfaction, longevity, educational achievement, democratic stability, and willingness to pay taxes. Trust seems to be, as Uslaner observes, ‘the chicken soup of social life’ (Uslaner 2002).

And yet trust is also a puzzle (Nannestad 2008). Its origins and nature remain controversial and unclear in spite of two decades of cross-national empirical research. For some time, the social capital claim that social and political trust are intimately related was questioned by surveys, which found little or no evidence of an association (Kaase 1999: 13; Orren 1997; Rothstein 2002: 320–1; Delhey and Newton 2003; Mishler and Rose 2005), although there was a difference between individual level and aggregate cross-national comparisons in this respect (Newton and Norris 2000). And while there was considerable survey evidence about general social trust and confidence in political and public institutions, there was little interest in particular social trust beyond Edward Banfield’s case study of Montegrano (Banfield 1958) and some social psychology research on in-groups and out-groups. It was assumed by some that ‘particular’ (also known as ‘thick’ or ‘specific’ trust) was incompatible with ‘general’ (‘thin’) social trust, but there was little evidence and it did not produce robust results.

Recent survey research has started to clarify some of these issues. There is now good evidence that social and political trust are indeed associated at the individual level, as social capital theory predicts, when the two are measured carefully with batteries of questions (Glanville and Paxton 2007; Freitag 2003a, 2003b; Bäck and Kestilä 2009; Jagodzinski and Manabe 2004: 85–7; Zmerli and Newton 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009). There is also strong evidence in the most recent World Values Survey of 2005–7 that particular trust is not only compatible with general social trust, but forms a platform or framework within which it can be

developed (Newton and Zmerli 2011). Moreover, the World Values data has clear evidence that all three forms of trust – particular social trust, general social trust and political trust – are positively correlated with each other.

The associations between the three forms of trust are not simple, however. Most of those who express forms of general trust are also trusting of ‘particular others’, but the reverse is not necessarily true. An overwhelming majority of the population of democratic societies (more than 90 per cent) professes one form or another of particular trust, but less than half of them extend this to ‘generalised others’. While almost all of those with high general trust scores are also high on particular trust, fewer than half (45 per cent) of those claiming strong particular trust also claim strong general trust. In other words, particular social trust seems to be a necessary but not sufficient cause of general social trust. Similarly, almost all of those with high political trust have high particular social trust, and a large proportion of the politically trusting are also generally trusting, but the reverse is not true. Most of those with strong particular trust do not have strong political trust. It seems from these results that particular social trust may form the foundation on which general trust can be developed, and that these two, in their turn, may form the basis on which political trust can be built.

These recent findings raise further questions for individual trust research: what sorts of people are able to combine particular social trust in those they know personally, or who are like them, with a more general form of trust in unknown or different others? In what sorts of circumstances are they likely to do this? What sorts of people are able to combine different forms of social trust with political trust and under what sorts of circumstances are they likely to do this? In this chapter, we try to provide some answers to these questions by examining the social, economic and political characteristics of different trust groups in the population of twenty-two democratic nations.

First, we outline the ‘winner hypothesis’, which suggests that the trusting in society are those who are successful in social, economic and political life. Secondly, we outline our data and methods, paying particular attention to the advantages of Mokken scale analysis, an analytical procedure enabling us to detect the latent features of twelve questionnaire items on trust and to identify hierarchical structures in response sets. We will examine how the three types of trust cluster in order to show that the same patterns repeat themselves both across nations and within them. The aim here is to show that our results are generally applicable to a wide range of democratic countries and to different social groups within them. Thirdly, we analyse the social, economic and political characteristics of different trust groups in society in order to establish the correlates of trust, with the aim of uncovering the individual origins of different forms of trust or, at least, the variables most closely associated with them. If the three forms of trust are indeed closely and positively associated, then we expect them to be correlated with a broadly similar set of independent variables. This will provide clues about why certain types of individuals combine different forms of trust and others do not. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of our findings for social integration and stability and for democratic development.

The winner hypothesis

In this chapter we examine three kinds of trust, two social and one political:

1. 'Particular' social trust (sometimes known as 'thick' or 'specific' trust) involves family and friends, neighbours and work colleagues because they are known to us personally. Some extend particular trust to unknown others who are like us in ethnic origin, socio-economic status, religion, language or culture (Uslaner 2000–1: 573; 2008: 102). In either case, particular trust is extended to those we know or are like us.
2. 'General' social trust, in contrast, is placed in unknown others, including those who are of a different ethnic origin, religion, class, language or culture. It is general in that it is not limited to a comparative narrow social circle.
3. 'Political' trust is either trust in particular politicians or trust in the main institutions of government and public life (the cabinet, parliament, police, legal system, the military, civil service, and political parties).

Why do some limit their trust to those they know personally or to those who are like them in terms of social and economic background, while others have a wider radius of trust that includes people of different religions and nationalities, people they do not know personally, and people who are not like them socially? And why do some people manage to combine different forms of social trust with political trust, while others do not?

There are some suggestions in the trust literature that help to answer these questions, as follows:

- It seems that those with the highest socio-economic status and incomes are the most trusting in society (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Newton and Delhey 2005), perhaps because the affluent can better afford to take the risks of trust compared with the poor, who can ill afford to lose money or property. Perhaps, as the 'rainmaker hypothesis' suggests (Newton and Norris 2000; Putnam et al. 2000: 26; van der Meer 2003) the better-off are more trusting because they are typically surrounded by trustworthy people who are, themselves, trusting.
- The most highly educated in society are generally the most trusting (Paxton 2007; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002: 1). This may be because the educated are better able to generalise and abstract their experience with known and similar others to unknown and dissimilar others, but it may also be that the better educated are usually of higher income, class, status, which, in their turn, are associated with trust.
- For the same sorts of reasons, unemployment is often associated with low trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997).
- So also is membership of minority groups that suffer from discrimination (Hero 2003; Patterson 1999: 190–1).

- Trust is usually associated with higher levels of subjective satisfaction, happiness, and health (Pelligra 2006; Kawachi *et al.* 1997; Inglehart 1999).
- From Tocqueville to modern theories of social capital, voluntary associations are seen as the great ‘free schools’ of civic education and reciprocity, teaching their members and especially their activists to co-operate and trust others (Putnam 1993: 171–6, 2000).
- Post-materialists are likely to claim comparatively high levels of trust because, being more affluent and less constrained by material concerns, they are able to focus more clearly on social values such as trust, co-operation, and respect for others irrespective of class, religion, nationality and ethnicity (Inglehart 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
- Trusting people tend to be optimists (Uslaner 2002), perhaps because life has given them plenty to be optimistic about.
- While political trust is often associated with the social and economic variables listed above, it is also associated with its own set of political variables, especially identification with the party in government and with political interest and knowledge (Newton 2001a).
- Trust in people may also be associated with the left–right scale insofar as leftist values are said to be based on a belief in the goodness of human nature, social equality and on the ability of individuals to co-operate in their common interest, while the ideologies of the political right are more likely to emphasise rational self-interest and competition rather than co-operation as the main motivating force behind human behaviour (Sullivan and Transue 1999; Bobbio 1997).

There may be a further link between social trust and political trust insofar as trust in the police and the courts is closely correlated with general social trust, probably because the law enforcement system is the social institution that is mainly responsible for maintaining the trustworthy behaviour of populations (Rothstein 1998; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). The better the system works, the more trustworthy citizens are and the more trust people are likely to express in each other.

The results of empirical research suggesting these correlates of trust tend to be fragmented, inconclusive, and patchy. They are rarely robust over time or across countries, and no single variable emerges as a consistently powerful predictor of trust. Nevertheless, the fragments seem to form a more general pattern in which social trust is most frequently expressed by the winners in society – those in dominant or majority groups, people of high class, status, income and education, the happy and satisfied, and individuals who benefit from better health and post-materialist security.

One might expect that those who have been treated kindly by life have a more trusting outlook, but apart from that there seem to be four general reasons why winners are trusting. These are, broadly, psychological, rational, sociological and institutional in nature.

Psychological: those that are trusting are optimistic and co-operative with a

benevolent view of humanity. Rosenberg called the battery of questionnaire items he devised to measure trust and distrust ‘the misanthropy scale’ (Rosenberg 1956, 1957) and later work by Uslaner (Uslaner 1999: 138, 2002: 79–86; 2000–1: 571) argues that trust requires an optimistic view of life. The winners in society have much to be optimistic about. The losers have more to be cynical, pessimistic and distrusting about.

Rational: it is rational for winners to be trusting. It is often remarked that trust entails risk because the trusting put themselves at the mercy of the trustworthiness of others, who might betray the confidence placed in them. Winners in society may risk a lot in absolute terms if they lose their fortune, but they usually risk relatively less than losers. They can better afford to take risks and chances.

Sociological: winners in society may be trusting because they live their lives in a trustworthy environment. It is the underclass of slum dwellers, flophouse residents and street people who experience most of the crime, family problems, ill health, violence, drug addiction and discrimination in society. Those in penthouses and the green and pleasant suburbs are likely to meet with more courtesy, kindness, patience, helpfulness and understanding. If questionnaire items measuring general trust (‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’) are less about the psychological propensities of individuals and more about how they judge the trustworthiness of the society they live in, then winners may express greater trust simply because they live in more trustworthy environments.

Institutional: winners in society have more reason to place their trust in the institutions of society, especially in those that help them succeed and those that maintain law and order, protect property, and restrain citizens who might otherwise behave in an untrustworthy manner. Winners are better able to make their own use of social institutions because their money, status, power, education, life experience and social networks help them understand how organisations work, get them better access to people who matter, provide them with resources to defend their interests, and to plan strategies to get results.

Political trust also seems to be a characteristic of winners. It is most frequently expressed by those who win socially and also by those who win politically in that they identify with the party or parties in government. As a result they are more likely to trust both the particular government in power (the home team effect) and the system of government that produces it (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson *et al.* 2005). A variation on this theme is that political distrust (and possibly social distrust as well) is most frequently found among those with radical political views who form small minorities, possibly with paranoid tendencies. Their radical views consign them to the political fringe that rarely wins an election or a political struggle, and their lack of political success confirms their distrust of the political system (McClosky and Chong 1985). Political trust is also associated with political knowledge, interest and engagement and these are, in turn, associated with education, income, socio-economic status and life satisfaction.

In brief, the winner hypothesis suggests that the trusting in society are generally those who have come out on top in social, economic and political life. That

is to say, particular social trust, general social trust and political trust is likely to be most expressed by the winners in society compared with the losers in society. Judging from recent work on the three kinds of trust (Newton and Zmerli 2011), the second hypothesis is that particular social trust is causally prior to general social trust, and that both particular and general social trust are causally prior to political trust.

Data and methods

Unlike any previous cross-national survey known to us, the latest World Values study of 2005–7 asks a set of six questions about social trust:

I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all –

- Your family
- Your neighbourhood
- People you know personally
- People you meet for the first time
- People of another religion
- People of another nationality

The first three deal with forms of particular trust involving known others with whom respondents have close ties (family and those they know personally) or who live in their neighbourhood. The last three questions cover general trust in people who either are not known personally or who are not members of the same social group.

On the face of it, these six forms can also be distributed along a single radius of trust from the most particular to the most general. Trust in the family is the narrowest and most particular, followed by people known personally, and then by others in the neighbourhood. People of other religions and nationalities are more general, although the assumption is that something (perhaps quite a lot) may be known about them. People met for the first time, about whom nothing may be known, lie at the most general point on the radius and entail the highest degree of risk. In addition, the 2005–7 World Values survey also asks the standard, tried and tested trust question: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Previous work (Delhey *et al.* forthcoming; Newton and Zmerli, 2011) has established that the three general trust questions form a single scale that correlates strongly with the standard general trust question, but that the three item scales of social trust are probably a better measure.

The World Values survey asks the same questions about political trust in a set of six political and governmental institutions, as follows:

I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me

how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

The organisations named are parliament, the government, political parties, the courts, the civil service, and the police. Altogether, therefore, we have three types of particular trust, three types of general trust and six measures of political trust – twelve measures of trust altogether.

Since this study is concerned with social and political trust, it selects from the World Values survey of 2005–7 a set of countries with the highest democratic scores in the Polity IV project. There is little sense in analysing survey responses to questions about political trust in non-democratic countries, where, apart from anything else, the absence of freedom of speech makes it difficult to give honest answers. What, for example, can we make of the finding that of seventy-seven nations covered in the World Values survey of 2000, trust in parliament is highest in Vietnam, China, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Uganda and Pakistan with scores of 76 to 98 per cent, compared with Ireland, Australia, the UK, Germany, Belgium, and USA, with scores of 31 to 38 per cent (Newton 2007: 347)?

Combining Polity IV democracy scores of 9 and 10 and the World Values data on trust produces a list of twenty-two democratic countries distributed across Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, and North and South America (see Appendix 1). Sampling and fieldwork methods in the World Values surveys of 2005–7 varied, but included face-to-face interviews and mailed questionnaires.¹ In the twenty-two selected democracies, 29,163 respondents participated in the survey. In this study, we wish to generalise as broadly as possible about the populations of modern democratic states and so, rather than conducting a country-by-country analysis, we pool the individual level data for the twenty-two nations in order to examine cross-national patterns of modern democracies.

To look for transnational patterns among the populations of democratic nations is not to deny national differences of significance and importance. It is simply to search for common patterns among individual citizens, irrespective of national variations. Our previous work (Newton and Zmerli 2011) has shown that there are indeed national differences as well as strong similarities among individuals with respect to social trust and political trust. This chapter is an attempt to push individual level analysis a step further in order to explore how and why different subgroups in society express different types of trust.

Mokken scale analysis

The first task is to establish whether there is an underlying, latent pattern to responses to the six social trust questions, or whether there are different and distinct forms of trust. To put it another way, do different forms of social trust lie on the same radius from particular to general or are they distinctive and unrelated? Mokken analysis is a scaling technique for dichotomous and polytomous items

1. See WVS 2005-7 codebook for further details.

that is similar to Guttman scaling. Both techniques test for the existence of underlying, latent dimensions in a set of measures, but whereas Mokken scaling has a probabilistic basis, Guttman scaling is deterministic. Mokken scales are also hierarchical in the sense that items in the scale can be ordered in terms of their positions in the hierarchy so that higher items will include lower items in such a way as to form a set of nested variables. This is a particularly useful method of scaling because it ranks items from the most to the least common and thereby allows us to explore which variables may be causally prior to others. In Mokken scale analysis, reproducibility is measured by Loevinger's coefficient H_i for each item i , and H for the entire scale. The calculation of H_i and H compares the probability of errors in ranking with the probability of such a ranking occurring among unrelated items. H_i and H values range from 0 to 1. H -scores of 0.3 to 0.39 indicate weak scales, scores of 0.4 to 0.49 are medium strength, and scores of 0.5 and more are strong. We select 0.4 as the cut-off point, H scores of less than 0.4 being rejected as too weak for our purposes (van Schuur 2003).

Results

Table 4.1 shows how the twelve forms of social and political trust are distributed in society. Uslander (1999: 123) is right in claiming that everyone must trust someone and for most people this is trust in the family, which is virtually universal among the 22,770 individuals in the twenty-two democratic nations.² This means that the most particular form of trust that lies at the centre of the particular-general radius is also the most widespread. Other forms of social trust are then less widespread as they move out on the trust radius from people known personally and neighbours to people of different religions and nationality, and finally to those met for the first time. This means that the more specific the form of social trust, the more widespread it is likely to be, and vice versa, the more general it is, the less widespread it is likely to be. The logic of political trust is not the same but there is a difference between the civil and non-partisan institutions of police, courts and civil service, which are the most common forms of political trust, and the political ones of government, parliament and parties which are the least common.

To see if these twelve trust items scale, a Mokken analysis was run on the pooled individual data for all the selected twenty-two countries. As the results in Table 4.2 show these twelve trust items most usually produce two strong trust scales, one for social trust and the other for political trust, with H scores of 0.55 and 0.60 respectively. This is strong support for the conclusion that social and political trust represent separate dimensions of trust. There is one major exception to this general rule. Family trust does not reach the $H_i = 0.3$ level of significance necessary for Mokken scaling, so it is automatically dropped from all the calculations. This is because family trust is virtually universal (98 per cent) and cannot be used to measure a latent scale.

2. The case number is based on valid and weighted data.

Table 4.1: Distribution of social and political trust (in %)

	in %	N
Family members	97.5	22,770
People known personally	83.8	22,553
Neighbours	71.9	22,166
Other religion	53.1	20,602
Other nationality	50.2	20,206
People met for the first time	30.9	21,863
Police	63.2	22,497
Courts	50.9	22,126
Civil Service	40.3	21,569
Government	38.5	22,170
Parliament	34.0	21,924
Political parties	20.6	22,000

Notes: The newly-released WVS integrated data set presents equilibrated weights for the 2005 survey in which N = 1,000 or 1,500. All tables in this paper are based on equilibrated data in which N = 1,000. The percentages are based on respondents who score 3 or 4 on the trust rating scale.

Table 4.2: Mokken scale analysis, twelve trust items, pooled data (Hi and H scale coefficients)

	Social trust scale	Political trust scale	Mean	Mean
Family	0.25*	–	3.79	–
People known	0.50	–	3.07	–
Neighbours	0.47	–	2.83	–
Other religion	0.60	–	2.45	–
Other nationality	0.60	–	2.39	–
Unknown people	0.56	–	2.06	–
Police	–	0.53	–	2.66
Courts	–	0.60	–	2.50
Government	–	0.61	–	2.32
Civil service	–	0.57	–	2.31
Parliament	–	0.65	–	2.24
Political parties	–	0.62	–	2.00
H scale coefficient	0.55	0.60	–	–

Notes: * Hi for ‘trust in family members’ is too low and is, therefore, excluded from the social trust scale.

More important, the other five social trust measures are organised in hierarchical order from particular to general with trust in known others at the core. Trust in neighbours, in people of another religion, of another nationality and in people one meets for the first time are progressively less widely distributed in the general population and hence come lower down the hierarchical ordering. All six political trust items meet Mokken scaling requirements and all are, therefore, included in the analysis. The ordering of the items shows that trust in the police and courts are fundamental to the scale, followed, in order, by trust in government, the civil service, national parliament and political parties.

To check these results and to be sure that we have not forced questionnaire responses into a false pattern by pooling 22,000 individuals in twenty-two countries, the same Mokken scaling procedure was carried out on each country separately and also on sub-samples of the twenty-two-nation pooled data according to a set of thirteen objective and subjective independent variables that have often been found to be associated with trust.³ For reasons of space, the figures are not presented here, but the analysis most generally produced the same two social and political trust scales found in the pooled data set of individuals. In a few cases, Mokken scaling uncovers a single social and political trust scale, but this occurs relatively rarely, and in no case does it produce more than two scales. Consequently, our results apply to the populations of all twenty-two countries and to subsets of the populations of every one of them.

Three conclusions follow from these findings:

1. The evidence clearly shows that social and political trust represent two distinct dimensions.
2. Particular and general social trust fall on a single continuum. They are not opposed or contradictory, and, moreover, their hierarchical ordering shows that general social trust most usually emerges only where there is particular trust; the former is a foundation for the latter.
3. Trust in family members is so widely spread throughout society that it is dropped from Mokken procedures because it does not meet their scaling criteria. Consequently, we concentrate on the remaining five particular and general social trust items, dropping family trust from the analysis that follows. Nevertheless, it is important to note that family trust is virtually universal in modern society and forms the basic framework or foundation for all other forms of social trust.

3. These are life satisfaction, education, class, income, employment status, voluntary association activity, gender, age, city size, materialism-postmaterialism, satisfaction with household income, happiness and church attendance.

From Particular to General Social Trust

Since particular and general social trust can be placed on a single continuum and are parts of a single syndrome of latent social trust variables, the question arises of how and why some people extend their particular trust to a more general level.

Table 4.3 suggests that the winner hypothesis is generally supported by the evidence. The table is built around a social trust count variable with a range of 0 to 5. Excluding trust in the family, it counts the number of times that respondents express trust or complete trust in each of the other five forms of social trust, and correlates their scores with the set of social, economic and political characteristics. High social trust is positively associated with feelings of happiness and life satisfaction, civic engagement, subjective health and social class, satisfaction with the financial situation of the household, educational attainment and income, and with post-materialism. Social trust is also positively correlated with political trust – easily the largest correlations in the column – and with interest in politics, which confirms previous results.

The winner hypothesis is also confirmed by the figures for political trust in Table 4.3. This is measured on a 0 to 6 scale covering all items of trust in civic and political institutions. Like social trust, political trust is positively associated with happiness and life satisfaction, civic engagement, subjective health and social class, education and income, and with satisfaction with the financial situation of the household. However, there is no significant correlation between postmaterialism and political trust. As we have now come to expect, it is also associated with general and particular social trust, as well as with interest in politics.

In almost all cases both social and political trust are usually associated with ‘winner’ characteristics, but before drawing this conclusion we can test the hypothesis in a different way that draws on a distinction between three types of trust and three types of trusters. The three types of trust are particular and general social trust and political trust. The three types of trusters are based on an empirical analysis of the main ways in which individuals combine different types of trust. Drawing on the results of Mokken scaling, it is possible to isolate three types of social trusters in the pooled individual data. The first type trusts only their family or (in the case of a tiny minority of thirty-one individuals or 0.1 per cent of the sample) nobody at all, and are called ‘distrusters’. Distrusters make up only 9 per cent of the total sample and are of interest mainly as an extreme case of low trust rather than for their numbers. The second type consists of those who trust only the people they know, or their neighbours, and they are called ‘particular trusters’. They make up one-third (32 per cent) of the pooled populations of the twenty-two democracies. The third type trusts people of another nationality or religion, or those they meet for the first time and are called ‘general trusters’ (58 per cent).⁴

4. Eagle-eyed readers may note an apparent discrepancy between the figures in Table 4.1 showing that particular trusters outnumber general trusters, and figures here showing the reverse. The explanation is that Table 4.1 shows the distribution of social trust while these figures here refer to the distribution of the types of trusters.

Table 4.3: Nonparametric correlations (Kendall's tau b) between social trust (count variable 0–5), political trust (count variable 0–6) and socio-economic and attitudinal items

	Social trust scale	Political trust scale
Sex	-.010	-.002
Age	.073***	.044***
Highest educational level attained	.126***	.060***
Feeling of happiness	.149***	.127***
Subjective state of health	.128***	.119***
Life satisfaction	.107***	.113***
Satisfaction with the financial situation of household	.122***	.135***
Subjective social class	.144***	.121***
Income	.106***	.097***
Political trust index	.249***	–
Left–right placement	-.030***	.033***
Interest in politics	.167***	.160***
Particular trust count variable (0–2)	–	.230***
General trust count variable (0–3)	–	.234***
Membership of voluntary associations	.151***	.113***
Inglehart index	.106***	.008

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$

Although the three types of trusters are not only the empirical types found in democratic nations, they do constitute the main types and they account for a large percentage of the total population. Table 4.4 shows that social distrusters are most generally on the loser end of social, economic and political life, while general trusters are most generally found among the winners. As hypothesised, the measures of winning in society correlate negatively and significantly with distrust and particular trust, but positively and significantly with general trust.

Finally, we are concerned with a more systematic and multivariate analysis of the interrelationship between social and political trust and its correlates. Our strategy mainly builds on previous multilevel analysis evidence which unambiguously shows that particular, general and political trust are strongly and positively related with each other, and that contextual factors affect general and political trust more than particular social trust (Newton and Zmerli 2011). A likely explanation is that particular trust is based on first-hand experiences with family, friends and neighbours, while political trust and general trust in (relatively) unknown others is more strongly influenced by the environment of trustworthiness and the institu-

tions that preserve it. The positive impact of both types of social trust on political trust is also in line with the Mokken scaling evidence since the latter reveals a single continuum running from the particular to the general. However, these findings are not sufficiently informative as to the relevance of different types of trusters. Are exclusively particular trusters inclined to trust politically as much as general trusters, or do they restrict their willingness to trust to the narrow, private sphere of people they know personally?

Table 4.4: Nonparametric correlations (Kendall's tau b) between three types of trusters (0–1) and socio-economic and attitudinal items

	Distrusters	Particular trusters	General trusters
Sex	.009	-.006	-.002
Age	-.038***	-.030***	.050***
Highest educational level attained	-.090***	-.090***	.138***
Feeling of happiness	-.118***	-.070***	.141***
Subjective state of health	-.107***	-.053***	.117***
Life satisfaction	.075***	-.048***	.092***
Satisfaction with the financial situation of household	-.080***	-.055***	.104***
Subjective social class	-.098***	-.064***	.124***
Income	-.093***	-.046***	.095***
Left–right placement	.029***	.000	-.018**
Interest in politics	-.114***	-.079***	.148***
Political trust index	-.189***	-.098***	.211***
Membership of voluntary associations	-.096***	-.113***	.166***
Inglehart index	-.064***	-.072***	.108***

Notes: ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

We follow up these questions by running linear and logistic regression analysis. An index of political trust is used as dependent variable in the linear regression model, but in contrast to our previous analysis of types of social trust in Table 4.4, we use count variables of particular and of general trust as predictors of political trust in Table 4.5. In addition, we avoid multicollinearity among the winner and loser indicators by building two ‘winner in life’ indices, the first combining happiness, health and life satisfaction (attitudes towards life) and the second combining education and income (socio-economic resources – see Appendix 2). As control variables in these regressions, we use gender, age, voluntary association activity, political interest and church attendance.

The results in Table 4.5 show that political trust is significantly and positively associated with both the winner indices as well as political interest, life satisfac-

tion, materialist values and voluntary association membership and regular church attendance. However, the coefficients for particular and general social trust are the strongest in the regression, showing once again the strong three-cornered association between the types of trust.

Table 4.5: Linear regression, political trust index with particular and general social trust (count variables) as predictors

	b	Std. error	Beta
Constant	1.29	.03	–
Sex	.02	.01	.02*
Age	.00	.00	.01
Attitudes towards life index	.07	.01	.09***
Socio-economic resources index	.02	.01	.02**
Particular trust (count variable 0–2)	.15	.01	.16***
General trust (count variable 0–3)	.08	.00	.16***
Membership of voluntary associations	.04	.01	.06***
Political interest	.09	.01	.14***
Inglehart index	-.05	.00	-.08***
Church attendance	.02	.00	.05***
Adjusted R ² in %		14.1	
N		18,743	

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, this picture changes when we replace the count variables of particular and general social trust by our three trust types (see Table 4.6). In this second linear regression model, the group of general trusters serves as our reference category and distrusters and particular trusters are included as predictors. As the results show, both trust types strongly and *negatively* affect political trust compared to general trusters. It seems that only where particular trust combines with general trust can we expect positive correlates with political trust.

We now reverse our dependent and independent variables by inspecting the impact of political trust on the two types of social trust. For this analysis we use our index of political trust as an independent variable alongside the same predictors used in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. To extend the winner hypothesis a little further, we also include employment status, using the full and part-time employed as the reference category and the unemployed and other employment status groups as predictors. Table 4.7 presents the findings for particular trusters. As the rather weak Nagelkerke's R^2 suggests, we must be careful not to overestimate the results even though they are consistent with our previous results. Most notably, being politically trustful significantly *decreases* the odds of being an exclusively particular trusters. The same is true for voluntary activity, which reduces the likelihood of trusting only one's personal social network. The other predictors are also consist-

ent with the results presented in Table 4.4. Particular trusters are more likely to be found among men, materialists, the young, and those dissatisfied with their life, and among those with fewer socio-economic resources and low political interest. Attending mass regularly, however, increases the likelihood of belonging to this limited trust type.

Table 4.6: Linear regression, political trust index with three types of trusters as predictors

	b	Std. error	Beta
Constant	1.65	.03	–
Sex	.02	.01	.02*
Age	.00	.00	.03***
Attitudes towards life index	.08	.01	.11***
Socio-economic resources index	.02	.01	.02**
Distrusters ^a	-.45	.02	-.20***
Particular trusters	-.19	.01	-.14***
Membership of voluntary associations	.04	.01	.06***
Political interest	.10	.01	.15***
Inglehart index	-.05	.00	-.08***
Church attendance	.01	.00	.05***
Adjusted R ² in %		12.1	
N		18,724	

Notes: ^a reference category general trusters. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The results for general trusters in Table 4.7 are the mirror image of those for particular trusters. In their case, Nagelkerke's R² indicates a better goodness of fit and all but two variables improve the chances of being a general trusters. High political trust and civic engagement stand out in this regard, but being on the sunny side of life also encourages general trust, as does being a woman, interest in politics, and postmaterialism. The self-employed and housewives are less likely to trust generally and so are regular churchgoers.

Finally, we extend the analysis to recent suggestions and evidence suggesting that the police and the justice system are particularly important promoters of general social trust (Rothstein 1998; Rothstein and Stolle 2003) because they are the primary public institutions responsible for maintaining the trustworthiness of their populations (Newton 2001b: 234). For this purpose, we construct two indices of political trust instead of one and use them as predictors in the same logistic regression models. The first index measures trust in the police and courts, and the second deals with trust in parliament, government, civil service and political parties. The

figures in Table 4.8 confirm the positive importance of public institutions for general social trust, suggesting an important top-down influence on levels of social trust, but they do not suggest that the police and the courts are particularly significant – civil and political institutions play an equally significant role in this respect.

Table 4.7: Logistic regressions, particular trusters and general trusters

	Particular trusters			General trusters		
	b	Std. error	Exp(B)	b	Std. error	Exp(B)
Constant	1.49	.12	4.46***	-3.49	.13	.03***
Sex	-.08	.04	.93*	.14	.03	1.15***
Age	-.01	.00	.99***	.01	.00	1.01***
Attitudes towards life index	-.07	.02	.96***	.22	.02	1.25***
Socioeconomic resources index	-.12	.02	.89***	.14	.02	1.15***
Membership of voluntary associations	-.21	.02	.81***	.28	.02	1.33***
Political trust index	-.34	.03	.71***	.67	.03	1.96***
Political interest	-.06	.02	.95**	.11	.02	1.12***
Inglehart index	-.13	.02	.88***	.15	.02	1.12***
Church attendance	.02	.01	1.02**	-.07	.01	.94***
Unemployed ^a	.00	.07	1.00	.09	.07	1.09
Self employed	-.11	.06	.89	-.12	.06	.88*
Pensioner	-.03	.06	.97	.04	.06	1.04
Housewife	.06	.06	1.06	-.40	.06	.67***
Student	.00	.07	1.00	.08	.07	1.08
Other	-.23	.12	.80	.31	.12	1.36*
Nagelkerke's R ² in %		5.1			14.8	
N		23,107			22,908	

Notes: ^a reference category fully or part-time employed. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.8: Logistic regressions, particular trusters and general trusters with two types of political trust as predictors

	Particular trusters			General trusters		
	b	Std. error	Exp(B)	b	Std. error	Exp(B)
Constant	1.42	.12	4.13***	-3.41	.12	.03***
Sex	-.09	.04	.92*	.14	.04	1.15***
Age	-.01	.00	.99***	.01	.00	1.01***
Attitudes towards life index	-.07	.02	.93***	.22	.02	1.24***
Socio-economic resources index	-.12	.02	.88***	.14	.02	1.15***
Membership of voluntary associations	-.21	.02	.81***	.29	.02	1.33***
Trust in civil institutions	-.05	.03	.96	.29	.03	1.34***
Trust in political institutions	-.27	.03	.77***	.33	.03	1.39***
Political interest	-.05	.02	.95**	.12	.02	1.12***
Inglehart index	-.12	.02	.88***	.15	.02	1.16***
Church attendance	.03	.01	1.03**	-.06	.01	.94***
Unemployed ^a	.00	.07	1.00	.09	.07	1.09
Self-employed	-.09	.06	.91	-.14	.06	.87*
Pensioner	-.03	.06	.97	.04	.06	1.04
Housewife	.08	.06	1.08	-.41	.06	.67***
Student	.01	.07	1.01	.08	.07	1.08
Other	-.22	.12	.80	.30	.12	1.35*
Nagelkerke's R ² in %		5.0			14.3	
N		22,880			22,696	

Notes: ^a reference category fully or part-time employed. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Conclusion

In recent years, two puzzles about trust have been solved. First, there is now good evidence that general social trust and political trust are closely and positively associated at both the aggregate cross-national and at the individual level: those that are socially trusting are, indeed, also politically trusting. Secondly, fresh evidence about particular social trust shows that it is not incompatible with general social trust, and, moreover, that particular social trust seems to be a foundation for the development of general social trust. Consequently, there is not only a close and positive association between particular and general social trust, but also between these two and political trust.

However, the associations are not simple and direct, but asymmetrical and complex. An overwhelming majority of the population of democratic societies claim high particular trust and virtually all of those who are high on general social trust are also high on particular social trust, but the reverse is not true. Only slightly more than half of particular trusters are also general trusters. There is a similarly uneven and partial overlap between social and political trust; virtually all political trusters are high on particular and general social trust, but only a minority of those high on particular and general social trust are also politically trusting. It would seem that particular trust is the foundation on which general social trust and political trust are based, but building on the foundations does not inevitably or even generally occur. Particular trust is a necessary but not sufficient cause of general trust; and both particular and general trust are a necessary but not sufficient cause of political trust. This raises the more general question of what sorts of people in what sorts of circumstances express trust in other people and in political institutions, and why?

The main hypothesis developed in this chapter is that the winners in society are likely to be trusting for a set of reasons concerning their psychological makeup, their trustworthy social environment, the risks they face, and their relationship with the main social and political institutions of society. By 'winners' we mean those with money, socio-economic status and education, those who are happy and satisfied with their life and claim to be in good health, and those who are on the winning side of party competition for political power or who view the political system as giving them a chance of being on the winning side. This chapter tests the winner hypothesis against survey data for some 22,000 individual citizens in twenty-two democratic countries covered by the World Values survey of 2005–7.

Perhaps the first thing to note is that there are strong international patterns of social trust among the citizens in these countries. This is not to deny that there are national variations that may well be both interesting and important, but the pooled individual data for all twenty-two nations also shows that different kinds of trust are combined in broadly similar ways in all the populations. Mokken scale analysis clearly demonstrates that trust forms two hierarchical scales, one social and one political, in the pooled populations of all these countries, in each country separately and in a large number of sub-groups within them. The main purpose of this chapter is to concentrate on trying to explain these common cross-national

patterns among individual citizens, rather than focussing on national variations.

The winner hypothesis is consistently supported by the evidence. All three types of trust – particular and general social trust and political trust – are closely associated with variables measuring different aspects of winning and losing. And all of the three main types of trusters in society – distrusters, particular trusters and general trusters – are similarly closely associated with winning and losing variables. Trust of different kinds is most strongly found among the rich, happy, satisfied, healthy, educated, and high socio-economic status groups in society. We cannot show that political trust is characteristic of the political winners in each national system because party ID and the winning parties cannot be matched in the WV survey, but it is clear that political trust levels are also highest among the social and economic winners in society.

We should be careful not to over-interpret these results. With 22,000 observations even small coefficients are statistically significant, but the explained variance in our regression models is usually quite small, as it usually is with individual level data. It is clear that winning and losing is part of the explanation of trust, but by no means the only explanation. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests some more general conclusions:

1. All the correlation and regression analysis in this chapter shows either that the three different forms of trust are positively and significantly associated with each other (see Tables 4.2 to 4.5) or that political trust is most usually found among individuals who combine particular and general social trust (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). This, in turn, confirms the main claim of the social capital theory that social and political trust are interdependent.
2. The results (see Table 4.8) also support the idea that trust in institutions matters for trust in individuals. This is further evidence that trust can be generated by top-down processes in which institutions reinforce trustworthy behaviour. It also suggests that the origins of the rainmaker effect may lie in institutions that reinforce trustworthiness, which, in turn, helps to create a culture of trust.
3. The results presented here help to integrate the findings of individual level and cross-national comparative work insofar as both now show that trust levels of countries and of individuals alike are associated with the winning characteristics of wealth and its associated variables. It is beginning to look as though there is much more unity and convergence in trust studies than appeared to be the case a decade or so ago. It does not mean that we should now start looking for a ‘theory of everything’ to do with trust, but it does show that trust is less of a puzzle than it seemed.

These findings, in turn, open up a set of related questions about the connections between different forms of trust and the structural characteristics of modern societies, most notably their wealth, income equality, democratic performance, the public services they provide, the quality of their political and civil institutions, and the heterogeneous nature of their populations. These characteristics are often

linked together. Wealthy societies are generally democratic and egalitarian, they often have good public services and high quality civil and political institutions and they are usually the countries with comparatively high particular and general social trust scores and the highest levels of trust in political institutions. It is too early to draw clear and firm conclusions, but it is beginning to look as if there is a syndrome of social and political characteristics associated with social and political trust, and as if these may be similar at both country and individual levels.

The finding that the three types of trust are normally positively associated also has theoretical and practical implications for the heterogeneous nature of modern societies. Some studies find that societies that are mixed in terms of ethnic, religious, linguistic, national and cultural sub-groups suffer from low levels of trust, but others argue that this is not always or necessarily the case (Glaeser *et al.* 2000; Helliwell 1996; Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Hero 1998, 2003; Costa and Kahn 2003). If, as some argue, in-group trust is incompatible with out-group trust and that there is a natural tendency to trust the people we know and are like us (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Banfield 1958; Uslaner 2000-1: 573), then heterogeneous societies are always likely to suffer from low trust. But if, as we find, in-group trust is not incompatible with out-group trust (see also Bahry *et al.* 2005), then heterogeneity and low trust are not necessarily connected. They may be in some circumstances, but it is not an automatic association. And if, as we find, large proportions of the democratic populations of the world are able to combine high levels of particular trust with high levels of general and political trust, there is no reason in principle why heterogeneous societies should not maintain comparatively high levels of particular, general and political trust. It may depend on the extent to which the immigrants and the minorities in society are also losers. We can speculate that the larger the loser percentage in the population, the lower trust levels are likely to be. But it is not only about immigrants, it is also about the growing share of those who perceive themselves as the losers in society that can threaten social cohesion. Support for this suggestion is found in the research showing that the greater the income inequality of a country the lower its general trust level is likely to be (Delhey and Newton 2005).

The practical lesson that might be drawn from our results concerns the difference between multicultural integration and monocultural assimilation of immigrants as government policies designed to handle the problems of heterogeneity (see Heath 1997; also Kymlicka 1998; Guttman 1994: 5; Rudolph 2006; Harles 1997). Broadly speaking, assimilation is based on the idea that social stability and peace requires a common culture, a consensus about values and identification with a single nation state. Immigrant groups are expected to change in order to fit into their host societies. Integration is a broader, looser, and more inclusive form of citizenship that permits greater cultural diversity with multiple identities and loyalties. The idea that particular and general social trust can reinforce each other fits well with theories of integration because strong ethnic and national identities are not incompatible with strong general trust in others in the wider society.

Finally, in showing how political trust is associated with different forms of social trust and their social and economic correlates, the results of this analysis

help to further explicate the social basis of politics. It demonstrates the close connection between social conditions and politics – and at the same time, suggests ways in which political institutions may affect the nature of interpersonal relations and political attitudes.

Appendix 1*Countries included in the analyses, WVS 2005–7, unweighted N*

	Unweighted N
Australia	1,404
Bulgaria	990
Chile	998
Cyprus	1,049
Finland	1,014
France	1,001
Germany	2,061
Great Britain	1,037
India	1,807
Italy	1,007
Mexico	1,550
The Netherlands	1,047
New Zealand	924
Peru	1,490
Poland	983
Romania	1,755
Slovenia	1,013
South Africa	2,974
Spain	1,189
Sweden	1,003
Switzerland	1,240
USA	1,211

Appendix 2

Variables	Coding
Particular social trust: Trust in family, neighbourhood, people one knows personally	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely
General social trust: Trust in people one meets for the first time, other religion, other nationality	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely
Particular social trust count variable: count 3 and 4 of trust in people known personally and neighbours	0 to 2
General social trust count variable: count 3 and 4 of trust in people of another religion, another nationality or people one meets for the first time	0 to 3
Distruster: exclusively trust in family members (3 or 4) or no trust at all	0 no, 1 yes
Particular truster: exclusively trust in people known personally or in neighbours (3 or 4; trust in family members not excluded)	0 no, 1 yes
General truster: trust in people of another religion or another nationality or people one meets for the first time (3 or 4; trust in family members, people known personally and neighbours not excluded)	0 no, 1 yes
Trust in institutions: Parliament, government, political parties, courts, civil service, police	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely
Political trust index: responses to all political trust items are summed and divided by the number of valid responses	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely
Interest in politics	1 no interest to 4 very interested
Sex	0 male, 1 female
Age in years	
Highest educational level	1 no formal education to 9 university-level
Membership of ten different types of voluntary associations	0 no member, 1 passive member, 2 active member
Feeling of happiness	1 not at all happy to 4 very happy

Variables	Coding
Subjective state of health	1 poor to 4 very good
Life satisfaction	1 dissatisfied to 10 satisfied
Subjective social class	1 lower, 2 working, 3 lower middle, 4 upper middle, 5 upper class
Employment status: full time employee or part time employee (combined), self employed, retired/pensioned, housewife or not otherwise employed, student, unemployed, other	0 no, 1 yes, separately for each employment status category
Scale of incomes	1 lower step to 10 upper step
Satisfaction with financial situation of the household	1 dissatisfied to 10 satisfied
Left–right placement	1 left to 10 right
Church attendance	1 never to 7 more than once a week
Inglehart index: First and second preference with regard to maintaining order in the nation, give people more say, fighting rising prices, protecting freedom of speech	1 materialist to 4 postmaterialist
Attitudes towards life index: count variable happiness (3 or 4), state of health (3 or 4), life satisfaction (6 to 10)	0 to 3
Socioeconomic resources index: count variable education (7 to 9), scale of incomes (6 to 10)	0 to 2

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2 Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy

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Trust and politics

In claiming that 'Mutual trust lies at the heart of all political processes', the political philosopher John Dunn (1993: 641) reasserts a theme going back at least to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and coming from them to us through the writings of de Tocqueville, Simmel, Tönnies, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Coleman, and Luhmann.¹ In recent years, the theme has been reformulated in a powerful form by writers of the social capital school. According to them, social trust is the central element in a complex virtuous circle in which a set of attitudes, such as mutuality, reciprocity, and trust, are associated with social participation and engagement in community and civic affairs; these help to build the social and political institutions necessary for democratic and efficient governments; in turn, these create the conditions in which social and political trust can flourish. At the individual level, trust is the cornerstone 'habit of the heart', which is associated with a climate of social trust that enables citizens to cooperate with each other, build a common identity, and pursue common goals. At the structural level, effective community organisations, especially voluntary associations, are an essential part of the social framework necessary to build the social, economic, and political institutions of modern democratic society.

In this chapter, we focus on three core elements within this broad and complex set of claims: social trust, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. Within the exploratory goals assigned to this chapter, our aims are twofold. First, we will investigate the relationships between social trust and political confidence, on the one hand, and social trust and satisfaction with democracy, on the other. If social trust is an important foundation of politics, then those who trust should also be more likely to express confidence in the institutions of their government, parliament, the courts, the cabinet, the local government, the police, and the political parties. And if social trust is an important foundation of democratic government, then those who trust socially should be more likely to express satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. Does the evidence suggest that social trust, confidence in

political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy are associated in a mutually supportive way? Conversely, is the socially distrusting citizen also a politically disaffected and critical citizen who is suspicious of political leaders, disenchanted with political institutions, and dissatisfied with the workings of democracy (Norris 1999b; Putnam *et al.* 2000)? Second, we will examine the associations between those three core elements and some basic individual variables. Although the causal relations are not at all clear, the theory also argues that social trust, confidence in institutions, and satisfaction with democracy have common origins in attachment to the local community and participation in its affairs, especially involvement in its voluntary clubs and organisations.² In the last part of the chapter we therefore also look at the origins of those three elements. Are they linked by common associations with attachment to and participation in the local community and its voluntary organisations, or do they develop from different and separate circumstances?

Past research on these themes suggests that our two aims are not at all straightforward. In spite of its long and distinguished history, the theory linking trust, community attachment, membership of voluntary organisations, political confidence, and satisfaction with democracy has received only partial and qualified support from modern empirical social science, at least at the individual level. There is a substantial body of research finding that generalised social trust is not consistently or strongly associated with confidence in political institutions or satisfaction with democracy.³ These works confirm Kaase's (1999: 13) conclusion that 'the statistical relationship between interpersonal trust and political trust is small indeed'. Nor has recent survey research uncovered a strong association between trust and civic engagement, or between trust and membership in voluntary associations. Uslaner (2001a: 572, 575), for example, has found 'no linkage between trust and most forms of civic engagement . . . Across a wide variety of surveys, the message is the same: in almost all cases, trust is not important for most forms of civic engagement'. Similarly, Hooghe (2003: 91–3) rejects the idea that interaction with others in a voluntary association leads to increasing levels of generalised social trust. Some argue that people are likely to join organisations because they trust the organisation to begin with (Newton 2001a: 207; but for a different view see Putnam 1993: 171–6; Putnam 1995b: 666), while others claim that participation in an organisation may reinforce particularised trust in people like themselves who join the organisation, but not generalised trust in different social types (Stolle 2001b).

There is some evidence of an association between trust and voluntary organisation membership, but it is weak and patchy, significant in some countries but not in others, among some social groups but not among others, and for some sorts of organisations but not for others. The evidence is not sufficiently robust to support the powerful claims of social capital theory.⁴ At this point it is necessary to introduce an important methodological caveat. We should be careful to distinguish between

'bottom-up' individual level research that treats the individual as the unit of analysis, and 'top-down' aggregate, institutional, or cross-national research that compares countries. The 'rainmaker hypothesis' (Putnam *et al.* 2000: 26–7; see also Newton 2001a) argues that while social trust and political confidence may not be associated at the individual level, they should, at least, be associated at the cross-national, aggregate level. Although we have to deal with the empirical consequences of the presence or absence of an individual or aggregate-level relationship between trust and confidence, we do not have the space for trying to fully disentangle their interactions in this chapter. Just as rain falls on the just and the unjust alike, irrespective of their individual characteristics, so a general climate of social trust might benefit all citizens whether they, as individuals, are comparatively trusting or not. Social trust is a social or collective resource, and to some extent all may benefit from it, irrespective of their individual characteristics and whether they happen to trust or not.

Top-down research dealing with societies, institutions, or cross-national comparisons does support claims about the importance of trust for democracy insofar as they find an association between social trust and political confidence.⁵ Nevertheless, it is still puzzling that only weak and patchy associations between social trust and political confidence have been uncovered at the individual level by survey research. Although there is no reason why social science results should necessarily be verified at the individual level, the absence of a strong individual association tends to undermine rather than support social capital theory. Since the Citizen, Involvement, Democracy (CID) survey uses more sensitive and reliable measures of trust than most other studies, we will investigate its association with political confidence and satisfaction with democracy in order to confirm or disregard the previous findings. Before we do so, however, we must start with some background comments about social trust, political confidence, satisfaction with democracy, and their measurement. We come to the conclusion that a great deal depends on the details of how these three elements are conceptualised and measured.

Social trust

The enormous importance attached to social trust is matched by fundamental disagreement about what it means (Lewis and Weingert 1985: 975; Misztal 1996: 9). After almost three decades of fairly intense theoretical and empirical work, the concept remains imprecise and confusing. Our approach to this conceptual tangle is threefold:

- 1 to produce a general working definition of trust;
- 2 to recognise that there are different types of trust, and work with what we believe is the most important type in modern society;
- 3 to show that the measures we use are reasonably reliable and valid.

Russell Hardin (1999: 24) has written that 'There is little point in arguing over the essential meaning of trust: It has no essential meaning. Rather, it has a variety of meanings that often conflict'. He goes on to define social trust in the following manner (1999: 26; emphasis in the original):

To say that I trust you with respect to some matter means that I have reason to expect *you to act in my interest* with respect to that matter, because you have good reasons to do so, reasons that are grounded in my interest . . . Your interest encapsulates my interest.

Trust is, therefore, 'encapsulated interest' (see also Hardin 1998: 12–15, and 2002, Chapter 1). To this extent, trust may be said to exist when *A* believes *B* will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, at worst, and will try to act in his interest and protect him, at best. This approach and definition has the merit of being close to the classical notion of trust as fidelity and promise-keeping, and to the modern usage of trust as having confidence or faith in others, and being able to rely upon them: I trust people when I think they will keep their word, and not mug, cheat, harm, lie to me, or exploit me. To trust means risking my interests in the hands of others. This is close to Hardin's (1998: 12–15) already mentioned definition of trust as 'encapsulated interest', to Gambetta's (1988b: 217) suggestion that trust is built upon the belief that others will act beneficially rather than maliciously towards us, and to Warren's assumption (1999b: 311) that trust involves shared interests and lack of malice.

There are clearly different types or dimensions of trust (Uslaner 2002: 52–6). *Particularised* trust in people we know is different from *generalised* trust in people we do not know. Social trust is different from political trust (Putnam 1995b; Newton 1999a: 179–80; Uslaner 2002: 54), and trust in people is different from confidence in institutions (Seligman 1997). In this chapter we are particularly interested in generalised trust, that is, thin trust in people we either do not know, do not know well, or who may not be much like us. This is the kind of trust best adapted to the circumstances of citizenship in modern, large-scale, heterogeneous, and impersonal societies, where weak ties are important (Granovetter 1973).⁶ Particularised trust, sometimes known as thick trust, is more likely to be found in small face-to-face communities.

Despite the controversy about the nature and meaning of the concept of social trust, most survey research settles on the same question, or questions, to measure it. The standard question is: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' This question, invented by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and first used in Germany in 1948, has been asked every year since then, making Germany the country with the longest social trust time-series in the world. The question was picked up by American researchers

(including Almond and Verba (1963), in *The Civic Culture* study, and the 1960 presidential election survey), and has spread around the globe as a measure of general trust. In spite of that, however, there is some disagreement about whether the question is a particularly good one, either as a measure of particular trust, or as a measure of generalised trust. Nevertheless, evidence shows that it does work reasonably well. Analysing a survey that asked more than a dozen questions about whom or what people trust, Uslaner (2001a: 575; 2002: 54) found that the Noelle-Neumann question places heavy emphasis on trust in strangers, and concludes that the question does indeed measure generalised trust.⁷

In many cross-national studies (such as the World Values and Eurobarometer surveys), the standard general trust question is the only one used. However, Rosenberg (1956) devised a three-question item consisting of the original Noelle-Neumann question plus two others (tapping respectively helpfulness and fairness):

- Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out for themselves?
- Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair?

Rosenberg and others have shown that the three-item scale forms a single measure of trust that is reasonably valid and reliable.⁸ For this reason we have used the three-item Rosenberg scale in the CID surveys, and asked respondents to rate their trust, or lack of it, on an 11-point scale (0–10) for each single item.

Principal component analysis of the three questions on trust asked in the 12 nations and 13 societies (with the East Germans as the thirteenth society) covered in our study shows that they do, indeed, scale pleasingly in all of them (Table 2.1). The single component – known here as 'general trust' – explains between 59 and 78 per cent of the variance, showing that there is a single and strong underlying dimension. In spite of the theoretical argument about the concept of generalised social trust, therefore, the single component that emerges from this principal component analysis of the three item Rosenberg scale is a good and simple indicator of it. Table 2.2 ranks our 13 societies in terms of their mean score for the three trust items. It presents no surprises. The three Nordic countries are at the top of the table, and three of the East European countries together with Spain, East Germany, and Slovenia are at the bottom, with the Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal, and West Germany in the middle range.

Confidence in political institutions

We agree with those scholars who argue that the word *trust* should be reserved for attitudes towards individuals, whereas *confidence* should apply to

Table 2.1 Principal component analysis of social trust

Country	General trust	Helpfulness	Fairness	Eigenvalue	Percentage of variance explained
Denmark	0.80	0.82	0.83	2.01	67
East Germany	0.87	0.90	0.89	2.35	78
West Germany	0.86	0.90	0.88	2.33	78
Moldova	0.76	0.87	0.86	2.08	69
The Netherlands	0.76	0.79	0.81	1.86	62
Norway	0.82	0.86	0.86	2.17	72
Portugal	0.87	0.87	0.85	2.23	74
Romania	0.79	0.84	0.84	2.03	68
Russia	0.79	0.80	0.80	1.91	64
Slovenia	0.79	0.80	0.80	1.90	63
Spain	0.81	0.80	0.79	1.92	64
Sweden	0.80	0.82	0.81	1.98	66
Switzerland	0.66	0.82	0.81	1.77	59

Table 2.2 Level and dispersion of social trust^a

Country	Mean	Standard deviation	N
Norway	0.64	0.17	2,286
Denmark	0.64	0.17	1,639
Sweden	0.64	0.20	1,265
The Netherlands	0.63	0.15	1,639
Switzerland	0.61	0.18	1,647
Portugal	0.54	0.19	1,003
West Germany	0.52	0.21	1,989
Slovenia	0.45	0.19	989
East Germany	0.45	0.23	1,013
Spain	0.43	0.17	4,218
Russia	0.41	0.24	1,731
Moldova	0.36	0.21	1,215
Romania	0.36	0.23	1,208

Note

a The measure is an additive index (mean of valid scores) based on all three questions about social trust. The index ranges from 0 to 1. Countries are ordered by their mean social trust.

institutions.⁹ While social trust belongs to the private sphere and is a feature of personal relationships based upon first-hand experience and knowledge, confidence belongs to the public, political sphere and is built upon second-hand sources, particularly the mass media (see Newton 1999a: 179). In the rest of the chapter we will thus follow the practice of talking about trust in people and confidence in institutions (or political confidence).

Although countless discussions have taken place about the meaning of trust, few analysts have concerned themselves with the concept of confi-

dence. In its broadest sense, it refers to citizens' assessments of the core institutions of the polity (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Magalhães 2006; Chapter 3, this volume). To paraphrase Levi and Stoker (2000: 484–5), political confidence entails a positive evaluation of the most relevant attributes that makes each political institution trustworthy, such as credibility, fairness, competence, transparency in its policy-making, and openness to competing views. And to extrapolate from our treatment of trust, confidence in an institution entails the belief that it will not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that is harmful to our interests or the nation's, but will treat us, and other citizens, equally, fairly, and justly. As a conceptual device, political confidence has been designed as a middle-range indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity (Gabriel 1995: 361; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995: 299–302). As Newton and Norris (2000: 53) have written: 'confidence in institutions ... [is] the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity'.

As an empirical indicator, almost all studies follow the World Values and Eurobarometer practice of using the question:

- Please look at this card, and tell me for each item, how much confidence you have in them.

The items vary from one questionnaire to another. The CID questionnaire includes a set of ten public institutions, namely the police, civil service, courts, municipal boards, political parties, politicians, parliament, cabinet, and two international bodies, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). Because our concern is domestic politics, rather than international affairs, we have dropped the EU and UN from our analysis and concentrated on the eight internal institutions of government and politics.¹⁰ Like the trust questions, the CID questionnaire asks respondents to rate their answers to the confidence questions on an 11-point scale, whereas the World Values and Eurobarometer surveys use a four-point scale.

Principal component analysis of responses to the eight questions reveals a single dimension in most of our countries (Table 2.3).¹¹ It thus seems that political confidence is all interconnected, in such a way that confidence in any one institution is likely to be repeated in all others.¹² In general, factor scores are relevant and have the correct sign, the percentage of variance explained is systematically high, and the KMO measures reveal an excellent degree of fitness for the interrelationships among the different institutions. That is, citizens are consistent and predictable in the confidence they express in different kinds of public institutions. Moreover, confidence levels in the different countries are very much as expected (Table 2.4), being highest in the old democracies, especially the

Table 2.3 Principal component analysis of confidence in institutions^a

Confidence in	CH	DK	ES	EG	WG	MD	NL	NO	PT	RO	RU	SE	SI
Politicians	0.77	0.84	0.81	0.72	0.76	0.83	0.88	0.83	0.79	0.83	0.80	0.86	0.84
Cabinet	0.79	0.85	0.77	0.88	0.82	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.75	0.85	0.73	0.85	0.83
Parties	0.74	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.78	0.85	0.87	0.82	0.80	0.86	0.71	0.82	0.84
Parliament	0.83	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.85	0.89	0.87	0.88	0.81	0.89	0.81	0.87	0.86
Courts	0.72	0.69	0.75	0.76	0.70	0.87	0.70	0.74	0.72	0.83	0.75	0.71	0.78
Civil service	0.76	0.73	0.81	0.83	0.79	0.86	0.80	0.81	0.75	0.86	0.82	0.76	0.79
Police	0.66	0.57	0.64	0.72	0.60	0.73	0.65	0.64	0.57	0.73	0.74	0.62	0.72
Municipal board	0.69	0.71	0.62	0.70	0.71	0.75	0.69	0.74	0.56	0.74	0.68	0.72	0.70
Eigenvalue	4.43	4.64	4.65	4.98	4.56	5.53	5.06	5.04	4.19	5.46	4.59	4.87	5.08
Pct. variance explained	55	58	58	62	57	69	63	63	52	68	57	61	64
KMO ^b	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.90	0.88	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.85	0.91	0.90	0.90	0.89

Note

a Entries are loadings on the first component. Kaiser's criterion yields a unidimensional solution in all countries except Denmark.

b KMO is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure, which indicates to what extent the variables included in the model fit the underlying criteria. The values of KMO range from 1.0 (excellent fit) to 0.5 and less (poor fit).

Table 2.4 Level and dispersion of political confidence^a

Country	Mean	Standard deviation	N
The Netherlands	0.61	0.14	1,631
West Germany	0.60	0.15	1,989
Denmark	0.59	0.16	1,637
Sweden	0.55	0.17	1,257
Switzerland	0.55	0.18	1,591
Norway	0.52	0.17	2,273
East Germany	0.52	0.18	1,011
Slovenia	0.49	0.21	983
Spain	0.47	0.18	4,101
Portugal	0.46	0.17	986
Romania	0.44	0.25	1,194
Moldova	0.34	0.22	1,215
Russia	0.33	0.21	1,723

Note

a The measure is an additive index (mean of valid scores) based on all eight questions about confidence in institutions. The index ranges from 0 to 1. Countries are ordered by their mean political confidence.

Netherlands, West Germany, and Denmark, and lowest in the new democracies, in particular Romania, Moldova, and Russia. This lends assurance in our political confidence measures.

Satisfaction with democracy

Table 2.5 shows the ranking of the CID societies according to how they score for our third main concept, satisfaction with democracy. There is general agreement about the best indicator to tap this variable. The CID survey uses the standard question employed in the Eurobarometer, ISSP, and World Values surveys. Like these, the CID survey also uses a four-point rating scale. The question reads:

- On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [name of country]?

The country results are as one would expect. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and West Germany are at the top of the table, Portugal, Slovenia, Romania, Russia, and Moldova at the bottom; the old, established democracies are high on the list, and the newer ones are low.

This distribution comes as no surprise particularly since the same pattern has been found in other studies over the last two decades (Schmitt 1983; Kuechler 1991; Klingemann 1999). In contrast with general agreement about question wording and the consistency of survey results, there is a good deal of dispute about how the results relate to democratic

Table 2.5 Level and dispersion of satisfaction with democracy^a

Country	Mean	Standard deviation	N
Denmark	0.68	0.21	1,615
The Netherlands	0.65	0.20	1,598
Sweden	0.63	0.20	1,241
West Germany	0.62	0.22	1,964
Norway	0.57	0.19	2,186
Switzerland	0.57	0.22	2,103
Spain	0.55	0.22	4,072
East Germany	0.45	0.24	989
Portugal	0.44	0.24	965
Slovenia	0.42	0.22	942
Romania	0.32	0.24	1,161
Russia	0.31	0.25	1,441
Moldova	0.23	0.20	1,104

Note

a Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale scored 0 to 1. Countries are ordered by their mean satisfaction with democracy.

support. Many scholars have questioned Easton's (1965: 267–8) classic distinction between diffuse and specific support, arguing that citizens do not perceive the difference and do not distinguish between basic support for democracy and the current performance of government, which means in empirical terms that the latter may be interpreted as a manifestation of the former.

The confusion between support for democracy and satisfaction with governmental performance has led some to use inappropriate indicators or draw the wrong inferences from the data. Therefore, it is important to distinguish satisfaction with democracy, and measures of legitimacy (see Gunther and Montero 2004). Legitimacy may be considered to be 'the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any others that might be established' (Linz 1988: 65). In contrast, political contentment (Easton 1965: 406), or political discontent, lie on a different dimension, consisting of people's judgements of the day-to-day actions of political leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes (Kornberg and Clarke 1992: 20). Satisfaction with democracy thus comprises a set of perceptions relating to the ability of a given polity to solve problems that citizens consider to be particularly important. Political satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, arises from citizens' evaluations of the performance of the regime or authorities, as well as of their political outcomes, and expresses displeasure with a significant social or political object. In other words, political dissatisfaction is a general rejection of political objects that do not meet the standards that citizens set for them (Di Palma 1970: 30; Farah *et al.* 1979; Norris 1999b).

While democratic legitimacy or diffuse support of democracy tends to

be fairly stable over time, dissatisfaction fluctuates in accordance with government policies, the condition of the society and economy, and the performance of key political institutions. And since it is focused on partisan political leaders and the governments they lead, it would not be surprising to find that, other things being equal, citizens supporting the party in government are more positive in their assessments than those who support opposition parties.

Social trust and political confidence

To examine the association between social trust and political confidence, we ran zero-order correlations between the factor extracted from the three-item Rosenberg trust scale and the factor extracted from the eight questions on confidence in public institutions. The CID results are unusual and surprising (Table 2.6). Contrary to almost all of the numerous studies published to date, and against all our expectations, there is a statistically significant zero-order correlation between social trust and confidence in institutions of government. The results are neither weak nor patchy. All the correlations are statistically significant at 0.001, and, moreover, they are substantively strong in almost all the societies except East Germany. The results are consistent and robust. Given the lack of any such findings in a large number of previous studies, these results are intriguing. And given their potential theoretical significance for social capital theory, they are worth investigating in greater depth.

Are these results simply a statistical artefact of our confidence factor? To eliminate this possibility, a second set of simple correlations was run,

Table 2.6 Correlation between social trust and political confidence^a

Country	Pearson's r	N
Norway	0.39	2,151
The Netherlands	0.38	1,471
Romania	0.38	1,034
Denmark	0.37	1,519
Sweden	0.36	1,104
Switzerland	0.32	1,185
Moldova	0.29	1,040
Portugal	0.29	909
West Germany	0.28	1,916
Slovenia	0.25	891
Spain	0.24	3,505
Russia	0.23	1,298
East Germany	0.18	913

Note

a The measures correlated are the single factors extracted from the principal component analyses of social trust and confidence in institutions. All correlations are statistically significant at the 0.001-level. Countries are ordered by the strength of the correlation.

this time between the social trust factor and confidence in *each* of the eight separate political institutions. Since this gives us a total of 104 simple correlations (eight institutions in 13 societies), the results are not reproduced here, due to lack of space. But it is sufficient to say that 97 of the zero-order correlations are significant at the 0.001 level, four are significant at 0.01, two are significant at 0.05, and one alone is not significant. The results could hardly be clearer or more consistent: there appears to be a close association between social trust and confidence in political institutions in all 13 of the societies covered by this study.

We are therefore presented with a puzzle: contrary to previous research, we find a close, statistically significant, and often substantial association at the individual level between social trust and confidence in political institutions. Why is this? The answer does not seem to be found in the sequence of questions in the different questionnaires. While question order might affect the results to some extent, it is difficult to believe that it has such a strong effect.¹³ There are two possible methodological explanations for the unusual findings.

- 1 *Number of indicators.* The CID questionnaire employs the full three-item Rosenberg trust scale, from which a single trust factor is extracted. Is this perhaps a better and more sensitive measure of generalised social trust than the single Noelle-Neumann question used in many other studies? Similarly, we have used factor scores for the eight questions on confidence in political institutions, while others have used a single questionnaire item, usually on confidence in parliament. Our measures are thus likely to be more refined and sensitive than others.
- 2 *Precision of indicators.* The CID questionnaire asks respondents to rate their answers on the three social trust questions on an 11-point scale. It is likely that this offers a more precise measure of trust than shorter rating scales.¹⁴ As Krosnick and Fabrigar (1997: 144) have written, 'There are various reasons to believe that more scale points will generally be more effective than fewer ... More scale points permit a researcher to make more subtle distinctions among individuals' attitudes towards the same object. Thus, longer scales have the potential to convey more useful information'.

Due to lack of space we cannot fully investigate these possibilities, but we can at least point out some likely suggestions about the number and the precision of indicators. Some surveys (the World Values, for example) use a single social trust question and give respondents a dichotomised 'Yes/No' option in answering it.¹⁵ The World Values study codes responses to the institutional trust (i.e. confidence) questions on a four-point scale, and many studies take as their indicator of political confidence the response to the single question about confidence in parliament. Is it pos-

sible that the full 11-point rating scale discriminates more sensitively for degrees of trust and confidence, and perhaps the three-item trust factor and eight-item confidence factor are better measures than the single questions used in other studies?

To test this possibility we re-ran our data, but this time in ways that increasingly approximate the type of measures and the rating scales used in other surveys. We change one variable at a time, so as to better identify what changes have what sorts of effects on the results. First, we use the usual single-item Noelle-Neumann social trust question (instead of the factor derived from the three-item scale) and correlate it with the confidence in institutions factor derived from the eight questions, both with the 11-point rating scale. Next, we employ the single social trust question on an 11-point scale and a single trust in parliament question, also on an 11-point scale. Third, we collapse the scales by using the single social trust question in dichotomised form and reducing the single confidence in parliament question to a four-point scale similar to that used by the World Values Surveys.¹⁶ If it is correct that indicators and scales explain the difference between our results and others, then we would expect the correlations between social trust and political confidence to become smaller as we approximate the less refined measures and the narrower rating scales of other studies.

Table 2.7 shows that this is exactly what does happen. The correlations fall steadily as one moves from the most refined measures of the CID survey included in the first column to the least refined shown in the last column. East Germany is the only exception to this pattern. The correlations remain statistically significant in all cases of the final column, but nonetheless in a clear majority of eight of 13 societies they fall to half or less of their original size.

To check our results in a different way, we finally re-ran the Spanish, Moldovan, and Romanian data. The surveys in these countries happened to collect trust data from the same samples according to *both* the full CID format (the three-item Rosenberg trust scale and the eight questions about confidence in political institutions, both on a 0–10 rating scale) *and* the collapsed World Values format (a single social trust question coded 'Yes/No'). This enables us to check the results of the two sets of indicators used in the same surveys and applied to exactly the same respondents, thus allowing us to compare the results of each without making too many assumptions about how best to approximate World Values results by collapsing the CID rating scales.

The results shown in Table 2.8 confirm our previous expectations. The correlations fall steadily as we move down from the results of the most refined and sensitive factor scores for trust and confidence in the first row, to the least refined and sensitive figures shown in the last row. For example, in the Moldovan case (first column), the CID data show a correlation of 0.29 between social trust and confidence in political institutions;

Table 2.7 Correlation between different measures of social trust and political confidence^a

Country	Full scales ^b		Single social trust question and political confidence factor ^c		Single social trust and confidence in parliament questions ^d		Collapsed single social trust and confidence in parliament questions ^e	
	Pearson's r	N	Pearson's r	N	Pearson's r	N	Pearson's r	N
Norway	0.39	2,151	0.32	2,155	0.26	2,231	0.21	2,231
The Netherlands	0.38	1,471	0.35	1,484	0.28	1,589	0.19	1,589
Romania	0.38	1,034	0.32	1,058	0.27	1,138	0.21	1,138
Denmark	0.37	1,519	0.34	1,542	0.30	1,620	0.24	1,620
Sweden	0.36	1,104	0.30	1,116	0.27	1,212	0.21	1,212
Switzerland	0.32	1,185	0.25	1,241	0.18	1,432	0.14	1,432
Moldova	0.29	1,040	0.25	1,079	0.20	1,162	0.18	1,162
Portugal	0.29	909	0.26	916	0.17	955	0.12	955
West Germany	0.28	1,916	0.22	1,919	0.21	1,965	0.14	1,965
Slovenia	0.25	891	0.19	905	0.18	967	0.17	967
Spain	0.25	3,435	0.16	3,496	0.16	3,743	0.12	3,743
Romania	0.23	1,298	0.15	1,323	0.15	1,636	0.11	1,636
East Germany	0.18	913	0.18	920	0.19	981	0.20	981
Weighted average correlations ^f	0.31	18,866	0.25	19,154	0.21	20,631	0.17	20,631

Notes

- a All correlations are statistically significant at the 0.001-level. Countries are ordered by their coefficients in the *full scales* column.
- b *Full scales* refers to the figures presented in Table 2.6, i.e. the social trust factor extracted from the three-item Rosenberg trust scale, based on 11-point ratings, and the factor extracted from the eight questions about public institutions, also based on 11-point ratings.
- c *Single social trust question and political confidence factor* refers to a single social trust question, using 11-point ratings, and the factor extracted from the eight confidence questions, based on 11-point ratings.
- d *Single social trust and confidence in parliament questions* refers to a single social trust question, using eleven-point ratings, and a single confidence in parliament question, also using eleven-point ratings.
- e *Collapsed single social trust and confidence in parliament questions* refers to the measures described in table note c above, but with the first dichotomised and the second converted to a four-point scale so as to resemble the indicators used in the World Values Surveys. On the social trust question, values 0-6 were scored as 0 and 7-10 as 1. On the confidence in parliament question, 0-2 were scored as 1, 3-5 as 2, 6-8 as 3, and 9-10 as 4.
- f *Weighted average correlations* are the sum of country coefficients multiplied by their Ns, and divided by the total N.

Table 2.8 Correlation between different measures of social trust and political confidence in Moldova, Romania, and Spain^a

Measures correlated	Moldova		Romania		Spain	
	r	N	r	N	r	N
Social trust factor scores (three items) and political confidence factor scores (eight items)	0.29	1,040	0.38	1,034	0.25	3,435
Single 11-point social trust question and political confidence factor scores (eight items)	0.25	1,079	0.32	1,058	0.16	3,496
Single 11-point social trust question and single 11-point confidence in parliament question	0.20	1,162	0.27	1,138	0.16	3,743
Single 11-point social trust question and single confidence in parliament question on a four-point scale ^b	0.20	1,162	0.25	1,138	0.15	3,743
Single dichotomous social trust question and political confidence factor scores (eight items)	0.17	1,056	0.23	1,052	0.11	3,400
Single dichotomous social trust question and single 11-point confidence in parliament question	0.15	1,136	0.18	1,132	0.12	3,634
Single dichotomous social trust question and single confidence in parliament question on a four-point scale ^b	0.15	1,136	0.17	1,132	0.11	3,634

Notes

- a All correlations are statistically significant at the 0.001-level.
- b The 11-point confidence in parliament question was collapsed to four points as described in Table 2.7, note c.

but the same survey, using single questions and a 'Yes/No' scale for trust, and a four-point rating scale for confidence in parliament, shows a correlation of 0.15. Correspondingly, the Spanish results drop from 0.25 to 0.11. In the Spanish case, it is also worth noting that recoding the CID data to correspond with World Values measures produces results that are identical to those of the World Values study in 1999 and very close in 1990 (Table 2.9). Therefore, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the better the indicators and rating scales used to measure trust and confidence, the more likely they are to show a close association.¹⁷ Conversely, the fact that previous research has not shown a consistently strong association between social trust and political confidence seems to be due to a combination of poor indicators and short rating scales.¹⁸

Social trust and satisfaction with democracy

If social trust is associated with political confidence, then perhaps it is also associated with satisfaction with democracy.¹⁹ Data included in Table 2.10 confirm this association at the individual level. Not surprisingly, there is a close relationship between political confidence and satisfaction with democracy, since these are aspects of the same general type of political support. But the figures also show that the socially trusting are more satisfied with democracy. Although the figures vary quite substantially from one country to another, they are highly significant in all cases except East Germany.²⁰ It is noticeable, however, that the association between social trust and satisfaction with democracy is less consistent and less close (a result that might partly be due to the fact that the latter is measured on a four-point scale) than that between social trust and political confidence, and its coefficients are moreover less homogeneous across countries.

The conclusions to this part of the chapter are as simple and straightforward as they are statistically clear. The best, most reliable, and most

Table 2.9 Correlation between social trust and confidence in parliament in Spain according to the CID and WVS studies^a

Survey	Pearson's r^b	Kendall's τ^b	N
CID	0.11**	0.10**	3,634
<i>WVS (World Values Surveys)</i>			
1999	0.11*	0.11*	1,109
1990	0.07*	0.06*	3,925
1981	-0.01	-0.00	2,106

Notes

a In all studies, social trust is measured by the same single dichotomous question. In the WVS study, confidence in parliament is measured by a single question using a four-point scale. In the CID study, confidence in parliament is measured by a single question using an 11-point scale, collapsed to a four-point scale as described in Table 2.7, note e.

b Levels of statistical significance: ** = 0.001, * = 0.01.

Table 2.10 Correlation of social trust and political confidence with satisfaction with democracy^a

Country	Social trust and satisfaction with democracy		Political confidence and satisfaction with democracy	
	Pearson's r	N	Pearson's r	N
Denmark	0.23	1,586	0.45	1,529
East Germany	0.10	974	0.49	901
West Germany	0.16	1,957	0.48	1,922
Moldova	0.13	1,039	0.36	1,023
The Netherlands	0.20	1,581	0.44	1,467
Norway	0.21	2,162	0.45	2,079
Portugal	0.13	951	0.35	896
Romania	0.26	1,107	0.42	1,045
Russia	0.11	1,358	0.35	1,131
Slovenia	0.14	931	0.39	862
Spain	0.10	3,924	0.39	3,404
Sweden	0.22	1,215	0.50	1,108
Switzerland	0.19	1,482	0.40	1,236

Note

a All correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01-level and with one exception (East Germany, social trust) on the 0.001-level as well. For information on the measures used, see notes to Tables 2.5 and 2.6.

refined measures we have of social trust, political confidence, and satisfaction with democracy show that they are, indeed, associated with each other at the individual level at statistically significant levels. To this extent, our results are consistent with the claims of social capital theory as far as individual citizens are concerned.

Social trust, political confidence, and satisfaction with democracy: multivariate analyses

So far we have presented only bivariate correlations. Do our findings stand up to the more searching test of multivariate regressions? And what do these tell us about the origins of our dependent variables? In the last section of the chapter we will try to answer these questions with three basic multivariate regressions on social trust, political confidence, and satisfaction with democracy. For the selection of independent variables we have relied on a combination of theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic considerations. To begin with, we have taken into account some of the many recent attempts to provide empirical explanations of any one of our three dependent variables, most of them working with survey data at individual level, and only sporadically analysing the complete set of reciprocal relationships these variables may have among themselves. Although the range of models and the operational variables in these studies are quite disparate, many of them contain a common core for explaining sources of

social trust that include at least personality characteristics of individuals (life satisfaction), participation in voluntary associations (membership, activism, or a compound measure), and their linkages, attachments or identifications with some type of community.²¹ With respect to the origins of political confidence, recent studies have often focused on social capital or social psychological explanations (including social trust) and political or institutional theories (including either aggregate or individual level variables, such as satisfaction with democracy).²² Finally, the sources of satisfaction with democracy have been analysed with a mixture of variables measuring party choice and party preferences, confidence in government and trust in political leaders, political attitudes and institutional features, economic performance and assessment of public policies, citizens' expectations, and years of democracy.²³

In selecting our independent variables, we have also kept in line with the exploratory nature of this chapter. Rather than providing a systematic theoretical and empirical account of the sources of social trust, political confidence, and democratic satisfaction, our aim is to confirm whether the multivariate analysis maintains the exceptionally strong and consistent relationships among those indicators found through bivariate correlations. To do this, we compiled a selection of variables covering different degrees of associational involvement, life satisfaction, attachment to the local community (neighbourhood or village) and the municipality, population size of the locality in which the respondent lives, and exposure to television. As social background variables we have selected education, age, gender, and religious denomination. Most of the variables are self-explanatory.²⁴

Table 2.11 shows the coefficients of the OLS regression on social trust. The results confirm our previous finding that social trust is strongly and consistently associated with confidence in political institutions across all countries at the individual level. But contrary to social capital theory, membership of voluntary associations rarely makes a significant appearance at all, confirming the results of many other studies.²⁵ However, life satisfaction, community attachment, and education are linked to social trust in most countries. It seems clear that satisfied, socially integrated, and educated people are more likely to trust, and that, consequently, both trust and life satisfaction tend to also be linked to education and status.²⁶

No other variable makes a strong or consistent showing across all the nations. Satisfaction with democracy, age, gender, and the urban-rural continuum make sporadic appearances, and in some cases signs change to underline the weak and patchy nature of the results. It should also be noted that the regressions do not explain a great deal of the variance in social trust: they rarely manage to account for as much as a fifth, and more usually the adjusted R² is between 12 and 18 per cent. There are consistently strong statistical associations between trust, on the one hand, and political confidence, life satisfaction and community attachment, on

Table 2.11 Multiple regression analysis of social trust^a

Predictor	CH	DK	ES	EG	WG	MD	NL	NO	PT	RO	RU	SE	SI
Political confidence	0.23***	0.31***	0.20***	0.25***	0.30***	0.21***	0.32***	0.28***	0.28***	0.25***	0.23***	0.30***	0.16***
Satisfaction with democracy	0.06**	0.05*	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.07	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.10**	-0.02	0.09**	0.04
Associational membership	0.02	0.01	0.03**	0.02	0.06***	0.04*	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Life satisfaction	0.21***	0.12***	0.08***	0.11*	0.17***	0.26***	0.14***	0.11***	0.16***	0.14***	0.13***	0.08*	0.17***
Community attachment	0.11***	0.03*	0.04**	0.01	0.08**	0.09**	0.11***	0.07***	0.12***	-0.01	0.08**	0.07**	0.04
Size of locality	-0.03	-0.01	0.06***	-0.09**	0.05**	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.01
Exposure to television	-0.77	-0.12**	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.13	-0.01	0.01	-0.13***	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.06	0.02
Education	0.05**	0.05**	0.09***	0.08*	0.09***	-0.04	0.08***	0.06***	-0.01	0.05	0.08**	0.10***	0.13***
Age	-0.06	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.10*	0.08**	-0.07	-0.10***	-0.13***	0.04	-0.10*	0.01	-0.16***	-0.10**
Gender (female)	0.02**	0.03***	0.01*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.04***	-0.03	-0.01	0.04*	0.04**	0.03**
Religious denomination ^b													
Protestant	0.02*	R	-	-0.09***	-0.02**	-	0.00	R	-	-0.03	-	R	-
Catholic	R	-	R	-0.11***	R	-	R	-0.04	R	0.01	-	-0.06	R
Orthodox	-	-	-	-	-	R	-	-0.07**	-	R	R	-	-
Muslim	-	-0.02	-	-	0.00	-	0.01	-	-	-0.04	0.05	-	-
Other religion	-0.00	-0.00	-0.06*	0.06	0.02	-0.04	-0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.15	-0.00	-0.05	-0.03
No religion	0.00	0.01	0.03***	R	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02*	0.09	-	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.214	0.191	0.120	0.079	0.166	0.174	0.212	0.246	0.125	0.177	0.109	0.179	0.118
N	1,126	1,488	3,135	879	1,853	770	1,220	1,812	803	914	1,040	1,081	836

Notes

a Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients. Levels of statistical significance: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05.

b The largest denomination constitutes the reference category (R). Denominations represented by too few cases to be distinguished are subsumed under 'other religion'.

the other, but they are not particularly successful in explaining a significant percentage of the variation in trust. But those results are no worse, and in most cases somewhat better, than most research of this kind (see Whiteley 1999: 42).

Given its relevance for social capital research, we might take a second look at the role played by voluntary organisations in generating social trust. First, there are many different kinds of voluntary association and, as Stolle and Rochon (2001: 144) have written: 'we expect that associations directed to different purposes will have different effects on the development of public social capital'. Second, membership is only one measure of voluntary activity, and perhaps other measures, such as participating in voluntary activity, or doing voluntary work in associations, might prove to be more productive of trust.

To what extent do different organisations and other forms of associational involvement have an impact on social trust? Tables 2.12 and 2.13 provide two rather eloquent answers.²⁷ In Table 2.12, we distinguish four types of voluntary associations (see Chapter 7, this volume) according to different criteria. Following Offe and Fuchs (2002: 192-9), spare-time, socio-cultural, and religious organisations belong to what they label as 'secondary or civic associations'; therefore, we should expect them to be better at producing social trust compared to interest, or 'tertiary', associations. Following Stolle and Rochon (2001: 154-5), interest and cultural associations, because of their purposes and degrees of inclusiveness, should be particularly productive of social trust. Moreover, religious organisations are treated separately on the grounds that trust is said to be associated with moral values (Uslaner 2002). And following both Putnam (2000) and Stolle (1998: 502), we might expect that associations fostering face-to-face interactions are much more likely to generate trust than those with passive or mediated forms of involvement.

However, none of these hypotheses are supported by any coefficient in Table 2.12. For every organisation and for every country, the coefficients are roughly the same as in the previous Table 2.11 – and most of them, moreover, are not significant (except for Spain and West Germany). With the partial exception of community attachment, the effects of other variables do not change appreciably. The same applies more generally to Table 2.13, which shows the effects of different forms of associational involvement on social trust, from membership to voluntary work and having friends in voluntary associations. With the exception again of Spain and West Germany, the contribution of these forms of engagement to social trust is usually small or insignificant. Only in these two countries, West Germany and Spain, is associational involvement a powerful predictor of social trust. In the other societies there is no pattern to suggest that face-to-face interaction in different types of organisations or distinct forms of associational involvement produce or strengthen social trust.

We now move from social trust to political confidence as our depend-

Table 2.12 Multiple regression analysis of social trust including membership in different types of associations^a

Predictor	CH	DK	ES	EG	WG	MD	NL	NO	PT	RO	RU	SE	SI
Political confidence	0.22***	0.30***	0.20***	0.25***	0.31***	0.21***	0.32***	0.28***	0.29***	0.25***	0.23***	0.30***	0.17***
Satisfaction with democracy	0.07**	0.05*	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.07	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.10**	-0.01	0.09**	0.04
Membership in sports clubs	0.00	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.03**	0.00	0.02*	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.02
Interest organisations	0.00	0.01	0.03***	0.01	0.00	0.04*	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00
Socio-cultural organisations	0.02	0.02*	0.02**	0.03	0.07***	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04**	0.02
Religious organisations	-0.02	0.01	0.07***	0.06	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	0.02	-0.04
Life satisfaction	0.20***	0.12***	0.07***	0.08	0.18***	0.26***	0.13***	0.10***	0.15**	0.14***	0.13***	0.07*	0.17***
Community attachment	0.11***	0.03	0.04**	0.02	0.06*	0.08**	0.10***	0.05***	0.12***	-0.01	0.08***	0.07**	0.04
Size of locality	-0.04	-0.01	0.06***	-0.11**	0.07***	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.01
Exposure to television	-0.92*	-0.09*	-0.07**	-0.05	-0.21**	-0.01	0.02	-0.14***	0.05	0.03	0.02	-0.04	0.02
Education	0.10*	0.13***	0.10***	0.21***	0.04	-0.05	0.08**	0.09***	-0.01	0.02	0.18**	0.16***	0.12***
Age	-0.07*	-0.12***	-0.03	-0.15**	0.06*	-0.07	-0.11***	-0.13***	0.04	-0.10*	-0.00	-0.15***	-0.10**
Gender (female)	0.02*	0.03***	0.01*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.04***	-0.02	-0.01	0.04*	0.03**	0.03**
Religious denomination ^b													
Protestant	0.02	R	-	-0.10***	-0.01	-	0.01	R	-	-0.03	-	R	-
Catholic	R	-	R	-0.14***	R	-	R	-0.04	R	0.01	-	-0.06	-
Orthodox	-	-	-	-	-	R	-	-0.08**	-	R	R	-	R
Muslim	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.01	-	-	-0.04	0.05	-	-
Other religion	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07**	0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.04**	0.00	-0.16	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02
No religion	-0.00	0.01	0.03***	R	0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0.08	-	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.203	0.204	0.134	0.104	0.159	0.172	0.203	0.235	0.122	0.175	0.110	0.180	0.118
N	1,112	1,468	2,997	814	1,706	770	1,208	1,669	803	919	1,040	1,083	836

Notes

a Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients. Levels of statistical significance: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05.

b The largest denomination constitutes the reference category (R). Denominations represented by too few cases to be distinguished are subsumed under 'other religion'.

Table 2.13 Multiple regression analysis of social trust including different forms of associational involvement^a

Form of involvement	CH	DK	ES	EG	WG	MD	NL	NO	PT	RO	RU	SE	SI
Involvement	0.06*	0.03	0.04***	0.02	0.06***	0.03*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02
Membership	0.02	0.01	0.03***	0.02	0.05***	0.03*	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Activity	0.02**	0.03**	0.04***	0.02	0.07***	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Donation	0.02*	0.03***	0.03***	0.04	0.06***	0.02	0.01	0.02**	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
Voluntary work	0.02*	0.01	0.03**	0.02	0.07***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.02
Friends	0.03**	0.01	0.03***	0.02	0.07***	0.02	0.02*	0.03***	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02

Note

^a These results are drawn from multiple regression analyses where the remaining independent variables correspond to the ones included in Tables 2.11 and 2.12. Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients. Levels of statistical significance: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05.

ent variable and perform the same regression analysis. As can be seen in Table 2.14, social trust, satisfaction with democracy, and attachment to the municipality appear in all the country equations, but trust is always significant at the highest level.²⁸ The robust association between social trust and confidence in political institutions is confirmed once more. Satisfaction with democracy is even more important; but its higher coefficients are only to be expected given that, conceptually, the two are closely related.²⁹ Attachment to the municipality is the third variable that appears strongly in all the country equations. It is interesting that, where social trust is concerned, it is attachment to the social unit, the community, that matters; but for the political measure of confidence, it is attachment to the political unit, the municipality, that counts. This suggests that social variables are most important for social trust, and political variables for political confidence (Newton 2001a; Anderson and LoTempio 2002). As Denters *et al.* (Chapter 3, this volume) make it clear in their much more comprehensive empirical analysis, both the socio-cultural and the political explanations of political confidence have some power, and should be seen as complementary rather than rival approaches; but the explanatory power of the political approach is considerably stronger.

The social trust and political confidence regressions also differ in that life satisfaction is closely related with trust, but not so closely associated with political confidence. Where Listhaug and Wiberg (1995: 319) found a positive though tenuous impact of life satisfaction on confidence levels, we find an association in only half the countries. As with social trust, membership of voluntary associations is unrelated to confidence.

The third set of regressions deal with satisfaction with democracy (Table 2.15). The coefficients tell much the same sort of story of mixed and scattered results, but with one significant difference. When distinct statistical models of satisfaction with democracy are run (not shown here due to lack of space), both social trust and confidence in institutions appear as strong variables in the equations *if* they are entered separately. But, when they are run in the same equation (as in Table 2.15), it is the confidence variable that retains its strong association with satisfaction, not the trust variable. Social trust is thus strongly associated with political confidence, and political confidence is strongly associated with democratic satisfaction. But social trust is not associated with democratic satisfaction independently of confidence. This suggests that the effect of social trust on satisfaction with democracy works through confidence in political institutions.

The satisfaction with democracy regressions also shows another interesting difference. While social trust and municipal attachment largely disappear from the scene, life satisfaction makes a reappearance in ten of the 13 equations. The results for the other variables are generally scattered, patchy, and once again, voluntary associations are insignificant (except in Portugal). Between 15 and 30 per cent of the variance is explained in each

Table 2.14 Multiple regression analysis of confidence in political institutions^a

Predictor	CH	DK	ES	EG	WG	MD	NL	NO	PT	RO	RU	SE	SI
Social trust	0.19***	0.24***	0.20***	0.10***	0.13***	0.22***	0.25***	0.25***	0.20***	0.27***	0.15***	0.17***	0.16***
Satisfaction with democracy	0.25***	0.27***	0.26***	0.29***	0.25***	0.34***	0.25***	0.31***	0.25***	0.29***	0.25***	0.35***	0.31***
Associational membership	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.02**	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Life satisfaction	0.00	0.03	0.05**	0.03	0.03	0.08**	0.02	0.08***	0.03	0.10***	0.08***	0.06*	0.03
Municipal attachment	0.13***	0.06***	0.09***	0.17***	0.13***	0.09**	0.07***	0.05***	0.09**	0.11**	0.06***	0.06**	0.15***
Size of locality	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	-0.05*	-0.05***	0.01	-0.05*	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.00	-0.01
Exposure to television	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	0.07	0.10*	-0.11*	0.00	-0.03	0.13*	0.10	0.03	0.01	0.05
Education	0.06**	0.04*	0.03	-0.00	0.01	0.05	0.04**	0.04**	0.06*	-0.09*	-0.02	0.04*	0.05
Age	0.03	0.05	-0.05*	0.07*	-0.07***	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06	-0.14***	-0.04	-0.13***
Gender (female)	-0.00	-0.00	0.01*	0.02	0.02***	-0.04**	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
Religious denomination ^b													
Protestant	-0.01	R	-	0.05**	0.01	-	0.01	R	-0.08	-0.03	-	R	-
Catholic	R	-	R	0.04*	R	-	R	0.01	R	0.01	-	-0.00	R
Orthodox	-	-	-	-	-	R	-	-0.05*	-	R	R	-	-
Muslim	-	-0.01	-	-	0.00	-	0.03	-	-	-0.04	0.01	-	-
Other religion	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.12	-0.03	0.00	0.01
No religion	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.06***	R	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.02*	0.05	-	0.01	-0.02	-0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.270	0.298	0.225	0.313	0.349	0.219	0.306	0.316	0.217	0.273	0.211	0.321	0.243
N	1,123	1,487	3,144	879	1,853	801	1,222	1,805	804	927	1,052	1,084	835

Notes

- a Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients. Levels of statistical significance: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05.
 b The largest denomination constitutes the reference category (R). Denominations represented by too few cases to be distinguished are subsumed under 'other religion'.

Table 2.15 Multiple regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy^a

Predictor	CH	DK	ES	EG	WG	MD	NL	NO	PT	RO	RU	SE	SI
Social trust	0.11**	0.08*	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.10**	-0.02	0.08**	0.05
Political confidence	0.50***	0.55***	0.47***	0.55***	0.65***	0.29***	0.64***	0.49***	0.51***	0.31***	0.43***	0.55***	0.41***
Associational membership	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.04*	0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.00
Life satisfaction	0.11**	0.14***	0.02	0.26***	0.13***	0.16***	0.11*	0.09***	0.06	0.18***	0.11***	0.10**	0.06
Municipal attachment	-0.02	-0.02	0.04*	0.01	0.09***	0.04	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.05
Size of locality	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.03**	-0.12***	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.08***
Exposure to television ⁴	-0.03	0.00	0.05	0.01	-0.09	0.04	-0.06	0.02	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.00
Education	-0.00	0.06*	0.05*	-0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05*	-0.01
Age	0.08*	-0.06	-0.01	0.06	0.02	-0.04	0.08*	0.09**	-0.02	-0.12**	0.28***	0.12***	0.12***
Gender (female)	-0.00	-0.06***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.04**	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00
Religious denomination ^b													
Protestant	-0.01	R	-	0.08***	0.01	-	-0.01	R	0.05	-0.07	-	R	-
Catholic	R	-	R	0.08**	R	-	R	-0.08**	R	0.01	-	-0.07	R
Orthodox	-	-	-	-	-	R	-	-0.00	-	R	R	-	-
Muslim	-	0.03	-	-	-0.01	-	-0.02	-	-	0.03	0.01	-	-
Other	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.03*	0.02	0.13	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
No religion	-0.04*	-0.01	-0.04**	R	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00
Adjusted R ²	0.179	0.234	0.152	0.297	0.246	0.175	0.209	0.220	0.148	0.218	0.181	0.281	0.175
N	1,123	1,487	3,144	879	1,853	801	1,222	1,805	804	927	1,052	1,084	835

Notes

- a Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients. Levels of statistical significance: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05.
 b The largest denomination constitutes the reference category (R). Denominations represented by too few cases to be distinguished are subsumed under 'other religion'.




Figure 2.1 Social trust, political confidence, and satisfaction with democracy.

country, and most of the work is done by the single measure of political confidence.

The associations among our three main variables are summarised in Figure 2.1. Although the lines are merely indicative of associations that are consistently significant in all or in most of the CID countries, the picture presents an interesting pattern of relationships between social trust and political confidence, on the one hand, and between confidence and satisfaction with democracy, on the other. The three variables are related but in different direct and indirect ways, and have their origins in distinctive combinations of social and political circumstances. Confirming the correlations developed in previous sections of this chapter, the multivariate analysis shows that political confidence is the most important predictor of social trust in every CID country. Whereas political confidence also holds a systematic, consistent, and strong relationship with satisfaction with democracy, social trust is linked to the latter only by virtue of its association with life satisfaction, which in turn is associated with our three dependent variables (much less so for political confidence).

In other words, it seems that social trust is strongly associated with political confidence, and political confidence is strongly associated with democratic satisfaction; but social trust is not associated with democratic satisfaction independently of confidence. While attachment to the community is associated with social trust, it is attachment to the municipality that accompanies political confidence. None of our measures of involvement in voluntary associations play a significant or consistent role in the models. Neither membership, nor participation, nor donating money, nor doing voluntary work, nor having friends in voluntary associations has any impact on social trust (except in Spain and West Germany). The composite variable of associational involvement, which combines all these measures, performs even worse (still with the same German and Spanish exceptions).

Conclusions

Social trust is thought to be the central element in a complex virtuous circle in which a set of attitudes, including mutuality, reciprocity, and trust

are associated with community involvement, especially with membership of voluntary associations and clubs, which, in turn, are linked to civic engagement and democratic political participation, which helps to build the social and political institutions necessary for democratic and effective government. Democracy and good government subsequently create the conditions in which social trust and political confidence can flourish, enabling citizens to develop their sense of citizenship and encouraging community involvement, civic engagement, and democratic participation, so completing the virtuous circle.

There are two main problems with this befitting theory. First, survey research, of which there are numerous studies available, shows that involvement in voluntary organisations has only a weak connection with generalised social trust. The same research shows that, by and large, voluntary activity has only a weak connection with political attitudes and behaviour, including confidence in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy. The results are much the same whether one takes passive membership of one or more associations as the measure of voluntary activity, or whether one takes a stronger measure of active work and engagement in them. One can sometimes find evidence to support the theory, but it is usually weak, patchy, and far from robust enough to be convincing.

The results of the present research confirm this conclusion. They provide little support for the claim that membership of voluntary associations creates generalised social trust in others, and virtually no evidence at all of a link between membership and support for political institutions and democracy. In this sense, membership of voluntary associations seems to be irrelevant to citizenship, political involvement, and democracy.

The second problem with the theory linking generalised social trust with confidence in political institutions is that past research has invariably found no link at all between them at the individual level of analysis. Many studies, and once again there is a fair amount of them, conclude that it is not the case that those who trust their fellow citizens are also likely to have confidence in the institutions of democratic government.

In this respect, our own results are surprising. Contrary to previous empirical findings, we discover that social trust and confidence in political institutions *are* associated. The link between them is strong in all our 13 societies and maintains its statistical and substantive strength in regression analysis which takes account of other variables. Indeed, in the country regressions on social trust (see Table 2.11), confidence in political institutions is by far the strongest variable in each equation in 12 of the 13 societies. This is a surprising finding.

Given that no previous research shows a strong or consistent association between social trust and confidence in political institutions, we must be cautious in drawing conclusions from our exceptional results. There are some valid reasons, however, for taking them seriously. The measures of trust and confidence used here may be more precise, sensitive, and

reliable than most others, partly because we use social trust and political confidence factors drawn from a set of questions that scale, and partly because we use an 11-point rating scale for all questions.

Our findings have two implications. Methodologically, it seems advantageous to use batteries of scaleable items and 11-point rating scales (at least for social trust and political confidence), although this may make surveys more expensive and time consuming. Substantively, it seems clear that social trust and political confidence are, indeed, associated at the individual level, which is consistent with the hypotheses set forth by those social capital theorists who expect to find an association at both the individual and aggregate levels.³⁰

A link at the individual level between social trust and political attitudes also has some important implications for the social origins of citizenship and democracy, but these are not entirely consistent with the theory outlined at the beginning of the chapter. This theory argues that patterns of social attitudes and behaviour (generalised social trust, membership of voluntary associations, and community attachment) will cluster together, and will be associated with another cluster of political attitudes and behaviour (civic attachment and engagement, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy). Although we find some of these associations, the patterns are not nearly as tight or simple as the theory predicts. The evidence suggests that there are different, though overlapping, pathways leading to generalised social trust, on the one hand, and attitudes of confidence towards democratic institutions, on the other.

Basically, these pathways are threefold. First, social trust is most closely linked to life satisfaction and attachment to the local community, although it is also strongly associated with confidence in political institutions. In their turn, attachment to the community and social trust are not directly associated with satisfaction with democracy. Second, satisfaction with democracy is closely associated with confidence in political institutions, which, subsequently, is associated not with attachment to the community but with attachment to the municipality. And, finally, satisfaction with democracy is not directly linked with social trust or attachment to the community, although it is linked with a common third factor, life satisfaction, which appears to lie at the heart of the causal network.

The implications of these findings for citizenship, involvement, and democracy must be stated cautiously at this stage. The conclusion seems to be that *social* attitudes and behaviour form one cluster of variables, while *political* orientations and behaviour form another, with life satisfaction linking the two. The classical theory is part right and part wrong. Satisfaction with democracy is mainly rooted in political conditions, while social trust is mainly rooted in social conditions, with life satisfaction being a common source of both. Social trust is not the crucial variable linking social life with democratic satisfaction after all, although it is closely associated with confidence in political institutions. Membership of voluntary

associations does not figure at all in the models of social trust or confidence in political institutions.

In short, the conditions of democratic activity and stability seem not to be as closely tied to the circumstances of community life as classical theory suggests. Involvement with and participation in the local community may have all sorts of benefits for both the community and its individual members, but its impact on democracy and its institutions seems to be indirect and comparatively weak. In this regard, our results question the extent to which democracy rests upon a vibrant community life. Be that as it may, the social roots of political life will be examined more closely in later chapters of this book.

Notes

- 1 It is neither necessary nor possible to cite the vast and rapidly increasing volume of work on social trust. For recent general commentaries see Luhmann 1979; Gambetta 1988a; Hardin 1991b, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2002; Putnam 1995b, 2000, 2002; Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hollis 1998; van Deth *et al.* 1999; Warren 1999b; Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000; Sztompka 2000; Edwards *et al.* 2001; Dekker and Uslaner 2001; O'Neill 2002; and Uslaner 2002.
- 2 See Putnam 1995b; van Deth 1996; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Torcal and Montero 1999: 182; Newton 1999a: 171–4; Uslaner 1999: 128; Minkoff 2001; and Stolle and Rochon 2001.
- 3 See Wright 1976: 104–10; Craig 1993: 27; Putnam 1995b: 665; Orren 1997; Hall 1999; Newton 1999a: 179–80; Newton and Norris 2000: 62–6; Newton 2001a; and Delhey and Newton 2003.
- 4 See, for example, Dekker and van den Broek 1995; van Deth 1996; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997: 1281–3; Newton 1999a; 1999b; 2001a; Torcal and Montero 1999; Whiteley 1999: 40–1; Booth and Richard 2001: 50; Stolle and Rochon 2001; Paxton 2002; and Uslaner 2002: 128–35.
- 5 See Putnam 1993: 111–15; Inglehart 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Newton and Norris 2000; Newton 2001a; Paxton 2002; Uslaner 2002: 217–48; Rothstein and Stolle 2003; and Delhey and Newton 2003.
- 6 For two distinct and yet complementary analyses of the varieties of trust, see Newton 1999b: 14–20 and Offe and Fuchs 2002: 191–4.
- 7 There is also some intriguing, though entirely inconclusive, evidence that the trust measure does actually correspond to the likelihood of citizens acting in a trustworthy manner. A small experiment in which wallets with money in them were 'lost' in various cities around the globe shows that the wallets were more likely to be turned over to the police in cities with a higher trust rating as measured by the standard trust question (see Knack and Keefer 1997: 1257). Similarly, the experiment conducted by Yamagishi (1988) found a correspondence between trusting attitudes and trusting behaviour.
- 8 While Rosenberg called his scale a misanthropy scale, it clearly loads heavily on trust, and might just as easily be called a trust scale. In fact, Rosenberg himself labelled it as a 'faith-in-people' scale in his 1956 and 1957 articles. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that in the United States the General Social Survey has been also using the three-item Rosenberg trust scale, but with only two possibilities of response (Yes/No); see Brehm and Rahn 1997: 1008 and Uslaner 2002: 68–74.

- 9 See, for example, Luhmann 1979: 39, 1988b; Giddens 1990: 114; Seligman 1997: 16–22; Offe 1999: 44–5; and Hardin 2000: 33–5. For a contrary position, see Paxton 1999: 105–6.
- 10 A principal component analysis of all ten institutions (domestic and international) produces either a single political confidence factor, or two of them, one of which loads heavily on internal institutions, and the other on international ones; see also Denters *et al.*, Chapter 3, this volume.
- 11 This is not so only in Switzerland, Portugal, and West Germany, where two factors break down quite neatly into confidence in the institutions of politics and government (politicians, party, the cabinet) and non-political public institutions (courts, civil service, police, and municipal boards). But since these three deviating cases are just at the borderline based on the Kaiser criterion (the first factor explains 52–59 per cent of the variance, and the second only 13–18 per cent), we work with the one-factor solution in this chapter.
- 12 This finding is consistent with the results of other research; see, for example, Listhaug 1998; Norris 1999b: 222; Bouckhaert and van de Walle 2001; and Christensen and Laegrid 2002.
- 13 It is true that, while question order is generally consistent in the common core questionnaires of the 13 CID surveys, it varies in different countries from one survey to another, and from one counting to another in other surveys. But this survey and country variability is unlikely to account for the consistently weak and statistically insignificant results of the associations between trust and confidence in almost all of the other surveys.
- 14 There is still another potential explanation. Given the natural propensity of 11-point rating scales, it is conceivable that respondents who see themselves as ‘middle of the road’ types, or as ‘radicals’ on the fringe of society and politics, might have consistently marked the same points on the rating scale and, therefore, gave a degree of spurious association to their responses. We are grateful to Willem Saris for making this point.
- 15 As already indicated, the wording of the WVS question is, ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’
- 16 We are grateful to Michael Braun, ZUMA Mannheim, for having provided us with important assistance in this regard.
- 17 In experiments using the Multi-Trait, Multi-Method approach for the CID social trust questions, undertaken for the European Social Survey pilots (which happened to have exactly the same indicators) in the Netherlands and Great Britain, Saris and Gallhofer (2003: 10) found that ‘the forced choice two point scale is definitively worse in both countries than the 11 point scale with respect to validity’.
- 18 Rothstein (2002: 320) reports a similar experiment in four Swedish surveys conducted yearly since 1996 with similar positive results.
- 19 See Putnam 1993 and Inglehart 1997: 180–7. However, Uslaner (2002: 218) questions whether ‘democratic societies are trusting societies’. It should be mentioned that both Uslaner and Inglehart base their conclusions on cross-national comparative data, not on the kind of individual data that this chapter is concerned with.
- 20 In Spain, however, where the Pearson’s r coefficient reaches the same value as in East Germany, the high level of statistical significance is probably due to the high number of cases.
- 21 See, for instance, Whiteley 1999, which adds some individuals’ normative beliefs and moral codes; Delhey and Newton 2003, which adds satisfaction with democracy, other personality traits, and networks of friends; and Freitag 2003, which adds moral values and confidence in political institutions.
- 22 See, for example, Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, which adds ideology, political interest, postmaterialism, and subjective life satisfaction; Newton and Norris 2000, which adds voluntary activism; Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck 2003, which adds political values; and Brehm and Rahn 1997, which provides a structural model of confidence in government, social trust, and civic engagement.
- 23 See, for instance, Clarke *et al.* 1993; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson 1998 (which also takes social trust into consideration); Anderson and Tverdova 2001; and, from a complementary perspective, Mishler and Rose 2001a.
- 24 In Tables 2.11 to 2.13 we explore, among other things, also the effect of three different aspects of social involvement. Table 2.11 depicts the influence of being a member in any of the voluntary associations listed in the CID questionnaire. The impact of *membership* in different types of organisations (presented and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7) is analysed in Table 2.12. Finally, in Table 2.13 we present the effects of distinct components of associational involvement (namely, whether the respondent is a member, has participated in any activity, donated money, done voluntary work, and has personal friends within an organisation; see also Chapter 6, this volume). *Life satisfaction* is an 11-point scale indicating to what extent the respondent is satisfied with his or her life as a whole. *Community attachment* and *municipal attachment* are 11-point scales indicating to what extent the respondent is attached to the neighbourhood or village (a social entity), on the one hand, and the municipality or town (a political entity), on the other. *Size of locality* ranges from rural to big city (more than 500,000 inhabitants). *Exposure to television* is based on the average number of hours per day the respondent spends watching television.
- 25 See, for example, among many others, Newton 1999a: 179–84, 2001a: 211–12, and Newton and Norris 2000: 65 for the lack of relationships between social trust and political confidence; and Putnam 1995a: 73; Stolle 1998: 522; Torcal and Montero 1999: 184; and Stolle and Rochon 2001: 131 for the association between social trust and membership of voluntary organisations; see also Whiteley 1999: 39 and Freitag 2003: 957–8 for findings similar to ours.
- 26 See on those points Brehm and Rahn 1997: 1019; Whiteley 1999: 39; Uslaner 2002: 84–6; Wuthnow 2002: 86; and Delhey and Newton 2003: 110–11.
- 27 See Chapter 6, this volume, for a more detailed analysis.
- 28 For reasons of space we do not present the regression on political confidence that shows its association with attachment to the community to be weaker than attachment to the municipality.
- 29 Although Holmberg (1999: 113) has claimed that the relationship between confidence in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy is spurious, it does not seem to be the case in spite of their conceptual closeness.
- 30 Cross-national empirical research results, based on data of the recently released first round (2003) of the European Social Survey, confirm this strong and consistent relationship between social trust and political confidence at the individual level in 21 European countries (Zmerli 2004).

4. Niveau und Trends politischer Unterstützung im europäischen Vergleich

(6)

Zmerli, Sonja (i.E.): "Konvergenz oder Divergenz? Entwicklungsverläufe und Determinanten politischer Unterstützung im europäischen Vergleich". In: Roßteutscher, Sigrid, Faas, Thorsten, Rosar, Ulrich (Hrsg.): *Bürger und Wähler im Wandel der Zeit. 25 Jahre Wahl- und Einstellungsforschung in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag.

Konvergenz oder Divergenz? Entwicklungsverläufe und Determinanten politischer Unterstützung im europäischen Vergleich

Sonja Zmerli

Europa steht erneut am politischen Scheideweg. Längst überwunden geglaubte Sollbruchstellen bahnen sich ein weiteres Mal ihren Weg durch den europäischen Kontinent. Seit Beginn der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise im Jahr 2008 und den daraus erwachsenen europaweit grassierenden Staatsschuldenkrisen signalisieren zahlreiche makroökonomische Kennzahlen das wirtschaftliche Auseinanderdriften der europäischen Staatengemeinschaft. Während beispielsweise die Arbeitslosenzahlen in Ländern wie Portugal, Spanien, Griechenland oder Italien bedrohliche und politisch destabilisierende Ausmaße annehmen, bleiben andere Länder wie Deutschland, Finnland, Österreich, die Niederlande oder auch Luxemburg weitgehend von der wirtschaftlichen Rezession verschont. Gefestigt geglaubte demokratische Errungenschaften verlieren in Zeiten der Krise ihre Selbstverständlichkeiten: Regierungen scheitern, extreme politische Parteien gewinnen an Zulauf, Bürger verlieren das Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure und die Akzeptanz politischer Alternativen jenseits demokratischer Prinzipien steigt. Auf den wirtschaftlichen folgt nunmehr ein politischer Riss, der quer durch Europa verläuft. Dabei sind die heftigsten Erschütterungen unter den Mitgliedsländern der EU-Währungsunion zu beobachten, in deren Verlauf eine Demarkationslinie zwischen sogenannten Geber- und Nehmerländern entsteht. In national geführten öffentlichen Diskursen wird mittlerweile vielfach die Europäische Union als europäisches Einigungsprojekt in ihrer bisherigen institutionellen Ausgestaltung gar grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt.

Diese besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen überraschen umso mehr, als das europäische Einigungsprojekt prinzipiell auf eine bemerkenswerte Erfolgsgeschichte zurückblicken kann. So wurden vor kaum mehr als zwanzig Jahren bis dato unüberwindbar geglaubte ideologische und wirtschaftliche Gräben zugeschüttet. Mit der Assoziierung und späteren Eingliederung zahlreicher ehemals sozialistischer Staaten in die Europäische Union sollte die europäische Integration gestärkt, demokratische Strukturen in diesen Ländern gefestigt und wirtschaftliches Wachstum angestoßen werden. Im Großen und Ganzen erfüllten sich die mit dieser Strategie verbundenen Erwartungen. Vielfach entfaltete jedoch die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung eine stärkere Dynamik als die Implementierung funktionsfähiger demokratischer Institutionen. Zahlreiche empirische Studien belegen, dass postsozialistische Gesellschaften

gegenwärtig unter vergleichsweise weit verbreiteter Korruption und stark anwachsender sozialer Ungleichheit leiden, die zusätzlich durch dysfunktionale Verwaltungspraktiken und sozialstaatliche Unterfinanzierung begünstigt werden (Uslaner 2008, 2011). Zu beobachten ist, dass Bürger postsozialistischer Gesellschaften politische Defizite dieser Art oftmals mit einem Entzug politischen Vertrauens und eingeschränkter politischer Unterstützung quittieren, was wiederum in eine geringere Funktionsfähigkeit politischer Institutionen mündet (Mishler, Rose 2001, 2005; Rose, Mishler 2011).

Vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen makroökonomischen Entwicklungen ist die vergleichende Einstellungsforschung nunmehr aufgefordert, ihren bisherigen ost-/westeuropäischen Analyseschwerpunkt um eine nord-/südeuropäische Perspektive zu erweitern. Der vorliegende Beitrag folgt dieser Empfehlung und untersucht Trends und Bedingungsfaktoren politischer Unterstützung aus dem Blickwinkel zweier Analyseebenen. Im Fokus steht erstens die Auswertung längerfristiger Trends politischer Unterstützung im europäischen Vergleich, wobei insbesondere der Frage nach der Konvergenz bzw. Divergenz ost-/westeuropäischer Einstellungsmuster nachgegangen wird. Anhand des innerdeutschen Vergleichs kann darüber hinaus das in Transitionsgesellschaften vorhandene Potential politischer Unterstützung unter Bedingungen bewährter demokratischer Institutionen nachgezeichnet werden. Zweitens berücksichtigen die im zweiten Schritt entwickelten Wirkungsanalysen politischer Unterstützung explizit Effekte sozialstaatlicher und wirtschaftlicher Faktoren, die im Zuge der aktuellen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise in zahlreichen europäischen Ländern gravierenden Veränderungen unterworfen sind. Es wird erwartet, dass die bereits als Große Rezession bezeichnete Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise schon früh erkennbare Spuren hinterlassen hat: politische Unterstützung sollte in betroffenen Ländern in Mitleidenschaft gezogen worden und deren Ursachen auch auf die sich verschlechternden makroökonomischen Indikatoren zurückzuführen sein.

Den empirischen Untersuchungen geht zuvor aus theoretischer Perspektive eine Erläuterung der Funktion, Relevanz und Operationalisierung politischer Unterstützung in demokratischen Gesellschaften voraus, verbunden mit einer Beschreibung ihrer individuellen und kontextuellen Voraussetzungen. Die sich anschließenden deskriptiven und mehrbenenanalytischen Auswertungen des World Values Survey (WVS) und des European Social Survey (ESS) ermöglichen konkrete Aussagen über Verlauf, Muster und

Bedingungsfaktoren politischer Unterstützung. Überlegungen zu zukünftigen Entwicklungen und politischen Handlungsoptionen beschließen diesen Beitrag.

Politische Unterstützung: Konzept, Bedeutung, Voraussetzungen

Politische Unterstützung demokratischer Regime gilt als Voraussetzung politisch und gesellschaftlich stabiler Verhältnisse. Konnte bislang kein wissenschaftliches Einverständnis über das „rechte“ Maß politischer Unterstützung zur Legitimation demokratischer Herrschaft erzielt werden, so besteht doch weitgehende Übereinstimmung über deren Bedeutung im Zuge demokratischen Regierens (Warren 1999). Als mehrdimensionales Konzept geht politische Unterstützung in seinen wesentlichen Aspekten auf Arbeiten David Eastons zurück (1965, 1975). Die Konzeptualisierung des Nationalstaates als politisches System dient laut Easton als zentraler Bezugspunkt politischer Unterstützung. Systemunterstützung basiert demzufolge auf individuellen Orientierungen gegenüber dem Nationalstaat, seinen Institutionen und Repräsentanten. „Where orientations are positive, citizens accept the legitimacy of their state to govern within its territorial boundaries. They do not challenge the basic constitutional structure and rules of the game or the authority of officeholders. Systems support is therefore understood as a psychological orientation” (Norris 2011: S. 20).

Die konzeptionelle Mehrdimensionalität lässt sich zunächst anhand der Unterscheidung zwischen diffuser und spezifischer Systemunterstützung beschreiben, die sich entlang eines Kontinuums manifestiert. Nationale Identität als Zeichen der individuellen Verbundenheit mit dem Nationalstaat, die sich in Form von Patriotismus oder Nationalstolz ausdrückt, kennzeichnet die diffuseste Form politischer Unterstützung. Die Zustimmung zu zentralen Prinzipien und normativen Werten des herrschenden Regimes markiert die nächste weniger diffuse Stufe der Systemunterstützung. Für demokratische Regime gilt die Befürwortung demokratischer Werte und Ideale bei gleichzeitiger Ablehnung autoritärer Herrschaftsprinzipien als stabilisierendes Fundament. Die dritte Ebene politischer Unterstützung in demokratisch verfassten Regimen beschreibt hingegen die allgemeine Bewertung demokratischer Regimeperformanz. Sie nimmt eine „Mittlerfunktion“ zwischen diffuser und spezifischer Systemunterstützung ein und wird vielfach in Form von individueller Demokratiezufriedenheit erhoben. Vertrauen in die konstitutiven Institutionen des politischen Systems zählt zum spezifischeren Ausdruck politischer Unterstützung. Diese können sowohl legislative, exekutive und judikative Institutionen politischer Herrschaft als

auch Verwaltung, Polizei oder Armee umfassen. Das spezifischste Kennzeichen der Systemunterstützung manifestiert sich schließlich in individuellen Einstellungen gegenüber gewählten Amtsträgern oder anderen politischen Repräsentanten wie Parteiführern. Individuelle Vertrauensbekundungen gegenüber diesem Personenkreis wird hierfür vielfach zur Messung herangezogen (Norris 2011: S. 24ff.).

Mit der kategorialen Zuordnung verschiedener Ausprägungen politischer Unterstützung geht zugleich die Unterscheidung zwischen der affektiven und evaluativen Ausgangsbasis einher. Während die Entwicklung einer nationalen Identität oder die Zustimmung zu demokratischen Normen und Prinzipien als stabilere affektive Formen der Systemunterstützung gelten, die auf politische Sozialisationsprozesse zurückgeführt werden, gründen spezifischere Formen politischer Unterstützung auf individuellen Bewertungen, Erfahrungen und Informationen über politische Institutionen und Akteure (Oskarsson 2010: S. 425). Folglich ist spezifischere Systemunterstützung stärkeren zeitlichen Schwankungen unterworfen, die zudem geringere Unterstützungsgrade aufweisen kann (Dalton 1999; Holmberg 1999; Pharr, Putnam 2000). Bei konstant hoher diffuser Systemunterstützung ist jedoch prinzipiell keine Erosion der Regimelegitimation durch schwankende bzw. nur gering ausgeprägte spezifische Unterstützung zu befürchten (Campbell 2011: S. 568). Dennoch sind die Übergänge zumeist fließend: politische Skandale, Krisen und Misserfolge können bereits schwach ausgeprägte diffuse Systemunterstützung zusätzlich beeinträchtigen. Gleichermaßen kann dauerhaft hohe spezifische politische Unterstützung die übergeordnete abstraktere Unterstützungsebene verstärken (Norris 2011: S. 22f.; Cernat 2010).

Die Komplexität des theoretischen Rahmens spiegelt sich zumeist auch in der Frage nach den Bestimmungsfaktoren politischer Unterstützung wider. Zwei Wirkungsebenen lassen sich unterscheiden. Zum einen erweisen sich verschiedene Merkmale der Individualebene als effektstarke Determinanten. Zum anderen trägt die politische und wirtschaftliche Regimeperformanz zweifellos zur Erklärung politischer Unterstützung bei. Anzumerken ist jedoch, dass bislang überwiegend Indikatoren spezifischer Unterstützung im Forschungsinteresse standen. Zahlreiche empirische Studien politischer Unterstützung weisen vielfach einen nennenswerten positiven Zusammenhang mit höherem Lebensalter und Bildung, politischem Interesse, interner und externer politischer Effektivität, sozialem Vertrauen sowie Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken nach (Bäck, Kestilä 2008; Campbell 2011; Catterberg, Moreno 2005; Newton 2006, 2008; Newton, Norris 2000; Putnam 1993;

Rothstein, Stolle 2008; Zmerli 2008; Zmerli, Newton 2008). Auf der Makroebene leistet hingegen gute Regierungsführung in all ihren Facetten einen zentralen Beitrag zur Stärkung politischer Unterstützung. Neben effektiver Regierungsführung zählen politische Stabilität, Rechtsstaatlichkeit sowie geringe Einkommensungleichheit und Korruption vielfach zu Prädiktoren politischer Unterstützung (Castillo, Zmerli 2012; Magalhaes 2013; Rothstein 2011; Uslaner 2008, 2011). Ökonomische Kennzahlen, wie das Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Wirtschaftswachstum oder die Arbeitslosenquote, leisten ebenfalls einen Erklärungsbeitrag zu politischer Unterstützung (Delhey, Newton 2005; Mishler, Rose 2005; Newton 2006; Zmerli 2012a, 2012b). Die Effekte sozialstaatlicher Leistungen sind hingegen ambivalent: während sich gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt hohe staatliche Sozialausgaben tendenziell negativ auswirken, trägt die Universalität sozialstaatlicher Ansprüche zumeist zur Stärkung politischer Unterstützung bei (Kumlin 2004, 2007, 2011; Rothstein, Stolle 2003; Svallfors 2012). Vielfach existiert jedoch eine enge Verzahnung zwischen objektiven wirtschaftlichen und sozialstaatlichen Kennzahlen und ihren entsprechenden individuellen Bewertungen. Individuelle Systemperformanzbewertungen zumeist operationalisiert in Form von individueller Zufriedenheit mit der Wirtschaft, der Regierung oder der Evaluation sozialstaatlicher Leistungen wie Bildung oder Gesundheit erweisen sich zumeist als erklärungsstarke Determinanten. Ähnliches gilt zudem für die Interaktion beider Ebenen: die Effektstärke dieser individuellen Bestimmungsfaktoren ist vielfach abhängig vom Niveau der korrespondierenden kontextuellen Faktoren (Newton, Zmerli 2011; van der Meer, Dekker 2011). Ferner konnten wider Erwarten jüngste empirische Studien politischer Unterstützung in europäischen Transitions Gesellschaften keinen Nachweis über das Nachwirken eines sozialistischen Erbes führen. Nicht die politische Sozialisation unter Bedingungen autoritärer Regime, sondern die Evaluation *aktueller* institutioneller und wirtschaftlicher Performanz leisten auch in Transitions Gesellschaften einen maßgeblich Beitrag zur Systemunterstützung (Mishler, Rose 2001, 2005; Rose, Mishler 2011).

Angesichts der angeführten empirischen Einblicke in kontextuelle Bedingungen politischer Unterstützung erscheinen die jüngsten politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen in verschiedenen vornehmlich südeuropäischen Gesellschaften in besonderem Licht. Im Zuge der Großen Rezession gerieten die Staatshaushalte zahlreicher insbesondere der Eurozone angehörender europäischer Staaten, darunter Irland, Griechenland, Portugal und Spanien, in starke Schief lagen. Bankenpleiten und Bankenrettungen, wirtschaftliche Rezession, sinkende Steuereinnahmen und steigende Arbeitslosenzahlen trugen maßgeblich zum Anstieg der

Staatsschuldenquoten bei, die in der Folge die Stabilität der europäischen Gemeinschaftswährung bedrohten. Zur Rettung des Euro vereinbarten die Mitgliedsländer der Eurozone Transferzahlungen, die jedoch an die Erfüllung strikter Reform- und Sparmaßnahmen geknüpft waren. Ein Konsortium aus Europäischer Zentralbank, Europäischer Kommission und Internationalem Währungsfonds, auch als Troika bekannt, erhielt den Auftrag, konkrete Zielvereinbarungen mit den finanziell angeschlagenen Ländern auszuarbeiten (in Form sogenannter „Memorandum of Understanding“), an deren Zustimmung die Auszahlung der Hilfgelder gebunden war.¹ Infolge der Reformvorgaben sahen sich nationale Regierungen gezwungen, verschiedene Sozialleistungen stark zu kürzen und die Beschäftigungsquoten im öffentlichen Sektor deutlich zu reduzieren. Während der internationale Spekulationsdruck auf die Gemeinschaftswährung allmählich nachließ, verschlechterten sich die wirtschaftliche Lage und die Beschäftigungssituation in den südeuropäischen Ländern dramatisch. Weitreichende politische Konsequenzen blieben nicht aus: zahlreiche Regierungskoalitionen zerbrachen, Expertenregierungen wurden eingesetzt, extremistische politische Parteien gewannen an Zulauf und breiter politischer Protest formierte sich auf der Straße (Castañeda 2012). Gegenwärtig warnt auch das International Labour Office in seinem „World of work report 2013“ die europäischen Staaten vor sozialen Unruhen als Folge der tiefgreifenden Krise (vgl. Ponticelli, Voth 2011).

Die *erste* der aus diesen Befunden und Entwicklungen abgeleitete Hypothese postuliert einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen desolaten Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungskennzahlen sowie Kürzungen sozialstaatlicher Leistungen und politischer Unterstützung. Die erwarteten Effekte sollten sich auf der Makroebene als Ebene der objektiv messbaren volkswirtschaftlichen Indikatoren sowie auf der Individualebene in Form von Systemperformanzbewertungen manifestieren. Aber auch eine Interaktion zwischen Determinanten beider Ebenen erscheint plausibel, wobei die nachfolgende Suche nach der spezifischen Form des Zusammenwirkens explorativ angelegt ist. Unter den maßgeblichen kontextuellen Faktoren wird des Weiteren der Einfluss des wahrgenommenen Korruptionsausmaßes untersucht. Höhere Korruption, so die Annahme, sollte mit geringerer politischer Unterstützung einhergehen. Der in diesem Zusammenhang zu überprüfende Cross-level-Effekt geht der Interaktion zwischen Korruption und sozialem Vertrauen nach, beides nachgewiesenermaßen bedeutsame Prädiktoren politischer Unterstützung und signifikant aufeinander bezogen (Newton, Zmerli 2011).

¹ Für weitere Informationen siehe auch http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/index_en.htm.

Neben der Analyse der durch die Große Rezession ausgelösten Erschütterungen politischer Unterstützung wird dieser Beitrag zuvor Trends und Muster verschiedener Ebenen der Systemunterstützung seit dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs im europäischen Vergleich nachzeichnen. Bescheinigten zahlreiche vergleichende Studien insbesondere postsozialistischen Gesellschaften bislang ein durchweg eher geringes Maß an politischer Unterstützung, das im Zeitverlauf auch nur geringfügig mit westeuropäischen Vergleichswerten zu konvergieren schien (Tusalem 2007; Zmerli 2004, 2012c), so wird nun die Formierung einer weiteren Spaltungslinie innerhalb Europas erwartet. Die *zweite* zu testende Hypothese lautet demnach, dass erkennbare Einbußen politischer Unterstützung mit der Intensität der Krisensymptomatik einhergehen sollten, die derzeit insbesondere in südeuropäischen Staaten zu beobachten ist.

Für die deskriptiven Analysen dienen vier Ländergruppen als Referenzkategorien: die Gruppe der skandinavischen Länder, die sich in zahlreichen Studien durch hohe Unterstützungswerte auszeichnet, eine westeuropäische Ländergruppe etablierter Demokratien, die Gruppe südeuropäischer Staaten sowie eine Ländergruppe postsozialistischer Gesellschaften (Gabriel, Walter-Rogg 2008; Listhaug, Ringdal 2008; Miller et al. 2004). Am Beispiel des durch die deutsche Wiedervereinigung herbeigeführten politischen Sonderfalls kann ferner der Frage nach der Konvergenz politischer Unterstützung zweier politisch unterschiedlich geprägter Gesellschaften unter identischen Bedingungen demokratischer Institution nachgegangen werden (vgl. Zmerli 2004, 2012a). Für die späteren mehrebenenanalytischen Modelle muss hingegen auf eine getrennte Analyse der deutschen Gesellschaft verzichtet werden, da sich die meisten der kontextuellen Faktoren auf Gesamtdeutschland beziehen.

Daten, Methoden, Fallauswahl

Die nachfolgenden empirischen Analysen verfolgen zwei Ziele. Zum einen wird der Frage nach den Mustern und Trends politischer Unterstützung anhand ausgewählter Indikatoren in den vier Ländergruppen, Skandinavien, West-, Süd- und Osteuropa sowie in Ost- und Westdeutschland über einen zwanzigjährigen Zeitraum hinweg nachgegangen. Zu diesem Zweck kann auf das Datenmaterial des World Values Survey (Wellen: 1981, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2005)² und des European Social Survey (Wellen: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010)

² Die Erhebung der letzten WVS-Welle erstreckte sich insgesamt über drei Jahre (2005-2008).

zurückgegriffen werden. Aufgrund der Verfügbarkeit einschlägiger Indikatoren eignet sich die Analyse des WVS insbesondere zur Untersuchung diffuser Systemunterstützung. Die fünf Erhebungswellen des ESS halten dagegen ausschließlich Frageitems spezifischer Formen politischer Unterstützung bereit.

Für die Untersuchung der Auswirkungen *aktueller* kontextueller Krisensymptome und individueller Bestimmungsfaktoren wird ausschließlich auf die fünfte ESS-Welle zurückgegriffen, die im Jahr 2010 kurz nach Ausbruch der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise erhoben und um zentrale kontextuelle Determinanten ergänzt wurde (siehe weiter unten). Folglich müssen sich die inferenzstatistischen Analysen auf spezifische Formen politischer Unterstützung als abhängige Variablen beschränken. Berücksichtigt werden alle Befragten ab achtzehn Jahren.

Die im WVS nach Ländergruppen verfügbaren Staaten umfassen Dänemark, Finnland, Norwegen, Schweden (Skandinavien), Österreich, Belgien, Irland, Frankreich, Niederlande, Schweiz, Großbritannien (Westeuropa), Bulgarien, Tschechische Republik, Estland, Ungarn, Lettland, Litauen, Polen, Rumänien, Slowakei, Slowenien (Osteuropa) sowie Italien und Spanien (Südeuropa). Ost- und Westdeutschland werden jeweils separat untersucht (siehe auch Ländertabelle im Anhang).³ Die im ESS nach Regionen vertretenen Länder umfassen Dänemark, Finnland, Island, Norwegen und Schweden (Skandinavien), Österreich, Belgien, Schweiz, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Irland, Luxemburg, Niederlande (Westeuropa), Bulgarien, Tschechische Republik, Estland, Ungarn, Lettland, Polen, Rumänien, Slowenien, Slowakei (Osteuropa) sowie Zypern, Spanien, Griechenland, Italien und Portugal (Südeuropa). Ost- und Westdeutschland werden separat analysiert (siehe auch Ländertabelle im Anhang).⁴

Den auf dem WVS und ESS basierenden deskriptiven Auswertungen der Ländergruppentrends schließen sich zwei weitere inferenzstatistische Analyseverfahren an, die sich allein auf die Daten der fünften ESS-Welle (2010) stützen. Anhand von Korrelationsanalysen nullter Ordnung werden in einem ersten Schritt Richtung und Zusammenhangsstärke zwischen den ausgewählten Kontextfaktoren, verschiedenen aggregierten individuellen Determinanten der Systemperformanzbewertung sowie den beiden

³ Für die deskriptiven Auswertungen des WVS werden die Daten mit dem äquilibrierten Gewicht (N=1.000) gewichtet.

⁴ Für die deskriptiven Auswertungen des ESS werden die Daten mit dem Design-Gewicht (dweight) gewichtet.

abhängigen Variablen ermittelt. Zur Untersuchung der Stärke und Art des Einflusses individueller und kontextueller Faktoren auf Indikatoren politischer Unterstützung werden mehrebenenanalytische Verfahren angewandt. Die Auswahl der für die Mehrebenenanalysen herangezogenen Länder beschränkt sich auf die Verfügbarkeit kontextueller Faktoren, für die insbesondere die OECD Datenbank entscheidende Trenddaten bereithält (siehe weiter unten).⁵

Die aus den Befragungswellen des WVS herangezogenen Indikatoren bilden *diffuse* Formen politischer Unterstützung ab, deren genauer Fragewortlaut und Messung im Folgenden aufgeführt sind: **Unterstützung demokratischer Prinzipien:** „Ich beschreibe nun verschiedene Typen politischer Systeme und frage Sie, was Sie über jedes einzelne als Regierungsform für dieses Land denken. Bewerten Sie jede einzelne und sagen Sie, ob sie eine sehr gute, ziemlich gute, ziemlich schlechte oder sehr schlechte Regierungsform für dieses Land wäre.“ „Ein starker Führer, der sich weder um Parlament oder Wahlen kümmern muss; Experten, keine Regierung, die nach bestem Wissen Entscheidungen für das Land treffen; eine Militärregierung; ein demokratisches politisches System“ (eigene Übersetzung). Bei der Auswertung dieser einzelnen Items politischer Unterstützung wurden die Antwortkategorien „sehr gut und ziemlich gut“ sowie „ziemlich schlecht und sehr schlecht“ zu jeweils einer Antwortkategorie zusammengefasst.

Die fünf Befragungswellen des ESS bieten mit der Frage nach Demokratiezufriedenheit sowie Vertrauen in verschiedene politische Institutionen und Akteure nur eine Auswahl an Indikatoren *spezifischer* politischer Unterstützung an. Deren Fragewortlaut und Messung lauten: **Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie:** „Und wie zufrieden sind Sie – alles in allem – mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in Deutschland funktioniert? Bitte sagen Sie es mir noch einmal anhand von Liste 10. 0 bedeutet äußerst unzufrieden und 10 äußerst zufrieden.“ **Politisches Vertrauen:** „Bitte benutzen Sie Liste 8 und sagen Sie mir zu jeder öffentlichen Einrichtung oder Personengruppe, die ich Ihnen nenne, wie sehr Sie persönlich jeder einzelnen davon vertrauen. Verwenden Sie dazu diese Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet, dass Sie dieser Einrichtung oder Personengruppe überhaupt nicht vertrauen, und 10 bedeutet,

⁵ Im Einzelnen sind dies Belgien, Dänemark, Deutschland (gesamt), Estland, Finnland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Irland, Niederlande, Norwegen, Polen, Portugal, Schweden, Schweiz, Slowakei, Slowenien, Spanien, Tschechische Republik und Ungarn.

dass Sie ihr voll und ganz vertrauen. Wie ist das mit: dem Bundestag, der Justiz, der Polizei, den Politikern, den Parteien?“⁶

Als Determinanten der Individualebene werden die soziodemographischen Variablen Geschlecht, Lebensalter und Bildungsniveau als Kontrollvariablen berücksichtigt, wobei von höherem Lebensalter und höherer Bildung eine Stärkung politischer Unterstützung erwartet wird.⁷ Gleiches gilt ferner für soziales Vertrauen, politisches Interesse, die Wirtschaftszufriedenheit sowie die Bewertung des Bildungs- und Gesundheitssystems, deren Effektstärke ebenfalls getestet wird.⁸

Als einflussreiche Bestimmungsfaktoren der Makroebene wird auf die nationalen Arbeitslosenquoten, das wahrgenommene gesellschaftliche Korruptionsausmaß in Form des Corruption Perception Index (CPI) sowie die realen staatlichen Sozialausgaben und das reale Bruttoinlandsprodukt zurückgegriffen. Als Berechnungsbasis dieser beiden realen volkswirtschaftlichen Indikatoren gelten deren im Jahr 2007 erzielten Werte.⁹ Für die Arbeitslosenquoten und CPIs werden keine Trenddaten, sondern die Ist-Ausprägungen der jeweiligen Jahre zugrunde gelegt. Neben direkten Effekten der kontextuellen Faktoren werden Interaktionseffekte mit ausgewählten individuellen Determinanten erwartet, die subjektive Bewertungs-, Zufriedenheits- und Vertrauensmaße erheben. Getestet werden mögliche Interaktionen zwischen Wirtschaftszufriedenheit, Arbeitslosenquote und realem

⁶ Diese fünf Indikatoren wurden zu einem additiven Index politischen Vertrauens zusammengefasst und durch die Anzahl der Fragen geteilt. Die Überprüfung durch Hauptkomponentenanalysen ergab für die meisten untersuchten Länder eine eindimensionale Struktur.

⁷ Der Fragewortlaut des Bildungsniveaus lautet: „Wie viele Jahre haben Sie insgesamt eine Schule besucht, inklusive den etwaigen Besuch einer Berufsschule oder Hochschule? Berücksichtigen Sie bitte alle Voll- und Teilzeitausbildungen, und rechnen Sie die Gesamtdauer Ihrer Schul- und Ausbildungszeit in ganze Jahre um.“

⁸ Siehe auch Ausführungen zu empirischen Befunden im vorangegangenen Abschnitt. Die Fragen lauten: Wirtschaftszufriedenheit: „Und wie zufrieden sind Sie – alles in allem – mit der gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftslage in Deutschland? Bitte antworten Sie anhand von Liste 10. 0 bedeutet äußerst unzufrieden und 10 äußerst zufrieden.“ Bewertung des Bildungssystems: „Bitte benutzen Sie Liste 11 und sagen Sie mir bitte, wie Sie – alles in allem – den derzeitigen Zustand des Bildungssystems in Deutschland einschätzen. 0 bedeutet äußerst schlecht und 10 äußerst gut.“ Bewertung des Gesundheitssystems: „Bitte benutzen Sie Liste 11 und sagen Sie mir bitte, wie Sie – alles in allem – den derzeitigen Zustand des Gesundheitssystems in Deutschland einschätzen. 0 bedeutet äußerst schlecht und 10 äußerst gut.“ Soziales Vertrauen: „Ganz allgemein gesprochen: Glauben Sie, dass man den meisten Menschen vertrauen kann, oder dass man im Umgang mit anderen Menschen nicht vorsichtig genug sein kann? Bitte sagen Sie es mir anhand dieser Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet, dass man nicht vorsichtig genug sein kann, und 10 bedeutet, dass man den meisten Menschen vertrauen kann.“ Politisches Interesse: „Wie sehr interessieren Sie sich für Politik? Sind Sie sehr interessiert, ziemlich interessiert, wenig interessiert oder überhaupt nicht interessiert?“. Für die Analysen wurde die Kodierung umgedreht: 1=überhaupt nicht interessiert bis 4=sehr interessiert.

⁹ Die Arbeitslosenquoten lieferten Erhebungen der Weltbank. Angaben zum CPI wurden dem „Quality of Government“ Datensatz der Göteborg Universität entnommen. Die Werteskala des CPI reicht von 0 bis 10, wobei höhere Werte für ein geringeres Korruptionsmaß stehen. Berechnungen der realen staatlichen Sozialausgaben sowie des realen Bruttoinlandsprodukts (Referenzjahr 2007) werden von der OECD zur freien Verfügung bereitgestellt.

Bruttoinlandsprodukt, zwischen der individuellen Bewertung des Bildungs- und Gesundheitssystems und den realen staatlichen Sozialausgaben sowie zwischen sozialem Vertrauen und dem gewählten Korruptionsmaß.

Empirische Befunde: Entwicklungsverläufe und Kausalitäten

Die individuelle Präferenz demokratischer Prinzipien repräsentiert die höchste für diesen Beitrag ausgewählte Abstraktionsebene politischer Unterstützung. Zur besseren graphischen Veranschaulichung eines möglichen destabilisierenden politischen Potentials steht die Auswertung der *Ablehnung* der Demokratie als Regierungssystem im Zentrum des Interesses. Eine Analyse des seit 1995 im WVS erhobenen Frageitems zeigt im Ländergruppenvergleich erstaunliche Unterschiede (Abbildung 1). Eine ablehnende Haltung gegenüber demokratischen Herrschaftsformen ist in Südeuropa und Skandinavien am geringsten ausgeprägt, wobei der nordeuropäische Verlauf erkennbare zeitliche Schwankungen aufweist. In Westeuropa fällt dagegen der prozentuale Umfang eines ablehnenden Bevölkerungsanteils doppelt so hoch aus. Dennoch begegnet man in der osteuropäischen Ländergruppe den meisten ablehnenden Stimmen, deren Anteil sich im Zeitverlauf auch nur unwesentlich verändert. West- und Ostdeutsche unterscheiden sich dagegen nur geringfügig im Umfang ihrer ablehnenden Haltung. Unter den institutionellen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Transferbedingungen der Wiedervereinigung entwickelten ostdeutsche Bürger somit in stärkerem Maße eine Befürwortung des Demokratieprinzips als die Vergleichsgruppe der mittel- und osteuropäischen postsozialistischen Gesellschaften.

Vergleichbare Tendenzen lassen sich im Hinblick auf die Ablehnung eines starken Führers als Regierungsalternative ausmachen (Abbildung 2). Während in Nord-, West- und Südeuropa mehr als siebzig Prozent der Bevölkerung einen starken Führer als Regierungsalternative zu demokratischen Verfahren (Parlament, Wahlen) ablehnen, gewinnt in Osteuropa diese Regierungsvariante gerade zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts deutlich an Zustimmung. Nahezu die Hälfte der Bevölkerung kann sich solch eine Regierungsform vorstellen. Der ost-/westdeutsche Vergleich verdeutlicht zweierlei: Zum einen hebt sich die ostdeutsche Bevölkerung erkennbar von den problematischen Entwicklungen in Osteuropa ab. Zum anderen löst sich der ost-/westdeutsche Unterschied selbst fünfzehn Jahre nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung nicht auf. Grundsätzlich muss jedoch jeder Ländergruppe ein widersprüchliches Antwortverhalten attestiert werden. Denn wäre nicht zu erwarten, dass sich

das Ausmaß der Befürwortung einer demokratischen Regierungsform nicht auch gleichzeitig im Niveau der Ablehnung eines starken Führers widerspiegeln sollte? Dies ist erkennbar nicht der Fall. Offenkundig wird zwar der Demokratie als Herrschaftsform von weiten Teilen der europäischen Bevölkerung der Vorzug gegeben, dass sich diese Präferenz aber faktisch nicht gleichzeitig mit der Bevorzugung eines starken Führers in Einklang bringen lässt, der sich über Parlament und Wahlen hinwegsetzt, bildet sich in dieser Konsequenz im Einstellungsmuster der Europäer nicht ab.

Abbildung 1: Ablehnung der Demokratie, in %, WVS





Abbildung 2: Ablehnung „Starker Führer“, in %, WVS



Die Haltung gegenüber Expertenregierungen offenbart dagegen deutliche Unterschiede zwischen postsozialistischen Gesellschaften einschließlich Ostdeutschland einerseits und den übrigen Ländergruppen andererseits (Abbildung 3). Gerade in den skandinavischen Ländern, Südeuropa sowie Westdeutschland ist im Zeitverlauf sogar eine Zunahme des Anteils ablehnender Haltungen gegenüber Expertenregierungen zu beobachten. Während desselben Zeitraums steigt in postsozialistischen Gesellschaften dagegen der Zuspruch zu dieser alternativen Regierungsform. Gleichzeitig belegen auch diese Befunde das widersprüchliche Antwortverhalten der Bürger sämtlicher europäischer Ländergruppen angesichts der zuvor beschriebenen breiten Unterstützung demokratischer Prinzipien. Unklar bleibt, ob sich diese Einstellungen aus mangelnder Kenntnis demokratischer Voraussetzungen speisen oder tatsächlich ein zwiespältiges Verhältnis europäischer Bürger zur uneingeschränkten Unterstützung demokratischer Prinzipien offenbaren.

Abbildung 3: Ablehnung Expertenregierung, in %, WVS





Abbildung 4: Ablehnung Militärregierung, in %, WVS



Militärregierungen als alternative Regierungsform werden hingegen europaweit überwiegend abgelehnt (Abbildung 4). Aber auch für dieses Frageitem gilt, dass Osteuropa vom Trend der übrigen europäischen Demokratien abweicht. Trotz jahrzehntelanger Erfahrungen unter militärisch-diktatorischen Regimen scheint es, als habe diese antidemokratische Regierungsform in Osteuropa an Schrecken verloren. Lediglich am Beispiel Ostdeutschlands lässt sich für postsozialistische Gesellschaften eine im Zeitverlauf geschlossen ablehnende Haltung gegenüber Militärregierungen als alternative Herrschaftsform beobachten. Zudem zeigt sich allein bei diesem Frageitem ein konsistentes Antwortverhalten angesichts der gleichzeitigen Präferenz demokratischer Regierungsformen.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Befunde lassen sich insbesondere für postsozialistische Gesellschaften auffallende einstellungsbezogene demokratische Konsolidierungsprobleme belegen. Entgegen der Erwartungen zeichnet sich im Zeitverlauf sogar eine Verschärfung dieser Problematik ab. Zugleich entkräftet dieser Trend die Annahme des Nachwirkens eines einstellungsbezogenen „sozialistischen Erbes“, das aufgrund des Generationenwechsels allmählich verblassen sollte. Vielmehr unterstreicht dieser Befund Mishlers und Rose‘ Diagnose der auch für Transitionsgesellschaften zentralen Bedeutung guter Regierungsführung und wirtschaftlicher Performanz für die Herausbildung demokratischer Einstellungen (Mishler, Rose 2001, 2005; Rose, Mishler 2011).

Vergleichbare Messinstrumente, die diffuse Items politischer Unterstützung erheben, wurden im ESS nicht berücksichtigt. Die über einen achtjährigen Erhebungszeitraum (2002-2010) verfügbaren Parameter erlauben dennoch konkrete Aussagen über jüngste Entwicklungen *spezifischer* Systemunterstützung in Form von Demokratiezufriedenheit und Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure.

In Abbildung 5 sind zunächst die Ergebnisse der Demokratiezufriedenheit auf einer elfstufigen Skala von 0 bis 10 abgetragen. Offenkundig bilden skandinavische und postsozialistische Länder die zwei entgegengesetzten Pole der Zufriedenheitsskala ab. Während sich Demokratiezufriedenheit in Skandinavien auf einem über dem Skalenmittelwert liegenden Niveau bewegt, äußern sich Osteuropäer tendenziell unzufrieden mit dem Zustand der Demokratie in ihrem Land. Für beide Ländergruppen liegen im Zeitverlauf weitgehend stabile Werte vor und auch die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise scheint diese Bewertungen nicht maßgeblich zu beeinflussen. Ganz im Gegenteil: in Osteuropa steigt die Demokratiezufriedenheit zum letzten Erhebungszeitpunkt sogar leicht an. Dagegen liegen die west- und südeuropäischen Befunde bis zum Beginn der Staatsschuldenkrise nahezu gleichauf, wobei in Südeuropa eine größere Unzufriedenheit überwiegt. Klar erkennbar setzt in der südeuropäischen Ländergruppe allerdings ein Abwärtstrend zwischen den beiden letzten Erhebungswellen ein, so dass sie im Jahr 2010 die Riege der unzufriedenen Demokraten in Europa anführt. Auch innerhalb Deutschlands zeichnet sich eine Divergenz der Demokratiezufriedenheit ab, die sich im Zeitverlauf nur unwesentlich verringert. Anders als im europäischen Vergleich erscheint es auf den ersten Blick wenig plausibel, dass die Qualität demokratischer Institutionen und Prozesse interregional derart stark variieren könnte. Die unterschiedlichen Bewertungen der Deutschen könnten möglicherweise auf interregionale Divergenzen wirtschaftlicher Indikatoren oder individueller Erwartungen zurückzuführen sein.

Ein nahezu identisches Bild bietet die Analyse des Index politischen Vertrauens (Abbildung 6). Daraus ließe sich schließen, dass zwischen diesen beiden konkretesten Ebenen politischer Unterstützung keine *substantielle* Differenz besteht. Die nachfolgenden Mehrebenenanalysen sollen ergründen, ob diese Annahme mit Blick auf die individuellen und kontextuellen Grundlagen beider Einstellungsebenen berechtigt ist. Ein intraregionaler Niveauvergleich legt jedoch nahe, dass Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure tatsächlich systematisch

geringer ausgeprägt ist als Demokratiezufriedenheit. Lediglich für postsozialistische Gesellschaften gilt diese „Gesetzmäßigkeit“ offenbar nicht.

Abbildung 5: Demokratiezufriedenheit, ESS





Abbildung 6: Politischer Vertrauensindex, ESS



Entwicklung kontextueller Faktoren

Die kontextuellen Grundlagen politischer Unterstützung werden im nachfolgenden empirischen Abschnitt erörtert. Die Auswahl der relevanten kontextuellen Faktoren orientiert sich an den erwarteten politischen Auswirkungen der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrisensymptomatik. Entsprechend werden für die empirischen Analysen ausschließlich Daten der fünften ESS-Erhebungswelle des Jahres 2010 herangezogen und der makroanalytische Schwerpunkt auf ausgewählte volkswirtschaftliche Indikatoren sowie das Korruptionsausmaß gelegt. Insofern sind die Untersuchungen auf die beiden spezifischsten Formen politischer Unterstützung beschränkt. Ob und inwiefern die sich vollziehenden wirtschaftlichen Krisen auf die vermeintlich stabileren Einstellungen der Systemunterstützung einwirken, kann somit nicht erfasst und diskutiert werden. Allerdings hält die sechste ESS-Welle des Jahres 2012, deren Daten zum Zeitpunkt des Verfassens dieses Beitrags noch nicht verfügbar waren, eine Fülle einschlägiger Indikatoren bereit.¹⁰


¹⁰ Zwar lagen bei Fertigstellung dieses Beitrags die Erhebungen der sechsten ESS-Welle aus dem Jahr 2012 vor, allerdings wurden u.a. keine Daten für Griechenland, eines der am schwersten von der Krise betroffenen Länder, erhoben, so dass auf die Analyse der sechsten Welle verzichtet wurde.

Vor dem Hintergrund der folgenreichen Reform- und Einsparmaßnahmen, deren beschäftigungsrelevante Auswirkungen in manchen europäischen Ländern derzeit die Dimensionen der Großen Depression der 1930er Jahre bei weitem übertreffen, soll zunächst die Entwicklung ausgewählter Makroindikatoren diskutiert werden, die sich unmittelbar auf individuelle Lebensumstände, wie materielle Ausstattung und soziale Integration, auswirken. Hierfür werden die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenquote, der *realen* staatlichen Sozialausgaben sowie des *realen* Bruttoinlandsprodukts herangezogen. Als zeitlicher Referenzpunkt der beiden letztgenannten Makroindikatoren gilt das Vorkrisenjahr 2007. Anders als die Erhebungen des ESS liegen die aktuellsten Makroindikatoren bis zum Jahr 2012 vor. Angesichts der seit 2010 dramatischen Verschärfung der wirtschaftlichen Lage in den betroffenen Ländern und den damit verbundenen erwarteten politischen Implikationen werden auch diese aktuellen Trenddaten bei der nachfolgenden deskriptiven Befundanalyse berücksichtigt. Da mit Ausnahme der Arbeitslosenquote keine separaten ost-/westdeutschen Parameter vorliegen, muss auf eine getrennte Betrachtung verzichtet werden.¹¹ Neben den volkswirtschaftlichen Indikatoren wird ferner der Verlauf des Korruptionsausmaßes berücksichtigt, dessen Einfluss auf politische Unterstützung bereits in zahlreichen früheren empirischen Studien nachgewiesen wurde.

Die in Abbildung 7 abgetragene Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenquoten belegt, dass die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise in ganz Europa ihre Spuren hinterlässt. In allen vier europäischen Regionen übertrifft die Arbeitslosenquote des Jahres 2010 die Vergleichswerte zu Beginn dieses Jahrhunderts. Insbesondere süd- und osteuropäische Gesellschaften mit ihren bereits zu diesem Zeitpunkt zweistelligen Arbeitslosenquoten sind besonderen wirtschaftlichen Härten ausgesetzt.

¹¹ Auf eine separate Darstellung der Arbeitslosenquote in Ost- und Westdeutschland wird an dieser Stelle jedoch ebenfalls verzichtet. Allerdings liefern volkswirtschaftliche Kennzahlen bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt keinerlei Hinweise auf eine Überwindung der ausgeprägten interregionalen Beschäftigungsdivergenz zu Lasten Ostdeutschlands.


Abbildung 7: Arbeitslosenquote, in %, Quelle: Weltbank




Wie die graphischen Darstellungen der Entwicklung staatlicher Sozialausgaben sowie der Wirtschaftskraft ausgewählter Länder exemplarisch belegen, können prozentuale Zuwächse an Sozialausgaben einerseits mit stark rückläufigen Bruttoinlandsprodukten, andererseits mit wirtschaftlich robusten Entwicklungen einhergehen (Abbildung 8). Dieser scheinbar widersprüchliche Befund lässt sich zum einen auf die steigende Anzahl Arbeitsloser in Zeiten wirtschaftlicher Rezession zurückführen, die zunächst durch staatliche finanzielle Zuwendungen materiell abgesichert werden, zum anderen auf höhere Ansprüche der Bürger gegenüber dem wirtschaftlich prosperierenden Sozialstaat. Einbußen der *realen* staatlichen Sozialausgaben seit dem Vorkrisenjahr 2007 lassen sich allein für Griechenland und Ungarn attestieren, die gleichzeitig empfindliche reale wirtschaftliche Einbußen hinnehmen mussten. Letzteres gilt insbesondere für Griechenland, das zum letzten verfügbaren Erhebungszeitpunkt 2012 knapp ein Fünftel seines Bruttoinlandsprodukts des Jahres 2007 eingebüßt hatte.

Abbildung 8: Reale staatliche Sozialausgaben, reales Bruttoinlandsprodukt (Referenz 2007, 100) und staatliche Sozialausgaben in % am BIP, Quelle: OECD 2013


Norwegen




Griechenland




Schweiz




Estland



Ungarn




Spanien



Die Auswertung des Korruptionsindex des vergangenen Jahrzehnts beschreibt eine weitere europäische Spaltungslinie (Abbildung 9). Während nord- und westeuropäische Länder recht stabile Werte ausweisen, die eine geringe Korruptionsanfälligkeit belegen, sind süd- und osteuropäische Gesellschaften offensichtlich in viel stärkerem Umfang korrupten Praktiken ausgesetzt. Eine weitere Verschärfung setzt in Südeuropa mit Ausbruch der Wirtschaftskrise ein.

Abbildung 9: Korruptionsindex (Corruption Perception Index, CPI)



Anmerkung: 0-10; 10=keine Korruption

In welchem Umfang die ausgewählten Makroindikatoren aufeinander und auf die ausgewählten Indikatoren politischer Unterstützung bezogen sind, veranschaulichen die in Tabelle 1 abgetragenen Korrelationskoeffizienten. Während die seit 2007 reale Entwicklung der Sozialausgaben in einem positiven aber nicht signifikanten Zusammenhang zu steigenden Arbeitslosenquoten steht, gehen letztere in hohem und signifikantem Umfang mit dem seit 2007 real sinkenden Bruttoinlandsprodukt und interessanterweise höherer Korruption einher. Diese Befunde sind nicht nur für das Verständnis der Zusammenhänge auf der Makroebene bedeutsam, sondern ebenso für die Konstruktion der nachfolgenden Mehrebenenmodelle, wobei es sinnvoll erscheint, die direkten Effekte der Makroindikatoren in separaten Analysen zu testen. Getrennte Modellspezifikationen bieten sich ebenfalls für die Überprüfung möglicher Cross-level Effekte an. Ferner scheint insbesondere das Aggregat der individuellen Zufriedenheit mit der Wirtschaft eines Landes in einem direkten Verhältnis zu objektiven

makroökonomischen Entwicklungen zu stehen (vgl. van der Meer, Dekker 2011; Kumlin 2011). Zudem zeigt sich, dass die beiden aggregierten abhängigen Variablen zwar signifikant mit der Arbeitslosenquote sowie dem Korruptionsausmaß eines Landes, nicht aber mit der seit 2007 realen Entwicklung der Sozialausgaben sowie des Bruttoinlandsprodukts korrelieren. Dagegen besteht ein starker Zusammenhang zu den drei ausgewählten Indikatoren der subjektiven Performanzbewertungen.

Tabelle 1: Korrelationsanalysen, Pearson's r, (ESS 2010)

	AQ	RSA	RBIP	CPI	WZ	BB	BG
Demokratiezufriedenheit	-0,49*	0,10	0,28	0,81***	0,90***	0,74***	0,66***
Politischer Vertrauensindex	-0,46*	0,07	0,19	0,88***	0,89***	0,76***	0,72***
Arbeitslosenquote (AQ)		0,30	-0,54*	-0,50*	-0,67**	-0,40†	-0,33
Reale Sozialausgaben seit 2007 (RSA)			-,010	0,12	0,08	0,38	0,21
Reales BIP seit 2007 (RBIP)				0,13	0,44†	0,08	0,12
Korruptionsausmaß (CPI)					0,76***	0,67**	0,74***
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit (WZ)						0,68**	0,65**
Bewertung Bildung (BB)							0,69*

Anmerkungen: N=19; †=p<0,10, *=p<0,05, **=p<0,01, ***=p<0,001. BG=Bewertung des Gesundheitssystems.

Mehrebenenanalytische Befunde

Im ersten Schritt der nachfolgenden Mehrebenenanalysen soll geklärt werden, ob spezifische Ländermerkmale tatsächlich einen Beitrag zur Erklärung der beiden ausgewählten Indikatoren spezifischer politischer Unterstützung leisten. Hierzu werden zunächst die sogenannten Nullmodelle getestet, die noch keinerlei Determinanten beinhalten, aber dennoch Einblicke in die Relevanz kontextueller Merkmale ermöglichen.¹² Die Analyse beider Parameter politischer Unterstützung weist signifikante Länderunterschiede nach. In beiden Fällen können rund 23 Prozent der erklärten Gesamtvarianz auf Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern zurückgeführt werden.¹³

Die Ergebnisse der Ausgangsmodelle zur Erklärung der Demokratiezufriedenheit sowie des politischen Vertrauens variieren nur unwesentlich voneinander und bestätigen durchweg empirische Erkenntnisse vorangegangener Studien (Tabelle 2 und 3, Modell 1):

¹² Auf eine tabellarische Darstellung der Ergebnisse wird verzichtet.

¹³ Der Intraklassen-Korrelationskoeffizient (ICC) für Demokratiezufriedenheit beträgt 23,8 Prozent, der ICC für den Index politischen Vertrauens erzielt 22,7 Prozent.

Erwartungsgemäß gehen stark positive Effekte von der individuellen Zufriedenheit mit dem Haushaltseinkommen, sozialem Vertrauen sowie politischem Interesse aus, wobei letzteres für politisches Vertrauen einen größeren Einfluss entfaltet. Die soziodemographischen Items liefern dagegen keine einheitlichen Befunde.

Modelle 2 erweitern die Auswahl individueller Determinanten um den subjektiven Grad der Zufriedenheit mit der Wirtschaft, dem Bildungs- und Gesundheitssystem eines Landes. Wie erwartet, erweisen sich alle drei Prädiktoren als erklärungsstark. Allerdings unterliegt insbesondere Demokratiezufriedenheit dem Einfluss der individuellen Wirtschafts- und Bildungszufriedenheit. Gleichzeitig verringert sich für beide Items politischer Unterstützung die Effektstärke sozialen Vertrauens sowie der Einkommenszufriedenheit.

Modell 3a nimmt zunächst den Makroindikator der Arbeitslosenquote auf, ohne gleichzeitig die Effekte der individuellen Systemperformanzbewertung zu überprüfen. Wie erwartet, zeichnet sich für beide abhängigen Variablen ein signifikant negativer Effekt höherer Arbeitslosigkeit ab, der für Demokratiezufriedenheit sogar etwas stärker ausfällt. Modell 3b testet den Cross-level-Interaktionseffekt zwischen Wirtschaftszufriedenheit und Arbeitslosenquote. Hierbei zeigt sich ein interessantes Ergebnis: bei steigender Arbeitslosigkeit *verstärken* sich die Effekte der Wirtschaftszufriedenheit signifikant.

Modell 4a überprüft zunächst den Haupteffekt der realen Entwicklung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts seit 2007. Zwar kennzeichnet den Koeffizienten in beiden Fällen ein positives Vorzeichen, jedoch entfaltet er keinerlei statistisch signifikante Erklärungskraft. Modell 4b testet den Interaktionseffekt zwischen Wirtschaftszufriedenheit und realer Entwicklung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts: die entsprechenden Koeffizienten sind nun statistisch signifikant, weisen hingegen ein negatives Vorzeichen auf. Höheres reales Wirtschaftswachstum *verringert* somit den Effekt der Wirtschaftszufriedenheit auf die beiden Parameter politischer Unterstützung.

Modell 5a testet ferner den Haupteffekt der seit 2007 realen Entwicklung der staatlichen Sozialausgaben. Auch dieser Makroindikator entfaltet zunächst keinen eigenständigen signifikanten Effekt. Eine Überprüfung der Interaktionseffekte zwischen Bildungs- und Gesundheitszufriedenheit und realen Sozialausgaben deckt lediglich ein einziges Mal eine signifikante Wirkung auf: der positive Einfluss höherer Zufriedenheit mit dem

Gesundheitssystem auf Demokratiezufriedenheit wird durch real steigende staatliche Sozialausgaben verringert.

Ungleich eindeutiger fällt demgegenüber der gemessene Einfluss des Korruptionsgrades eines Landes aus (Modell 6a). Für beide abhängigen Variablen lässt sich ein nennenswerter signifikanter Effekt nachweisen. Geringere Korruptionsanfälligkeit stärkt beide Indikatoren politischer Unterstützung, scheint für Demokratiezufriedenheit aber noch wichtiger zu sein. Im Zusammenwirken mit geringerer Korruption verstärkt sich zudem der Effekt sozialen Vertrauens auf politisches Vertrauen (Modell 6b).

Tabelle 2: Demokratiezufriedenheit, mehrbenenanalytische Modellierung, (Random-Intercepts, fixed effects), ESS

	Modell 1		Modell 2		Modell 3a		Modell 3b		Modell 4a	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ebene 1										
Konstante	5,10***	0,21	5,03***	0,11	5,09***	0,18	5,07***	0,12	5,09***	0,20
Geschlecht (Referenz: männlich)	-0,04	0,02	0,04†	0,02	-0,04†	0,02	0,01	0,02	-0,04†	0,02
Lebensalter	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00**	0,00	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00***	0,00
Bildung in Jahren	-0,01*	0,00	0,01***	0,00	-0,01*	0,00	-0,00	0,00	-0,01*	0,00
Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen	0,36***	0,02	0,11***	0,01	0,36***	0,02	0,13***	0,01	0,36***	0,02
Soziales Vertrauen	0,22***	0,01	0,09***	0,00	0,22***	0,01	0,14***	0,01	0,22***	0,01
Politisches Interesse	0,17***	0,01	0,17***	0,01	0,17***	0,01	0,15***	0,01	0,17***	0,01
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit			0,35***	0,01			0,46***	0,01		
Bewertung Bildungssystem			0,24***	0,01						
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem			0,12***	0,01						
Ebene 2										
Arbeitslosenquote					-0,10*	0,04	-0,001	0,03		
Reales BIP (Referenz: 2007)									0,04	0,03
Reale staatliche Sozialausgaben (2007)										
Korruptionsausmaß (CPI)										
Interaktionseffekte										
Wirtschaftszuf. x Arbeitslosenquote							0,003*	0,00		
Wirtschaftszuf. x reales BIP										
Bewertung Bildungssystem x reale staatliche Sozialausgaben										
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem x reale staatliche Sozialausgaben										
Soziales Vertrauen x Korruption										
Varianzkomponenten										
Varianz Ebene 2	0,83***		0,22***		0,64***		0,26***		0,76***	
Varianz Ebene 1	4,45***		3,39***		4,49***		3,76***		4,49***	
N, Ebene 1	32.262		32.262		32.262		32.262		32.262	
N, Ebene 2	19		19		19		19		19	

Anmerkungen: †=p<0,10, *=p<0,05, **=p<0,01, ***=p<0,001; sämtliche unabhängigen Variablen wurden am Gesamtdurchschnitt zentriert; gewichtet nach Design-Gewicht.

Tabelle 2: Demokratiezufriedenheit (Fortsetzung)

	Modell 4b		Modell 5a		Modell 5b		Modell 6a		Modell 6b	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ebene 1										
Konstante	5,07***	0,12	5,10***	0,21	5,06***	0,16	5,07***	0,14	5,07***	0,14
Geschlecht (Referenz: männlich)	0,02	0,02	-0,04†	0,02	0,01	0,02	-0,04†	0,02	-0,04†	0,02
Lebensalter	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00**	0,00	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00***	0,00
Bildung in Jahren	-0,00	0,00	-0,01*	0,00	0,01***	0,00	-0,01*	0,00	-0,01*	0,00
Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen	0,13***	0,01	0,36***	0,02	0,26***	0,01	0,36***	0,02	0,36***	0,02
Soziales Vertrauen	0,14***	0,01	0,22***	0,01	0,14***	0,01	0,22***	0,01	0,22***	0,01
Politisches Interesse	0,15***	0,01	0,17***	0,01	0,19***	0,01	0,17***	0,01	0,17***	0,01
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,46***	0,01								
Bewertung Bildungssystem					0,29***	0,01				
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem					0,19***	0,01				
Ebene 2										
Arbeitslosenquote										
Reales BIP (Referenz: 2007)	-0,003	0,02								
Reale staatliche Sozialausgaben (2007)			0,01	0,03	-0,01	0,02				
Korruptionsausmaß (CPI)							0,37***	0,08	0,37***	0,08
Interaktionseffekte										
Wirtschaftszuf. x Arbeitslosenquote										
Wirtschaftszuf. x reales BIP	-0,002*	0,00								
Bewertung Bildungssystem x reale staatliche Sozialausgaben					0,000	0,001				
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem x reale staatliche Sozialausgaben					-0,002**	0,001				
Soziales Vertrauen x Korruption									0,00	0,00
Varianzkomponenten										
Varianz Ebene 2	0,26***		0,83***		0,49***		0,38***		0,38***	
Varianz Ebene 1	3,76***		4,45***		3,76***		4,49***		4,49***	
N, Ebene 1	32.262		32.262		32.262		32.262		32.262	
N, Ebene 2	19		19		19		19		19	

Anmerkungen: †=p<0,10, *=p<0,05, **=p<0,01, ***=p<0,001; sämtliche unabhängigen Variablen wurden am Gesamtdurchschnitt zentriert; gewichtet nach Design-Gewicht.

Tabelle 3: Politisches Vertrauen, mehrebenenanalytische Modellierung, (Random-Intercepts, fixed effects), ESS

	Modell 1		Modell 2		Modell 3a		Modell 3b		Modell 4a	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ebene 1										
Konstante	4,74***	0,14	4,68***	0,07	4,73***	0,13	4,73***	0,08	4,73***	0,14
Geschlecht (Referenz: männlich)	0,14***	0,02	0,20***	0,02	0,14***	0,02	0,18***	0,02	0,14***	0,02
Lebensalter	-0,00***	0,00	0,00*	0,00	0,00***	0,00	0,00***	0,00	0,00***	0,00
Bildung in Jahren	0,00	0,00	0,01***	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Zuf. mit Haushaltseinkommen	0,24***	0,01	0,07***	0,01	0,24***	0,01	0,09***	0,01	0,24***	0,01
Soziales Vertrauen	0,23***	0,00	0,14***	0,00	0,23***	0,00	0,17***	0,00	0,23***	0,00
Politisches Interesse	0,30***	0,01	0,31***	0,01	0,30***	0,01	0,29***	0,01	0,30***	0,01
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit			0,23***	0,00			0,31***	0,00		
Bewertung Bildungssystem			0,16***	0,00						
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem			0,11***	0,00						
Ebene 2										
Arbeitslosenquote					-0,06*	0,03	0,01	0,02		
Reales BIP (Referenz: 2007)									0,02	0,02
Reale Sozialausgaben (2007)										
Korruptionsausmaß (CPI)										
Interaktionseffekte										
Wirt.zuf. x Arbeitslosenquote							0,01***	0,00		
Wirt.zuf. x reales BIP										
Bewertung Bildungssystem x reale Sozialausgaben										
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem x reale Sozialausgaben										
Soziales Vertrauen x Korruption										
Varianzkomponenten										
Varianz Ebene 2	0,37***		0,08***		0,31***		0,11***		0,36***	
Varianz Ebene 1	2,66***		2,10***		2,67***		2,31***		2,62***	
N, Ebene 1	32.231		32.231		32.231		32.231		32.231	
N, Ebene 2	19		19		19		19		19	

Anmerkungen: †=p<0,10, *=p<0,05, **=p<0,01, ***=p<0,001; sämtliche unabhängigen Variablen wurden am Gesamtdurchschnitt zentriert; gewichtet nach Design-Gewicht.

Tabelle 3: Politisches Vertrauen (Fortsetzung)

	Modell 4b		Modell 5a		Modell 5b		Modell 6a		Modell 6b	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ebene 1										
Konstante	4,72***	0,08	4,73***	0,14	4,71***	0,10	4,71***	0,08	4,70***	0,08
Geschlecht (Referenz: männlich)	0,18***	0,02	0,14***	0,02	0,18***	0,02	0,14***	0,02	0,14***	0,02
Lebensalter	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00**	0,00	-0,00***	0,00	-0,00***	0,00
Bildung in Jahren	0,00	0,00	-0,00	0,00	0,01***	0,00	-0,00	0,00	-0,00†	0,00
Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen	0,08***	0,01	0,24***	0,01	0,16***	0,01	0,24***	0,01	0,24***	0,01
Soziales Vertrauen	0,17***	0,00	0,23***	0,00	0,17***	0,00	0,23***	0,00	0,23***	0,00
Politisches Interesse	0,29***	0,01	0,30***	0,01	0,31***	0,01	0,30***	0,01	0,30***	0,01
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,31***	0,00								
Bewertung Bildungssystem					0,19***	0,00				
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem					0,15***	0,00				
Ebene 2										
Arbeitslosenquote										
Reales BIP (Referenz: 2007)	-0,01	0,01								
Reale staatliche Sozialausgaben (2007)			0,00	0,02						
Korruptionsausmaß (CPI)							0,28***	0,04	0,28***	0,04
Interaktionseffekte										
Wirtschaftszuf. x Arbeitslosenquote										
Wirtschaftszuf. x reales BIP	-0,003***	0,00								
Bewertung Bildungssystem x reale staatliche Sozialausgaben					-0,001	0,00				
Bewertung Gesundheitssystem x reale staatliche Sozialausgaben					-0,001	0,00				
Soziales Vertrauen x Korruption									0,01***	0,00
Varianzkomponenten										
Varianz Ebene 2	0,12***		0,37***		0,19***		0,12***		0,12***	
Varianz Ebene 1	2,31***		2,66***		2,28***		2,66***		2,66***	
N, Ebene 1	32.231		32.231		32.231		32.231		32.231	
N, Ebene 2	19		19		19		19		19	

Anmerkungen: †=p<0,10, *=p<0,05, **=p<0,01, ***=p<0,001; sämtliche unabhängigen Variablen wurden am Gesamtdurchschnitt zentriert; gewichtet nach Design-Gewicht.

Fazit und Ausblick

Angesichts der jüngsten tiefgreifenden wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklungen, die insbesondere dem Einsetzen der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise geschuldet sind, werden Befürchtungen über ein Auseinanderdriften Europas immer lauter. Eine der Sorgen gilt der Krisenfestigkeit demokratischer Einstellungen als zentrale Voraussetzung demokratischer Stabilität. Richtete sich der Blick früherer vergleichender Einstellungsstudien vielfach auf das Zusammenwachsen Ost- und Westeuropas, wird diese Forschungsperspektive allmählich von der Frage nach den unmittelbaren und längerfristigen politischen Folgen der Wirtschaftskrise, die gegenwärtig insbesondere die südeuropäischen Länder erfasst hat, abgelöst.

Der vorliegende Beitrag unternimmt den Versuch, diese beiden unterschiedlichen, aber dennoch aufeinander bezogenen Perspektiven miteinander zu verbinden. So zeichnen zunächst die deskriptiven vergleichenden Untersuchungen den Verlauf und die Muster politischer Unterstützung während der vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte nach, wobei die Ländergruppenuntersuchungen durch einen ost-/westdeutschen Vergleich komplettiert werden. Die hieraus gewonnenen Erkenntnisse geben Aufschluss über die Möglichkeit einer Überwindung ideologischer Gegensätze und eines gesellschaftlichen Zusammenwachsens in Europa. Eine Untersuchung der kontextuellen und individuellen Grundlagen politischer Unterstützung bildet den Schwerpunkt des zweiten Teils der empirischen Analysen. Das Hauptinteresse richtet sich hierbei auf das Zusammenwirken ausgewählter Mikro- und Makrofaktoren, die in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang zu den ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Staatsschuldenkrisen stehen.

Die wesentlichen Erkenntnisse der deskriptiven Befunde bestätigten frühere Forschungsergebnisse. Über den gesamten Untersuchungszeitraum hinweg ist in Osteuropa zwar vielfach eine deutliche Zunahme politischer Unterstützung erkennbar, dennoch bildet diese Ländergruppe im europäischen Vergleich oftmals das Schlusslicht. Mehr noch: manch ausgewählter Indikator politischer Unterstützung postsozialistischer Gesellschaften muss im Zeitverlauf sogar Einbußen hinnehmen. Infolgedessen werden innereuropäische Divergenzen nicht überwunden. Während skandinavische Gesellschaften häufig die höchsten Unterstützungswerte aufweisen, rangieren West- und Südeuropäer im Wechsel auf Rang zwei

oder drei. Interessanterweise überwiegen selbst im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich trotz des bereits zwanzig Jahre währenden Vereinigungsprozesses und dem damit verbundenen Institutionentransfer Einstellungsdivergenzen, die zwar vielfach nur marginal ausfallen, aber dennoch auf fortdauernde Einstellungsunterschiede hinweisen. Ferner formiert sich, wie erwartet, in der Ländergruppe, die am stärksten von der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise betroffen ist, eine weitere innereuropäische Spaltungslinie. Bereits kurze Zeit nach Einsetzen der Krise ist in Südeuropa ein deutlicher Rückgang an Demokratiezufriedenheit und politischem Vertrauen erkennbar. Die übrigen europäischen Ländergruppen folgen diesem Abwärtstrend dagegen nicht. Angesichts der verfügbaren Wirtschaftskennzahlen, die bis in das Jahr 2012 reichen und ein beunruhigendes Bild in zahlreichen europäischen Ländern zeichnen, ist jedoch nicht nur zu erwarten, dass sich dieser Trend in Südeuropa weiter verschärft, sondern sich auch auf andere betroffene Ländergruppen ausweitet. Aufgrund der aktuell verfügbaren Daten müssen sich diese Aussagen auf Erwartungen hinsichtlich spezifischer Formen politischer Unterstützung beschränken. Inwieweit auch vermeintlich stabilere Einstellungen politischer Unterstützung in Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden, bleibt zukünftigen Analysen vorbehalten.

Darüber hinaus konnten empirische Nachweise über den engen Zusammenhang zwischen wirtschaftlichen Parametern, staatlichen Sozialausgaben, Korruption und politischer Unterstützung erbracht werden. Die Effekte der individuellen Bewertung sozialstaatlicher Leistungen und der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung sind tatsächlich vom Niveau realer staatlicher Sozialausgaben oder des Bruttoinlandsprodukts abhängig. Ein positiver Trend des Bruttoinlandsprodukts und eine Zunahme realer Sozialstaatsausgaben *verringern* jeweils den Einfluss positiver individueller Bewertungen, ohne allerdings eigenständig Wirkungskraft zu entfalten. *Direkte* negative Effekte gehen dagegen von hoher Arbeitslosigkeit und Korruption aus. Zudem zeigt sich, dass sich positive individuelle Bewertungen der Wirtschaftsperformanz in Zeiten hoher Arbeitslosigkeit vergleichsweise stärker auf politische Unterstützung auswirken. Soziales Vertrauen hingegen entfaltet sein Potential idealerweise unter Bedingungen gesellschaftlich gering verbreiteter Korruption.

Ferner lässt sich insgesamt feststellen, dass Demokratiezufriedenheit in vergleichsweise stärkerem Maße dem Einfluss sämtlicher Makrovariablen ausgesetzt zu sein scheint.

Sind angesichts der sich seit 2010 in zahlreichen europäischen Ländern massiv verschlechternden wirtschaftlichen Lage weitere Einbußen politischer Unterstützungsbereitschaft zu erwarten? Und wären diese Entwicklungen als Vorboten demokratischer Dekonsolidierungsprozesse zu bewerten? Mit dem Einzug offen faschistischer Parteien in nationale Parlamente zeichnen sich gegenwärtig bereits bedenkliche antidemokratische Tendenzen in Ländern wie Griechenland oder Ungarn ab.¹⁴ Unbeantwortet bleibt ferner, wie nachhaltig demokratische Grundüberzeugungen durch die Nachbeben schwerer Wirtschaftskrisen erschüttert werden. Im Umkehrschluss erscheint zweifelhaft, ob allein eine zukünftige Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Koordinaten die neuerliche europäische Sollbruchstelle kitten wird. Die eindeutigen Befunde zur Stärkung politischer Unterstützung durch effektive Kontrolle korrupter Praktiken weisen zumindest einen Weg, der über rein wirtschaftliche Kennzahlen hinausreicht und stattdessen das Primat der Politik unterstreicht. Ob hingegen auch zukünftig das Integrations- und Prosperitätsversprechen der Europäischen Union trägt, erscheint zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt hingegen mehr als fraglich.

¹⁴ Damit sind die Parteien „Jobbik“ in Ungarn und die „Goldene Morgenröte“ in Griechenland gemeint. Letzterer wurde im Oktober 2013 gemäß eines Parlamentsbeschlusses die weitere Staatsfinanzierung aufgrund des Verdachts krimineller Aktivitäten entzogen

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Anhang

Tabelle A.1: Länder des World Values Survey, Erhebungszeitraum und Fallzahlen (ungewichtet)

Länder	1981/82	1989/90/91/93	1996/97	1998/99	2000	2005
Österreich		1.460		1.522		
Belgien	1.145	2.792		1.912		
Bulgarien		1.034	1.072	1.000		1.001
Tschechische Republik		924/2.109		1.147/1.908		
Dänemark	1.182	1.030		1.023		
Estland		1.008	1.021	1.005		
Finnland		588	987		1.038	1.014
Frankreich	1.200	1.002		1.615		1.001
Ostdeutschland		1.336	1.009	999		1.076
Westdeutschland	1.305	2.101	1.017	1.037		988
Großbritannien	1.167	1.484		1.093/1.000		1.041
Ungarn	1.464	999		650/1.000		
Irland	1.217	1.000		1.012		
Italien	1.348	2.018		2.000		1.012
Lettland		903	1.200	1.013		
Litauen		1.000	1.009	1.018		
Niederlande	1.221	1.017		1.003		1.050
Norwegen	1.051	1.239	1.127			1.025
Polen		938/982	1.153	1.095		1.000
Rumänien		1.103		1.239/1.146		1.776
Slowakei		466/1.136		1.095/1.331		
Slowenien		1.035	1.007	1.006		1.037
Spanien	2.303	2.637/1.510	1.211	1.200	1.209	1.200
Schweden	954	1.047	1.009	1.015		1.003
Schweiz		1.400	1.212			1.241

Tabelle A.2: Länder des European Social Survey, Erhebungszeitraum und Fallzahlen
(ungewichtet)

Länder	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
Österreich	2.257	2.256	2.405		
Belgien	1.899	1.778	1.798	1.760	1.704
Bulgarien			1.400	2.230	2.434
Tschechische Republik	1.360	3.026		2.018	2.386
Dänemark	1.506	1.487	1.505	1.610	1.576
Estland		1.989	1.517	1.661	1.793
Finnland	2.000	2.022	1.896	2.195	1.878
Frankreich	1.503	1.806	1.986	2.073	1.728
Ostdeutschland	1.098	1.019	1.040	967	1.056
Westdeutschland	1.821	1.851	1.876	1.784	1.975
Griechenland	2.566	2.406		2.072	2.715
Großbritannien	2.052	1.897	2.394	2.352	2.422
Ungarn	1.685	1.498	1.518	1.544	1.561
Irland	2.046	2.286	1.800		2.576
Island		579			
Italien	1.207	1.529			
Lettland			1.960	1.980	
Luxemburg	1.552	1.635			
Niederlande	2.364	1.881	1.889	1.778	1.829
Norwegen	2.036	1.760	1.750	1.549	1.548
Polen	2.110	1.716	1.721	1.619	1.751
Portugal	1.511	2.052	2.222	2.367	2.150
Rumänien			2.139	2.146	
Slowakei		1.512	1.766	1.810	1.856
Slowenien	1.519	1.442	1.476	1.286	1.403
Spanien	1.729	1.663	1.876	2.576	1.885
Schweden	1.999	1.948	1.927	1.830	1.497
Schweiz	2.040	2.141	1.804	1.819	1.506
Zypern			995	1.215	1.083

5. Kontextuelle und individuelle Determinanten politischen Vertrauens im internationalen Vergleich

(7)

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Soziales und politisches Vertrauen

Sonja Zmerli

Wie ist es um das Zusammenwachsen Deutschlands und Europas zwanzig Jahre nach dem Mauerfall bestellt? Haben vierzig Jahre DDR-Regime und Bündnistreue zur Sowjetunion bleibende Spuren hinterlassen, oder hat sich eine Generation später Willy Brandts Losung tatsächlich erfüllt? Ist das vereinigte Deutschland im Herzen Europas angekommen, oder nimmt es aufgrund der jahrzehntelangen Teilung eine Sonderstellung ein? Ließe sich daran anschließend nicht vielmehr vermuten, dass die gesellschaftliche und politische Spaltung Europas auch zwanzig Jahre nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs trotz aller Integrationsbemühungen weiterhin Bestand hat? Mögen manchem diese Fragen auf den ersten Blick noch recht akademisch erscheinen, so rütteln sie doch an den Grundfesten des gesellschaftlichen und politischen Zusammenhalts in Deutschland und Europa. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße für individuelle Einstellungen, die dem gesellschaftlichen Miteinander sowie der Unterstützung politischer Systeme zugrunde liegen. Konkreter geht es dabei um soziales Vertrauen, das es Gesellschaften erst ermöglicht, in gegenseitige Kooperationen einzutreten und politisches Vertrauen, das als Voraussetzung für die Funktionsfähigkeit und Legitimation demokratischer politischer Systeme bewertet wird. Gerade im Hinblick auf eine notwendige Basis politischen Vertrauens sind aber mit Blick auf postsozialistische Gesellschaften erhebliche Zweifel angebracht. In autoritären Regimen, deren Selbsterhalt allein durch Unterdrückung, Verfolgung und Bespitzelung der Bürger gewährleistet werden kann, ist die Existenz einer breiten Vertrauensgrundlage nicht zu erwarten. Dieses gegen die politischen Institutionen des Landes gerichtete wohlbegründete Misstrauen schlägt sich allerdings auch in einer eingeschränkten individuellen Vertrauensbereitschaft gegenüber den Mitbürgern nieder. Gering ausgeprägtes soziales Vertrauen ist die Folge.

Aus Sicht der Vertreter des Sozialkapitalansatzes ist diese Wechselwirkung zwischen politischem und sozialem Misstrauen fatal. Allein Gesellschaften, die über ein hohes Maß an sozialem Vertrauen verfügen, sind in der Lage, wirtschaftlich zu prosperieren, sich als mündige Bürger an demokratischen Entscheidungsprozessen zu beteiligen, den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt zu stärken, eine responsive politische Elite hervorzubringen und insgesamt ein zufriedeneres Leben zu führen (Putnam 2000). Aufgrund ihres politischen Erbes blieben postsozialistischen Gesellschaften diese Errungenschaften demnach versagt. Allerdings wäre zunächst zu klären, ob prägende Erfahrungen mit autoritären Regimen auch unter veränderten politischen Vorzeichen ihre Wirkungsmacht aufrechterhalten oder aber individuelle Einstellungen im Lebensverlauf kontextabhängig und folglich veränderbar sind. Gerade

letzteres wäre vor dem Hintergrund der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und dem Fortschreiten der europäischen Integration höchst wünschenswert. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass politische Gebilde, seien es Nationalstaaten oder supranationale Institutionen, die lediglich durch Teile der Bevölkerung Unterstützung erfahren, nur eingeschränkt legitimiert und funktionsfähig sind. Eine Gesellschaft, deren politische Kultur durch derart auseinanderstrebende politische Einstellungen geprägt wäre, stünde vor großen Herausforderungen. Inwiefern diese Darstellung reiner Fiktion oder realistischen Einschätzungen entspricht, soll in diesem Beitrag geklärt werden. Zur Kontrastierung, Einordnung und besseren Bewertung der deutsch-deutschen Einstellungsmuster bietet sich ein west-/osteuropäischer Vergleich an. Auf dieser breiten Datengrundlage erscheint es möglich, konkrete Aussagen über die Entwicklungsrichtung des vereinigten Deutschlands, aber auch Europas zu treffen. Gemäß diesen Überlegungen geht es in der nachfolgenden Untersuchung um dreierlei: Eine alle vier Wellen des *European Social Survey* (ESS) umfassende Zeitreihenanalyse sozialen und politischen Vertrauens soll zunächst Aufschluss über Kontinuität bzw. Wandel deutsch-deutscher Einstellungen geben. Sofern eine Persistenz individueller Einstellungen vorläge, dürften sich im Zeitverlauf keine Annäherungen zwischen ost- und westdeutschen Bürgern abzeichnen. Die in der DDR sozialisierten Bürger der neuen Länder stünden ihrer Umwelt und ihren politischen Institutionen nach wie vor misstrauisch gegenüber und würden sich darin nicht wesentlich von anderen postsozialistischen Gesellschaften unterscheiden. Die Befunde zahlreicher empirischer Studien lassen jedoch an dieser Vorstellung Zweifel aufkommen. Obwohl sich zwischen den individuellen Einstellungen der Ost- und Westdeutschen nach wie vor Unterschiede ausmachen lassen, erscheinen diese doch nicht unüberbrückbar. Zeitstudien belegen zudem ost-/westdeutsche Annäherungen (Kunz 2004; Zmerli 2004). Vor diesem Hintergrund ließe sich die These formulieren, dass nicht institutionelle Primärerfahrungen individuelle Einstellungen dauerhaft prägen, sondern diese ebenso von institutionellen Veränderungen beeinflusst werden können. Daraus ergibt sich die Aufgabe in einem nächsten Schritt, den Wirkmechanismen sozialen und politischen Vertrauens nachzuspüren. In Zeiten fundamentaler politischer Umbrüche sind Einstellungsänderungen gegenüber politischen Institutionen sicherlich zu erwarten. Soziales Vertrauen könnte in Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden, sofern ein hoffnungsvoller demokratischer Neubeginn Misstrauen, Zukunftsängste und enttäuschte Erwartungen hervorbrächte. Andererseits böte eine breite Grundlage sozialen Vertrauens die Chance auf einen gelingenden politischen Wandel bzw. sich stabilisierende politische Verhältnisse. Darüber hinaus unterliegen soziales und politisches Vertrauen weiteren individuellen und strukturellen Einflüssen, deren Effekte anschließend mit Hilfe multivariater Untersuchungsverfahren einer vergleichenden Bewertung unterzogen werden sollten.

Die theoretische Einordnung dieses Beitrags wird im folgenden Kapitel vorgenommen. Eine Beschreibung der Datengrundlage sowie der Operationalisierungen schließt sich hieran an. In der abschließenden Diskussion der Ergebnisse wird die hier dargelegte Argumentation wieder aufgegriffen und auf der Grundlage der empirischen Erkenntnisse weiterentwickelt.

Theoretischer Rahmen, Entwicklungslinien, Hypothesen

Soziales Vertrauen

Gerade in gesellschaftlichen, politischen oder wirtschaftlichen Krisenzeiten wird oftmals auf den Vertrauensverlust in einer Gesellschaft verwiesen, der als schwerwiegende Folge dieser Krisen ausgemacht und dessen Wiederherstellung im Umkehrschluss als Allheilmittel zahlreicher Missstände bewertet wird. Im politikwissenschaftlichen Kontext lassen sich diese Annahmen und Argumente insbesondere im Sozialkapital-Ansatz verorten, der in den vergangenen fünfzehn Jahren weitreichende wissenschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Beachtung fand (Putnam 1993; 2000; 2007). Im Kern dieses Ansatzes wird Sozialkapital als Fundament demokratischer Gesellschaften betrachtet: „Es ist Garant für die Performanz demokratischer Institutionen, wirtschaftlichen Erfolg und die Priorität des Allgemeinwohls gegenüber Partikularinteressen“ (Zmerli 2008: 17). Ein umfassender gesellschaftlicher Sozialkapitalbestand führt zur Lösung des weit verbreiteten Kollektivgutproblems und somit zu größerer Kooperationsfähigkeit und -bereitschaft unter gesellschaftlichen Mitgliedern. Diese zeigen sich interessierter an politischen Prozessen, sind vertrauensvoller auch gegenüber politischen Institutionen und Akteuren, toleranter, engagementbereiter, zufriedener und optimistischer und verfügen über zivile Kompetenzen, die für gesellschaftliche Teilhabe unerlässlich sind (Putnam 1993). Die politischen Eliten dieser Gesellschaften zeichnen sich ihrerseits durch vergleichbare Persönlichkeitsmerkmale aus, was zu responsiver und weniger korruptionsanfälliger Politik führt. Innovative und effiziente Regierungen können aus diesem gesellschaftlichen und politischen Zusammenspiel erwachsen (Putnam 2000: 347).

Soziales Vertrauen gilt neben sozialen Netzwerken und Normen der Reziprozität als wesentlicher Baustein sozialen Kapitals.¹ Während aus demokratietheoretischer Perspektive soziales Vertrauen demokratische Einstellungen und politische Teilhabe befördert, betonen Ökonomen dessen Bedeutung für wirtschaftliche Austauschbeziehungen. Verbesserter Informationsfluss, höhere Innovationskraft und Risikobereitschaft sowie geringere Transaktionskosten werden als wesentliche wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsvorteile der Existenz sozialen Vertrauens zugeschrieben (Kunz 2004: 202).

Neueste international vergleichende Studien bestätigen nunmehr tatsächlich einen ausgeprägten positiven Zusammenhang zwischen sozialem und politischem Vertrauen. War den politikwissenschaftlichen Annahmen zur Relevanz und Wechselwirkung zwischen sozialem Vertrauen und politischer Unterstützung lange Zeit die empirische Validierung versagt geblieben, so führte die Entwicklung und Verbreitung verbesserter Messinstrumente zu eindeutigen Resultaten (Jagodzinski/ Manabe

1 Für eine ausführliche Diskussion der Sozialkapitaltheorie siehe Gabriel u. a. (2002) und Castiglione u. a. (2008).

2004: 85-97; Zmerli/Newton 2008; Freitag/Bühlmann 2009).² Gleichmaßen erschien es nun aber auch möglich, die während der vorangegangenen Jahre beobachteten Erosionserscheinungen politischen Vertrauens mit sinkenden gesellschaftlichen Sozialkapitalbeständen zu erklären (Dalton 2004).

Trotz der großen Bedeutung, die sozialem Vertrauen als Komponente sozialen Kapitals disziplinübergreifend beigemessen wird, konnte bislang kein wissenschaftliches Einverständnis über dessen Begriffsbestimmung erzielt werden (Kunz 2004: 203; Zmerli u. a. 2007: 37ff.). So reichen Definitionen von Hardins „encapsulated interest“ (1998: 12ff.) über Gambettas Vorschlag, Vertrauen als persönliche Überzeugung in das aufrichtige und wohlwollende Handeln anderer zu definieren (1988: 217) bis hin zu Warrens Vorstellung von Vertrauen als Ausdruck gemeinsamer Interessen bei gleichzeitiger Abwesenheit von Arglist (1999: 311). Zu Recht verweist Kunz zudem auf die Notwendigkeit, die Kontextbezogenheit sozialen Vertrauens zu berücksichtigen. Dieser Annahme zufolge liegen der Vertrauensgenese Sozialisationsprozesse zugrunde, die mit dem Erwerb kultureller Regeln und Wertorientierungen verknüpft sind. „In dieser Hinsicht beinhaltet Vertrauen Merkmale einer kulturell festgelegten Reziprozität, die ein starkes Gefühl sozialer Übereinstimmung mit anderen Menschen reflektiert“ (Kunz 2004: 203). Ein weiterer Teilaspekt der Begriffsbestimmung sozialen Vertrauens bezieht sich auf die Reichweite sozialer Beziehungen. Putnam differenziert hierbei zwischen „thick trust“ und „thin trust“, wobei „thick trust“ aus intensiven und regelmäßigen persönlichen Beziehungen resultiert und „thin trust“ Vertrauensverhältnisse zu nicht bestimmten abgrenzbaren Personengruppen kennzeichnet (2000: 136). Gerade die letztgenannte Vertrauensform ist, so die These, für die Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität moderner demokratischer Gesellschaften unerlässlich. Alternativ zu den Begriffen „thick“ und „thin“ trust finden sich in der Literatur weitere Bezeichnungen, wie partikulares und generalisiertes soziales Vertrauen (Putnam 2000: 136; Newton/Zmerli i. E.). Beide Vertrauensformen begreift Putnam als Endpunkte eines Kontinuums (2000: 466). In einer jüngsten vergleichenden Bevölkerungsumfrage wurde nun erstmals die Verbreitung *beider* Vertrauensformen erhoben.³ Erste international vergleichende Studien liefern nun den empirischen Nachweis, dass die Entwicklung individuellen generalisierten sozialen Vertrauens die Existenz partikularen sozialen Vertrauens voraussetzt. Allerdings führen starke partikulare Vertrauensbeziehungen nicht unweigerlich zur Ausbildung einer generalisierten Vertrauenshaltung. Vielmehr gibt es erste Hinweise darauf, dass die Bereitschaft zu generalisiertem sozialem Vertrauen in Abhängigkeit zur persönlichen materiellen und immateriellen Ressourcenausstattung steht. Für *beide* soziale Vertrauensformen werden hingegen ausgeprägte positive Zusammenhänge zu politischem Vertrauen ermittelt (Newton/Zmerli i. E.; Zmerli/Newton i. E.). Aufgrund der verfügbaren Daten wird sich der vorliegende

2 Für einen empirischen Nachweis dieser Annahme siehe Zmerli u. a. (2007) und Zmerli/Newton (2008).

3 Siehe World Values Survey 2005/07.

Beitrag auf empirische Analysen generalisierten sozialen Vertrauens beschränken müssen.

Grundsätzlich lässt sich dieser Zusammenhangsbefund strukturorientierten Erklärungsansätzen zuordnen, die das Entstehen sozialen Vertrauens auf soziale und gesellschaftliche Faktoren zurückführen. Insbesondere die Zugehörigkeit zu formellen oder informellen Netzwerken, politisch-institutionelle sowie sozio-ökonomische Strukturen, Sicherheit und Ordnung, aber auch soziale und ethnische Heterogenität werden weitreichende Effekte auf soziales Vertrauen zugesprochen. Während soziale Integration mittels sozialer Netzwerkzugehörigkeit, politisches Vertrauen oder Demokratiezufriedenheit, Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Lage eines Landes oder die wahrgenommene Sicherheit im öffentlichen Bereich zur Stärkung sozialen Vertrauens beitragen, wirken sich persönlich wahrgenommene Diskriminierungserfahrungen negativ auf die persönliche Vertrauensbereitschaft aus. Ferner werden zur Erklärung sozialen Vertrauens neben strukturorientierten Ansätzen Indikatoren herangezogen, die auf mögliche Antworten im persönlichen Bereich schließen lassen. Hierzu zählen insbesondere persönliche Ressourcen, wie Bildung oder Einkommen, oder individuelle Lebenszufriedenheit und Wohlbefinden. Belastende Lebensereignisse, wie Scheidung, oder Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit, sollten dagegen mit Vertrauenseinbußen einhergehen (Brehm/Rahn 1997; Kunz 2004: 210ff.; Uslander 1999, 2002).

Höchst unterschiedlich fallen die empirischen Befunde zur Entwicklung sozialen Vertrauens in etablierten Demokratien aus. Während Putnam für die USA klare Tendenzen eines Verfalls sozialen Vertrauens konstatiert (2000), können europäisch vergleichende Studien keine entsprechenden Entwicklungen belegen. Auffallend ist jedoch, dass sich europäische Gesellschaften recht deutlich in ihrer Vertrauensbereitschaft unterscheiden. Während insbesondere skandinavische Länder über ausgesprochen hohe Vertrauensniveaus verfügen, ist in den postsozialistischen Gesellschaften vielfach ausgeprägtes Misstrauen zu beobachten. Selbst innerhalb Deutschlands ließen sich in der Vergangenheit diese Divergenzen nachweisen (Zmerli 2004; 2008).

Politisches Vertrauen

Die Stabilität demokratischer Gesellschaften stützt sich in weiten Teilen auf das Vertrauen der Bürger in ihre politischen Institutionen und Akteure. Sofern Institutionen, Akteure und politische Prozesse als vertrauenswürdig und fair wahrgenommen werden, zeigen Bürger eine größere Bereitschaft, sich gesetzeskonform zu verhalten, entwickeln ein gesteigertes Interesse an politischen Themen und eine größere Engagementbereitschaft (Putnam 1993). Zudem bereitet eine breite Vertrauensbasis politischen Akteuren einen größeren, weniger restriktiven Handlungsspielraum (Warren 1999). Wie Newton und Norris betonen, sollte politisches Vertrauen als zentraler Indikator einer seitens der Bürgerinnen und Bürger eines Landes empfundenen Bewertung ihrer Polity definiert werden (2000: 53). Als solches dient poli-

tisches Vertrauen als konzeptionelles Instrumentarium, das „has been designed as a middle-range indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity“ (Zmerli u. a. 2007: 41). Glaubwürdigkeit, Fairness, Kompetenz, Transparenz politischer Entscheidungsprozesse oder auch Responsivität gegenüber der öffentlichen Meinung sind Charakteristika, durch die politische Institutionen und Akteure Vertrauenswürdigkeit erlangen (Levi/Stoker 2000: 484f.). Gleichermäßen ermöglicht die Präsenz politischen Vertrauens politischen Institutionen und Akteuren effizientes und effektives Handeln, wodurch sich wiederum deren Funktions- und Leistungsfähigkeit erhöht, ein Wechselspiel, das in höheres politisches Vertrauen mündet (Putnam 1993).

Eine systematische Differenzierung des Konzepts politischen Vertrauens ermöglichen verschiedene theoretische und empirische Studien. So unterscheiden beispielsweise Gabriel u. a. (2002), Denters, Gabriel und Torcal (2007) oder van Deth (2000) zwischen drei Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens. Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure umfasst Vertrauen in das Parlament, Politiker, politische Parteien oder auch die Regierung. Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen, die sich im Idealfall durch Unparteilichkeit und Fairness auszeichnen, bezieht sich auf die Vertrauenswürdigkeit von Polizei und Justiz eines Landes. Schließlich wird eine weitere, dritte Dimension politischen Vertrauens diagnostiziert. Diese basiert auf Vertrauen in supranationale Institutionen (EU, Europäisches Parlament) und/oder internationale Institutionen (UN) (van Deth 2000).

Vor dem hier skizzierten Hintergrund der Relevanz politischen Vertrauens für die Stabilität demokratischer Gesellschaften ist die wachsende Verunsicherung in den Reihen politischer Entscheidungsträger und Wissenschaftler angesichts anscheinend rückläufiger Vertrauenstrends nachvollziehbar. So zeigten bereits in der Vergangenheit einschlägige international vergleichende Studien, dass insbesondere die Vertrauenswürdigkeit von Politikern oder nationaler Parlamente empfindliche Einbußen erlitten hatte (Dalton 1999; Holmberg 1999; Kaase/Newton 1995; Klingemann 1999; Pharr/Putnam 2000). Obwohl offenkundig sämtliche etablierten, aber auch jungen Demokratien von diesen rückläufigen Trends betroffen sind, lassen sich innerhalb Europas deutliche Niveauunterschiede ausmachen. Während skandinavische Länder vergleichsweise hohe Vertrauenswerte erzielen, fällt die politische Vertrauensbereitschaft der Deutschen, Engländer oder Franzosen eher moderat aus. Teilweise besorgniserregendes großes politisches Misstrauen lässt sich dagegen zumeist in den noch jungen Demokratien Mittel- und Osteuropas beobachten (Tusalem 2007). Jüngere Studien zur Entwicklung politischen Vertrauens insbesondere in den etablierten Demokratien Europas stimmen dagegen etwas hoffnungsvoller (Catterberg/Moreno 2005; Gabriel/Walter-Rogg 2008). Die Situation in Deutschland war in der Vergangenheit hingegen tatsächlich durch Vertrauensdivergenzen zwischen Ost und West gekennzeichnet. Zeitverlaufsstudien diagnostizierten dabei systematisch geringere Vertrauenswerte für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der neuen Länder (Zmerli 2004).

Gerade die politischem Vertrauen zuerkannte demokratietheoretische Relevanz im Zusammenhang mit dessen diagnostizierter Volatilität lassen eine räumlich wie

zeitlich breit angelegte Untersuchung der Bedingungsfaktoren als besonders dringlich erscheinen. Die Annahme, dass politisches Vertrauen insbesondere aus institutioneller und akteursbezogener Fairness, Glaubwürdigkeit und Transparenz resultiert, beschreibt die so genannte „top-down“ Perspektive des einen Erklärungsansatzes. Darüber hinaus wird der wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit eines Landes erheblicher Einfluss auf politische Vertrauensbildungsprozesse zugesprochen (Newton/Norris 2000; Gabriel/Kunz 2002). Der „bottom-up“ Ansatz argumentiert hingegen, dass gerade rückläufiges oder gar völlig fehlendes gesellschaftliches Sozialkapital für einen möglichen politischen Vertrauensschwund verantwortlich zu machen wäre. Auf der Grundlage sozialen Zusammenhalts, der durch Kooperationsbereitschaft, Vertrauen und Solidarität gesichert wird, wandelt sich das Eigeninteresse der Bürger zu einem persönlichen Interesse am Allgemeinwohl. Aus einer wachsenden persönlichen Zuwendung zu politischen Inhalten und einer größer werdenden Engagementbereitschaft resultieren dann die Unterstützung und das Vertrauen in das eigene demokratische System. Im Umkehrschluss folgt aus einem Sozialkapitalchwund rückläufige politische Unterstützung.

Schließlich beeinflussen auch Faktoren, die auf der Mikroebene angesiedelt sind, wie individuelle politische Orientierungen und Kompetenzen, die persönliche politische Vertrauensbereitschaft. Grundsätzlich sind politische Orientierungen und Kompetenzen den drei Teilbereichen politischen Engagements, Kognition, Affekt sowie politische Teilhabe, zuzuordnen. Dem Teilbereich der Kognition lässt sich beispielsweise politisches Interesse zuordnen, das den Grad der Aufmerksamkeit beschreibt, welcher politischen Vorgängen entgegengebracht wird. Gleiches gilt auch für die subjektiv empfundene Kompliziertheit von Politik, die als Ausdruck individueller politischer Kompetenzen zu verstehen ist. Größeres politisches Interesse sowie eine persönlich wahrgenommene geringere Kompliziertheit von Politik sollten die politische Vertrauensneigung steigern. Die Determinante Kirchgangshäufigkeit wird als Indikator der individuellen Bedeutung konservativer Werte betrachtet. Somit ist sie dem affektiven Teilbereich individueller Einstellungen und Orientierungen zuzuordnen. Grundsätzlich wird ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen einer größeren Kirchgangshäufigkeit und politischem Vertrauen erwartet (Zmerli 2004: 244).

Hypothesen

Aus der Bandbreite der oben beschriebenen Wirkungszusammenhänge lassen sich verschiedene Hypothesen ableiten, die nachfolgend einer empirischen Überprüfung unterzogen werden.

H1: Da von einem positiven Wirkungszusammenhang zwischen sozialem und politischem Vertrauen ausgegangen werden kann, sollte (H1a) *ein höheres Maß politischen Vertrauens mit höherem sozialen Vertrauen einhergehen*. Zu erwarten ist jedoch, dass (H1b) *die drei verschiedenen Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens in unterschiedlichem Maß auf soziales Vertrauen einwirken*. Der geringste

Effekt wäre von Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure zu erwarten, da sie nur mittelbaren bzw. vermittelten Einfluss auf nationale Politikgestaltung nehmen und nur in Krisenregionen, nicht aber in Europa, Schutzaufgaben, wie die der Friedenssicherung, übernehmen.

- H2: Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Kompetenz politischer Institutionen und Akteure finden aber auch mittels erfolgreicher Politikformulierung und Implementierung ihren Ausdruck. Insofern sollte (H2) *eine positive Bewertung verschiedener Politikfelder ebenfalls zu höherem sozialen Vertrauen beitragen*.
- H3: In Anlehnung an die oben aufgeführten struktur- und persönlichkeitsorientierten Erklärungsansätze wird erwartet, dass (H3a) *die Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken, ein subjektiv empfundenes Sicherheitsgefühl, höhere Bildung, eine höhere Zufriedenheit mit den eigenen Lebensverhältnissen und der Einkommenssituation zu einer Stärkung sozialen Vertrauens führen*. Dagegen wird erwartet, dass (H3b) *Diskriminierungserfahrungen oder Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit in einem signifikant negativen Zusammenhang zu sozialem Vertrauen stehen könnten*.
- H4: Obwohl eine Reihe einschlägiger europäisch vergleichender Studien stark divergierende Niveaus sozialen Vertrauens ermitteln konnten, gibt es keinerlei konkrete empirische Hinweise auf verschiedenartige Wirkungszusammenhänge. Insofern werden auch für die nachfolgenden Wirkungsanalysen (H4) *keine deutsch-deutschen bzw. west-/osteuropäischen Unterschiede erwartet* (abhängige Variable: soziales Vertrauen).
- H5: Da von einer Wechselwirkung zwischen sozialem und politischem Vertrauen ausgegangen wird, sollte (H5a) *höheres soziales Vertrauen mit höherem politischen Vertrauen einhergehen*. Die Effektstärken sollten jedoch (H5b) *zwischen den drei politischen Vertrauensdimensionen variieren*. Der geringste Effekt sozialen Vertrauens wäre für die Dimension des Vertrauens in externe politische Akteure zu erwarten, da deren Handlungs- und Einflussbereich, aber auch deren gesellschaftliche Referenzpunkte weit über den eigenen nationalen oder auch regionalen gesellschaftlichen Kontext hinausreichen.
- H6: Aus Sicht der „top-down“ Perspektive kann gefolgert werden, dass (H6a) *eine positive Einschätzung relevanter Politikfelder sowie der wirtschaftlichen Lage eines Landes zu höherem politischen Vertrauen führen sollte*. Der „bottom-up“ Ansatz verweist zudem (H6b) auf den *positiven Wirkungszusammenhang zwischen Netzwerkzugehörigkeit und politischem Vertrauen*. Ebenso sollte *politisches Interesse, subjektiv wahrgenommenes Kompetenzgefühl sowie regelmäßiger Kirchgang mit einer Stärkung politischen Vertrauens einhergehen*. Dagegen sind (H6c) *Einbußen politischen Vertrauens bei persönlichen Diskriminierungserfahrungen oder Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit zu erwarten*.
- H7: Schließlich liegen auch für den europäischen Vergleich politischen Vertrauens Befunde vor, die deutlich divergierende Vertrauensniveaus offen legen. Empirische Nachweise über maßgeblich unterschiedliche Wirkmechanismen existieren allerdings nicht, so dass auch für die nachfolgende Analyse politischen Vertrauens (H7) *keine deutsch-deutschen bzw. west-/osteuropäischen Effektunterschiede erwartet werden* (abhängige Variable: politisches Vertrauen).

Daten und Methoden

Gemäß der konzeptionellen Anlage dieses Sammelbandes basieren sämtliche nachfolgenden empirischen Analysen ausschließlich auf den vier Erhebungswellen des ESS.⁴ Die zu untersuchenden Variablen ‚soziales Vertrauen‘ und ‚politisches Vertrauen‘ basieren auf verschiedenen Fragen, die nachfolgend dargestellt werden.

In einer Reihe vorangegangener Studien (Kunz 2004; Zmerli u. a. 2007; Zmerli/Newton 2008) wurde zur Messung sozialen Vertrauens ein auf drei Fragen basierender Index gebildet, dessen empirische Validität überprüft und bestätigt wurde. Auch die vier Wellen des ESS beinhalten diese drei Fragen, so dass für die sich anschließenden Untersuchungen ein entsprechender Vertrauensindex gebildet wird.

Soziales Vertrauen:

Ganz allgemein gesprochen: Glauben Sie, dass man den meisten Menschen vertrauen kann, oder dass man im Umgang mit anderen Menschen nicht vorsichtig genug sein kann? Bitte sagen Sie es mir anhand dieser Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet, dass man nicht vorsichtig genug sein kann, und 10 bedeutet, dass man den meisten Menschen vertrauen kann.

Glauben Sie, dass die meisten Menschen versuchen, Sie auszunutzen, wenn sie die Gelegenheit dazu haben, oder versuchen die meisten Menschen, sich fair zu verhalten? Die meisten Menschen versuchen, mich auszunutzen = 0, die meisten Menschen versuchen, sich fair zu verhalten = 10 (Skala von 0 bis 10).

Und glauben Sie, dass die Menschen meistens versuchen, hilfsbereit zu sein, oder dass die Menschen meistens auf den eigenen Vorteil bedacht sind? 0 bedeutet, dass die Menschen meistens auf den eigenen Vorteil bedacht sind, und 10 bedeutet, dass die Menschen meistens versuchen, hilfsbereit zu sein. Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.

Zur Bildung des Index werden die Werte der Antworten zunächst addiert und danach durch die Anzahl gültiger Antworten dividiert (Skala von 0 bis 10).⁵

Für die Bildung der Indizes politischen Vertrauens wird ebenfalls auf die bereits angeführten theoretischen und empirischen Vorarbeiten zurückgegriffen (Gabriel u. a. 2002; Denters u. a. 2007; van Deth 2000). Dieser differenzierten empirischen Vorgehensweise der o.a. Studien wird auch in diesem Beitrag entsprochen, da es plausibel erscheint, dass diese drei Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens in unterschiedlichen Wechselbeziehungen zu sozialem Vertrauen und weiteren Bestimmungsfaktoren stehen könnten.

4 Für weitere Informationen siehe das Einführungskapitel dieses Sammelbandes.

5 Für die empirischen Analysen wird dieser Index standardisiert, so dass der Minimalwert 0 und der Maximalwert 1 betragen.

Politisches Vertrauen:

Bitte sagen Sie mir zu jeder öffentlichen Einrichtung oder Personengruppe, die ich Ihnen nenne, wie sehr Sie persönlich jeder einzelnen davon vertrauen. Verwenden Sie dazu diese Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet, dass Sie dieser Einrichtung oder Personengruppe überhaupt nicht vertrauen, und 10 bedeutet, dass Sie ihr voll und ganz vertrauen. Wie ist das mit...

- dem Bundestag?
- der Justiz?
- der Polizei?
- den Politikern?
- den politischen Parteien (als Item ab der zweiten Welle des ESS enthalten)?
- dem Europäischen Parlament?
- den Vereinten Nationen?

Vertrauen in den Bundestag, Politiker und politische Parteien bilden Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure ab. Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen wird durch Vertrauen in Polizei und Justiz gemessen. Mit den Fragen zum Vertrauen in das Europäische Parlament sowie die Vereinten Nationen wird die dritte Vertrauensdimension in externe politische Akteure erhoben. Wie zuvor werden auf der Grundlage der entsprechenden Fragen jeweils additive Indizes gebildet, die durch die Anzahl gültiger Antworten dividiert werden (Skala von 0 bis 10).⁶

Soziales und politisches Vertrauen in Deutschland und Europa


Zur Situation in Deutschland und Europa

Die deskriptiven Auswertungen der vier ESS Wellen zu sozialem Vertrauen in Deutschland und Europa zeichnen ein Bild von Kontinuität einerseits und gesellschaftlicher Differenz andererseits (Abbildung 1).⁷ Während sich Ost- und Westdeutsche in ihrem Vertrauensniveau nur noch marginal voneinander unterscheiden und lediglich graduelle Veränderungen im Zeitverlauf erkennbar sind, weisen osteuropäische Länder gegenüber westeuropäischen Gesellschaften deutliche Rückstände auf. Auf einer Skala von 0 bis 1 erzielen Osteuropäer deutlich unter dem Durch-

6 Für die empirischen Analysen wird dieser Index standardisiert, so dass der Minimalwert 0 und der Maximalwert 1 betragen.


7 Die Gewichte der deskriptiven Analysen in den Abbildungen 1 bis 4 basieren auf Design-Effekten sowie auf den Einwohnerzahlen der Länder in jeder Welle; für die deutsch-deutschen Analysen auf Gewichte für Design-Effekte sowie Einwohnerzahlen der beiden Landesteile.

Abbildung 1: Soziales Vertrauen




schnitt liegende Vertrauenswerte. Vergleichbar mit beiden deutschen Landesteilen lässt sich dagegen das Bild der Kontinuität sozialen Vertrauens auch in West- und Osteuropa nachzeichnen. Aus dieser europaweit beobachtbaren weitgehend stabilen Vertrauenslage ist zu schließen, dass sich die ausgeprägte innereuropäische Vertrauensdivergenz kurzfristig nicht auflösen wird. Somit wäre in naher Zukunft mit keiner nennenswerten Annäherung osteuropäischer Verhältnisse an westeuropäische Gegebenheiten zu rechnen. Aus Sicht der Sozialkapitaltheorie käme diese Persistenz des Niveauunterschieds einem auf Dauer angelegten Gefälle gesellschaftlicher Kooperationsfähigkeit, institutioneller Performanz und wirtschaftlicher Leistungskraft gleich. Grund zur Hoffnung gibt dagegen die Lage in Ostdeutschland. Trotz ihres sozialistischen Erbes sind die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der neuen Länder im Westen Deutschlands und Europas angekommen. Gemessen am Niveau sozialen Vertrauens sind Ostdeutsche im gleichen Maße ausgestattet wie Bürger etablierter Demokratien. Dieser Sachverhalt gibt einen klaren Hinweis darauf, dass sich Vertrauensdispositionen im individuellen Lebensverlauf ändern können. Denn noch zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre wiesen Ostdeutsche eine deutlich geringere Vertrauensbereitschaft als Westdeutsche auf (Cusack 1997). Im hiesigen Fall ist zu vermuten, dass die Übernahme funktionsfähiger demokratischer Institutionen zusammen mit nachhaltiger wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und gesellschaftlicher Modernisierung einen positiven Beitrag zur Stärkung der Vertrauensbereitschaft erbracht haben. In dem Maße, in dem sich in osteuropäischen Ländern vergleichbare institutionelle, strukturelle und wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen abzeichneten, könnte auch dort mit einer Vertrauenskonsolidierung auf westeuropäischem Niveau gerechnet werden.

Abbildung 2: Vertrauen in politische Institutionen



Deutlich heterogener fallen dagegen die Analysen zu politischem Vertrauen in Europa aus. Im Unterschied zu der überwiegend auf Kontinuität hinweisenden sozialen Vertrauensdisposition aller Europäer lassen sich für Vertrauen in politische Institutionen im Zeitverlauf deutliche Ausschläge in beide Richtungen ausmachen (Abbildung 2). Auffallend ist zunächst, dass europaweit Parlamente, Politiker und politische Parteien keinen ausgeprägten Vertrauensbonus genießen. Dennoch sind im deutsch-deutschen sowie im europäischen Vergleich deutliche Unterschiede erkennbar. So weisen Ostdeutsche über den gesamten Zeitverlauf hinweg ein erkennbar geringeres Vertrauensniveau als ihre westdeutschen Mitbürger auf. Selbst der ab 2006 einsetzende deutliche Vertrauensanstieg im Osten der Republik kann diese Diskrepanz nicht überbrücken, da sich ab diesem Zeitpunkt auch in den alten Ländern die politische Vertrauensbereitschaft leicht erhöht. Aufgrund des Erhebungszeitraums der vierten ESS-Welle, der für sämtliche Länderbefragungen *nach* dem Beginn der weltweiten Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise liegt, lässt sich folgern, dass die zumindest in Deutschland getroffenen politischen Maßnahmen durch zunehmendes politisches Vertrauen gestützt wurden. In beiden Landesteilen ging diesem Vertrauenszuwachs zunächst jedoch ein Rückgang voraus. Am Ende des Erhebungszeitraums lässt sich für Westdeutschland konstatieren, dass das Ausgangsniveau von 2002 nicht gänzlich erreicht wird. Die Vertrauensbereitschaft der Ostdeutschen des Jahres 2008 übersteigt dagegen den Ausgangswert und nähert sich erkennbar westeuropäischen Verhältnissen. Insofern grenzen sich ostdeutsche Bürger auch deutlich von den übrigen postsozialistischen Gesellschaften ab. Gerade in den Kernländern Osteuropas ist der rückläufige Trend ab 2004 besonders stark ausgeprägt. Diese


Abbildung 3: Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen



Abwärtsspirale setzt sich in dieser Ländergruppe auch 2008 fort, obwohl sich für die gesamten osteuropäischen Gesellschaften der vierten Erhebungswelle ein geringfügiger Anstieg abzeichnet. In der Einzelanalyse lässt sich insbesondere für die Ukraine, die dem osteuropäischen Kernländer set angehört, ab 2004 ein massiver Vertrauenseinbruch diagnostizieren. Die gesellschaftlich weitverbreitete Enttäuschung über die gescheiterte ‚orange Revolution‘ findet in diesen Mittelwerten sicherlich ihren Ausdruck. Dennoch gilt, dass osteuropäischen politischen Institutionen und Akteuren überwiegend mit Misstrauen begegnet wird, wodurch ihre zukünftige Akzeptanz und Legitimation fraglich erscheint. Das ohnehin niedrige Ausgangsniveau erfährt dramatische Einbußen, die im westeuropäischen Vergleich ihresgleichen suchen und das Vertrauensgefälle zwischen West und Ost erheblich vergrößern. Zweifellos müssten die Ursachen für diesen Vertrauensverlust in den Bereichen institutioneller oder wirtschaftlicher Fehlentwicklungen gesucht werden, als sie auf individuelle Faktoren zurückzuführen. Dennoch büßen am Ende des Untersuchungszeitraums auch im Westen Europas politische Institutionen Vertrauen gegenüber dem Auftakt der ESS-Erhebungen ein. Dieser Rückgang fällt jedoch marginal aus und mündet schließlich in einer Angleichung westdeutscher und westeuropäischer Verhältnisse.

Abbildung 3 trägt die Vertrauenswürdigkeit regulativer Institutionen, wie Polizei und nationales Rechtssystem, im europäischen Vergleich ab und zeichnet dabei ein gänzlich anderes Bild. Zunächst zeigt sich, dass Ost- und Westdeutsche in ihrer Einschätzung der Vertrauenswürdigkeit dieser beiden Institutionen recht deutlich auseinander liegen. Diese Diskrepanz ist aber weniger einer zu geringen Vertrauensnei-

Abbildung 4: Vertrauen in externe Akteure



gung in Ostdeutschland geschuldet, die sich ganz im Gegenteil sogar auf westeuropäischem Niveau bewegt, als vielmehr der außerordentlich hohen Vertrauenswürdigkeit, die Polizei und Justiz in Westdeutschland genießen. Gemessen an der elfstufigen Vertrauensskala, die den Erhebungen zugrunde liegt, erzielen regulative Institutionen in beiden Teilen Deutschlands sowie Westeuropa tendenziell überdurchschnittliche Werte. Im Zeitverlauf sind zwar leichte Bewegungen zu beobachten, diese fallen aber eher gering und uneinheitlich aus.

Für den Osten Europas treffen diese Beobachtungen dagegen keinesfalls zu. Während das geringere Vertrauensniveau in Osteuropa gegenüber westeuropäischen Gesellschaften zu Beginn der europäischen Umfragen noch den Erwartungen entspricht, sind dessen starke Einbußen in den Folgejahren ohne westeuropäisches Pendant. Vertrauen in Polizei und Justiz erleidet über einen Zeitraum von nur sechs Jahren empfindliche Verluste und bewegt sich nunmehr auf einem Niveau, das deutliches Misstrauen zum Ausdruck bringt.

Ganz anders stellt sich im europäischen Vergleich die Vertrauensneigung gegenüber externen politischen Akteuren, wie dem Europäischen Parlament und den Vereinten Nationen, dar (Abbildung 4). Im Vergleich zu den oben beschriebenen Vertrauensdimensionen rangiert die Vertrauenswürdigkeit externer Akteure auf mittlerem Niveau. Wie die Ausgangsmessungen zeigen, verfügen sie 2002 in den osteuropäischen Gesellschaften sogar über den höchsten Vertrauensbonus. Allerdings führen die im Zeitverlauf beobachtbaren Verluste, die ein weiteres Mal im Osten Europas deutlicher als anderswo ausfallen, zunächst zu einer weitgehenden Vertrauensangleichung zwischen West- und Osteuropa. Zum Zeitpunkt der letzten Erhebung rangieren die Osteuropäer allerdings ein weiteres Mal auf dem letzten Platz. Den-

noch scheint es, als existiere für Osteuropäer eine klare Demarkationslinie zwischen nationalen politischen und regulativen Akteuren und Institutionen einerseits sowie internationalen bzw. supranationalen Institutionen andererseits: ein weiteres Indiz dafür, dass sich das sozialistische Erbe nicht zwingend als dauerhaft prägende Sozialisationsinstanz erweist. Ostdeutsche Bundesbürger folgen diesem osteuropäischen Trend nicht. Verglichen mit ihren westdeutschen Mitbürgern vertrauen sie dem Europäischen Parlament sowie den Vereinten Nationen in geringerem Umfang. Der ab 2006 beobachtbare Vertrauenszuwachs führt jedoch zu einer deutlichen Angleichung ost- und westdeutscher Vertrauensverhältnisse. Die westeuropäische Entwicklung lässt dagegen auf stabile Vertrauensbeziehungen schließen. Die Schwankungen sind marginal und münden mit der letzten Erhebungswelle im höchsten Durchschnittswert.

Den deskriptiven Untersuchungen lässt sich entnehmen, dass auch zwanzig Jahre nach dem Mauerfall und dem Ende des Ost-/Westkonflikts bedeutende Unterschiede fortbestehen, wenn nicht sogar sich verschärft haben. Diese Trennlinie verläuft aber weniger innerhalb Deutschlands, dessen beide Landesteile sich nahtlos in Westeuropa einfügen, als vielmehr zwischen West- und Osteuropa. Obwohl beide deutschen Gesellschaften nach wie vor zu leicht unterschiedlichen Einschätzungen zur Vertrauenswürdigkeit ihrer Mitmenschen, politischer und regulativer Institutionen sowie externer Akteure gelangen, ist diese Diskrepanz im europäischen Vergleich ungleich stärker ausgeprägt. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser erkennbaren Divergenzen, aber auch der beobachtbaren Volatilität politischen Vertrauens gewinnt die nachfolgende Suche nach deren Ursachen zusätzlich an Bedeutung.

Determinanten sozialen und politischen Vertrauens

Unabhängig von den zu erwartenden jeweils unterschiedlichen Bedingungsfaktoren sozialen und politischen Vertrauens geben die in Tabelle 1 dargestellten Korrelationsergebnisse erste Hinweise auf das enge Zusammenwirken beider Vertrauensformen. Entgegen der unter H1b formulierten Hypothese lassen sich positive und hoch signifikante Zusammenhänge zwischen sozialem Vertrauen und *allen drei* Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens ermitteln. Zudem unterliegen diese Zusammenhänge im Zeitverlauf nur geringfügigen Schwankungen. Bemerkenswert erscheint zudem, dass das Zusammenwirken sozialen und politischen Vertrauens europaweit Gültigkeit besitzt. Sofern diese bivariaten Korrelationsbefunde der nachfolgenden empirischen Überprüfung durch lineare Regressionsanalysen standhielten, müssten dem weitreichenden politischen Vertrauensschwund in Osteuropa mittelfristig über Aspekte politischer Legitimation hinausreichende Auswirkungen bescheinigt werden.

Die in den nachfolgenden Wirkungsanalysen zu sozialem und politischem Vertrauen berücksichtigten Determinanten wurden bereits in den vorangegangenen theoretischen Ausführungen sowie den Hypothesen erörtert. Die Erklärungsmodelle

Tabelle 1: Korrelationen zwischen sozialem und politischem Vertrauen (Pearson's r)

	E-W*	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-O*
Politische Institutionen						
2002	0,38***	0,37***	0,36***	0,30***	0,34***	0,34***
2004	0,38***	0,38***	0,41***	0,42***	0,34***	0,34***
2006	0,41***	0,38***	0,36***	0,41***	0,31***	0,32***
2008	0,48***	0,45***	0,38***	0,34***	0,27***	0,30***
Regulative Institutionen						
2002	0,33***	0,32***	0,27***	0,31***	0,30***	0,30***
2004	0,36***	0,36***	0,33***	0,39***	0,33***	0,33***
2006	0,40***	0,38***	0,29***	0,39***	0,30***	0,33***
2008	0,42***	0,40***	0,28***	0,34***	0,29***	0,32***
Externe Akteure						
2002	0,27***	0,26***	0,28***	0,32***	0,26***	0,26***
2004	0,30***	0,29***	0,36***	0,38***	0,25***	0,25***
2006	0,30***	0,29***	0,31***	0,35***	0,20***	0,25***
2008	0,32***	0,31***	0,30***	0,25***	0,21***	0,26***

Signifikanz: *p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

sozialen Vertrauens sind auf die Überprüfung der struktur- und persönlichkeitsorientierten Erklärungsansätze ausgelegt. Neben den soziodemographischen Variablen, Alter, Geschlecht und Bildung werden Zufriedenheit mit dem monatlichen Haushaltseinkommen, persönliche Lebenszufriedenheit, Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken, das subjektiv bei Einbruch der Dunkelheit empfundene Sicherheitsgefühl, persönliche Diskriminierungserfahrungen, persönliche Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit, die drei Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens sowie die damit verbundenen Einschätzungen des jeweils aktuellen Zustandes des nationalen Gesundheits- sowie Bildungssystems in die nachfolgenden Analysen sozialen Vertrauens einbezogen.⁸

- 8 Die Operationalisierungen und Codierungen/Skalierungen der einzelnen Determinanten lauten wie folgt: Geschlecht (0=männlich, 1=weiblich); Alter (Lebensalter in Jahren und quadriertes Lebensalter in Jahren), Bildung (0=Grundschule nicht beendet, 1=Schule beendet ohne Abschluss einer weiterführenden Schule, 2=Volks-/Hauptschulabschluss bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule mit Abschluss 8. oder 9. Klasse, 3=Mittlere Reife bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule mit Abschluss 10. Klasse, 4=Fachhochschulreife, 5=Abitur bzw. erweiterte Oberschule mit Abschluss 12. Klasse; diese Angaben entsprechen den Bezeichnungen des deutschen Bildungswesens); Zufriedenheit mit Haushaltseinkommen: 4=kann ich/können wir bequem leben, 3=zurechtkommen, 2=nur schwer zurechtkommen, 1=nur sehr schwer zurechtkommen; Lebenszufriedenheit: 0=äußerst unzufrieden bis 10=äußerst zufrieden; Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken: 1=nie, 2=weniger als einmal im Monat, 3=einmal im Monat, 4=mehrmals im Monat, 5=einmal in der Woche, 6=mehrmals in der Woche, 7=täglich; subjektives Sicherheitsgefühl: 4=sehr sicher, 3=sicher, 2=unsicher, 1=oder sehr unsicher; Diskriminierungserfahrung: 0=nein, 1=ja; Arbeitslosigkeit: 0=nein, 1=ja; Bewertung des Bildungssystems: 0=äußerst schlecht bis 10=äußerst gut; Bewertung des Gesundheitssystems: 0=äußerst schlecht bis 10=äußerst gut. Diese beiden Politikfeld-Variablen werden in den

Während zum Einfluss des Lebensalters und des Geschlechts keine eindeutigen empirischen Befunde vorliegen, lassen höhere Bildung und Einkommens- und Lebenszufriedenheit, politisches Vertrauen und eine positive Bewertung bedeutsamer Politikfelder, die Integration in soziale Netzwerke, ein subjektives Gefühl der Sicherheit sowie die Abwesenheit von Diskriminierungs- und Arbeitslosigkeitserfahrungen positive Wirkungszusammenhänge erwarten.

Aufgrund der hohen Fallzahlen in West- und Osteuropa wird darauf verzichtet, sämtliche signifikanten Koeffizienten näher zu erläutern. Stattdessen orientiert sich die Diskussion an der Effektstärke der Bestimmungsfaktoren.

Wie bereits bei den Ausprägungen sozialen Vertrauens zu beobachten war, offenbart auch der deutsch-deutsche Vergleich seiner Determinanten keine markanten Unterschiede (Tabelle 2). Über alle vier Erhebungswellen hinweg kommt den Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens in beiden Landesteilen eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Ein genauerer Blick zeigt aber auch, dass diese drei Prädiktoren unterschiedliche Erklärungskraft entfalten. Der Einfluss des Vertrauens in externe politische Akteure ist insgesamt betrachtet am schwächsten ausgeprägt. Insofern bestätigen diese Befunde Hypothesen 1a und 1b. Interessant ist zudem, dass persönliche Einschätzungen des Zustands konkreter Politikfelder, wie hier Gesundheit und Bildung, von eher untergeordneter Bedeutung sind, womit Hypothese 2 nur bedingt gestützt würde. Der Faktor der persönlichen Lebenszufriedenheit unterstreicht ein weiteres Mal dessen konsistent hohen Stellenwert für die individuelle soziale Vertrauensneigung und bestätigt somit empirische Befunde aus einer Vielzahl vorangegangener Studien (Zmerli u. a. 2007; Zmerli/Newton 2008). Daneben trägt auch das subjektiv wahrgenommene Sicherheitsgefühl zur Stärkung sozialen Vertrauens bei. Entgegen der aus theoretischer Perspektive herausragenden Relevanz sozialer Netzwerke bleiben diese jedoch vergleichsweise erklärungs- und schwach. Dieser Befund ist jedoch nicht überraschend, steht er doch im Einklang mit den Ergebnissen einer Reihe empirischer Studien (van Deth/Maloney 2008; Wollebæk/Strømsnes 2008; Zmerli u. a. 2007). Alle weiteren Prädiktoren weisen im Zeitverlauf entweder uneinheitliche oder schwache Effektstärken auf. Allein ein höherer Bildungsgrad erscheint im Westen des Landes im Zeitverlauf etwas bedeutsamer als im Osten zu sein. Hypothese 3a wird insofern nur in Teilen bestätigt. Hypothese 3b kann hingegen aufgrund der schwachen und weitgehend insignifikanten Koeffizientenstärken nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten werden. Mit einer eigens erstellten Variable zur DDR-Sozialisation wurde zudem für

Analysen der vierten ESS-Welle durch zwei Indizes ersetzt, die Effizienz und Gleichbehandlung durch das Gesundheitssystem und die nationalen Steuerbehörden messen. Beide Indizes setzen sich aus jeweils zwei Variablen zusammen, die hoch miteinander korrelieren; Effizienz und Gleichbehandlung durch Gesundheitssystem (1. Frage Effizienz: 0= äußerst ineffizient bis 10=äußerst effizient. 2. Frage Gleichbehandlung: 0=bestimmte Personen werden bevorzugt behandelt bis 10=alle werden gleich behandelt); Effizienz und Gleichbehandlung durch nationale Steuerbehörden (1. Frage Effizienz: 0=äußerst ineffizient bis 10=äußerst effizient; 2. Frage Gleichbehandlung: 0=bestimmte Personen werden bevorzugt behandelt bis 10=alle Personen werden gleich behandelt). Die methodische Vorgehensweise bei der Bildung der beiden Indizes entspricht derjenigen zur Bildung der Vertrauensindizes. Sämtliche Variablen sind standardisiert und zwischen 0 und 1 skaliert.

Tabelle 2: Determinanten sozialen Vertrauens (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2002			ESS 2004		
	E-W*	E-W	E-O	D-W	D-O	E-O*
Konstante	0,00	0,00	0,11***	0,13***	0,14*	0,14***
Geschlecht	0,03***	0,02***	0,01**	0,03***	0,03*	0,02***
Alter	0,05	0,05	0,02	-0,12	-0,11	-0,03
Alter (quadratiert)	0,06	0,06	-0,02	0,15	0,09	0,06
Bildung	0,08***	0,09***	0,08***	0,08***	0,12**	0,08***
Einkommenszufriedenheit	0,08***	0,07***	0,01	0,02	0,02	0,00
Vertrauen in:						
<i>Politische Institutionen</i>	0,15***	0,16***	0,19***	0,18***	0,13*	0,19***
<i>Regulative Institutionen</i>	0,09***	0,08***	0,08***	0,09***	0,10*	0,11***
<i>Externe Akteure</i>	0,02**	0,02**	0,03*	0,07**	0,06	0,01
Lebenszufriedenheit	0,14***	0,13***	0,10***	0,12***	0,08*	0,11***
Soziale Netzwerke	0,07***	0,07***	0,03**	0,04*	0,06	0,05***
Sicherheitsgefühl	0,08***	0,08***	0,05***	0,08***	0,06*	0,03***
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,01	-0,01	-0,04***	-0,01	-0,05	-0,01
Arbeitslosigkeit	0,00	0,00	-0,02***	0,01	0,01	-0,01*
Gesundheitssystem	0,02***	0,01*	0,09***	0,05**	0,08*	0,05***
Bildungssystem	0,09***	0,09***	-0,00	0,01	0,02	0,02*
Korrigiertes R ² in %	28,6	27,5	20,8	25,6	25,7	20,4
N	20.535	22.684	5.030	2.005	477	7.847

Signifikanz: *p<0,05; **p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Fortsetzung Tabelle 2: Determinanten sozialen Vertrauens (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2006				ESS 2008							
	E-W*	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-O*	E-W*	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-O*
Konstante	0,11***	0,11***	0,14***	0,14*	0,15***	0,16***	0,05***	0,05***	0,10**	0,03	0,14***	0,15***
Geschlecht	0,02***	0,02***	0,04***	-0,00	0,01***	0,01	0,02***	0,02***	0,04***	0,02	0,01*	0,01*
Alter	-0,05	-0,05	0,03	0,04	-0,01	-0,09	-0,06***	-0,09**	0,04	0,41	-0,05	0,04
Alter (quadratiert)	0,14***	0,14***	-0,07	-0,09	0,05	0,13	0,14***	0,18***	0,02	-0,32	0,06	-0,01
Bildung	0,08***	0,08***	0,07**	0,02	0,09***	0,12***	0,07***	0,07***	0,08***	-0,00	0,09***	0,09***
Einkommenszufriedenheit	0,04***	0,04***	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,06***	0,06***	0,01	0,01	0,00	-0,01
Vertrauen in:												
<i>Politische Institutionen</i>	0,16***	0,16***	0,17***	0,14*	0,13***	0,12***	0,22***	0,21***	0,18***	0,10	0,08***	0,08***
<i>Regulative Institutionen</i>	0,12***	0,12***	0,06**	0,16***	0,12***	0,13***	0,09***	0,09***	0,07***	0,15***	0,12***	0,12***
<i>Externe Akteure</i>	0,03***	0,03***	0,04*	0,03	-0,01	0,03**	-0,02**	-0,02**	0,07**	0,02	0,03***	0,05***
Lebenszufriedenheit	0,15***	0,15***	0,14***	0,12**	0,10***	0,09***	0,13***	0,13***	0,07***	0,11**	0,10***	0,09***
Soziale Netzwerke	0,02***	0,02***	0,04**	0,08*	0,04***	0,03**	0,04***	0,04***	0,03*	0,09*	0,03***	0,04***
Sicherheitsgefühl	0,08***	0,08***	0,06***	0,09**	0,05***	0,04***	0,08***	0,08***	0,10***	0,09**	0,05***	0,06***
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,01	-0,01	-0,04*	-0,02	-0,02*	-0,01	-0,00	-0,00	-0,04**	-0,05	-0,01	-0,02**
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,00	-0,00	0,00	-0,01	-0,01***	-0,02***	0,00	0,01**	-0,01	-0,02	-0,01	-0,01**
Gesundheitssystem	0,01	0,01	0,05**	0,06	0,06***	0,05***	0,08***	0,09***	0,05*	0,08	0,12***	0,11***
Bildungssystem	0,07***	0,07***	0,02	0,01	0,02**	0,03**	0,07***	0,07***	0,06***	0,03	0,04***	0,02
Korrigiertes R ² in %	28,6	28,6	22,6	26,8	16,2	18,2	34,9	32,8	23,2	20,7	16,8	18,0
N	22.286	22.286	2.021	503	12.622	7.565	21.618	22.571	2.000	470	16.567	9.293

Signifikanz: *p<0,05, ** p<0,01, *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Ostdeutschland überprüft, ob Befragte, die zum Zeitpunkt der Wiedervereinigung mindestens zwanzig Jahre oder älter waren, eine geringere Vertrauensneigung aufweisen als ihre jüngeren ostdeutschen Mitbürger. Keine der vier Erhebungen liefert einen statistisch signifikanten Nachweis dieser Annahme, womit die Sozialisations- these empirisch nicht bestätigt werden kann.⁹ Schließlich unterstreichen auch die annähernd vergleichbaren erklärten Varianzen die zuvor erläuterten deutsch- deutschen Gemeinsamkeiten. Trotz der begrenzten Anzahl erklärungsstarker Determinanten erzielen die ausgewiesenen Modellgüten ein akzeptables Niveau.

Ein Blick auf die Ergebnisse Westeuropas bestätigt weitestgehend den Einfluss politischen Vertrauens. Ein weiteres Mal zeigt sich jedoch, dass der Effekt von Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure marginal ausfällt. Für die vierte Welle lässt sich sogar ein signifikant *negativer* Zusammenhang konstatieren. Ferner erweist sich die Erklärungskraft von Vertrauen in politische Institutionen gegenüber regulativen Institutionen als durchweg stärker. Im Unterschied zu den beiden deutschen Landesteilen wirkt sich in Westeuropa die persönliche Einschätzung von Politikfeldern, wie z.B. dem Bildungssystem, sehr wohl auf die individuelle Vertrauensbereitschaft aus. Erwartungsgemäß fallen hingegen die Befunde für die Prädiktoren Lebenszufriedenheit und subjektives Sicherheitsempfinden aus.¹⁰ Die Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken ist indessen in der dritten und vierten Erhebungswelle erkennbar erklärungs- schwach. Dagegen sind insbesondere höher Gebildete und Personen mit zufriedenstellendem monatlichem Haushaltseinkommen eher geneigt, anderen Menschen Vertrauen entgegenzubringen. Im gesamteuropäischen Vergleich erzielen die westeuropäischen Regressionsmodelle zudem die stärkste Erklärungskraft. Deutlich geringer fällt dagegen die Erklärungskraft der osteuropäischen Modelle aus. Obwohl auch für den östlichen Teil Europas politisches Vertrauen und Lebenszufriedenheit von herausragender Bedeutung für die Stärkung sozialen Vertrauens sind, zeigen die übrigen Kennzahlen zweifelsfrei, dass sowohl die Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken als auch das subjektive Sicherheitsempfinden in deutlich geringerem Umfang Erklärungskraft entfalten. Allerdings scheint auch im Osten Europas höhere Bildung eine wesentliche Voraussetzung sozialen Vertrauens zu sein. Die differenzierte Operationalisierung politischen Vertrauens bestätigt wiederum die geringe Relevanz von Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure. Im Zeitverlauf lässt sich dagegen keine eindeutige Aussage zur Effektrangfolge des Vertrauens in politische und regulative Institutionen treffen. Ähnlich wie im Westen des Kontinents wirkt sich die persönliche Einschätzung der Osteuropäer von Politikfeldern auf die Vertrauens- bereitchaft aus. Insbesondere die Bewertung des Zustands der Gesundheitssysteme kommt hierbei zum Tragen.

9 Die Befunde dieser linearen Regressionsanalysen werden aus Platzgründen an dieser Stelle nicht dargestellt.

10 Die westeuropäischen Ergebnisse der dritten Welle unterscheiden sich nicht, da Zypern aufgrund der fehlenden Bildungsvariable nicht in die Analyse aufgenommen wurde und somit kein Unterschied zwischen den beiden Länder-Samples vorliegt. Identität der Länder-Samples existiert auch für die erste und zweite Erhebungswelle der osteuropäischen Länder.

Wie die deutsch-deutschen und europäischen Analysen aufzeigen, lassen sich zwar unterschiedliche Wirkungszusammenhänge zwischen sozialem Vertrauen und den hier überprüften Determinanten ermitteln, diese fallen jedoch überwiegend marginal aus und beschreiben keine grundsätzlich gegenläufigen Tendenzen. Hypothese 4 wird somit empirisch bestätigt.

Für die Wirkungsanalysen politischen Vertrauens werden die „top-down“, „bottom-up“ sowie persönlichkeitsorientierten Erklärungsansätze überprüft. Neben den soziodemographischen Variablen, Alter, Geschlecht und Bildung werden Zufriedenheit mit dem monatlichen Haushaltseinkommen und der wirtschaftlichen Lage im Lande, persönliche Lebenszufriedenheit, soziales Vertrauen, Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken, persönliche Diskriminierungserfahrungen, persönliche Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit, politisches Interesse, Kirchengangshäufigkeit, subjektives politisches Kompetenzgefühl sowie die persönlichen Einschätzungen des jeweils aktuellen Zustandes des nationalen Gesundheits- sowie Bildungssystems berücksichtigt.¹¹ In Anlehnung an die weiter oben präsentierten Hypothesen werden positive Effekte von Lebens-, Wirtschafts- und Einkommenszufriedenheit, sozialem Vertrauen, Netzwerkzugehörigkeit, politischem Interesse und regelmäßiger Kirchengangshäufigkeit, subjektivem politischem Kompetenzgefühl, positiven Einschätzungen relevanter Politikfelder sowie der Abwesenheit von persönlichen Diskriminierungserfahrungen sowie Arbeitslosigkeit erwartet. Anzumerken ist, dass der Faktor Lebenszufriedenheit zwar nicht unmittelbar politischen Orientierungen zugeordnet werden kann, als individuelle Disposition, deren Einfluss auf politisches Vertrauen in früheren Studien nachgewiesen wurde, erscheint diese Determinante dennoch relevant und das empirische Vorgehen vertretbar (Zmerli u. a. 2007). Konkrete Aussagen zur Effektstärke bzw. -richtung der soziodemographischen Variablen lassen sich nicht treffen, da *konsistente* empirische Befunde noch ausstehen.

Sämtliche Erklärungsmodelle zu Vertrauen in politische Institutionen bescheinigen den Determinanten Wirtschaftszufriedenheit, soziales Vertrauen sowie politisches Interesse bedeutende Erklärungskraft (Tabelle 3). Vor dem Hintergrund der divergenten deskriptiven Befunde überrascht diese europaweit ermittelte Konsistenz der Ergebnisse. Vergleichbares gilt für die Relevanz der Bewertung einzelner Politikfelder. Nahezu durchweg weisen sowohl die Einschätzung des Gesundheits- und Bildungssystems als auch die wahrgenommene Effizienz und Gleichbehandlung durch Finanzbehörden (ESS 4) signifikant positive Zusammenhänge mit dieser politischen Vertrauenskategorie auf. Mit Ausnahme der ersten Erhebungswelle des ESS tragen auch die beiden Altersprädiktoren in erheblichem Umfang zur Erklärungskraft der Regressionsmodelle bei. Im Falle Ostdeutschlands erlangen diese Messgrößen jedoch keine statistische Signifikanz. Dies gilt ebenfalls für die ‚DDR-Sozialisationsvariable‘, deren Koeffizientenvorzeichen im Zeitverlauf veränderlich sind und in keinem einzigen Fall statistische Signifikanz erlangen.¹² Ferner legt eine

12 Siehe Fußnote 9.

Tabelle 3: Determinanten von Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2002			ESS 2004			E-O	E-O*
	E-W*	D-W	D-O	E-W*	D-W	D-O		
Konstante	0,10***	0,01	0,10	0,09***	0,08*	0,09	0,08***	0,08***
Geschlecht	0,01*	-0,00	0,01	0,01**	0,01**	0,02	0,03***	0,03***
Alter	0,00	-0,11	-0,04	-0,24***	-0,23***	-0,32	-0,29***	-0,29***
Alter (quadr.)	-0,06	0,07	-0,02	0,24***	0,21***	0,23	0,29***	0,29***
Bildung	0,03***	0,07**	0,03	0,03***	0,02***	0,03	0,03**	0,03**
Einkommenszufriedenheit	-0,01	0,07***	0,05	-0,01	0,02	0,03	-0,07***	-0,07***
Soziales Vertrauen	0,20***	0,24***	0,22***	0,19***	0,28***	0,18***	0,25***	0,25***
Lebenszufriedenheit	0,00	0,01	-0,04	0,01	0,00	-0,01	-0,03**	-0,03**
Soziale Netzwerke	-0,01	-0,00	-0,04	-0,04***	0,01	-0,00	-0,01	-0,01
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	-0,05***	-0,07***	-0,08	-0,03***	-0,04**	-0,11*	0,00	0,00
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,05***	-0,05**	-0,07	-0,02***	-0,03***	-0,03	-0,05***	-0,05***
Politisches Interesse	0,13***	0,12***	0,16***	0,13***	0,12***	0,09**	0,13***	0,13***
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,23***	0,29***	0,31***	0,21***	0,30***	0,35***	0,30***	0,30***
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,02***	-0,01***	-0,01	-0,00	-0,01	-0,02	-0,00	-0,00
Gesundheitssystem	0,14***	0,09***	0,06	0,14***	0,15***	0,10**	0,07***	0,07***
Bildungssystem	0,08***	0,09***	0,07	0,11***	0,10***	0,18***	0,03**	0,03**
Subjektive pol. Effektivität	0,04***	0,03	-0,03	0,03***	0,04*	0,07	0,02*	0,02*
Korrigiertes R ² in %	34,4	32,7	29,2	34,9	35,9	46,6	26,3	26,3
N	21.301	23.436	2.153	21.326	2.074	493	9.009	9.009

Signifikanz: *p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Fortsetzung Tabelle 3: Determinanten von Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und Akteure (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2006				ESS 2008							
	E-W*	F-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-O*	E-W*	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-O*
Konstante	0,03**	0,03**	0,17***	0,02*	-0,01	-0,03	0,08***	0,08***	0,16***	0,12	0,04**	-0,03
Geschlecht	0,01***	0,01***	0,00	0,03	0,02***	0,02***	0,01***	0,01***	0,00	0,02	0,01***	0,02***
Alter	-0,22***	-0,22***	-0,38**	-0,37	-0,12*	-0,08	-0,31***	-0,27***	-0,42***	-0,46	-0,13**	-0,15**
Alter (quadrat)	0,18***	0,18***	0,38**	0,34	0,19***	0,16*	0,22***	0,20***	0,32**	0,34	0,14**	0,19**
Bildung	0,03***	0,03***	0,02	0,02	-0,02	-0,02*	0,01	0,00	-0,01	0,04	-0,03***	-0,03**
Einkommenszufriedenheit	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,03	-0,02***	-0,01	-0,00	-0,00	0,06**	0,00	-0,01	0,03***
Soziales Vertrauen	0,23***	0,23***	0,23***	0,23***	0,16***	0,17***	0,24***	0,23***	0,26***	0,14**	0,14***	0,17***
Lebenszufriedenheit	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03	0,01	0,00	-0,01	0,03***	0,04***	-0,01	0,03	0,01	0,00
Soziale Netzwerke	0,01	0,01	-0,04*	0,02	0,01	0,02**	-0,02***	-0,02***	0,03	0,02	-0,01*	0,02*
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,05**	-0,08*	0,02*	0,01	-0,05***	-0,05***	-0,08***	-0,06	-0,02**	0,00
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,04	0,02	-0,01**	-0,00	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03	-0,06	-0,02***	-0,01
Politisches Interesse	0,13***	0,13***	0,08***	0,06*	0,10***	0,09***	0,13***	0,13***	0,07***	0,12***	0,11***	0,10***
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,23***	0,23***	0,17***	0,29***	0,27***	0,28***	0,27***	0,26***	0,15***	0,21***	0,36***	0,31***
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,00	-0,00	-0,03**	-0,00	-0,01	-0,01*	-0,00	-0,00	0,00	-0,00	-0,01	0,00
Gesundheitssystem	0,12***	0,12***	0,17***	0,14***	0,12***	0,11***	0,04***	0,04***	0,00	-0,01	-0,01	0,02*
Bildungssystem	0,15***	0,15***	0,17***	0,12***	0,09***	0,08***	0,10***	0,09***	0,15***	0,15**	0,10***	0,12***
Subjektive pol. Effektivität	0,02**	0,02**	-0,04*	0,03	0,01	0,06***	0,16***	0,16***	0,12***	0,16***	0,08***	0,06***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	37,2	37,2	33,6	40,3	29,2	30,2	44,3	42,4	28,8	34,7	30,7	31,8
N	22.853	22.854	2.083	516	13.820	8.206	22.287	23.256	2.029	486	17.553	9.828

Signifikanz: *p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Untersuchung der erklärten Varianzen im Zeitverlauf nahe, dass das Erklärungsmodell den ostdeutschen Gegebenheiten zumindest in der zweiten und dritten Welle am besten entspricht. Allerdings fällt die Bandbreite der Schwankungen recht hoch aus, was auch für Westeuropa feststellbar ist. Die größten Konsistenzen erklärter Varianzen werden dagegen für Westdeutschland und Osteuropa diagnostiziert.

Die Analyse der Determinanten des Vertrauens in regulative Institutionen deckt eine Reihe von Gemeinsamkeiten mit der vorangegangenen Untersuchung auf, verweist aber auch auf einige markante Unterschiede (Tabelle 4). Unabhängig von Region und Erhebungswelle erzielen die Regressionsmodelle zu regulativen Institutionen eine durchweg geringere erklärte Varianz, die sich allerdings im Zeitverlauf über alle Untersuchungseinheiten hinweg steigert. Der deutsch-deutsche Vergleich legt nahe, dass die ostdeutschen Modelle eine stärkere Erklärungskraft entfalten. Europäische Vergleichswerte erreichen beide deutschen Landesteile dagegen nahezu ausnahmslos nicht. Auch für Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen gilt europaweit, dass soziales Vertrauen, Wirtschaftszufriedenheit sowie positive Einschätzungen des Zustands wichtiger Politikfelder einen wesentlichen Beitrag leisten. Auffallend ist jedoch, dass für die westdeutsche Bevölkerung die Zufriedenheit mit der Wirtschaft von vergleichsweise geringerer Bedeutung zu sein scheint. Im Unterschied zu den Determinanten des Vertrauens in politische Institutionen spielt politisches Interesse hier nur eine untergeordnete Rolle. Dieser Befund überrascht wenig, bestätigt er doch vielmehr die Annahme, dass Polizei und Justiz in ihrer Funktion tendenziell als fair und unparteiisch wahrgenommen werden. In gewisser Hinsicht fügt sich hier ebenfalls das Ergebnis zur Relevanz einer höheren Lebenszufriedenheit ein. Funktionsfähige regulative Institutionen vermögen den Bürgern eines Landes Gefühle von Sicherheit, Fairness und Gleichbehandlung zu vermitteln, die sich ihrerseits auf individuelle Lebenszufriedenheit auswirken. Allein in Ostdeutschland lässt sich dieser Zusammenhang nicht nachweisen. Interessanterweise lassen sich nun für die Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Netzwerken ausschließlich negative Koeffizienten ermitteln, sofern sie statistisch signifikant sind. Unter Umständen weist dieser Zusammenhang auf gegenseitigen Erfahrungsaustausch mit regulativen Institutionen in sozialen Netzwerken hin, der offensichtlich nicht zum Vorteil für Polizei und Justiz ausfällt. Eine weitere Erklärung könnte mit einem möglicherweise erhöhten Sicherheitsbedürfnis sozial weniger integrierter Personen im Zusammenhang stehen. Die Prädiktoren Bildung und Kirchgangshäufigkeit verweisen als einzige unabhängige Variablen auf eine Divergenz zwischen west- und ostdeutschen Bürgern sowie west- und osteuropäischen Gesellschaften. Während sich höhere Bildung in Westeuropa und zu zwei Erhebungszeitpunkten auch in Westdeutschland statistisch signifikant auf die individuelle Vertrauensneigung auswirkt, ist dieser signifikante Effekt in Ostdeutschland entweder nicht oder in Osteuropa nur mit negativem Vorzeichen zu beobachten. Ferner trägt im Westen Europas und auch in Westdeutschland die Häufigkeit des Kirchgangs zu einer größeren Vertrauensbereitschaft bei. Ein vergleichbar signifikantes Phänomen lässt sich in den neuen Ländern hingegen nicht beobachten. Für den Osten Europas fällt der Befund zu uneinheitlich aus, um zu einer klaren

Tabelle 4: Determinanten von Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2002			ESS 2004		
	E-W*	D-W	E-O	E-W*	D-W	E-O
Konstante	0,31***	0,35***	0,20***	0,19***	0,34***	0,18
Geschlecht	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,01**	-0,00	0,03
Alter	-0,08*	-0,01	-0,13	0,01	-0,18	0,13
Alter (quadratiert)	0,09*	0,01	0,11	0,01	0,25*	-0,28
Bildung	0,04***	0,03	-0,01	0,04***	0,06*	0,02
Einkommenszufriedenheit	-0,04***	0,03	-0,03*	-0,01	0,01	-0,03
Soziales Vertrauen	0,21***	0,17***	0,21***	0,21***	0,25***	0,23***
Lebenszufriedenheit	0,07***	0,11***	0,05***	0,08***	0,06**	0,08
Soziale Netzwerke	-0,04***	0,01	-0,04**	-0,03***	0,01	-0,01
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	-0,07***	-0,07***	-0,03**	-0,04***	-0,04*	-0,00
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,04***	-0,03	-0,02	-0,03***	-0,03	-0,04
Politisches Interesse	0,02***	0,04**	0,05***	0,04***	-0,01	0,06
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,15***	0,04*	0,25***	0,15***	0,10***	0,18***
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,01*	-0,01	0,00	-0,00	-0,02*	-0,03
Gesundheitssystem	0,09***	0,13***	0,08***	0,13***	0,08***	0,21***
Bildungssystem	0,15***	0,13***	0,15***	0,14***	0,12***	0,09
Subjektive pol. Effektivität	0,03***	-0,03	0,03*	0,02***	0,02	0,03
Korrigiertes R ² in %	24,1	18,2	23,4	27,8	21,0	28,8
N	21.338	2.147	5.635	21.376	2.080	492
	23.509	504	5.635	24.523	2.987	8.987
						23,9
						8,987

Signifikanz: *p<0,05, ** p<0,01, *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Fortsetzung Tabelle 4: Determinanten von Vertrauen in regulative Institutionen (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2006			ESS 2008			E-O*
	E-W*	D-O	E-O	E-W*	D-W	D-O	
Konstante	0,11***	0,38***	0,08***	0,19***	0,31***	0,25**	0,09***
Geschlecht	0,02***	-0,01	0,03***	0,01**	0,00	0,03	0,02***
Alter	0,03	-0,13	0,05	-0,06	0,22	-0,32	-0,16**
Alter (quadr.)	-0,03	0,16	-0,04	0,04	-0,32*	0,22	0,17**
Bildung	0,04***	0,01	-0,02	0,05***	0,05*	0,02	-0,05***
Einkommenszufriedenheit	0,00	-0,01	0,05	-0,02**	0,05*	-0,08	0,01
<i>Soziales Vertrauen</i>	0,24***	0,14***	0,33***	0,22***	0,21***	0,27***	0,19***
Lebenszufriedenheit	0,05***	0,11***	0,05	0,06***	0,07**	0,05	0,12***
Soziale Netzwerke	-0,00	0,01	0,04	-0,03**	-0,02	0,05	-0,02**
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	-0,02***	-0,05**	-0,03	0,03**	-0,06**	0,02	-0,01
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,03***	-0,06**	0,03	-0,03***	-0,01	-0,11*	-0,01
Politisches Interesse	0,04***	0,04***	0,02**	0,03***	0,04*	0,05	0,06***
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,19***	0,11***	0,21***	0,22***	0,08***	0,15**	0,21***
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,01	-0,01	0,00	-0,01*	-0,01	-0,02	0,01*
Gesundheitssystem	0,12***	0,12***	0,14***	0,02*	-0,03	0,03	-0,02*
Bildungssystem	0,16***	0,11***	0,15***	0,11***	0,08**	0,13*	0,02***
Subjektive pol. Effektivität	0,02**	-0,04	0,03***	0,16***	0,14***	0,19***	0,02***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	32,1	21,1	26,8	33,0	16,8	23,9	27,8
N	22.910	2.097	13.799	22.327	2.034	486	17.536

Anmerkungen: Signifikanz: *p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Aussage zu gelangen. Schließlich bleibt zu erwähnen, dass die ‚DDR-Sozialisationsvariable‘ auch in diesem Erklärungsmodell zu keinem Erhebungszeitpunkt einen belastbaren statistischen Nachweis erbringt.

Gegenüber den beiden zuvor untersuchten Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens fällt die Modellgüte der linearen Regressionsmodelle zu Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure vielfach vergleichsweise moderat aus (Tabelle 5). Ein weiteres Mal sind es insbesondere soziales Vertrauen, Wirtschaftszufriedenheit sowie die positive Bewertung einzelner Politikfelder, die zur Stärkung dieser Vertrauensdimension beitragen. Zudem ist zu beobachten, dass größeres politisches Interesse zu einer höheren Vertrauensneigung führt. Für die beiden deutschen Länder erweist sich dieser Befund allerdings als weniger stabil. Der bemerkenswerteste Unterschied zwischen den westlichen und östlichen europäischen Gesellschaften lässt sich anhand der beiden Altersvariablen abbilden. Nachweislich sind deren Effekte im Westen, auch in den alten Ländern, über den gesamten Zeitverlauf hinweg statistisch signifikant. Eine vergleichbare Aussage lässt sich dagegen für die osteuropäischen Staaten nur für die vierte ESS-Welle treffen. Auch in den neuen Ländern ist die Befundlage nicht eindeutig. Klarer erscheint sie hingegen in Bezug auf die Bedeutung der Sozialisation in der DDR. Wie bereits zuvor lässt sich keinerlei statistisch signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen DDR-Sozialisation und politischem Vertrauen ausmachen.

Die Hypothesentests zu politischem Vertrauen ergeben ein ambivalentes Bild. Zwar zeigt sich, dass soziales Vertrauen tatsächlich in einem systematisch positiven Zusammenhang zu politischem Vertrauen steht (H5a) und dessen Effektstärken insbesondere zwischen politischen und regulativen Institutionen einerseits und externen Akteuren andererseits variieren (H5b). Die Hypothese zur „top-down“-Perspektive (H6a) wurde ebenfalls durchweg empirisch bestätigt. Dagegen lässt sich der „bottom-up“-Erklärungsansatz nicht uneingeschränkt aufrecht erhalten (H6b). Lediglich politisches Interesse entfaltet über alle drei Dimensionen politischen Vertrauens und alle Untersuchungseinheiten hinweg nennenswerte positive Effekte. Zudem muss die Hypothese zur Relevanz persönlicher Erfahrungen von Diskriminierung oder Arbeitslosigkeit verworfen werden (H6c). Nennenswerte Effektunterschiede, die im deutsch-deutschen oder europäischen Vergleich auf verschiedenartige Wirkmechanismen hinweisen würden, ließen sich nicht identifizieren. Insofern findet Hypothese 7 ihre empirische Bestätigung.

Drei nennenswerte Schlussfolgerungen lassen sich aus den vorgenommenen Analysen ziehen. Erstens verläuft der gesellschaftliche Riss, der sich in einer divergenten Vertrauenshaltung gegenüber Mitmenschen sowie politischen und regulativen Institutionen manifestiert, nicht entlang einer imaginären deutsch-deutschen Trennlinie. Vielmehr entzweit er etablierte Demokratien und postsozialistische Gesellschaften, wobei Ostdeutschland sein sozialistisches Erbe bereits weitgehend abgelegt zu haben scheint. Gerade in den letzten Jahren hat sich dieser divergente Trend sogar noch verstärkt. Zweitens zeigt das Beispiel Ostdeutschlands, dass dieses Auseinanderdriften weniger auf langfristig und nachhaltig wirkende Sozialisations effek-

Tabelle 5: Determinanten von Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2002			ESS 2004			E-O	E-O*						
	E-W*	E-W	D-O	D-W	E-W	D-O			E-O	E-O*				
Konstante	0,42***	0,43***	0,31***	0,15	0,26***	0,27***	0,36***	0,38***	0,22***	0,26***	0,22***	0,22***	0,22***	0,22***
Geschlecht	0,01***	0,01***	0,02*	-0,00	-0,00	-0,00	0,01**	0,01**	0,02*	-0,01	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Alter	-0,45***	-0,46***	-0,52***	-0,16	-0,18	-0,18	-0,64***	-0,65***	-0,75***	-0,73*	-0,14	-0,14	-0,14	-0,14
Alter (quadratiert)	0,32***	0,34***	0,48***	0,15	0,09	0,09	0,57***	0,56***	0,65***	0,72*	0,05	0,05	0,05	0,05
Bildung	0,01	0,01	0,05	-0,00	0,02	0,02	0,05***	0,05***	0,06*	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
Einkommenszufriedenheit	-0,02**	-0,01*	0,02	0,04	-0,02	-0,02	-0,01	-0,01	-0,04	0,03	0,02	0,02	0,02	0,02
Soziales Vertrauen	0,16***	0,16***	0,21***	0,26***	0,17***	0,17***	0,16***	0,15***	0,28***	0,22***	0,19***	0,19***	0,19***	0,19***
Lebenszufriedenheit	0,01	0,01	0,02	-0,04	0,03	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,03	0,06	0,03*	0,03**	0,03**	0,03**
Soziale Netzwerke	0,00	-0,00	0,01	-0,00	-0,02	-0,02	0,01	0,01	0,01	-0,02	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Kirchengängigkeit	-0,07***	-0,08***	-0,06**	-0,01	-0,03***	-0,03*	-0,03***	-0,04***	-0,02	-0,07	-0,02	-0,02	-0,02	-0,02
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,05***	-0,05***	-0,04	-0,02	-0,02	-0,02	-0,04***	-0,04***	-0,04*	-0,03	-0,02	-0,02	-0,02	-0,02
Politisches Interesse	0,06***	0,06***	0,11***	0,13***	0,15***	0,15***	0,06***	0,06***	0,03	0,09*	0,11***	0,11***	0,11***	0,11***
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,14***	0,12***	0,16***	0,19***	0,19***	0,19***	0,17***	0,16***	0,27***	0,23***	0,21***	0,21***	0,21***	0,21***
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,01	-0,00	0,00	-0,02	0,01	0,01	0,00	-0,00	0,01	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
Gesundheitssystem	0,07***	0,06***	0,09***	0,08	0,02	0,02	0,04***	0,04***	0,05*	0,13**	0,03**	0,03**	0,03**	0,03**
Bildungssystem	0,09***	0,11***	0,06**	0,12**	0,16***	0,16***	0,12***	0,12***	0,10***	0,14**	0,10***	0,10***	0,10***	0,10***
Subjektive pol. Effektivität	0,02**	0,01	-0,01	0,01	0,08***	0,08***	0,03***	0,02**	0,12***	0,00	0,05***	0,05***	0,05***	0,05***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	16,2	15,4	16,8	19,1	17,2	17,2	19,1	18,5	26,0	30,2	14,5	14,5	14,5	14,5
N	20.332	22.432	2.095	486	4.994	4.994	20.501	23.516	1.987	477	7.850	7.850	7.850	7.850

Signifikanz: *p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

Fortsetzung Tabelle 5: Determinanten von Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure (OLS, unstandardisierte Regressionskoeffizienten)

	ESS 2006				ESS 2008							
	E-W*	E-W	D-W	D-O	F-O	F-O*	E-W*	E-W	D-W	D-O	E-O	E-O*
Konstante	0,31**	0,31***	0,22***	0,17	0,23***	0,19***	0,36***	0,35***	0,37***	0,34***	0,22***	0,22***
Geschlecht	0,02***	0,02***	0,02*	0,01	0,00	0,01*	0,02***	0,02***	0,02	0,05**	0,00	0,01**
Alter	-0,50***	-0,50***	-0,46**	-0,44	-0,13	-0,11	-0,57***	-0,53***	-0,66***	-0,74*	-0,16**	-0,34***
Alter (quadrat)	0,37***	0,37***	0,39**	0,31	0,12	0,10	0,40***	0,37***	0,44**	0,63*	0,11	0,29***
Bildung	0,05***	0,05***	0,02	0,08	0,01	0,03	0,02**	0,01*	0,04	-0,01	0,03*	0,02*
Einkommenszufriedenheit	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,07	-0,02**	0,02	-0,02***	-0,02***	0,02	-0,05	-0,01	0,02
Soziales Vertrauen	0,20***	0,20***	0,21***	0,21***	0,11***	0,16***	0,15***	0,14***	0,26***	0,15***	0,14***	0,17***
Lebenszufriedenheit	-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,03	0,02	0,07***	0,05***	0,04***	0,05***	0,00	0,05	0,08***	0,06***
Soziale Netzwerke	0,03***	0,03***	0,00	0,01	0,02	0,02*	0,01	0,00	0,05*	0,02	0,00	0,01
Kirchgangshäufigkeit	-0,03***	-0,03***	0,03	-0,04	-0,04***	-0,02	-0,05***	-0,05***	-0,08***	-0,01	-0,04***	-0,02*
Diskriminierungserfahrung	-0,04***	-0,04***	-0,00	0,02	-0,02	0,01	-0,03***	-0,03***	0,00	-0,06	-0,02**	-0,02
Politisches Interesse	0,06***	0,06***	0,05**	0,06	0,10***	0,08***	0,07***	0,07***	0,04*	0,08	0,10***	0,10***
Wirtschaftszufriedenheit	0,14***	0,14***	0,12***	0,18***	0,13***	0,13***	0,18***	0,18***	0,08***	0,15**	0,20***	0,20***
Arbeitslosigkeit	-0,01*	-0,01*	-0,02*	-0,01	0,00	-0,00	-0,01*	-0,01*	0,01	-0,00	0,01**	0,01
Gesundheitssystem	0,07***	0,07***	0,14***	0,12*	0,04**	0,04**	0,02**	0,02***	-0,02	-0,03	0,02	0,03*
Bildungssystem	0,13***	0,13***	0,14***	0,08	0,18***	0,15***	0,08***	0,08***	0,13***	0,11	0,05***	0,03*
Subjektive pol. Effektivität	0,01	0,01	0,04	0,00	0,07***	0,06***	0,14***	0,14***	0,08***	0,18***	0,12***	0,13***
Korrigiertes R ² in %	19,8	19,8	19,6	22,8	13,8	15,7	23,6	22,5	17,6	18,8	14,5	17,7
N	22.008	22.008	2.005	504	12.272	7.453	21.458	22.406	1.978	468	16.222	9.560

Signifikanz: *p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Gewichtet für Design-Effekte.

te zurückzuführen ist, die persönlichen Erfahrungen während der Zeit des Sozialismus geschuldet sind, als vielmehr auf Indikatoren politischer und wirtschaftlicher Systemperformanz. Denn tatsächlich erweisen sich für sämtliche Untersuchungseinheiten, auch für die osteuropäischen, politisches Vertrauen, positive Bewertungen von Politikfeldern sowie Zufriedenheit mit der wirtschaftlichen Leistung des eigenen Landes als aussagekräftigste Determinanten. Schließlich wurde der empirische Nachweis erbracht, dass soziales und politisches Vertrauen in einer engen Wechselwirkung zueinander stehen. Gerade diese enge Verzahnung zwischen sozialem und politischem Vertrauen gibt jedoch für die weitere Entwicklung Osteuropas Anlass zur Sorge. Demnach wäre es nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis sich der in Osteuropa beobachtbare Abwärtstrend politischen Vertrauens auch auf die Bereitschaft, seinen Mitmenschen vertrauensvoll zu begegnen, auswirken würde. Diese Aussichten lassen die Hoffnung auf eine auf Dauer angelegte Legitimation der noch jungen demokratischen Systeme, stabilen gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt, sozialen Frieden sowie Stärkung der wirtschaftlichen Leistungskraft schwinden.

Schlussfolgerungen und Diskussion

Zwanzig Jahre nach dem Mauerfall lässt der Blick auf Deutschland in Europa den Schluss zu, dass sich West- und Ostdeutsche in ihren politischen Einstellungen in naher Zukunft nicht mehr maßgeblich voneinander unterscheiden werden und damit inmitten der *westeuropäischen* Gesellschaften angekommen sind. Was für die Westdeutschen bereits seit geraumer Zeit gilt, hätte demnach auch für die Bürger der neuen Länder Gültigkeit. Auch wenn aktuelle Studien (Sozialreport 2010) belegen, dass die innere Einheit Deutschlands nach wie vor nicht vollzogen ist, zeigen die auf die vier Wellen des ESS gestützten vergleichenden Analysen dennoch eine deutlich größere Nähe der Ostdeutschen zu westdeutschen und entsprechend auch westeuropäischen Vertrauensmustern als zu denjenigen der postsozialistischen Gesellschaften Osteuropas. Aus dieser ermutigenden Feststellung lässt sich aber auch schließen, dass Bürger flexibel auf veränderte politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen reagieren können. Diese Annahme wird zudem durch empirische Befunde gestützt, die einen Fortbestand von Einstellungsmustern widerlegen, die während der SED-Diktatur erworben wurden. Somit käme das sozialistische Erbe der mittel- und osteuropäischen Länder weniger einem unabwendbaren Fluch als vielmehr einer schweren, aber überwindbaren Bürde gleich. Trotz allem muss die Erfolgsgeschichte der deutschen Wiedervereinigung als das gesehen werden, was sie tatsächlich war: ein glücklicher Ausnahmetatbestand, der in dieser Form auf kein anderes europäisches Land übertragbar gewesen wäre. Im Unterschied zu allen anderen postsozialistischen Staaten ermöglichte der Beitritt zur Bundesrepublik den neuen Ländern die unmittelbare Übernahme bewährter demokratischer Institutionen, funktionsfähiger Verwaltungsstrukturen und einer neuen Wirtschaftsordnung, wobei soziale Härten durch finanzielle Transferleistungen abgemildert wurden. Dennoch forderte die Wiedervereinigung auch von den Bürgern der DDR einen hohen Preis,

ging sie doch mit dem Zusammenbruch einer ganzen Volkswirtschaft und dem Verlust zahlreicher Arbeitsplätze einher.

Im Osten Europas beobachten wir dagegen derzeit eine beunruhigende Erosion politischer Unterstützung, die systemdestabilisierend wirken und den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt gefährden könnte. Insbesondere die europaweit erkennbare starke Wechselbeziehung zwischen politischem und sozialem Vertrauen legt diese Schlussfolgerungen nahe. Angesichts dieser überwiegend misstrauischen Haltung stellt sich auch für die Bürger der osteuropäischen Länder die Frage, ob nicht die politische Sozialisation in einem autoritären Regime zwangsläufig zu diesen Einstellungsmustern führt. Gerade der deutliche Vertrauensverlust der letzten Jahre verweist auf die Notwendigkeit weiterer Erklärungsversuche. Es ist anzunehmen, dass diese folgenreiche Entwicklung durch die im Osten Europas allgegenwärtige Korruption, den starken Anstieg sozialer Ungleichheit sowie wirtschaftliche Erschütterungen im Zuge der im Jahr 2008 ausgelösten Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise begünstigt wird (Uslaner 2008). Ein weiteres Indiz zur Entkräftung der ‚Sozialisationsthese‘ liefern die osteuropäischen Kennzahlen zum Vertrauen in externe politische Akteure, wie das Europäische Parlament und die Vereinten Nationen. Obwohl auch für diese Dimension politischen Vertrauens eine rückläufige Tendenz zu beobachten ist, lassen sich innerhalb Europas keine stark divergierenden Niveauunterschiede feststellen. Offensichtlich stehen internationale Institutionen bei den Bürgern Osteuropas deutlich höher im Kurs als deren heimische politische und regulative Institutionen und Akteure. Nicht zuletzt unterstreicht dieser Befund, der in Osteuropa im starken Kontrast zum Vertrauen in politische und regulative Institutionen steht, die Bedeutung einer Differenzierung politischen Vertrauens. Die Untersuchung der Bestimmungsfaktoren dieser drei Dimensionen liefert weitere empirische Nachweise. Während soziales Vertrauen, Wirtschaftszufriedenheit und positive Bewertungen einzelner Politikfelder durchweg Erklärungskraft erzielen, verweisen die Faktoren Lebenszufriedenheit sowie politisches Interesse auf jeweils unterschiedliche Bezugspunkte. Gravierende ost-/westdeutsche bzw. ost-/westeuropäische Differenzen können dagegen nicht aufgedeckt werden. Ähnlich konsistente Befunde ergeben sich auch bei der Analyse sozialen Vertrauens. Lebenszufriedenheit und politisches Vertrauen bilden europaweit ein solides Fundament gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts. Insgesamt findet demnach der größte Teil der weiter oben erläuterten Hypothesen seine empirische Bestätigung, obwohl Effektstärkenunterschiede durchaus beobachtbar sind. Einzig die erwarteten negativen Auswirkungen persönlicher Diskriminierungserfahrungen und Phasen der Arbeitslosigkeit lassen sich nicht überzeugend nachweisen.

Schließlich erscheint es vor dem Hintergrund der empirischen Ergebnisse ratsam, den analytischen Fokus zukünftig verstärkt auf die Gefahren eines politischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Auseinanderdriftens Europas zu richten. Eine stabile Basis für transparentes, responsives und effektives Regieren lässt sich für zahlreiche osteuropäische Länder noch nicht, vielleicht gar immer weniger konstatieren. Im Sinne eines geeinten Europas bliebe zu wünschen, dass der erfolgreichen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Integration dieser Länder in die Europäische Union

zukünftig dieselbe Aufgabe zufällt, wie sie zuvor bereits die Bundesrepublik Deutschland für ihre neuen Länder erfüllte.

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Three forms of trust and their association

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This article investigates the relationships between particular social trust, general social trust, and political trust and tests a variety of political, social-psychological, and social capital theories of them. This sort of research has not been carried out before because until the World Values Survey of 2005–07 there has been, to our knowledge, no comparative survey that includes measures of particular and other forms of trust. The new data challenge a common assumption that particular social trust is either harmful or of little importance in modern democracies and shows that it has strong, positive associations with other forms of trust. However, the relationships are not symmetrical and particular social trust seems to be a necessary but not sufficient cause of general social trust, and both forms of social trust appear to be necessary, but not sufficient conditions for political trust. Strong evidence of mutual associations between different forms of trust at both the individual micro level and the contextual macro level supports theories of rainmaker effects, the importance of political institutions, and the significance of social trust for political trust. In more ways than one, social trust, not least of a particular type, seems to have an important bearing on social and political stability.

Keywords: particular social trust, general social trust, political trust, social capital

Introduction: on social and political trust

In a recent and comprehensive overview of the voluminous and rapidly expanding literature, Peter Nannestad (2008: 432) concludes that ‘The question of trust is a huge puzzle that is not even near solution’. This article tries to solve a part of the puzzle exploring the three-cornered set of associations between particular social trust, general social trust, and political trust. This work focuses on only a part of the puzzle, but at the same time it is at the heart of the much larger project of political sociology conceived as a study of the relationship between politics and the wider society. It also goes to the heart of social capital theory and its claim that contextual effects (the rainmaker effect) have a strong impact on individual trust, as well as considering the impact of institutions on different forms of trust. In other words, it considers both micro theories of a bottom-up, social-psychological,

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and individual nature, and top-down theories that focus on government, social institutions, and aggregate levels of trust.

Much of the current interest in trust derives from social capital theory, which argues that social trust is intimately related to political trust and hence to the health and stability of democracy. It is said that the slow erosion of social trust, and the voluntary associations and social networks that help to produce it, explain the declining levels of support for political leaders and the institutions of government across much of the western world (Putnam, 2000, 2002; Dalton, 2004). In this regard, many writers find it useful to distinguish between particular and general social trust, reasoning that the latter is most important for social capital in a large-scale, mobile, and socially mixed society – a society of strangers (Sahlins, 1972; Newton, 1999: 20–21; Warren, 1999: 8–12). However, there is considerable disagreement in the contemporary literature about (1) the nature and the origins of particular and general social trust, (2) the relationship of particular trust to general trust, and (3) the relationship of different forms of social trust to political trust. Hence, there is also disagreement about what combinations of different forms of trust contribute to social and political stability.

This paper examines the nature, associations, and origins of three kinds of trust. The first part discusses the nature of different kinds of trust, and the second focuses on three models of them to be found in the voluminous and growing social science literature. The third part describes the data used in the study, together with some preliminary empirical results on which the methods and approaches are based. The fourth part proceeds by way of correlation and multi-level analysis to examine the associations between the three types of trust and the independent variables linked with them. The final section returns to the three models of trust, drawing some conclusions about them and more general issues.

The nature of particular, general, and political trust

Particular and general social trust

For some, particular trust is based on knowledge of and close contact with others gained from close and constant contact with others. Hence, Hardin states, ‘for me to trust you, I have to know a fair amount about you’ (Hardin, 2000: 34). Similarly, Rose (1994: 29) finds that east Europeans ‘know who they can trust and trust who they know’, which is generally a fairly small circle of family, friends, and colleagues (see also Luhmann, 1979: 43; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Offe, 1999: 56). In contrast, Uslaner (2000–2001: 573, 2008a: 102) refers to knowledge-based trust as strategic trust, and distinguishes it from particular trust, which is ‘faith only in your own kind’. Strangers, he says, are presumed to be untrustworthy, and he gives the example of religious fundamentalists who see non-believers as heathens.

Empirically, there is probably a good deal of overlap between ‘knowledge based’ particular trust and ‘own-kind’ particular trust, but theoretically they

are distinct. In daily life, most people probably come into closest contact with people like themselves, and they probably develop their most trusting relations with people they come into close and constant contact with, but we cannot assume either of these claims. Do people usually, invariably, or inevitably trust others because they are of the same family, church, ethnic group, neighbourhood, profession, class, status, gender, or generation? Do we trust the person in the next office because he or she is of the same class, status, education, age, ethnic group, and nationality as us? These are subjects for empirical research rather than matters of definition.

In this article, we try to avoid empirical speculation by defining particular trust in a neutral way. Following the standard Oxford English Dictionary definition, the word 'particular' is used here as an adjective describing the noun 'trust' where social trust is associated with specific people or groups of people, whether known or in-group others. General trust is not limited in this way. It extends in a more abstract manner to people as a whole in an unselective and unspecific manner. General trust is inclusive. General trust is the belief that most people can be trusted, even if you do not know them personally, and even if they are not like you socially (Uslaner, 2001–2002: 573). Accordingly, Misztal (1996: 72) suggests that social trust ranges along a continuum from the personal (particular) to the abstract (general), while others see this as a continuum of 'thick' and 'thin' trust, the latter being a basis of the weak, low-density ties of large-scale society (Granovetter, 1973, 1983).

Since it is often assumed that general trust is most important for modern western society, most comparative research ignores particular trust and what little research is published on the subject is impressionistic or else based on plausible assumptions or limited case studies. To our knowledge, there was no systematic comparative study of particular social trust until the World Values survey of 2005–07, the basis of this work, which breaks new research ground and produces new and novel conclusions. However, it seems reasonable to hypothesize with Uslaner (1999: 123) that everyone must trust someone, and consequently that particular trust is fairly widespread in all societies. Much more is known about general social trust, which is a relatively rare commodity in some countries because it involves risks, unknowns, and short-cuts (Luhmann, 1988; Kollock, 1994: 319; Misztal, 1996: 18). In only eight of the 93 nations covered in the World Values study of 2000 does more than half the population say that 'most people can be trusted', and five of these are in the small group of affluent nations in northwestern Europe. In another 19 nations, mostly Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, between a third and a half express attitudes of general trust, but in much of central and east Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, a minority of 25% is willing to express general trust (Newton, 2007: 346). Nevertheless, general trust is vital to modern, large-scale, mobile, and heterogeneous society in which the weak ties of daily life require risk-taking with strangers and casual acquaintances.

The relationship between particular and general social trust

Recent studies have begun to uncover the relationship between particular and general social trust, but with very different results. Some have found that they are distinct and sometimes incompatible sets of attitudes (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994: 144; Yamagishi *et al.*, 1998; Newton, 1999: 180; Stolle, 2001, 2002; Uslaner, 2002: 54), while others find that the two can coexist, or that specific trust can promote general trust (Whiteley, 1999; Yosano and Hayashi, 2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). A third possibility is suggested in an experimental study finding cultural differences between Americans, who tend to trust strangers if they are of the same in-group as themselves, and Japanese, who place greater trust in strangers if they are members of the same personal social network, irrespective of in-group/out-group differences (Yuki *et al.*, 2005). The inconsistent results of research add to the puzzle of trust; are particular and general social trust mutually exclusive or mutually supportive, or does this depend on culture and context?

Social and political trust

Another major part of the trust puzzle is the association between different forms of social and political trust. For some years, empirical research failed to deliver clear support for the social capital theory that social and political trust are linked at the individual level. At best, the evidence was weak and patchy, and at worst it showed no clear associations between social and political trust (Wright, 1976: 104–110; Craig, 1993: 27; Orren, 1997; Hall, 1999; Kaase, 1999; Newton, 1999: 180–185, 2001, 2006a: 84–85; Newton and Norris, 2000: 62–66; Uslaner, 2000–2001: 586, 2002, 2008a: 111; Delhey and Newton, 2005). At the same time, there is better evidence that cross-national levels of aggregate social and political trust are positively associated (Inglehart, 1997, 1999; Rothstein, 1998; Putnam *et al.*, 2000: 26; Newton and Norris, 2000: 52–73; Newton, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Torpe, 2003; Freitag, 2003a; Van der Meer, 2003; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin, 2007; Oskarson, 2007; Svallfors, 2007; Gabriel and Walter-Rogg, 2008; Listhaug and Ringdal, 2008; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008a, b; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009).

More recent studies, however, have found stronger associations between social and political trust at the individual level. Country studies in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and Japan find a close tie between general social and political trust (Freitag 2003a, b; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Bäck and Kestilä, 2008) and cross-national studies at the individual levels have produced similar evidence (Jagodzinski and Manabe, 2004: 85–97; Zmerli and Newton, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). The conclusion that social and political trust are, indeed, associated at both individual and cross-national aggregate levels revives a range of research questions concerning the political importance of social capital.

Although bits of the picture have been filled in, the puzzle of trust remains, not least the triangular set of relations between particular and general social trust and

political trust. A reading of the large and growing social science literature suggests that there are three main models of trust. One claims that different types of social and political trust tend to fit together in a mutually reinforcing pattern, another argues the opposite, and the third suggests a more complicated pattern in which some but not all forms of trust fit together. We will refer to these as the compatible model, the incompatible model and the conditional model.

Three models of social and political trust

Model 1: the compatible model

The simplest model presents all three types of trust as a single syndrome; those who are trusting in one realm of life are usually trusting in the others. Two main schools of thought contribute to this view. The first is the macro approach to social capital arguing that social and political structures and institutions are major influences on levels of trust. Societies with dense networks of social relations and voluntary associations, and with embedded institutions that enforce or encourage trustworthy behaviour (police, courts, civil service and welfare institutions), will develop high levels of social and political trust. This, in turn, will reinforce the institutions and norms of civil society and so create a virtuous spiral (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Rothstein, 1998; Tyler, 1998; Weingast, 1998; Rahn *et al.*, 1999; Knack, 2000; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Newton and Norris, 2000; Paxton, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Uslaner, 2008b).

Social psychology offers a second theory for expecting that most forms of trust are closely associated in the same individual. Glanville and Paxton (2007) label it 'the psychological propensity model'. It argues that trust is a core personality characteristic, learned mainly in early life and intimately linked with other personality characteristics, especially a sense of control over life, a belief in interpersonal cooperation and a sunny and optimistic disposition. In contrast, the distrusting are a misanthropic breed with a dismal view of fate, human nature, and the possibility of cooperation (Erikson, 1950; Rosenberg, 1956, 1957; Allport, 1961; Cattell, 1965; Uslaner, 1999: 138, 2002: 79–86; 2000–2001: 571). If the social psychology school is right, trust and distrust of different kinds are unlikely to mix in the same individual.

The two theories are supported by some empirical evidence. Uslaner (2002: 32–33), for example, finds a small and positive correlation between particular and general social trust, and Herring *et al.* (1999) find little evidence in their study of African-Americans to suggest that strong in-group identity is associated with strong out-group dislike. Whiteley (1999) finds that measures of particular and general trust form a single cumulative scale. Bahry *et al.* (2005: 525, 529) find positive correlations between in-group and out-group trust and conclude that 'Faith in one's own and faith in major out-groups are not mutually exclusive, but complementary'. Glanville and Paxton (2007: 240) find no evidence that trust in any one domain (particular trust) hinders the development of general trust.

Other research finds a mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy, social trust, and political trust (Putnam, 1993, 2000: 136–137; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Inglehart, 1999; Booth and Richard, 2001; Newton, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005). Zmerli and Newton (2008) and Zmerli *et al.* (2007) find a strong and significant positive correlation between individual general social trust and political trust in two separate studies covering democracies in Europe and the United States. Conversely, the political systems of the communist bloc generated both low political and general social trust (Sztompka, 2000; Mishler, and Rose 2001).

The empirical implications of the compatibility model are that (hypothesis 1) the three types of trust are positively associated. However, (hypothesis 2) while social psychologists argue that this is a feature of individual personality characteristics, (hypothesis 3) social capital theorists argue that the association may also be influenced by top–down social climates of trust and by social and political institutions that reinforce trustworthiness.

Model 2: the incompatible model

The second model is almost, but not quite, the reverse of the compatible model. It is based on reasons for believing that particular social trust may be incompatible with both general social trust and political trust. In his influential study of ‘Montegrano’ in southern Italy, Banfield (1958) argues that the local culture of amoral familism entailed trust in the family and automatic distrust of all others, including politicians who are presumed to be only self-interested. More recent work also argues that interpersonal trust (particular trust) is not an instance of a more general impersonal phenomenon, and nor can it simply be transferred to others or to other contexts (Cohen, 1999: 221). Hooghe (2008: 578) and Hardin (2002) say it should not be assumed that we will trust strangers simply because we trust the people we know. There is little theory or evidence to tell us how particular trust can be extended to a general form, which leaves a hole in the theory claiming that the particular can lead to the general.

Some research goes an important step further by claiming that particular and general trust are inimical. A recent study of Russia points out that particular trust is generally assumed to be a zero-sum entity (Bahry *et al.*, 2005: 525). Uslaner (1999: 124–125) writes, ‘the more dependent we are on our close associates and kin, the more we think of the world in terms of “we” and “they”. We won’t trust “most people”’ (Uslaner, 1999: 124). Warren (1999: 318) remarks that particular trust in members of the same family, clan, or group is often combined with general distrust of strangers. There is evidence that particular and general trust load on discrete factors (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Uslaner, 2002: 54), and that general trust is weak among members of associations with strong in-group trust (Stolle, 1998: 503–504).

Other empirical work finds little evidence of associations between social and political trust at either individual or aggregate levels (Kaase, 1999; Newton, 2006a: 84–86, 2006b). This may be because the two are different things, social

trust being influenced largely by social variables, including class, education, and membership of voluntary associations, and political trust being associated mainly with political variables such as political interest, party identification, and use of the political media (Abramson, 1983; Lawrence, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Anderson and LoTempio, 2002).

The empirical implications of the incompatibility model are that there will be (hypothesis 4) a negative correlation between particular and general social trust, and (hypothesis 5) a negative or random association between social trust and political trust.

Model 3: the conditional model

The third model of trust suggests that there is no necessary incompatibility between particular and general social trust, and that the two may be positively associated in some cases, but not necessarily in most or all cases. There are three reasons for advancing this possibility, one logical and two empirical.

The logical argument is simple: it is difficult to conceive of an individual who is high on general trust but low on particular trust, since someone who trusts in general must logically trust in particular. The reverse is not true, however: to trust particular and selected others does not necessarily entail trusting people in general. At the same time, since everyone must trust someone, total distrust is probably as rare as total trust. Even the inhabitants of Montegrano had, perforce, to trust their own family, while distrusting all others.

The second argument for the conditional model is drawn from social psychology research. Much of it assumes, at least implicitly, that in-group identity is necessarily associated with out-group hostility (cf. Brewer, 1999: 430), but recent work shows that in-group attachment is independent of attitudes towards out-groups. Distrust of out-groups depends partly on competition for resources, how much the in-group feels threatened, and on the trade-off between the benefits of closure of in-group boundaries versus the opportunities of opening up to outside groups (Brewer, 1979, 1999, 2007; Yamagishi *et al.*, 1998; Hewstone *et al.*, 2002: 575–604; Voci, 2006).

The third argument supporting the conditional model of trust concerns the wider cultural and institutional context in which in-groups and out-groups exist. Lines of demarcation can change turning out-groups into in-groups, or vice versa. Bates *et al.* (1998) gave an example of how political change caused Serbs and Croats to turn from being peaceful social groups with a high rate of inter-marriage into hostile in- and out-groups. In times of war and crisis, national populations tend to forget their internal differences and concentrate on common and external problems. Liberal and egalitarian cultures may make it easier in some countries to combine particular and general social trust compared with other countries, and countries with established, corruption-free, and power-sharing democratic governments, low levels of inequality, Protestant traditions, a strong rule of law, and universal social services seem to make it easier for individuals to combine all three forms of trust (Freitag, 2003a; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003; Delhey and Newton, 2005;

Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; Neller, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009), compared with non-democratic countries where particular social trust seems to accompany a lack of political and general social trust.

Evidence of conditionality can be found in the very different social contexts of Russia and Germany. Along with other studies of Russia, Bahry *et al.* (2005: 530) find that some individuals express high particular with low general social trust, but they also find others who combine high particular and general social trust. Freitag and Traunmüller (2009) also find evidence of an overlap between general and particular trust in Germany. Trusting one's own group, or particular other ethnic groups, does not necessarily preclude a high level of general social trust, but is not necessarily associated with it either. It may depend upon circumstances.

The conditional model suggests (hypothesis 6) that while all those expressing general trust must necessarily express specific trust, the reverse is not necessarily true and that (hypothesis 7) not all of those who trust in particular will necessarily trust in general, although (hypothesis 8) some will combine both forms of social trust. Similarly, (hypothesis 9) the more open, democratic, and egalitarian a society the more its citizens will combine all three forms of trust.

A note of caution

Often assumed to be much less important than general social trust for modern society, particular trust has slipped into the background of research. The recent *Handbook of Social Capital* (Castiglione *et al.*, 2008) mentions it once, in passing, in its 720 pages. There are a few single-country surveys that include questions about both general and particular social trust, alongside questions about political trust, but until the most recent World Values survey we know of no cross-national study that includes batteries of questions about all three kinds of trust. Therefore, the three models outlined above are built on weak foundations of formal logic, brave assumptions, and some contradictory evidence, some of it circumstantial or based on single case studies. All three models have a *prima facie* plausibility, but Models 1 and 2 are contradictory and both cannot be right.

Data and methods

Since this study focuses on the relationship between social and political trust, it selects from the World Values survey of 2005–07 a set of countries with the highest democratic scores in the Polity IV project. There is little sense in analysing survey responses to questions about political trust in non-democratic countries, where, apart from anything else, the absence of freedom of speech makes it difficult to give honest answers. In 78 countries covered in the 1999–2000 World Values study, confidence in parliament was highest in Vietnam and China, with scores of 98% and 95%, respectively (Newton, 2007: 347). One of the longest and most advanced democracies in the world, Norway, had the same political trust score as Iran (70%), and

Sweden (51%) was barely higher than Zimbabwe (50%). Combining Polity IV democracy scores of 9 and 10 and the World Values data on trust produces a list of 22 democratic countries distributed across Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, and North and South America.¹ The World Values survey was carried out between 2005 and 2007. Sampling and fieldwork methods varied but included face-to-face interviews and mailed questionnaires.² In the 22 selected democracies, 29,163 respondents participated in the survey. In order to test for macro- and micro-level effects on our three individual types of trust, we run multi-level analyses that control for varying intercepts.³ The 2005–07 World Values survey includes a battery of questions about particular and general social trust as well as confidence in political institutions.

Social trust

The World Values survey asks a set of six questions about social trust.

I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?

- Your family
- Your neighbourhood
- People you know personally
- People you meet for the first time
- People of another religion
- People of another nationality.

The first three deal with forms of particular trust involving known others with whom respondents have close ties (family and those they know personally) and people in their neighbourhood. These three measures cover particular social trust in the sense that they ask about particular, specific, and selected others. The last three questions cover general trust in unspecified and possibly different others who are not known personally. In addition, World Values asks: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?'. This is the 'standard' general social trust question used in many surveys. Respondents are offered a 'Yes/No' option for this question, as against the four rating scale of the other six questions, which makes comparison difficult, but it provides a useful benchmark against which to judge the general nature of responses to the last three questions, and vice versa.

Principal component analysis of the pooled social trust data for 22 countries yields a two component solution, one weighted primarily on the measures of

¹ See Table 3.

² See World Values survey 2005–07 Codebook for further details (<http://www.wvsevdb.com/wvs/WVSDocs.jsp?Idioma=1>).

³ In accordance with Hox (2002), we tested in a stepwise manner the presence of random slope effects. The corresponding variance components were weak and often insignificant. For reasons of simplicity and parsimony, we decided to restrict the multi-level analyses to random intercept models.

Table 1. Principal component analyses of measures of social trust, promax rotation, structure matrix, with and without the standard general trust item

	Components			
	1	2	1	2
People of another nationality	0.852	0.292	0.879	0.246
People of another religion	0.837	0.287	0.870	0.238
People you meet for the first time	0.790	0.321	0.779	0.312
Most people can be trusted	0.532	0.136	–	–
Family	0.088	0.833	0.088	0.833
Neighbourhood	0.549	0.680	0.548	0.680
People you know personally	0.603	0.613	0.607	0.605
Eigenvalue	3.1	1.1	3.0	1.1
Explained variance in %	44.8	15.1	49.2	17.5
KMO		0.794		0.775

The newly released World Values survey integrated data set presents equilibrated weights for the 2005 survey in which $N = 1000$ or 1500 . All tables in this paper are based on equilibrated data in which $N = 1000$.

particular trust in known others and the other on the four measures of general trust (Table 1). This confirms the validity of the three general trust questions, and vice versa (see also Uslaner, 2002: 54). Although the six or seven trust measures cluster in two groups, these are not completely distinct, because trust in the neighbourhood and in people known personally show positive loadings on both components, though not the heaviest ones. This suggests that there are two types of social trust corresponding to the particular–general distinction, but that they overlap to some degree.⁴ Similar results have appeared in national studies of the United States, Germany, and Japan (Yosano and Hayashi, 2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009), but Table 1 provides cross-national confirmation of these studies. It is consistent with empirical propositions 6 and 7 of the conditional model.

Political trust

The World Values survey asks the same questions about a set of six political and governmental institutions as follows:

I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

⁴ This overlap is also confirmed by Mokken's scale analysis. Owing to lack of space, the results are not presented here, but they show significant and similar hierarchical patterns for the pooled and cross-national data. The scale analysis suggests that particular social trust lays the foundation for the development of general social trust.

Table 2. Principal component analysis of six measures of confidence in political institutions

	Component 1
Parliament	0.847
Government	0.807
Political parties	0.782
Justice system	0.761
Civil services	0.758
Police	0.676
Eigenvalue	3.6
Explained variance in %	59.9
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin	0.864

Countries weighted by equilibrated weight ($N = 1000$).

The organisations named are parliament, the government, political parties, the justice system, the civil service, and the police. The World Values survey also asks about a further set of private institutions, but since this study focuses on interpersonal social trust and political trust, they are not included in this study.

In common with previous research (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995; Zmerli and Newton, 2008), Table 2 shows that principal component analysis of the six World Values questions tapping political confidence reveals a single component. As with social trust, the principal component analysis shows a common cross-national pattern of responses to political confidence questions.

At this stage, we could conduct two kinds of analysis, one focusing on country variations and explanations of them, the other trying to build high-level cross-national generalizations about trust, irrespective of national differences. Notwithstanding the existence of national variations that are both interesting and important, this article chooses the second approach. The fact that different types of trust cluster in a clearly patterned way when individual data for 22 nations are pooled shows that it is also meaningful to take individuals as the unit of analysis, leaving national comparisons for later work. Correlation and multi-level analysis (see below) support this approach. In addition, analysing pooled individual data across 22 nations helps to set a broadly based framework of research within which particular country variations may be more meaningfully examined at a later stage.

The second choice involves using trust measures based either on factor loadings or indices. We choose to use indices here.⁵ The first index measures particular trust

⁵ Indices are preferred over factor scores because they can be interpreted more intuitively and involve fewer missing values (see also Zmerli and Newton, 2008 for arguments and evidence justifying the use of indices rather than factor loadings). The two indices of social trust are calculated by summing each individual's answers to the three trust questions and dividing by the number of valid responses. In the case of political confidence, six responses are summed and divided by the number of valid responses. The WV

in family, neighbours, and people known personally, and the second measures general trust in people met for the first time and those of other nationalities and religions. Both indices are based on the 4-point rating scale of the trust questions, ranging from 1 (low trust) to 4 (high trust) and have 13 parameter values. The standard general social trust question is dropped from the analysis for three reasons. First, as the authors have shown elsewhere (Zmerli and Newton, 2008), interviewees are offered a 'Yes/No' response option that does not discriminate as effectively as a 4-item rating scale, and second, a single-item measure of social trust is not as sensitive as a 3-item scale. Third, as the figures in Table 1 show, the 3-item scale in the World Values survey is a better measure of general social trust than the standard question. The political trust index is built in the same way using the six political confidence questionnaire items. It ranges from 1 (low trust) to 4 (high trust) and has 37 parameter values.

The study proceeds by way of correlation analysis to show the strength, direction, and consistency of the associations between the three types of trust in the 22 countries, before moving to multi-level analysis to test the strength of their associations with each other and with other individual and contextual variables.

Analysis and results

Cross-national patterns

Table 3 shows the distribution of national trust scores ranked in descending order of general trust. As hypothesized, particular trust is higher than general trust in every country and usually by a substantial margin. The average general trust score for all countries weighted equally is 2.3 on a 4-point scale. For particular trust it is 3.3, which is 43% higher. However, the hypothesis that general social trust is more common than political trust is not supported by the figures. Across the 22 countries, political and general social trust have the same mean of 2.3 and in 13 countries political trust is equal to, or higher than, general social trust. High levels of political compared with general trust are found in a mixture of countries, including South Africa, Switzerland, Finland, India, Cyprus, and Germany, which adds to the puzzle.

Correlations between the three types of trust show that they are positively and significantly associated (Table 4). All correlations except two are statistically significant at 0.01, and those between particular and general trust are most generally the highest, as one might expect.⁶ The correlations are generally within

trust scores have been recoded so that 1 is low and 4 is high. A recoding also applies to the standard general trust question (see Appendix 1).

⁶ The figures in the last two columns for Spain are anomalous and may be erroneous. It does not fit with previous work of this kind on Spain (see Zmerli *et al.*, 2007; Zmerli and Newton, 2008), which shows the country conforming to the general pattern in Europe. We also note in passing that the country figures presented in tables 3 and 4 are not intended to highlight the national differences that undoubtedly exist, but to show that it is possible to reach high-level generalizations about individual trust patterns in 22 democracies, notwithstanding country variations.

Table 3. Means of social and political trust by country, ranked by general social trust

	General social trust			Particular social trust			Political trust		
	Mean	Std. dev.	Unweighted (N)	Mean	Std. dev.	Unweighted (N)	Mean	Std. dev.	Unweighted (N)
New Zealand	3.0	0.8	352	3.6	0.4	907	2.4	0.5	924
Sweden	2.9	0.5	995	3.6	0.4	1003	2.6	0.5	1003
France	2.8	0.7	1000	3.5	0.5	1000	2.2	0.6	1001
Finland	2.7	0.6	1012	3.5	0.4	1014	2.7	0.5	1014
Great Britain	2.6	0.7	1004	3.4	0.4	1038	2.4	0.6	1037
United States	2.6	0.5	1216	3.3	0.4	1214	2.4	0.5	1211
Australia	2.6	0.5	1407	3.4	0.4	1411	2.4	0.5	1404
Switzerland	2.6	0.6	1228	3.4	0.4	1241	2.7	0.5	1240
South Africa	2.4	0.7	2968	3.2	0.5	2988	2.7	0.7	2974
Spain	2.3	0.8	1167	3.4	0.4	1199	2.4	0.5	1189
Poland	2.3	0.6	995	3.2	0.4	1000	2.0	0.6	983
The Netherlands	2.2	0.6	1020	3.2	0.5	1050	2.2	0.5	1047
India	2.2	0.8	1924	3.4	0.5	1984	2.7	0.8	1807
Bulgaria	2.2	0.7	977	3.3	0.4	995	2.1	0.7	990
Germany	2.2	0.7	2006	3.3	0.4	2039	2.2	0.5	2061
Italy	2.1	0.6	995	3.1	0.5	1010	2.3	0.5	1007
Chile	2.0	0.7	952	3.0	0.6	998	2.2	0.6	998
Romania	2.0	0.7	1710	2.9	0.5	1767	2.0	0.6	1755
Slovenia	1.9	0.7	1016	3.2	0.5	1033	2.0	0.6	1013
Cyprus	1.9	0.6	1049	3.1	0.6	1049	2.5	0.7	1049
Mexico	1.8	0.7	1554	3.0	0.6	1557	2.1	0.7	1550
Peru	1.7	0.6	1495	2.8	0.6	1500	1.7	0.6	1490
Average ^a	2.3	0.7	21,956	3.3	0.5	22,855	2.3	0.6	22,718

^aEntries are based on the weighted means of the three trust indices. Average scores and Ns are based on World values equilibrated weight ($N = 1000$). Countries in order of descending mean of general social trust.

Table 4. Correlations between indices of three types of trust. Pearson's r , by country

	General and particular social trust	General social trust and political trust	Particular social trust and political trust
Sweden	0.404***	0.166***	0.105**
New Zealand	0.500***	0.253***	0.201***
Finland	0.457***	0.315***	0.311***
United States	0.539***	0.299***	0.337**
France	0.441***	0.198***	0.249***
Australia	0.440***	0.182***	0.155***
Switzerland	0.399***	0.220***	0.228***
Great Britain	0.343***	0.276***	0.165***
South Africa	0.429***	0.251***	0.238***
Spain	0.376***	0.042	0.081**
Poland	0.370***	0.194***	0.213***
The Netherlands	0.370***	0.298***	0.281***
Germany	0.373***	0.217***	0.172***
Bulgaria	0.307***	0.218***	0.165**
Italy	0.389***	0.168***	0.259***
India	0.238***	0.357***	0.150***
Chile	0.475***	0.264***	0.231***
Romania	0.489***	0.249***	0.280***
Slovenia	0.336***	0.160***	0.197***
Mexico	0.453***	0.222***	0.229***
Cyprus	0.402***	0.249***	0.388***
Peru	0.457***	0.168***	0.194***
Average ^a	0.488***	0.302***	0.297***

^aResults are based on equilibrated weights ($N = 1000$); *** $P < 0.001$, ** $P < 0.01$, * $P < 0.05$.

the same, rather small range in each column showing, once again, strong cross-national consistency. One surprise, however, is that in 10 of the 22 cases, the association between political and particular social trust is stronger than that between political and general social trust. Therefore, as social capital theory would have it, there is a close and positive correspondence between social and political trust at the individual level in all countries, but in some countries particular trust is a more important correlate than general trust. These results are not consistent with the incompatible model of trust, and seem to fit the conditional model better than does the compatible model. Nevertheless, the strong association between particular social and political trust is unexpected.⁷ It also seems from Table 3 that all three forms of trust are generally higher in wealthier and established

⁷ At the aggregate level, there are also strong positive correlations between all three types of trust, with Pearson's r 's of 0.88, 0.71, and 0.58 between particular and general, particular and political, and general and political trust, respectively. Each of them is significant at the 0.000 level.

democracies, a finding that is consistent with previous cross-national studies (Inglehart, 1997, 1999; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Newton, 2007: 347).

The claim that everyone must trust someone is confirmed by the fact that of the 28,031 individuals giving valid answers, only 31 (0.1%) claimed to have no social trust of any of the six kinds. Similarly, no more than 0.6% professed the strange combination of general but not particular trust, a finding that is consistent with hypothesis 6. It may be that 0.1% and 0.6% figures are noise created by interviewer error, miscoding, or failure on the part of those interviewed to understand or hear the questions.⁸ Particular trust is the normal position for nine out of ten people in democratic countries, where 92% express high particular trust (score 2.6 or more on the particular trust index). It is virtually impossible to develop a sense of general trust in the absence of particular trust, but particular trust is not automatically associated with general trust. No less than 99% of those with high general trust have high particular trust, whereas only 45% of those with high particular trust also have high general trust. This combination of figures is consistent with the conditional model, but not with the compatible model or the incompatible model. Nor are the figures consistent with the social psychology school claiming that there is a personality type for whom trust is a core characteristic. It seems that people choose where to place their trust, distinguishing between those close to them (family, neighbours, and those they know well) and those who are not (members of other nations, religions, and those they have just met). Trust is not a general personality characteristic, but something involving choices and distinctions, a suggestion that fits the conditional model.

There is a similar asymmetry between social and political trust, in which the great majority of those with political trust are socially trusting, but only one third to 40% of those who are socially trusting are also politically trusting. This also suggests that social trust, either particular or general, is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of political trust. This also suggests that social trust conditions political trust, although it also indicates an unexpectedly important role for particular trust.

In the next stage of the analysis, we use multi-level modelling in order to put the associations between different forms of trust to a more rigorous test and to estimate the effects of individual and contextual variables on them.

Multi-level analysis

A reading of the already voluminous literature on trust suggests a fairly short and consistent list of individual variables associated with it, namely membership of voluntary associations, education, church attendance, age, gender. For political

⁸ In some ways, cross-tabulations tell us more about the associations between different kinds of trust than correlations, but they consume far more space. For the cross-tabulations, see the authors' paper presented to the ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, September 2009 (<http://www.ecprnet.eu/default.asp>).

trust, we can add political identity and political interest.⁹ The list of contextual variables covers corruption, ethnic heterogeneity, social equality, and various measures of democratic development, durability, and performance.

Individual variables

Associational membership. The enormous importance attached by writers from de Tocqueville to John Stuart Mill to modern studies of social capital, civil society, and voluntary activity should make this a particularly strong determinant of both social and political trust. However, recent summaries of the very large and growing literature on voluntary associations and trust reveal very different, inconclusive, and sometimes contrary findings (Uslaner, 2002; Stolle, 2007: 667–669; Hooghe, 2008: 568–593; Rossteutscher, 2008: 216–224; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008a,b: 277). The relationship between trust and voluntary activity remains an important part of the trust puzzle.

Education. As Uslaner (2008a: 108) observes, ‘virtually every study of generalized trust, in every setting, has found that education is a powerful predictor of trust’.

Gender and age. Gender and age have been included as standard control variables in most trust studies, although their effects are usually small and variable. Women are sometimes less trusting than men, and the old sometimes more trusting than the young, but this pattern varies over time and from one country to another (Newton, 1999: 182–183; Whiteley, 1999: 34–35).

Church attendance. As a proxy for conservative value orientations, church attendance has proven to be positively linked with political trust (see, e.g. Zmerli, 2004).

Political interest and identity. Social trust may be more strongly associated with social variables compared with political trust, which is more closely related to political variables, especially political interest, partisanship, and support for the ruling party or parties, and the left–right scale (Newton, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008b: 282–283). Unfortunately, left–right, partisanship, and government support are either not available in the World values data or else produce a large number of missing cases, and therefore only political interest can be included as an independent variable.

Contextual variables

Homogeneity and ethnic fractionalization. Social heterogeneity is often argued to be a cause of low trust (Helliwell, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hero, 1998, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Glaeser *et al.*, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001;

⁹ The ‘mean world’ effect of the mass media should also be included, but it is difficult to test World Values using the World Values file and there is a large amount of missing data for our 22 countries.

Costa and Kahn, 2003; Eisenberg, 2006). The indicator used here is the Alesina and La Ferrara index of ethnic fractionalization (2002).

Corruption. Corruption in public life is also argued to be a cause of low trust (Svensson, 1998; Alesina *et al.*, 1999; Annett, 1999; Easterly, 2000; Uslander, 2005).

Democratic quality and durability. The better established and developed a democratic system, the more likely it is to sustain comparatively high levels of social and political trust (Dunn, 1993; Putnam, 1993: 111–115; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Inglehart, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000: 70; Booth and Richard, 2001: 55; Paxton, 2002). This study uses the duration of democracy and the *Economist* quality of democracy index as its measures.

Government effectiveness and performance. The more effectively and impartially a political system performs for its citizens, the more likely it is to generate high levels of political trust and to sustain high levels of social trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1275–1276; Tyler, 1998; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Uslander, 2002: 223–229; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008a, b). Three World Bank indicators are used, measuring government effectiveness, rule of law, and regulatory quality.

Equality and inequality. Previous research shows social and economic equality to have a positive association with social and political trust (Putnam, 2000: 354–361; Warren, 2004: 143; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Uslander, 2008a: 113). The indicator used here is the Gini index.¹⁰

In addition, we intend to scrutinize whether and to what extent the inter-relationships between our three types of trust are affected by country-specific variations of the contextual variables. For this purpose, we create cross-level interactions and include them in the multi-level models.

Tables 5, 6 and 7 present multi-level analyses of each type of trust at the individual level. Since the macro variables create problems of colinearity, each table presents them separately. Each set of tables includes both macro and micro measures of the other two types of trust as independent variables in order to test for their aggregate ('rainmaker' effects) and individual level effects on other types of trust.¹¹ Each set of tables includes both fixed effects based on the cross-national consistencies in the pooled individual-level data for 22 countries and cross-level interactions.

Together, the multi-level tables present a rich collection of statistics, from which we may draw six general conclusions. First, the numerous significant cross-level interaction effects show significant country variations, but the fixed effects also show

¹⁰ The details and sources of macro and micro variables are provided in Appendix 1.

¹¹ Macro variables are not included in the first two columns where only the effects of cross-level interactions and micro measures are analysed.

Table 5. (Continued)

Fixed effects	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	3.25***	0.02	3.26***	0.02	3.25***	0.02	3.26***	0.02	3.25***	0.02
Contextual level effects										
Years of democracy	0.00	0.00								
Quality of democracy			0.06**	0.02						
Governance effectiveness					0.08**	0.02				
Rule of law							0.07**	0.02		
Regulatory quality									0.10*	0.04
Individual level effects										
Age	-0.01*	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
Level of education	0.01***	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.01***	0.00
General trust	0.28***	0.01	0.27***	0.01	0.28***	0.01	0.28***	0.01	0.28***	0.01
Political trust	0.13***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.13***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.13***	0.01
Active membership	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01
Political interest	-0.01**	0.00	-0.01**	0.00	-0.01**	0.00	-0.01**	0.00	-0.01**	0.00
Church attendance	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	-0.00	0.01
Cross-level effects										
Years of democracy × general trust	-0.00***	0.00								
Years of democracy × political trust	-0.00	0.00								
Quality of democracy × general trust			-0.04***	0.01						
Quality of democracy × political trust			-0.01	0.01						
Governance effectiveness × general trust					-0.04***	0.01				
Governance effectiveness × political trust					-0.00	0.01				
Rule of law × general trust							-0.04***	0.01		
Rule of law × political trust							-0.00	0.01		
Regulatory quality × general trust									-0.06***	0.01
Regulatory quality × political trust									-0.00	0.01
Variance components										
Individual level	0.18***	0.00	0.18***	0.00	0.18***	0.00	0.18***	0.00	0.18***	0.00
Contextual level	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.00
Deviance		25,423		25,342		25,354		25,349		25,360
Explained variance at level 1 in %		19.6		19.8		19.8		19.8		19.8
Explained variance at level 2 in %		7.2		27.5		30.2		29.0		24.1
N = 21,344										

*** $P < 0.001$, ** $P < 0.01$, * $P < 0.05$; for the coding of the variables see Appendix. Predictors are centred on their grand means. Countries weighted by equilibrated weight ($N = 1000$); explained variances calculated according to Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). The intra-class correlation coefficient based on the empty model indicates that 83.1% of the variance are explained by the first level and 16.9% by the second level.

Table 6. (Continued)

Fixed effects	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	2.32***	0.04	2.33***	0.04	2.32***	0.04	2.32***	0.04	2.31***	0.04
Contextual level effects										
Years of democracy	0.00**	0.00								
Quality of democracy			0.15**	0.04						
Governance effectiveness					0.18**	0.05				
Rule of law							0.17**	0.05		
Regulatory quality									0.25**	0.08
Individual level effects										
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
Level of education	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00
Particular trust	0.50***	0.01	0.50***	0.01	0.50***	0.01	0.50***	0.01	0.50***	0.01
Political trust	0.13***	0.01	0.13***	0.01	0.13***	0.01	0.13***	0.01	0.13***	0.01
Active membership	0.05***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.05***	0.01
Political interest	0.04***	0.00	0.05***	0.00	0.05***	0.00	0.05***	0.00	0.05***	0.00
Church attendance	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Cross-level effects										
Years of democracy × particular trust	0.00**	0.00								
Years of democracy × political trust	0.00	0.00								
Quality of democracy × particular trust			0.02*	0.01						
Quality of democracy × political trust			0.01	0.01						
Governance effectiveness × particular trust					0.02	0.01				
Governance effectiveness × political trust					0.02*	0.01				
Rule of law × particular trust							0.02**	0.01		
Rule of law × political trust							0.01	0.01		
Regulatory quality × particular trust									0.03*	0.02
Regulatory quality × political trust									0.03*	0.01
Variance components										
Individual level	0.32***	0.00	0.32***	0.00	0.32***	0.00	0.32***	0.00	0.32***	0.00
Contextual level	0.03**	0.01	0.04**	0.01	0.04**	0.01	0.03**	0.01	0.04**	0.01
Deviance	38,185		38,167		38,166		38,163		38,163	
Explained variance at level 1 in %	21.4		21.4		21.4		21.4		21.4	
Explained variance at level 2 in %	45.4		34.1		36.6		37.8		30.2	
N = 21,344										

*** $P < 0.001$, ** $P < 0.01$, * $P < 0.05$; for the coding of the variables see Appendix. Predictors are centred on their grand means. Countries weighted by equilibrated weight ($N = 1000$); explained variances calculated according to Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). The intra-class correlation coefficient based on the empty model indicates that 74.7% of the variance are explained by the first level and 25.3% by the second level.

Table 7. Macro- and micro-level determinants of political trust, multi-level analysis, random intercept models

Fixed effects	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	2.31***	0.05	2.32***	0.04	2.31***	0.05	2.31***	0.05	2.31***	0.05	2.31***	0.04
Contextual level effects												
Aggregate particular trust			0.57*	0.21								
Aggregate general trust					0.27*	0.13						
Gini index							-0.00	0.01				
Ethnic fractionalization									-0.03	0.25		
Corruption perception index											0.05*	0.02
Individual level effects												
Age	0.02*	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01
Gender	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00
Level of education	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00
Particular trust	0.22***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.20***	0.01
General trust	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01
Active membership	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Political interest	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00
Church attendance	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00
Cross-level effects												
Aggregate political trust × particular trust	0.14***	0.03										
Aggregate political trust × general trust	0.01	0.03										
Aggregate particular trust × particular trust			0.04	0.04								
Aggregate particular trust × general trust			-0.00	0.03								
Aggregate general trust × particular trust					0.02	0.02						
Aggregate general trust × general trust					0.01	0.02						
Gini index × particular trust							-0.00	0.00				
Gini index × general trust							-0.00	0.00				
Ethnic fractionalization × particular trust									-0.02	0.03		
Ethnic fractionalization × general trust									-0.08*	0.04		
Corruption perception × particular trust											-0.00	0.00
Corruption perception × general trust											0.00	0.00
Variance components												
Individual level	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00
Contextual level	0.05**	0.02	0.04**	0.01	0.04**	0.01	0.05**	0.02	0.05**	0.02	0.04**	0.01
Deviance	36,236		36,257		36,262		36,282		36,258		36,274	
Explained variance at level 1 in %	10.4		10.3		10.3		10.3		10.3		10.3	
Explained variance at level 2 in %	31.6		3.4		15.0		-4.5		-4.9		19.0	
N = 21,344												

Table 7. (Continued)

Fixed effects	b	SE	b	SE	B	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	2.31***	0.05	2.31***	0.04	2.31***	0.04	2.31***	0.04	2.30***	0.04
Contextual level effects										
Years of democracy	0.00	0.00								
Quality of democracy			0.14**	0.04						
Governance effectiveness					0.16**	0.05				
Rule of law							0.13*	0.05		
Regulatory quality									0.22*	0.08
Individual level effects										
Age	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Gender	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00
Level of education	-0.01***	0.01	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00
Particular trust	0.21***	0.01	0.20***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.21***	0.01
General trust	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01	0.12***	0.01
Active membership	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Political interest	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00	0.08***	0.00
Church attendance	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00
Cross-level effects										
Years of democracy × particular trust	0.00	0.00								
Years of democracy × general trust	0.00	0.00								
Quality of democracy × particular trust			-0.00	0.01						
Quality of democracy × general trust			0.01	0.01						
Governance effectiveness × particular trust					0.01	0.01				
Governance effectiveness × general trust					0.02	0.01				
Rule of law × particular trust							0.00	0.01		
Rule of law × general trust							0.01	0.01		
Regulatory quality × particular trust									0.02	0.01
Regulatory quality × general trust									0.02	0.02
Variance components										
Individual level	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00	0.29***	0.00
Contextual level	0.05**	0.02	0.04**	0.01	0.04**	0.01	0.04**	**	0.04**	0.01
Deviance	36,292		36,265		36,259		36,266		36,258	
Explained variance at level 1 in %	10.3		10.3		10.3		10.3		10.3	
Explained variance at level 2 in %	9.9		29.6		30.3		22.6		22.2	
N = 21,344										

*** $P < 0.001$, ** $P < 0.01$, * $P < 0.05$; for the coding of the variables see Appendix. Predictors are centred on their grand means. Countries weighted by equilibrated weight ($N = 1000$); explained variances calculated according to Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). The intra-class correlation coefficient based on the empty model indicates that 81.2% of the variance are explained by the first level and 18.8% by the second level.

strong patterns in the pooled individual-level data for the 22 countries. There are, in other words, generally strong consistencies across countries as well as variations between them. Second, the trust levels of a country as a whole have a significant impact on individual levels. Consistent with the rainmaker hypothesis (hypothesis 3), aggregate social trust of the particular and general variants have large and significant impacts on individual levels of social and political trust. This evidence is also supported by the significant cross-level interactions, which reveal that aggregate trust levels impact on the strength and direction of micro level determinants of trust. Third, and following from this point, all three forms of trust form a fairly tight triangle of interdependent relationships, although particular and general social trust are more closely associated with each other than with political trust, again consistent with the conditional model. Fourth, particular trust is not incompatible with either general social trust or political trust, being positively and significantly associated with them at both the aggregate and individual levels, at least in the democratic nations covered in this study.¹² Particular social trust seems to play an important part in creating and sustaining high levels of general and political trust. Fifth, contextual political variables do not make much of a contribution to particular social trust, and they are more important for general and (not surprisingly) for political trust. The overarching, society-wide impact of democratic government, rule of law, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality would seem to have an impact on general trust in unknown others, but less so on particular trust in close and known others. This suggests a slight modification of hypothesis 3 to read that aggregate and institutional macro variables have a stronger impact on general social and political trust than on particular forms of trust.

Conclusion

This study investigates the relationships between particular social trust, general social trust, and political trust. Contemporary research has largely overlooked particular social trust, because it is regarded as being of little importance for modern society or else a damaging influence on it. Interest in the association between general social trust and political trust at the individual level has also been undermined by a series of earlier studies, suggesting that they are weakly and patchily correlated, although more recent work has challenged this conclusion by finding much closer associations. The latest wave of the World Values survey includes a set of questions on all three kinds of trust that makes it possible for the first time to conduct a cross-national study of the associations between particular and general social trust and the associations between political trust and the two types of social trust. The 4-point rating scales of the trust questions also make them more sensitive measures than the 'Yes/No' option attached to the standard social trust question.

¹² Note that a study covering democratic and non-democratic countries would be expected to show high levels of general trust in democracies and high levels of particular trust in non-democracies.

An overview of the literature suggests three different models of trust: the first argues that different kinds of trust are mutually reinforcing and compatible; the second argues, on the contrary, that particular social trust drives out general social trust, and that particular social trust is unlikely to be accompanied by political trust; the third, a modification of the two others, suggests that there is no necessary compatibility or incompatibility of the three types of trust, but that particular social trust should condition the development of general and political trust.

The evidence of the 2005–07 World Values survey is most consistent with the conditional model. Cross-tabulations, correlations, and multi-level analysis of the three types of trust show that they are positively and significantly associated, but in different ways and to varying extents. An overwhelming majority of the population of democratic societies (more than 90%) professes particular trust of one form or another, but less than half are high on general trust, and slightly more than the third are high on political trust. While (of logical necessity) all but a tiny minority (0.6%) of those with a high general trust score are also high on particular trust, fewer than half (45%) of those claiming particular trust also claim high general trust. There is a similar conditionality between social and political trust; almost all of those who are politically trusting have a high score on the measure of particular social trust, but the reverse is not true. It would seem from these results that particular trust is the foundation on which general social trust and political trust are based, but building these forms of trust on the foundations does not inevitably or even generally occur.

The evidence refutes the idea that particular social trust drives out or undermines general social trust, a finding that supports some social capital and social-psychological writing. More than that, it points to the crucial importance of particular social trust as a platform on which general and political trust may be, but is not necessarily, built. This raises the question of who extends one form of trust to another and under what sorts of circumstances.

Conversely, the results are not consistent with the social psychology theory that social trust is a pervasive core personality characteristic – what Glanville and Paxton (2007) call ‘the psychological propensity model’. The evidence shows that individuals do not have a general propensity to trust or not to trust, but that they choose whom and what to trust and combine varying degrees of trust or distrust in different objects.

The evidence is consistent with social capital theory in two significant ways. First, it suggests that there is indeed a significant and positive relationship between general social trust and political trust, and it goes a step further in finding that particular social trust also has an impact on political trust, as it does on general social trust. In sum, there is a strong set of triangular relations between the three types of trust, as some social capital theory predicts. Second, the evidence is consistent with the rainmaker effect, whereby aggregate levels of trust in society have an influence on individual levels – a top-down view of trust and trustworthiness. Similarly, the evidence suggests strong institutional and macro influences

on individual trust levels, including the quality of democracy, government effectiveness, and the rule of law and regulatory quality in society. Here again, it goes a step further in finding that aggregate political trust and the institutions of government have little effect on individual particular trust compared with general social and political trust. This is probably because particular trust, so far as it is based on personal knowledge and close social contact, is less likely to be affected by wider contextual influences that have an impact on society as a whole.

Trust variables apart, other individual-level variables have little impact on the three types of trust. The effects of age, gender, and church attendance are small even when they are significant, while those of education and active membership are barely larger. It is not surprising that education has no association with the measures of particular trust based on personal knowledge and contacts, but most studies have found a strong and enduring connection between education and general social trust, which is not replicated here. And in spite of all the literature on the importance of voluntary associations for social and political trust, the evidence here, as in some other studies, is not particularly convincing. Nor do the aggregate measures of equality or ethnic fractionalization have an impact, although some previous studies have found these to be good predictors of either political or social trust, or both. However, our small national *n* of 22 Polity IV democracies may explain the ‘under performance’ figures for ethnic fractionalization and the Gini index.

Last, the study suggests that particular social trust is a key part of the trust puzzle discussed in the opening section of this paper: it seems to make things possible but not inevitable; it seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient cause of more general forms of social and political trust. At any rate, there seem to be good reasons for devoting more attention to particular social trust in order to understand how and why it may develop into general social and political trust. To this extent, particular social trust may play a significant role in strengthening social integration and democratic stability.

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Appendix 1: Micro and macro variables and their coding

Variable	Coding	Source
Particular social trust. Trust in: family neighbourhood people one knows personally	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely	World Values 2005–07
General social trust. Trust in: people one meets for the first time other religion other nationality	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely	World Values 2005–07
General social trust. 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people'.	1, trust, 0 can't be too careful.	World Values 2005–07
Confidence in institutions: Parliament, government, political parties, justice, civil service, and police	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely	World Values 2005–07
Active associational membership	1 active, 0 inactive or no member	World Values 2005–07
Interest in politics	1 no interest to 4 very interested	World Values 2005–07
Church attendance	1 never to 7 more than once a week	World Values 2005–07
Gender	0 male, 1 female	World Values 2005–07
Age in years		World Values 2005–07
Highest educational level	1 no formal education to 9 university-level	World Values 2005–07
Aggregate particular social trust	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely	World Values 2005–07
Aggregate general social trust	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely	World Values 2005–07

Appendix 1 (*Continued*)

Variable	Coding	Source
Aggregate political trust	1 do not trust at all to 4 trust completely	World Values 2005–07
Ethnic fractionalization index	0 = homogeneous to 1 = heterogeneous	Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)
Gini index	0 (highly equal) to 100 (highly unequal)	Human Development Report 2007/08
Corruption perception index	0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly transparent)	Transparency International 2006
Duration of democracy in years	Years counted from ratings 9 and 10	Polity IV project
Government effectiveness	–2.5 to 2.5, higher scores correspond to better outcomes	Worldwide Governance Indicators project
Rule of law	–2.5 to 2.5, higher scores correspond to better outcomes	Worldwide Governance Indicators project
Regulatory quality	–2.5 to 2.5, higher scores correspond to better outcomes	Worldwide Governance Indicators project
<i>Economist</i> quality of democracy index	0 = lowest to 10 = highest quality of democracy	The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006

(9)

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5 Mass media and political trust in Europe

Testing for ‘rainmaker’ effects

*Sonja Zmerli, Kenneth Newton and
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Introduction

This chapter tests for ‘rainmaker’ effects of mass media on citizen confidence in democratic institutions. When applied to the media, the ‘rainmaker’ effect hypothesises that the nature of the system itself, and the way in which the population of the country as a whole use the media available to them, will have an effect on individual levels of trust independently of how those individuals use the media themselves. That is, the formal characteristics of national media systems, especially their news media, and the aggregate characteristics of media consumption in a country will have an impact on both individual and aggregate levels of political trust and confidence in that country (Lazarsfeld and Menzel 1962). Previous research has found evidence of a ‘rainmaker’ effect concentrating on the aggregate characteristics of country populations and of TV audiences (Newton and Norris 2000; Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing 2010; van der Meer 2003; van der Meer and Dekker 2011). Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) amended with macro data on aggregate media use and media system characteristics, the present chapter attempts to extend this research to include newspaper readership, as well as TV viewing, and the consequences, if any, of a free media system on the Europeans’ political trust.

We begin with a brief discussion of research into media effects on political trust, with a special emphasis on ‘rainmaker’ effects out of which testable hypotheses are derived. Next the data, methods and variables are presented, and eventually we turn to the findings of a series of multilevel models. Our findings are mixed. One of our hypotheses is clearly confirmed; for two of the proposed relationships findings are in line with the null hypothesis; and in one case our findings are actually reverse to what we expected to see. The concluding section discusses these findings in some detail.

Do the mass media influence citizens’ political trust?

Political trust: a conceptual framework

The investigation of the origins of political trust draws mainly on two explanatory approaches. The first follows a top-down perspective and deals with the

influence of institutional, systemic and cultural influences on trust. The second follows a bottom-up approach, focusing on individual psychological and social characteristics that have an effect on trust levels of citizens (Mishler and Rose 2005; Newton 2006; Newton and Norris 2000; Zmerli and Newton 2008; Newton and Zmerli 2011). These approaches are not mutually exclusive but, on the contrary, can both have varying impacts on individual and aggregate levels of trust.

The top-down approach examines how institutional systems, their performance and aggregate patterns of media use affect political trust. It puts the trustworthiness of others at the centre of its approach on the grounds that how much trust individuals place in others, and in the institutions of their society, depends on how much they believe they are likely to behave and operate in a trustworthy manner. Trustworthiness is embedded in a system of institutions that promote political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law, and which encourages the fair, equal and just treatment of citizens. System performance indicators are closely associated with different measures of political support and trust (Mishler and Rose 2005; Zmerli *et al.* 2007) and national levels of social trust are associated with confidence in the courts, the police, the public services and with an absence of corruption in society (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Newton and Norris 2000: 66–7; Rothstein 1998).

In contrast, the bottom-up approach examines the social and psychological features of individuals and is seen as a core personality characteristic, alongside optimism and a belief in cooperation (Rosenberg 1956; Uslaner 2002). Trust correlates with individual characteristics, especially education, socio-economic status, life chances, ethnicity and religion, happiness, life satisfaction, membership of voluntary associations and attitudes towards citizenship and community involvement. Individual social trust is also a good predictor of political trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Mishler and Rose 2005; Newton 2006; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Zmerli and Newton 2008).

Mass media effects and political trust: the ‘rainmaker’ effect

The ‘rainmaker’ effect, a term coined by Putnam *et al.* (2000: 26), is conceived as a top-down contextual influence that has an impact on citizens’ attitudes and behaviour independently of, or in conjunction with, their personal characteristics. Individuals may be trusting because of their early socialization and experience of the world, but they may also trust others because they have found them to be generally trustworthy. Whether individuals act in a trustworthy manner is likely to depend, in part, on the effectiveness of the social and political institutions that are designed to enforce trustworthy behaviour. In social life this is likely to centre around the principles of the rule of law and the institutions of the police, courts and civil service. In political life, the rule of law is crucial (no one should be above the law) but also the separation of powers, the accountability of public officials, political transparency, an absence of corruption and a general sense that democratic institutions are functioning as they should (confidence in democracy).

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1 The media may play a role in creating, sustaining or undermining a general
2 sense of trust in others and in government and politics. For the most part modern
3 research has sided with the media malaise school of thought which argues that
4 the media, and especially TV, has a socially and politically destructive effect on
5 society (Postman 1985; Putnam 2000; Patterson 1994; Habermas 2006). Some
6 empirical work has found that entertainment media undermine social and polit-
7 ical trust, and although it has never been established, it is often assumed that this
8 is because of its content of crime, violence and horror and because it helps to
9 create a culture of self-centred commercialism and materialism (Bennett *et al.*
10 1999; Hooghe 2002). The news media are also said to have a mean world effect,
11 in which ‘feeding frenzies of attack journalism’ create a general mood of polit-
12 ical alienation, cynicism and distrust, reinforced by a daily diet of bad news
13 about political incompetence, corruption and immorality (Patterson 1994; Rob-
14 inson 1976; Ranney 1983; Schudson 1995: 9). The fact that the modern media
15 penetrate every corner of society and that watching TV now consumes a large
16 proportion of the waking hours of Western populations strengthens the case of
17 the media malaise school of thought.

18 The ‘rainmaker’ effect has been explored in a cross-national study of media
19 effects on social trust which finds that individual levels of TV exposure have no
20 more than a weak association with general social trust. What matters is not how
21 much TV an individual watches, but the viewing habits of country populations
22 as a whole (Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing 2010). Populations that watch a lot of
23 TV on average tend to be less trusting, even those individuals who do not watch
24 much TV, but in contrast those with public service TV tend to be more socially
25 trusting, including the individuals who prefer watching commercial channels.
26 Hooghe’s study of Belgium (2002) finds that watching commercial TV is associ-
27 ated with low trust, although he finds no evidence that public service TV is cor-
28 related with high social trust. There is, however, evidence that public service TV
29 news tends to be more trusted than its commercial counterparts (Newton 2014).

30 All this literature focuses on the aggregate ‘rainmaker’ effects of population
31 characteristics, but it may also be that there is a top-down effect of institutions on
32 political trust as well. Social trust is associated with confidence in the police,
33 courts, civil service and the like. Political trust, not surprisingly, also tends to be
34 higher in established democracies with their separation of powers, rule of law, free
35 elections, etc. It may also be that political trust is associated with media systems
36 that are integral to democracy, most particularly a free press. This might encourage
37 not just confidence in the news media themselves but also a spill-over effect on
38 democracy and government. This is because citizens are likely to have greater con-
39 fidence in a system where the press plays a vital watchdog role in political life and
40 is free to call attention to the failings and shortcomings of governments.

41 The ‘rainmaker’ effect literature to date also concentrates heavily on the role
42 of television. It has, so far, not dealt with possible effects of the political press.
43 There is, of course, a body of research dealing with the direct effects on indi-
44 viduals of reading newspaper as against watching TV news (Aarts and Semetko
45 2003; Dimock and Popkin 1997; Newton 1999; Norris 2000). This suggests that

the printed press has a greater impact, and a positive one, on political knowledge, political participation and political trust than TV, especially among those who read a high-quality broadsheet paper rather than the tabloid, boulevard press. In which case it may also be that, like TV, the press has a ‘rainmaker’ effect on political trust.

Hypotheses

Focusing on citizens’ political trust, the present chapter tests four aspects of the ‘rainmaker’ hypothesis. We ask whether and how citizens’ confidence in a range of public institutions (parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, political parties) is associated – irrespective of individual media use – with the time spent watching TV; with the distribution of TV audiences between public service and commercial stations; with newspaper penetration in societies; and with the freedom of media systems.

Following the work of Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing (2010), and van der Meer and Dekker (2011) we hypothesize that:

H1: The higher the aggregate level of TV consumption in a society the lower its level of political trust, even among those with comparatively low levels of TV consumption.

Until recently, there were few cross-national studies of media effects. Most research was carried out in the United States and much of it contributed to media malaise theory. More recent work has been able to draw on cross-national data to establish differences between media systems, especially a distinction between commercial and public service TV. While commercial channels carry more entertainment programmes and are said to be associated with media malaise, public service channels (and commercial channels with public service regulation of news content) carry more hard and international news associated with political trust, knowledge and subjective competence. Public service TV seems to increase (or, at least, do no harm to) rather than decrease citizens’ system support and political trust. Entertainment TV and commercial stations seem to have the opposite effect, albeit a rather weak one. Accordingly, we hypothesize:

H2: The larger the audience for public service broadcasting in a society, the greater its average level of political trust, even among those who prefer watching commercial stations.

While research on TV often finds weak and mixed effects (Aarts and Semetko 2003; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006), the results for newspapers are clearer

1 and more consistent. Reading a tabloid (boulevard or yellow press) is the equi-
2 valent of watching entertainment and commercial TV and is associated with low
3 political trust. Apparently, the broadsheets have the opposite effect. Moreover,
4 the aggregate effects of newspaper reading in a country seem to be similar to
5 those of TV exposure in so far as one comparative study finds social capital is
6 higher in societies with high newspaper penetration (Schmitt-Beck 2008). We
7 hypothesize:

H3: The higher the newspaper penetration in a society, the higher its
members' political trust, regardless of their individual newspaper reading
patterns.

14 Free media are a defining attribute of democratic political systems. Nonetheless,
15 the implications for political trust may be ambivalent. Ideally, a free press provides
16 its audience with pluralist information, thereby enhancing its political understand-
17 ing and enabling it to form 'enlightened' preferences (Dahl 1989). A recent study
18 by Fraile (2013) has demonstrated that the degree of a media system's political and
19 economic freedom indeed is related to the political knowledge displayed by its
20 citizens as well as to the size of the knowledge gap between highly and less well
21 educated citizens. However, it does not necessarily follow that media freedom
22 exerts similarly positive effects on political trust. A free press is vitally important
23 for democracy because it allows public criticism of the government and other
24 public agencies, but this very criticism might also help to undermine trust and con-
25 fidence in politicians and the institutions of government (Kepplinger 1998: 225–6).
26 Two contradictory hypotheses can therefore be extracted:

H4a: The higher the level of freedom enjoyed by a society's mass media,
the higher its citizens' level of political trust, regardless of their personal
media use.

H4b: The higher the level of freedom enjoyed by a society's mass media, the
lower its members' political trust, regardless of their personal media use.

38 **Data, methods and variables**

39 *Data*

40 This chapter uses data from the fifth wave of the ESS fielded in 2010. Three
41 countries are excluded from the study: Israel because of its special 'garrison
42 state' characteristics and Cyprus and Slovenia because they lack newspaper
43 circulation figures. This leaves 14 West European countries (Belgium, Denmark,
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Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) and seven East-Central European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Data from each country for all citizens aged 15 and over were pooled to yield a total of 41,475 respondents. The ESS design weight is used throughout the analysis.

Models are estimated in a multilevel framework, considering individuals as level-one units nested in countries constituting the second level. This kind of random-intercept model is appropriate when testing macro–micro hypotheses of the kind investigated in this study (Hox and Roberts 2011). The ESS data are supplemented by country-level media data from various sources described below. To diminish the risk of simultaneity bias (due to the possible reverse causation) we use the macro measures for 2009, the year preceding data collection of the ESS surveys. Taking into account the clustered nature of the data (clustering by country), multilevel analysis allows for a more accurate estimation of the standard errors. All independent variables are centred on the grand mean for the multilevel analyses. The analysis is performed with the statistical packages *xtmixed* and *multilevel* tools of Stata 12 (Möhring and Schmidt 2012).

Dependent variable

The dependent variable, political trust as a specific indicator of political support, taps citizens’ attitudes towards national parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians and political parties.¹ These five indicators are summarized in an additive index of political trust and divided by the number of valid answers. Cross-country tests of dimensionality resulted in a one-dimensional solution for most countries.

Independent variables

Useful data for measuring societies’ overall TV consumption are provided by television broadcasters’ audience research. They are more valid than the recall data of social surveys since they are based on direct measurement of actual individual TV usage, using so-called people-meter systems that are hooked to TV sets in selected households and continuously register the actual consumption of each household member (Prior 2009a, 2009b; Schulz 2000). As the indicator of TV consumption that we need to test H1 we use average total daily TV viewing time for 2009 (in minutes per day), calculated across all weekdays (source: IP International Marketing Committee 2010). To test H2 we rely on the audience shares of public broadcasters (which are the inverse of commercial broadcasters’ market shares). The market share of a channel is the percentage tuned into this channel out of all those watching TV at a given time (Schulz 2000: 117). The indicators used in our analysis are the combined audience shares of all public channels within each society in 2009 (in per cent; source: IP International Marketing Committee 2010).

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1 To measure the penetration of the daily press in European societies we use
2 standardized circulation figures of newspapers. Based on World Press Trends
3 data collected by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers
4 (WAN-IFRA) we calculated the average daily circulation of newspapers per
5 1,000 inhabitants aged 15 and above for each country in the study in 2009.² To
6 measure countries' media freedom we use the Freedom of the Press Index 2009
7 provided by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press#.U9fLYbEQMo5). This index is based on regularly updated expert assess-
8 ments of the media in countries covering three dimensions: (1) the media's 'legal
9 environment' ('laws and regulations that could influence media content and the
10 government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict
11 the media's ability to operate'); (2) the 'political environment' (indicators of the
12 'degree of political control over the content of news media'); and (3) the 'eco-
13 nomic environment' (including, among other things, the 'structure of media
14 ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establish-
15 ing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution').³
16 The media freedom index has a range of 0 to 100, with lower values indicating
17 free media systems. Since this is somewhat counter-intuitive, we reverse the
18 scale for the multilevel models presented below, while for the descriptive anal-
19 yses they remain as originally coded.
20

21 The data reveal that television usage differs strikingly across Europe (Table
22 5.1). Hungary, Croatia and Greece lead the field with an average daily viewing
23 time per person of more than four hours (280, 279 and 277 minutes, respec-
24 tively). At the other end of the scale we find Switzerland and Sweden, with
25 between two and a half and three hours (156 and 176 min). There are also large
26 differences in the size of audiences for public service broadcasters. Denmark
27 tops all other countries, with a public service audience share of 56.8 per cent. In
28 Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece, on the other hand, public television accounts for
29 less than one out of every five minutes spent in front of a TV set (12.7, 14.7 and
30 16.9 per cent – that is between one in six to nine minutes).

31 Newspaper reading varies even more strongly across countries. 'Newspaper
32 societies' like Switzerland, Norway and Sweden rank highest, with more than
33 500 copies sold per 1,000 inhabitants. Slovakia and Portugal rank lowest, with
34 fewer than 100 copies. There is less variance for the Freedom House index, but
35 it is not negligible. Croatia and Bulgaria, with scores of less than 30, qualify as
36 'partly free' according to the Freedom House criteria, and Greece, with a value
37 of 29, is a marginal case. At the other end of the scale Finland, Norway and
38 Sweden score 10, indicating a high degree of media freedom.
39

40 **Control variables**

41 To identify 'rainmaker' effects of macro media characteristics it is necessary to
42 control for individuals' patterns of media consumption. The ESS includes a
43 small battery of questions to measure individual exposure to TV and newspapers.
44 To measure total TV consumption, ESS respondents were asked to indicate their
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Table 5.1 Media use and media freedom by country: macro and micro indicators

Country	Macro indicators (2009)				Micro indicators (2010)				N _{min}
	Average TV viewing time per individual in minutes per day (Monday–Sunday)	Audience share of public TV channels (per cent)	Average circulation of daily newspapers (copies per 1,000 inhabitants)	Freedom of the Press index (0–100)	Total TV viewing time per day (0–7)	TV: share of time for political news (0–1)	Total newspaper reading time per day (0–7)	Newspapers: share of time for political news (0–1)	
Belgium	196.2	33.3	182.3	12	4.28	0.45	1.13	0.39	1,686
Bulgaria	229.0	12.7	160.1	34	5.46	0.40	1.12	0.31	2,413
Croatia	279.0	46.0	158.0	40	4.19	0.39	1.31	0.43	1,619
Czech Republic	198.0	25.2	189.3	18	4.83	0.34	1.04	0.41	2,378
Denmark	199.0	56.8	359.5	11	4.36	0.56	1.26	0.57	1,596
Estonia	250.0	16.8	200.1	17	4.59	0.49	1.49	0.53	1,789
Finland	183.0	45.1	460.1	10	3.78	0.52	1.70	0.67	1,872
France	217.0	33.6	183.9	23	4.22	0.49	0.98	0.41	1,698
Germany	226.0	29.5	280.3	17	4.11	0.44	1.32	0.55	3,018
Great Britain	241.0	37.2	320.3	19	4.91	0.38	1.23	0.32	2,417
Greece	277.0	16.9	136.7	29	4.86	0.37	0.64	0.23	2,707
Hungary	280.0	14.7	178.5	23	4.24	0.39	1.22	0.43	1,557
Ireland	196.0	38.2	253.7	15	4.70	0.42	1.66	0.46	2,509
Netherlands	191.0	34.7	357.6	14	4.52	0.50	1.45	0.54	1,817
Norway	184.0	36.0	526.9	10	3.96	0.56	2.07	0.66	1,537
Poland	253.0	37.3	111.4	24	3.93	0.47	1.01	0.40	1,722
Portugal	213.0	30.7	97.7	16	4.47	0.47	0.76	0.36	2,124
Slovakia	198.0	19.2	94.8	23	4.71	0.41	1.15	0.44	1,824
Spain	237.0	36.1	165.5	24	3.96	0.46	0.81	0.40	1,881
Sweden	176.0	30.1	503.2	10	3.72	0.53	1.62	0.62	1,496
Switzerland	156.8	33.6	523.9	13	3.19	0.46	1.57	0.60	1,503

Sources: macro indicators: average TV viewing time per individual and audience share of public TV channels: IP International Marketing Committee (2010); average circulation of daily newspapers: World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers; Freedom of the Press index: Freedom House (2009); Micro indicators: ESS (2010).

Note
Level 1 indicators weighted by design weight.

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1 daily time spent watching television.⁴ Unfortunately, the ESS does not collect
2 data about public and commercial TV usage. However, it includes a question
3 about watching TV news that can be used to estimate ratios of information
4 versus entertainment TV watching. Respondents were asked how much time
5 they usually spent 'watching news or programmes about politics and current
6 affairs'. This, again, was measured in half-hour intervals. By calculating polit-
7 ical programmes as a share of total consumption we obtained a measure of how
8 individuals divided their time between entertainment and news (Klingemann and
9 Voltmer 1989). The variable resulting from this transformation ranges from 0
10 (never watch politics on TV, whether or not they never watch TV at all) to 1.0,
11 for respondents who devote their entire TV time to political content.

12 Usage of newspapers is measured similarly in two ways. One question regis-
13 ters the self-reported total time devoted to reading the papers on an average day
14 (range between 0 and 7). The other measures the portion of this usage that is
15 devoted to political content. In accordance with the procedure described above, a
16 variable was constructed which measures the consumption of political news as a
17 share of total newspaper reading, ranging from 0 to 1.

18 In seeking to understand the role of media as an influence on individual political
19 trust, it is essential that competing explanations for observed relationships are ruled
20 out as far as possible. Hence, a broad range of control variables must be included
21 in the multivariate models. At the individual level this includes the variables known
22 to influence media usage and factors that are connected to individuals' political
23 trust. The problem of selectivity bias is notorious in media effects research and
24 requires including the well-known correlates of television and newspaper usage. In
25 the main these involve socio-demographic attributes like age, gender, levels of
26 formal education and household income (or a proxy of it). The same controls must
27 be introduced into models of political trust; in this case age, gender, education and
28 household income are important correlates of social status. It has been found that
29 higher-status individuals who are better equipped with socio-economic and intel-
30 lectual resources will display higher levels of political trust (Zmerli and Newton
31 2011). Given the usually high numbers of missing data for household income, the
32 study draws on respondents' personal assessment of their present income.⁵ The
33 analyses also take into account the impact of social trust, political interest, satisfac-
34 tion with the economy in one's own country and church attendance.⁶

35 Since our multilevel models encompass only 21 countries, there is not much
36 room for level-two control variables. We include GDP per capita (in constant
37 international dollars, purchasing power parity; 2009) and the age of democracy
38 in the respective countries (in years) in the models to control for the possibility
39 that affluence and experience with democratic political life may be important for
40 political trust.⁷

41 **Analyses and findings**

42 We test our four hypotheses through a sequence of multilevel models (Table
43 5.2). According to the null model (not displayed here) a substantial and highly
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Table 5.2 Political trust in Europe: multilevel analyses (random-intercept, fixed effects models)

	Model 1			Model 2a			Model 2b		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>beta</i>
<i>Level 1</i>									
Constant	4.30***	0.12		4.29***	0.08		4.29	0.08	
Gender (reference: male)	0.12***	0.03	0.03	0.12***	0.03	0.03	0.12***	0.03	0.03
Age	0.00*	0.00	-0.03	0.00*	0.00	-0.03	0.00*	0.00	-0.03
Education in years	-0.01*	0.00	-0.02	-0.01*	0.00	-0.02	-0.01*	0.00	-0.02
Satisfaction with household income	0.08***	0.01	0.03	0.08***	0.01	0.03	0.08***	0.01	0.03
Church attendance	0.11***	0.01	0.08	0.11***	0.01	0.08	0.11***	0.01	0.08
Social trust	0.16***	0.01	0.18	0.16***	0.01	0.18	0.16***	0.01	0.18
Political interest	0.31***	0.03	0.13	0.30***	0.03	0.13	0.30***	0.03	0.13
Satisfaction with economy	0.33***	0.02	0.40	0.33***	0.02	0.40	0.33***	0.02	0.40
Total TV viewing time	0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.02
Share of political news (TV)	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.01
Total newspaper reading	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Share of political news (newspaper)	0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.10***	0.03	0.02
<i>Level 2 (lagged: data for 2009)</i>									
Average viewing time per individual				0.000	0.003	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Audience share of public channels									
Average circulation of newspapers									
Freedom of the press									
Democracy in years				0.01**	0.01	0.18	0.01*	0.01	0.18
GDP per capita				0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02

Variance components

Variance level 1	2.41***	0.02	2.41	0.02	2.41***	0.02
Variance level 2	0.32**	0.02	0.16**	0.06	0.16**	0.06
Deviance	21.635 ^b		17.8		17.8	
R ² in %, level 1 ^a	25		25		25	
R ² in %, level 2	76		90		90	

Model 2c

Model 2d

Model 3

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>beta</i>
<i>Level 1</i>									
Constant	4.28***	0.08	0.03	4.28***	0.07	0.03	4.28***	0.06	0.03
Gender (reference: male)	0.12***	0.03	-0.03	0.12***	0.03	-0.03	0.12***	0.03	-0.03
Age	0.00*	0.00	-0.02	0.00*	0.00	-0.02	0.00*	0.00	-0.02
Education in years	-0.01*	0.00	-0.02	-0.01*	0.00	-0.02	-0.01*	0.00	-0.02
Satisfaction with household income	0.08***	0.01	0.03	0.08***	0.01	0.03	0.08***	0.01	0.03
Church attendance	0.11***	0.01	0.08	0.11***	0.01	0.08	0.11***	0.01	0.08
Social trust	0.16***	0.01	0.18	0.16***	0.01	0.18	0.16***	0.01	0.18
Political interest	0.30***	0.03	0.13	0.30***	0.03	0.13	0.30***	0.03	0.13
Satisfaction with economy	0.33***	0.02	0.40	0.33***	0.02	0.40	0.33***	0.02	0.40
Total TV viewing time	0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.02
Share of political news (TV)	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.01
Total newspaper reading	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Share of political news (newspaper)	0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.10***	0.03	0.02

continued

Table 5.2 Continued

	Model 2c			Model 2d			Model 3		
	b	SE	beta	b	SE	beta	b	SE	beta
<i>Level 2 (lagged: data for 2009)</i>									
Average viewing time per individual							0.006**	0.002	0.09
Audience share of public channels			0.07				0.00	0.01	0.01
Average circulation of newspapers	0.001†	0.001					0.001	0.001	0.06
Freedom of the press	0.01*	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.01	0.13	0.05***	0.01	0.17
Democracy in years	0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.01†	0.00	0.13
GDP per capita		0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.00	0.00	-0.05
<i>Variance components</i>									
Variance level 1	2.41***	0.02		2.41***	0.02		2.41***	0.02	
Variance level 2	0.15**	0.05		0.11**	0.04		0.11**	0.04	
Deviance	19.6			25.5			31 ^c		
R ² in % level 1 ^a	26			26			26		
R ² in % level 2	91			93			95		

Sources: level 2 indicators: average TV viewing time per individual and audience share of public TV channels: IP International Marketing Committee (2010); average circulation of daily newspapers: World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers; Freedom of the Press index: Freedom House (2009); democracy in years: Quality of Government cross-section and time-series data set (Treisman measure); GDP per capita: Quality of Government cross-section and time-series data set (World Bank). Level 1 indicators: ESS (2010).

Notes

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; Freedom of the Press index multiplied by -1 to reverse polarization; all independent variables centred around grand mean; data weighted by ESS design weight. Level 1 $N = 39,024$; level 2 $N = 21$. Variance components of empty model (SE): level 1 3.33 (0.02), level 2 1.38 (0.44); a: Bryk/Raudenbush R² in %; b: baseline empty model; c: baseline RI-model with level 1; ICC: 0.28.

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1 significant amount in the variance of political trust is due to country differences
2 (ICC=0.28). We begin the analysis by including individual-level predictors in
3 the estimation. A substantial amount of the cross-country variance (76 per cent)
4 is due to composition effects. Satisfaction with the economy stands out as the
5 most powerful effect, followed, at a distance, by social trust, political interest
6 and church attendance. Two of the four media exposure variables are also posi-
7 tively associated with political trust. Confirming previous studies, confidence in
8 political institutions is higher among those who often read political reports in
9 newspapers. Political trust is also higher among those who watch TV more often.
10 This, however, is not consistent with previous writing, most of which argues that
11 TV is a destructive force that undermines civic attitudes and political support,
12 with the exception of recent research on public service broadcasting. Moreover,
13 the distinction between news and entertainment makes no difference because
14 only the amount of time spent in front of the screen counts. However, it should
15 be noted that the TV effect is only marginally significant and with more than
16 40,000 observations this indicates an impact of TV that is weak, even if it is sta-
17 tistically significant. By comparison the newspaper effect is stronger. Even so,
18 the TV and newspaper variables are among the weakest in the model, suggesting
19 that the media can have an impact at the individual level, but a small one.

20 A methodological note of caution is necessary before turning to our level-two
21 tests of the four ‘rainmaker’ hypotheses. Testing the effects of four macro-level
22 predictors while controlling for two other macro-level variables is problematic
23 in a model with just 21 cases. Therefore, we proceed in stages in which models 2a
24 to 2d look at each of our four independent media variables separately, while con-
25 trolling for the age of democracy and GDP per capita. How the four independent
26 variables fare when analysed simultaneously is examined in the final step of the
27 analysis in model 3.

28 Including the two control variables and one of the four macro-level media
29 variables improves the explanatory power of each model. In each case the vari-
30 ance explained increases by at least another 14 per cent. Of the two control vari-
31 ables, only the age of democracy makes a substantial difference to political trust
32 and of the four attributes of national media systems only one is significantly
33 associated with political trust. In this case it is the measure of newspaper pen-
34 etration in a country that is positively associated with trust. This is consistent with
35 H3, but the statistical support is too weak to consider the hypothesis confirmed
36 by the data. In contrast to studies of social trust (Schmitt-Beck 2008; Schmitt-
37 Beck and Wolsing 2010), political trust does not appear to be much affected by
38 country patterns of media use. However, while media consumption seems to
39 make little difference, the freedom of the media consumed does seem to matter.
40 A highly significant parameter estimate in model 2d shows that the greater the
41 media freedom in a country, the higher its citizens’ trust in democratic institu-
42 tions. Of the two alternative hypotheses we developed, this confirms H4a.

43 Model 3 pulls together all the data into one simultaneous estimation. The
44 highly significant positive effect of media freedom reappears in this model and,
45 indeed, when the three aggregate measures of media consumption are included,

the media freedom variable increases its significance. Model 3 thus provides even stronger support for H4a. However, the effect of overall newspaper readership disappears in this more complex model. In its stead, another aggregate measure of media consumption emerges in model 3 that was not significant in the previous level-two analysis. It suggests that individual political trust is higher in countries where the population as a whole watches a lot of TV. That this observation repeats our individual-level finding of higher political trust among those viewing a lot of TV (which is sustained in model 3) makes it no less puzzling. It squarely contradicts H1, even though this effect is much weaker than the effect of media freedom. H2 and H3 are not supported by our data; in both cases the statistical results are consistent with the null hypothesis of no significant association between political trust and the media measures.

With an increase of almost 20 per cent, the explanatory power of the full model 3 of cross-country variance of political trust is considerably higher than that of the pure individual-level model 1. While the effects of media system attributes on political trust differ considerably from those found for social trust (Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing 2010), our results parallel existing findings on the mass media's 'rainmaker' effect with regard to the relative importance of macro- and micro-level media effects. As evidenced by the standardized regression coefficients, all media system attributes that have been found to contribute to citizens' political trust exert much stronger effects than the corresponding effects of individual-level media use. In fact, in terms of standardized effect sizes at least the influence of press freedom ranges in the same order as the most powerful individual-level effects, with the exception of satisfaction with the economy which already in model 1 has been found to stand out as a predictor of political trust.

Conclusion

Dealing in turn with the four hypotheses of this chapter, our evidence does not support the first proposition that the higher the level of TV consumption in a country the lower its political trust. The data do suggest a 'rainmaker' effect but, contrary to our own expectations and to those of most previous work, political trust is higher in countries whose populations watch more TV. Nor are the second and third hypotheses supported by the data. Country audience levels for public and commercial TV channels have no association with political trust, and nor does the circulation of newspapers. In both cases the regression coefficients are close to zero. The fourth hypothesis, however, is strongly supported by the data in so far as there is a significant and positive association between the freedom of the press and political trust (H4a), rather than the opposite (H4b). The evidence suggests that freedom of speech is not only an integral part of any democratic system in its own right, but also has the effect of raising public confidence in that system.

The results of our research are, therefore, mixed, but two general conclusions seem to emerge. First, we find evidence of a top-down effect of the 'rainmaker' type in two different ways. Aggregate levels of TV watching do have an effect

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1 on country levels of political trust and on individual levels as well, regardless of
 2 the individual's own TV habits. And not only do aggregate levels of TV watch-
 3 ing matter, but so also do institutions, a different but related form of top-down
 4 effect. Countries where the freedom of the press is a clearly established principle
 5 demonstrate higher levels of political trust, irrespective of the individual and col-
 6 lective newspaper reading and TV watching patterns of their populations as a
 7 whole. To speculate, this is likely to be because freedom of the press encourages
 8 a certain amount of trust in the media themselves as a source of news that is
 9 independent of government, and because citizens feel that their system of gov-
 10 ernment is likely to work better if there is a press to watch over it.

11 The second general conclusion is that although we find evidence of media
 12 effects, these are mixed and weak. They are mixed because at both the individual
 13 and cross-national levels some media variables play no role in the regressions,
 14 while others are statistically significant. They are weak because even where sta-
 15 tistically significant the media coefficients are substantively small, explaining
 16 less than 0.003 per cent of the variance. With 41,475 observations, this scarcely
 17 adds up to strong and robust support for claims about the powerful effects of the
 18 media in modern society. Model 3 in Table 5.2 makes it clear that individual
 19 satisfaction with the economy and political interest are the powerful drivers of
 20 political trust, and, to a lesser extent, social trust, gender and church attendance.

21 The positive and significant (though weak) association between hours of TV
 22 viewing and political trust is puzzling and needs some explanation. We can only
 23 speculate here. Table 5.1 shows that countries like Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
 24 Estonia, Slovakia and Hungary all have rather high viewing hours, and that these
 25 are also the ex-Communist countries that have put rather high hopes and trust in
 26 their newly democratized polities. It is possible that the results of the study are
 27 atypical because the survey on which they are based was taken in 2010, when
 28 almost all of the 21 countries were struggling to recover from deep economic
 29 problems. The fact that satisfaction with the economy is consistently the strong-
 30 est variable in all the regressions reported in Table 5.2 supports this suggestion
 31 as circumstantial evidence. Lastly, while social trust across the Western world is
 32 a relatively stable phenomenon, political trust can drop steeply and recover
 33 quickly (Newton 2006). It seems to respond rather sensitively, though within
 34 boundaries, to short- and medium-term fluctuations such as economic problems
 35 and political difficulties. Social trust may follow trends of slower and more iner-
 36 tial patterns of social change. Social and political trust are positively associated
 37 at both the individual and aggregate levels and they both seem to have 'rain-
 38 maker' effects, but it does not follow that they necessarily track each other pre-
 39 cisely over time.

40 Notes

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- 43 1 The exact question wording is: 'Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how
 44 much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust
 45 an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... [country]'s par-
 liament, the legal system, the police, the politicians, political parties?'

- 2 We are indebted to Teemu Henriksson of WAN-IFRA for providing us with the circulation data, and to Almire Brahimi (Chair of Political Science – Political Sociology, University of Mannheim) for standardizing them by population size using World Bank population statistics (see data.worldbank.org). 1
- 3 See also www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2011/methodology#.U9fMArEQMo4. 2
- 4 ‘On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?’ Answers were registered on an eight-point scale ranging, in half-hour intervals, from 0=no time at all, to 7=more than three hours. 3
- 5 The question wording is ‘Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays? Living comfortably on present income (1), coping on present income (2), finding it difficult on present income (3), finding it very difficult on present income (4)’ (coding reversed). 4
- 6 For social trust, the ESS draws on the following question: ‘Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.’ Political interest is measured as: ‘How interested would you say you are in politics – are you very interested (1), quite interested (2), hardly interested (3), or not at all interested (4)?’ (coding reversed). Satisfaction with the state of economy is measured as: ‘On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied.’ Finally, the ESS question wording for church attendance is: ‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays? Every day (1), more than once a week (2), once a week (3), at least once a month (4), only on special holy days (5), less often (6), never (7)?’ (coding reversed). 5
- 7 Both macro-level control variables were derived from the Quality of Government cross-section and time-series data set (Teorell *et al.* 2013). GDP per capita is drawn from the World Bank’s calculation reflecting GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity and converted to international dollars. The calculation of years of democracy is Treisman’s measure of the number of consecutive years of democracy since 1930 as of 2000. For each country, nine more years were added. 6

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6. Sozialstruktur, Wohlfahrtsregime, Einkommensungleichheit und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit als Determinanten politischen Vertrauens

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5 Social structure and political trust in Europe

Mapping contextual preconditions of a relational concept

Sonja Zmerli

Introduction¹

Any political system strives for stability. Authoritarian regimes revert to manifold means such as sanctions, oppression or persecution in order to ensure that subjects would not revolt. The stability of democratic regimes, by contrast, strongly depends on citizens' system support. When institutions and political actors within democratic regimes are perceived to be trustworthy, citizens are, as a consequence, more willing to obey by the laws, become more interested in politics and get more involved in civic affairs (Putnam 1993). In addition, political trust provides the basis for political actors to act and decide unrestrictedly (Warren 1999). Thus, any signs of a lack or a downturn of system support and political trust is a matter of serious concern.

According to this line of argument, recent empirical studies revealed a number of harbingers of disturbing developments. It was widely shown that different forms of political trust, such as trust in national parliaments or politicians, have been declining over time (Dalton 1999; Holmberg 1999; Kaase/Newton 1995; Klingemann 1999; Pharr/Putnam 2000). These trends hold for nearly every established democratic regime as well as for post-communist societies. Besides these deplorable trends, we are also confronted with significantly diverging levels of political trust amongst the European citizenry.

In general, Scandinavian countries show high levels of political trust compared to other European countries, such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom, whose citizens perceive their political institutions as being only moderately trustworthy. Political trust in less experienced European democratic systems which emerged from the third or the fourth wave of democratization (Huntington 1991; Tusalem 2007) is particularly low suggesting that the stability of political order might be at risk in the long run if trust levels remain as such or degrade even more.

These phenomena and related concerns prompted a number of empirical studies which focused primarily on the conditions and mechanisms accountable for these trends. As a result, two explanatory approaches proved to be of particular importance. The first approach reflects a top-down perspective aiming at the relevance of institutional performance for the formation of political trust.

The nature of the second strand of arguments, on the other hand, reveals a bottom-up approach, claiming that the erosion or even the complete absence of social capital leads to a severe downgrading of political trust (Gorbachyk/Lyzogub 2000; Gabriel/Kunz 2002; Keele 2007; Mishler/Rose 2005; Newton 2006b; Newton/Norris 2000; Rohrschneider/Schmitt-Beck 2003; Zmerli 2004; Zmerli *et al.* 2007; Zmerli/Newton 2008).

Attempts to juxtapose the explanatory and predictive potential of both approaches resulted in a distinct predominance of the performance-related perspective over the societal one. Accordingly, the trustworthiness of political institutions is largely assumed to be a function of their ability to provide citizens with a political and economic environment which guarantees political rights, lives up to ethical, just, fair and transparent standards, and ensures economic prosperity for substantial parts of society (Mishler/Rose 2005; Newton 2006b).

Despite the overwhelming empirical evidence of the strength of this explanatory approach, the bottom-up perspective also needs to be taken into account. Features of social cohesion which are embodied in the prevalence of a spirit of cooperation, trust and solidarity, provide the basis for citizens to shift their focus from narrow self-interest to the common good, become interested and participatory in politics and, consequently, supportive of the political system as a whole. Two levels of analysis can be distinguished and are both relevant for political trust formation. The aggregate level indicates to which extent a society can draw on social capital, e.g. social trust, as a resource for cooperation. The individual level describes a person's endowment with a trustful and cooperative spirit (Newton 2001; Newton/Norris 2000; Paxton 2002; Zmerli/Newton 2008; Zmerli *et al.* 2007).

Declining levels of political trust are, thus, explained by deteriorating institutional performance, on one hand, and societal malfunctions, on the other.

Notwithstanding, political trust is not only an outcome but also a source of institutional and societal performance. Where people are trustful of their political institutions they are more likely to act according to the rules which, in turn, reduces the necessity and costs for monitoring or sanctioning. Reducing these transaction costs results, as a consequence, in an accumulation of resources which are now available for further more efficacious and effective institutional action (Putnam 1993). Furthermore, high levels of political trust also strengthen people's willingness to engage in cooperation with their fellow citizens because they put trust in effective sanctions imposed by political institutions in case of defective behaviour (Zmerli *et al.* 2007).

Another explanation for the observable trends of decreasing levels of political trust is brought forward by modernization theorists. With ever increasing shares of well-educated citizens and postmaterialists in modernizing societies, they argue, the number of politically knowledgeable and interested but *critical* citizens is growing as well (Dalton 2004; Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999). Political *distrust* is, therefore, not perceived as some undesirable phenomenon but simply as the expression of individual orientations of reflective citizens (Catterberg/Moreno 2005).

Perceived from a broader perspective, matters of social cohesion, effects of modernization and institutional settings are intrinsically related to the fabric of social structure of any given society. Analysing a society's social structure aims first and foremost at disclosing the distribution of resources and restrictions relevant for individual or collective action across different groups of people, as well as identifying their goals in life and networks of interaction (Rössel 2009). For instance, where distribution of resources and restrictions is biased or, in other words, social inequality prevails, social cohesion is hampered. Furthermore, different stages in the process of modernization are reflected by typical manifestations in the socio-structural setting. As a consequence, socio-structural characteristics should also matter for the extent of political support and trust. Accordingly, a number of aspects of social structure could be of importance in our endeavour to detect sources of system support. We can assume, for example, that it matters for social cohesion whether a society is polarized along class conflicts or vertical immobility, characterized by a predominance of the primary, secondary or tertiary sector, suffers from high rates of illiteracy or unemployment or from high income disparities, and is fractionalized along linguistic, religious or ethnic lines. Likewise, the degree of urbanization or the size of one's domicile are important indicators for the availability of resources for individual or collective action. To which extent a society is able to organize itself in formal or informal social networks and whether this ability for self-organization and cooperation promotes the emergence of a high or low trust society are both central features and outcomes of socio-structural constellations.

All of these aforementioned socio-structural aspects determine the amount of resources available for action to individuals or groups and the corresponding restrictions they have to confront. Inequalities in distribution of both resources and restrictions have either a vertical or a horizontal dimension. Originally, studies of social inequality focused on disparities of wealth, occupational prestige, income or education describing the vertical axis of a society's composition. The second or horizontal dimension of social inequality was only taken into consideration later. By now, however, it is widely acknowledged that, for instance, age, gender, ethnicity or size of one's domicile can limit an equal access to resources (Rössel 2009; Hradil 2004).

By means of measures of distributive justice, the modern welfare state, as we know it, is designed to counter social inequalities which could endanger social cohesion and eventually destabilize the nation state as a whole. Doubtlessly, their impact on narrowing the gap between either vertical or horizontal forms of inequality is as diverse as the different welfare state arrangements. As recent research on the antecedents of political trust has shown, welfare state arrangements prevalent in Scandinavian countries and which, by and large, also meet people's perceptions and expectations of procedural fairness, are particularly conducive to strengthening political trust (Kumlin 2004). Not surprisingly, these so-called social-democratic or universal welfare state regimes also come along with the least extent of social inequalities and the highest levels of political support.

In summary, not only are the sources of political trust manifold but they are also located at different societal levels. Personal traits, such as gender, age, ethnicity, level of education or employment status are typical indicators of the micro level, whereas the size of one's domicile or the density of social networks in a region are measures of the meso level. Unemployment rates, distribution of wealth, societal fractionalizations or types of welfare state arrangements, by contrast, describe features at the macro level.

According to the line of arguments outlined above, the *explicit* and not only implicit analysis of the characteristics of social structure and their effects on political trust should play a more prominent role in current research on political trust. From this perspective, some recent studies have already taken particular account of the impact of macro-level socio-structural indicators and stressed their importance (Gabriel/Walter-Rogg 2008; Lischtaug/Ringdal 2008; Oskarsson 2007; Kunlin 2004; Rothstein 1998). But more extensive investigations are needed to systematically unfold how socio-structural micro-, meso- and macro-level indicators matter for political support. The following study will attempt to address this research question. More specifically, we assume that macro-level socio-structural indicators which measure different dimensions of social inequality will negatively affect political trust or, in other words: the presence of social inequality deteriorates political support. On the individual level, by contrast, we expect that individuals who enjoy greater resources and experience fewer restrictions are also politically more trustful.

Before turning to the analysis of the socio-structural micro-, meso- and macro-foundations of political trust the subsequent sections will, first, introduce the concept of political trust and summarize recent trends over time. Second, a short overview of the main arguments and findings of the most powerful explanatory models will be presented. These models are predominantly based on the top-down or bottom-up approaches described above and do rather implicitly than explicitly take account of the relevance of socio-structural predictors. The empirical section of this chapter will, third, depict the development of political trust in Europe from 2002 to 2006 and present multivariate analytical models aiming at disclosing the preconditions of political trust. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the consequences of the findings.

Political trust: concept, trends and patterns

Defining political trust

According to Levi and Stoker political trust rests on a positive evaluation of those features which confer trustworthiness to political institutions (2000: 484f). Credibility, fairness, competence and transparency in its policy-making all make up for those characteristics as well as an openness to competing views. Moreover, political trust as represented by trust in institutions 'entails the belief that it [the political institution] will not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that is harmful to our interests or the nation's, but will treat us, and other

citizens, reasonably equally, fairly, and justly' (Zmerli *et al.* 2007: 41). As Newton and Norris point out: 'confidence in institutions ... [is] the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity' (2000: 53). As such it serves as a conceptual device which 'has been designed as a middle-range indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity' (Zmerli *et al.* 2007: 41; see also Lischtaug/Wiberg 1995: 299–302 and Gabriel 1995: 361).

Gabriel and Kunz (2002) as well as Gabriel *et al.* (2002) identify two dimensions of political trust. They differentiate between trust in party-state institutions, such as governments, political parties, parliaments and politicians, and trust in output-oriented or regulative institutions, such as constitutional courts, police, civil courts or civil services.

Developments and patterns of political trust

As a number of studies have shown in recent years, citizens in most established democracies are ever less willing to put trust in their political institutions. Referring to the differentiation outlined above, however, it is mainly politicized institutions, such as parliaments or governments, and politicians that are particularly affected by this downward trend (Dalton 1999: 63ff.; Holmberg 1999: 103ff.; Kaase/Newton 1995; Klingemann 1999: 51ff.; Pharr/Putnam 2000; Zmerli 2004). Despite this reservation, these trends have given rise to general debates about the performance and stability of democratic systems and the challenges they could face (Norris 1999; Pharr/Putnam 2000).

In spite of these worldwide observable deteriorating developments, we can discern countries where political trust still ranges on a comparatively high level and others where citizens tend to distrust their political institutions (Catterberg/Moreno 2005). In the case of Europe, quite a stable pattern of countries exists. Scandinavian countries, in particular, are endowed with citizens who mostly perceive their political institutions as trustworthy. Southern Europeans and citizens from post-communist countries, however, express on average political distrust. In some of those countries and for some political objects of reference the average trust levels are disturbingly low (Gabriel/Walter-Rogg 2008; Lischtaug/Ringdal 2008; Miller *et al.* 2004; Zmerli 2004; Zmerli *et al.* 2007; Zmerli/Newton 2008).

Determinants of political trust: theories and findings

Explicitly combining micro-, meso- and macro-level socio-structural indicators and investigating their impact on political trust has not yet received broad attention in political science research. Thus, attempts to trace preconditions of political trust building mostly revolve around three major themes which tackle aspects of social structure and inequality rather implicitly than explicitly. First, it is widely assumed and empirically corroborated that individual orientations and competences substantially impact on an individual's perception and evaluation

of politically relevant institutions. Citizens who are politically interested in and feel efficacious about influencing political decision-making processes tend to be more trustful. In addition, ideological positions influence the propensity to put trust in political institutions. In population surveys, these individual political orientations are, for instance, measured by the frequency of church attendance. Frequent church attendances are perceived to reflect conservative value orientations and are mostly positively related to political trust (Catterberg/Moreno 2005; Zmerli 2004).

Second, the top-down approach aims at the relevance of institutional performance for political trust building. According to this strand of arguments the trustworthiness of political institutions is, by and large, a function of their ability to provide citizens with a political and economic environment which guarantees political rights, lives up to ethical, fair, just and transparent standards, and ensures economic prosperity for substantial parts of society. In empirical analyses, system performance indicators reveal considerable influence on trust in a number of political institutions (Mishler/Rose 2005; Newton 2006b; Zmerli 2004; Zmerli *et al.* 2007).

Third, it is assumed that the erosion or even the complete absence of social capital leads to a severe downgrading of political trust. This bottom-up approach starts from the assumption that features of social cohesion which are embodied in the prevalence of a spirit of cooperation, trust and solidarity provide the basis for citizens to shift their focus from narrow self-interest to the common good, become interested and participatory in politics and, consequently, supportive of the political system as a whole. In particular, social trust turns out to be a strong predictor of political trust (Catterberg/Moreno 2005; Mishler/Rose 2005; Newton 2006b; Zmerli 2004; Zmerli/Newton 2008; Zmerli *et al.* 2007). Declining levels of political trust are, thus, explained by societal malfunctions.

A stronger emphasis on the relevance of social structure and the design and procedures of related state institutions has been placed by various recent studies which shift their focus on the consequences of different welfare state arrangements for political trust formation. It is argued that welfare states which meet the citizenry's expectations of distributive and procedural justice are most likely to be perceived as trustworthy (Kumlin 2004). Providing universal welfare allowances as is the case in Scandinavian countries, for instance, has the highest potential to foster political trust. This impact is mainly due to the fact that the provision of means-tested allowances which, for example, make up for most of the liberal welfare states' benefits, can generate a feeling of discrimination on the recipients' side. In addition, street-level bureaucrats in liberal or conservative welfare states are vested with considerable discretion in their decision making potentially resulting in unjust and intransparent decisions which then become another source of citizens' distrusting attitudes (Rothstein/Stolle 2003). Besides, social inequalities conducive to political distrust are also least pronounced in universal welfare states. As a consequence, the latter seems to offer a more positive environment for the formation of political trust. But, of course, the type of welfare state arrangements concomitantly goes along with a number of other

socio-structural features. Apart from the extent of social inequality, we observe that universal welfare states, for example, positively correlate with lower unemployment rates, higher GDP per capita, more advanced levels of modernization, less ethnic, linguistic or religious fractionalizations, less corruption, higher aggregate levels of social trust or high scores on measures of quality of democracy (Delhey/Newton 2005; Kumlin 2004, 2007; Lishaug/Ringdal 2008; Oskarsen 2007; Rothstein 1998; Svallfors 2007).²

To be sure, this overview of explanatory approaches is not exhaustive. A number of other factors can also be held accountable for a loss of political trust (Bovens/Anchrit 2008). Political scandals, for example, do not only deteriorate trust in politicians but also affect trust in governments (Bowler/Karp 2004). Likewise, the emergence of postmaterialist value orientations in modern societies is assumed to bring about critical citizens who are less willing to trust (Catterberg/Moreno 2005; Dalton 2004; Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999). In post-communist societies, decreasing levels of political trust are partly attributed to the so-called post-honeymoon effect. In these countries, the breakdown of communism initiated the emergence of high hopes for a better future which often resulted in bitter disappointment and a disbelief in the benefits of the new political systems (Catterberg/Moreno 2005). Finally, the role of the media and television in particular, is often scrutinized, although with conflicting results (Mutz/Reeves 2005; Newton 2006a).

Although this chapter focuses primarily and explicitly on the explanatory power of socio-structural features some of the most outstanding predictors of political trust will also be scrutinized or included as control variables in the subsequent analyses. They mainly tap the realm of individual political orientations or features relating to the architecture or performance of political institutions.

According to our assumptions outlined above, we argue that effects of socio-structural characteristics on political trust should be distinguished along two levels of analysis. On the macro level, we assume that advanced degrees of modernization, low levels of social inequality, high aggregate levels of social trust and just, transparent and efficient state institutions go along with stronger political support. On the individual level, by contrast, we expect that individuals who enjoy greater resources and experience fewer restrictions are also politically more trustful. Whether this favourable position in life is an outcome of vertical or horizontal inequality should not matter.

More precisely, the subsequent analyses will tap our macro-level socio-structural indicators by national unemployment rates, GDP per capita, the state of modernization in a country as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gini Index as a proxy for vertical social inequality, measures for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, as well as aggregate levels of social trust. Low unemployment rates, less social inequality and fractionalizations in society are all assumed to strengthen political trust. The same should hold true for high GDPs per capita, high rates on the HDI and high aggregate levels of social trust. In addition, considering Putnam's argument about vertical relationships predominant in Catholic societies and their negative effects on

aggregate levels of social trust versus horizontal ties in Protestant societies which enhance social trust and its close relationship with political trust, we assume significant influence stemming from different denominational shares in society (Putnam 1993). Another way of capturing a country's socio-structural characteristics is to refer to Esping-Andersen's 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' (1990). In an extension of this theoretical concept, we differentiate between universal or social democratic welfare regimes prevalent in Scandinavian countries, liberal and conservative welfare regimes where commodification and means-tested allowances prevail, post-communist countries where financial resources and allowances are severely restricted, and Southern European countries with a preponderance of familial bonds and restricted allowances (Arts/Gelissen 2002; Lischka/Ringdal 2008). As outlined above, distributive justice together with procedural fairness most likely occurs in universal welfare regimes (Kumlin 2004). We, thus, expect them to bear the highest potential to strengthen political trust.

On the micro level, we assert that high levels of education, a higher household income or a positive perception of the latter indicate an individual favourable position on the socio-structural ladder as they disclose resources available for action which should impact positively on political trust. In addition, people who are integrated socially and therefore cooperative and more trustful of their fellow citizens are also more inclined to put trust in their political institutions. Holding the citizenship of the country one lives in and thus enjoying full political and social rights is certainly another important characteristic of feeling socially integrated and developing positive attitudes towards the political system. In addition, this overall advantageous situation in life should express itself in higher life satisfaction. However, having experienced times of unemployment which mostly go along with financial constraints and insecurity, i.e. socio-structural restrictions, is assumed to be detrimental to political trust. Furthermore, every additional member of one's household reduces available financial resources. The same deteriorating effects can be expected from experiences of discrimination when a person belongs to minority or other disadvantaged groups. A special case in point certainly refers to gender and age in life. Both attributes can represent dimensions of horizontal inequality. While women in Western societies are mostly disadvantaged in terms of social status, occupation and income, younger or older people might experience, in particular, discrimination on the employment market. Despite these frequently observed horizontal inequalities, being a woman or of older age have often proved to be positive determinants of political trust. At this stage, it is thus an open question how gender and age are related to political trust in our study. Finally, as the single meso-level indicator we include the size of one's domicile in the subsequent analyses. Once again, we assume a horizontal dimension of inequality stemming from the limited availability of resources for individual or collective actions in villages or rural areas. Therefore, living in urban areas or bigger cities should impact political trust positively.

In the realm of possibly relevant control variables, it is expected that stronger political interest and internal political efficacy as well as conservative value orientations measured by means of church attendance positively affect political

trust. In the event that the government is held responsible for equality in society, however, the effect should be traceable for political rather than for regulative institutions. Likewise, an individually perceived satisfactory system performance should result in higher levels of political trust. In addition, contextual political characteristics are also expected to impact on political trust formation. In particular, low corruption rates, the longevity of democracy, and a high quality of democracy in one's own country should all contribute to strengthen political support. Moreover, system characteristics which aim at channeling social conflicts and give voice to minorities are likewise considered to be conducive to political trust. For example, this positive impact should be observable for consensus democracies and high effective numbers of electoral parties (Gabriel/Walter-Rogg 2008).

Data and methods

The three waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) contain six question items on political trust. The question wording and the items are as follows:

Please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...

- (country)'s parliament
- the legal system
- the police
- politicians
- political parties
- the European Parliament?

According to Gabriel *et al.* (2002) the question items on trust in the national and the European Parliament, politicians and political parties can be assigned to the realm of party-state institutions whereas trust in the legal system and the police belong to the sphere of regulative institutions.

To summarize, a twofold differentiation of political trust seems appropriate: trust in party-state or political institutions, on the one hand, and trust in regulative institutions, on the other. For this matter, we will construct two indices which tap these two different dimensions of political trust.⁴

In the descriptive part of the following section, its development over time as well as its distribution across countries will be scrutinized. The ensuing inferential analyses presented from section 'micro- and meso-level foundations of political trust' onwards are based on linear regression analyses where the impact of individual-level socio-structural factors on political trust is primarily being tested. They are followed by zero-order correlation analyses to reveal the relationship between political trust and a set of political and socio-structural macro-level indicators. The concluding multilevel analyses will finally uncover

the influential interplay between individual socio-structural indicators and political orientations and contextual socio-structural and political characteristics and their consequences for political trust formation.

Political trust in Europe: trends and foundations

Trends in political trust

Based on the empirical findings outlined above, our expectations regarding the levels and trends of political trust are clear-cut. Regulatory institutions such as police, courts or other institutions pertaining to the national legal system generally receive higher approval rates while parliaments, politicians or political parties suffer from significant distrust. Irrespective of the specific political object, however, an overall decline in the levels of political trust should be observed.

As is depicted in the last rows of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, both assumptions are confirmed. Quite notably, for each ESS wave trust in regulative institutions ranks

Table 5.1 Means of trust in political institutions over time

	ESS 1	ESS 2	ESS 3	Diff.
Slovakia	—	3.2	4.1	0.9
Estonia	—	3.8	4.2	0.4
Denmark	5.5	5.6	5.7	0.2
Luxembourg	5.1	5.3	—	0.2
The Netherlands	4.9	4.7	5.1	0.2
Finland	5.1	5.2	5.2	0.1
Spain	4.3	4.3	4.2	0.1
Belgium	4.7	4.5	4.7	0.0
Ireland	4.4	4.5	4.4	0.0
Slovenia	3.9	3.7	3.9	0.0
Sweden	4.9	4.5	4.8	-0.1
Switzerland	5.2	4.9	5.1	-0.1
Norway	5.0	4.6	4.8	-0.2
United Kingdom	4.0	3.8	3.7	-0.3
France	4.2	3.9	3.8	-0.4
East Germany	3.7	3.4	3.3	-0.4
Greece	4.6	4.2	—	-0.4
Austria	4.3	3.9	3.8	-0.5
Czech Republic	3.7	3.2	—	-0.5
West Germany	4.3	3.7	3.8	-0.5
Poland	3.5	2.5	2.9	-0.6
Italy	4.6	3.9	—	-0.7
Portugal	3.9	2.9	3.2	-0.7
Hungary	4.7	3.5	3.3	-1.4
Ukraine	—	4.3	2.6	-1.7
Total	4.3	3.9	3.7	-0.6

Notes

Data weighted by each country each wave; results presented in a descending order of mean differences.

Table 5.2 Means of trust in regulative institutions over time

	ESS1	ESS2	ESS3	Diff.
Spain	4.9	5.3	5.5	0.6
Slovakia	—	4.0	4.5	0.5
Belgium	5.0	5.3	5.4	0.4
The Netherlands	5.6	5.7	6.0	0.4
Finland	7.4	7.4	7.6	0.2
Norway	6.7	6.7	6.9	0.2
Denmark	7.5	7.6	7.6	0.1
Poland	4.3	3.8	4.4	0.1
Switzerland	6.5	6.5	6.6	0.1
East Germany	5.5	5.5	5.5	0.0
Estonia	—	5.3	5.3	0.0
Ireland	5.9	5.9	5.6	0.0
Slovenia	4.6	4.3	4.6	0.0
United Kingdom	5.5	5.6	5.5	0.0
France	5.4	5.3	5.3	-0.1
Luxembourg	6.4	6.3	6.3	-0.1
Portugal	4.7	4.5	4.6	-0.1
Sweden	6.4	6.1	6.3	-0.1
West Germany	6.4	6.1	6.3	-0.1
Austria	6.3	6.0	6.1	-0.2
Hungary	5.0	4.8	4.7	-0.3
Czech Republic	4.4	4.0	—	-0.4
Italy	6.1	5.6	—	-0.5
Greece	6.4	5.7	—	-0.7
Ukraine	—	3.6	2.6	-1.0
Total	5.6	5.3	5.3	-0.3

Notes

Data weighted by each country each wave; results presented in a descending order of mean differences.

higher than trust in political ones. On a scale from zero to ten each and every mean value either exceeds or comes close to the scale's midpoint.

According to our expectations, parliaments, politicians and political parties are certainly no political entities which are endowed with a comforting level of trust. As the means of the three ESS waves indicate, citizens are remarkably distrustful of these political institutions.

In addition, as the outlined differences over time in the last row of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (ESS 1 to ESS 3) depict, we do indeed observe a decline in trust for both indices. Although the losses are small they are consistent. Based on these findings, we reckon that political trust is deteriorating in Europe irrespective of the specific political object of reference. But does this assumption also hold true when we investigate the trends of these two trust indices across countries? Moreover, can we discern similar distributions of the two indices within countries and do we find patterns of countries where political trust is particularly strong or weak, respectively?

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide astounding insights. First, the assumption of a Europe-wide and all-embracing decrease in political trust is not corroborated by

the empirical evidence. The overall picture is far too heterogeneous to draw unequivocal conclusions. While in some countries, such as Slovakia or Estonia, trust in political institutions has been rising considerably over time, others, such as Hungary or Ukraine, are deeply in trouble. The same goes for Spain, Slovakia, Belgium and the Netherlands where trust in regulative institutions has been increasing while Italy, Greece and once again Ukraine suffer considerable losses. Trust in political institutions is particularly affected by both strong declines and increases in a few countries. Gains and losses of trust in regulative institutions, by contrast, are more equally distributed across countries. By scrutinizing the extent of absolute losses, however, we infer that they outweigh the revealed gains by far. Second, despite these obvious diverging trends the within-country rankings of the two trust indices remain the same as before with regulative institutions receiving the highest approval and political institutions the least. Third, we observe that the emerging country patterns are completely in line with patterns identified in preceding empirical studies and outlined in section 'developments and patterns of political trust'. Clearly, Scandinavian countries are located on top of this country ranking. Post-communist societies, by contrast, rank lowest in most cases with some Southern European countries joining this group of distrusters.

Micro- and meso-level foundations of political trust

In a next step, we address the question if and to which extent micro- and meso-level socio-structural indicators can be made accountable for trust in political and regulative institutions. In order to adequately assess the impact of an individual's position in society we have to control for other influential factors in a next step. These are political orientations as well as individual system performance evaluations.

Table 5.3 depicts two linear regression models with trust in political institutions as the dependent variable. In the upper half of the explanatory models the effects of socio-structural determinants are depicted while the impact of the control variables in the second model is presented in the lower half of the table. Their effects will only be outlined here briefly.

As the first model shows, individual socio-structural precursors account for nearly 20 per cent of the explained variance of trust in political institutions. A closer inspection reveals, however, that the strength of this model can mainly be attributed to the strong positive impact of social trust. Higher life satisfaction, positive feelings about one's household income and *not* holding the citizenship of the country one lives in exert additional noteworthy effects on trust in political institutions. The latter, however, runs counter to our assumption and certainly asks for substantial explanation. The remaining socio-structural variables, by contrast, are only marginally influential. This pattern of influence shifts, however, when we control for the impact of political orientations and individual system performance evaluations. Although social trust remains the strongest predictor amongst the individual socio-structural variables, its effect is clearly

Table 5.3 Micro- and meso-level effects on trust in political institutions

Predictors	Political institutions					
	b	Std error	beta	b	Std error	beta
Constant	2.17***	0.05	-	1.43***	0.05	-
Gender (1 = female)	-0.08	0.01	-0.02***	0.11	0.01	0.03***
Age in years	-0.24	0.04	-0.02***	-0.73	0.04	-0.06***
Level of education	0.31	0.03	0.04***	0.00	0.03	0.00
Citizenship	-0.60	0.03	-0.06***	-0.24	0.03	-0.02***
Number of household members	-0.07	0.03	-0.01*	-0.03	0.03	0.00
Feeling about household income	0.50	0.02	0.07***	0.00	0.02	0.00
Ever unemployed more than 3 months	-0.15	0.01	-0.03***	-0.13	0.01	-0.03***
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.15	0.03	0.01***	0.04	0.03	0.00
Member of discriminated group	-0.34	0.03	-0.04***	-0.36	0.02	-0.04***
Socially meet with people	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.07	0.02	-0.01
Social trust index	3.22	0.03	0.31***	1.91	0.03	0.18***
Life satisfaction	1.19	0.03	0.13***	0.00	0.03	0.00
Size of domicile	-0.16	0.02	-0.02***	-0.28	0.02	-0.04***
Adjusted R ² in %	18	19	-	-	-	-
Satisfaction with economy	-	-	-	2.13	0.03	0.26***
Satisfaction with education system	-	-	-	1.03	0.03	0.12***
Satisfaction with health care system	-	-	-	1.13	0.03	0.14***
Church attendance	-	-	-	-0.45	0.02	-0.06***
Political interest	-	-	-	1.09	0.02	0.16***
Internal political efficacy	-	-	-	0.34	0.03	0.04***
Government responsible for equality	-	-	-	0.05	0.02	0.01*
Total adjusted R ² in %	-	33	-	-	-	-
N	107,589	97,801	-	-	-	-

Notes

OLS, pooled by countries and waves; all independent variables are standardized from 0-1; two-tailed t-test: * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.

reduced. The influence of life satisfaction even disappears altogether. Despite the weakening of a number of socio-structural predictors, they altogether still unfold the same explanatory power in the extended model.

With regard to the control variables we observe that the importance of perceived system performance for political trust formation is impressively substantiated by three indicators measuring one's satisfaction with the economy, the educational as well as the health care system in one's country. According to the expectations outlined in the section 'determinants of political trust: theories and findings', attending mass is also positively related to trust in political institutions. In addition, citizens who show interest in politics are distinctly more politically trustful than people whose personal interests are unaffected by politics. Moreover, the effect of internal political efficacy is traceable, though to a smaller extent than the one of political interest. Accordingly, people who feel confident about their political knowledgeability and efficacy tend to be more trustful politically. Whether one believes that governments should reduce income disparities, by contrast, is rather negligible when it comes to the explanation of trust in political institutions. All in all, the inclusion of these control variables accounts for an increase of another 1.5 percentage points of explained variance.

Turning to the explanation of trust in regulative institutions reveals a similar pattern (Table 5.4). The explained variance of the first model is nearly identical and, once again, social trust exerts the strongest impact on the dependent variable. Life satisfaction, feelings about one's household income and citizenship are likewise relevant predictors. In addition, controlling for the second block of determinants results in comparable changes. Social trust remains the strongest precursor of trust in regulative institutions but loses parts of its explanatory power. So does life satisfaction but in contrast to the model of trust in political institutions it preserves some impact and statistical significance. The remaining socio-structural variables, however, are only marginally influential.

As for the control variables, we observe that the impact on trust in regulative institutions unfolded by satisfaction with the country's economy and political interest is distinctly smaller than the one measured for trust in political institutions. The effects of the other precursors, by contrast, do not differ substantially from the ones depicted in Table 5.3. This is valid for the additional amount of explained variance of this extended model.

We conclude that the individual availability of resources for individual or collective action, in terms of different measures of horizontal and vertical social inequality, relates only marginally to the willingness to put trust in political or regulative institutions. Only socially trustful people stand out in this regard.

Notwithstanding, assessing the impact of *individual* socio-structural characteristics on political trust can only roughly account for the importance of socio-structural *contextual* factors, such as the extent of income inequality in a country, national unemployment rates or GDP per capita and aggregate levels of social trust. To be sure, socio-structural micro- and macro-level indicators are intrinsically related to each other. For example, where gross domestic product per capita is high and income inequality low, satisfaction with the financial situation

Table 5.4 Micro- and meso-level effects on trust in regulative institutions

Predictors	Regulative institutions					
	b	Std error	beta	b	Std error	beta
Constant	2.72***	0.05	-	1.91***	0.06	-
Gender (1 = female)	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.09	0.01	0.02***
Age in years	0.17	0.04	0.01***	-0.07	0.05	-0.01
Level of education	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.01*
Citizenship	-0.60	0.03	-0.05***	-0.16	0.03	-0.01***
Number of household members	-0.41	0.03	-0.04***	-0.35	0.03	-0.04***
Feeling about household income	0.68	0.03	0.08***	0.30	0.03	0.04***
Ever unemployed more than 3 months	-0.07	0.02	-0.01***	-0.04	0.02	-0.01*
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.04	0.03	-0.00
Member of discriminated group	-0.29	0.03	-0.03***	-0.27	0.03	-0.03***
Socially meet with people	-0.13	0.03	-0.01	-0.15	0.03	-0.02***
Social trust index	3.51	0.04	0.30***	2.39	0.04	0.20***
Life satisfaction	2.00	0.03	0.19***	0.94	0.03	0.09***
Size of domicile	-0.04	0.02	-0.01*	-0.18	0.02	-0.02***
Adjusted R ² in %	21	22	-	-	-	-
Satisfaction with economy	-	-	-	1.59	0.03	0.17***
Satisfaction with education system	-	-	-	1.21	0.03	0.12***
Satisfaction with health care system	-	-	-	1.29	0.03	0.14***
Church attendance	-	-	-	-0.32	0.02	-0.04***
Political interest	-	-	-	0.35	0.02	0.05***
Internal political efficacy	-	-	-	0.21	0.03	0.02***
Government responsible for equality	-	-	-	-0.08	0.02	-0.01**
Total adjusted R ² in %	-	30	-	-	-	-
N	107,836	97,860	-	-	-	-

Notes

OLS, pooled by countries and waves; all independent variables are standardized from 0-1; two-tailed t-test: * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.

of one's household is expected to be elevated too. What is more, a number of socio-structural and political macro-level indicators also strongly correlate with each other. Indicators of good governance, such as rule of law, political stability, government effectiveness or low corruption rates go hand in hand with higher gross domestic products per capita, lower unemployment rates and more effective health care and educational systems.⁵ Thus, it is challenging to disentangle this complex web of interrelatedness. By means of multilevel analysis, however, it is possible to develop explanatory models which integrate both micro- and macro-level predictors at the same time and identify their effects on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, given the strong correlations between our macro-level indicators relevant for our analyses here it is very likely that their effects on political trust will cancel each other out in multilevel analysis when included at the same time in the models. We therefore present simple zero-order correlations between our two trust indices and a range of macro-level indicators in order to develop an understanding of the associations between institutional and societal contexts and political orientations. Subsequently, the results will also inform our selection of relevant determinants.

Assessing the association between context and political trust

According to the findings depicted in Table 5.5, many of the macro-level indicators show a strong correlation with both dimensions of political trust. As expected, countries with lower unemployment rates, higher GDP per capita, smaller shares of Roman Catholics but higher shares of Protestants seem to provide a suitable environment for their citizens' political trust building irrespective of the specific type of trust. Quite unexpectedly, however, income inequality is not related to trust in political institutions and only marginally to trust in regulative ones. Comparably weak associations do also unfold between ethnic, linguistic or religious fractionalizations in a given country and both indices of political trust. In an attempt to group countries according to their welfare state arrangements and using these proxies for our zero-order correlations we reveal significant and positive relationships between national contexts providing universal welfare allowances and political trust. The heterogeneous but limited welfare state arrangements characterizing post-communist countries, by contrast, are strongly but negatively related to trust in political and regulative institutions. In light of these findings discussed so far, a strong and positive relationship between both trust indices and the 2002 Human Development Index does not come as a surprise. Nor do the strong and positive coefficients of years of democracy, high ratings on the Quality of Democracy Index, perception of low corruption rates in one's country or high-trust societies. Other political indicators, such as high effective numbers of political parties or consensus democracies which are meant to channel class or other societal conflicts, by contrast, are not particularly related to political trust.

In a final analytical step, we will attempt to detect whether and to which extent political trust is contingent upon both micro- and macro-level socio-structural factors.

Table 5.5 Zero-order correlations between political trust and macro level indicators (Pearson's r coefficients)

	<i>Political institutions</i>	<i>Regulative institutions</i>
Unemployment rate 2002	-0.17***	-0.19***
GDP per capita in US\$2002	0.21***	0.30***
Gini Index	-0.01***	-0.12***
Ethnic fractionalization	0.03***	-0.10***
Linguistic fractionalization	0.09***	-0.04***
Religious fractionalization	-0.06***	-0.08***
Share of Roman Catholics	-0.12***	-0.19***
Share of Protestants	0.20***	0.30***
<i>Welfare state arrangements</i>		
Post-communist	-0.18***	-0.31***
Universal	0.21***	0.26***
Conservative	0.03***	0.09***
Liberal	0.02***	0.01**
Southern European	-0.04***	0.05***
HDI 2002	0.21***	0.34***
Effective number of electoral parties	0.08***	0.01***
Consensus vs majoritarian system	0.06***	0.07***
Years of democracy	0.22***	0.34***
Corruption Perception Index 2004	0.23***	0.36***
Quality of Democracy Index 2006 (EIU)	0.25***	0.35***
Aggregate social trust	0.24***	0.34***

Notes

Data weighted by each country all waves; two-tailed t -test: * = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$, *** = $p < 0.001$.

For this matter, we run multilevel analyses including the previously identified most powerful individual-level determinants and several contextual socio-structural and political indicators. As mentioned earlier, however, a wide range of indicators located at the macro level are strongly correlated with each other. Therefore, we run six multilevel analyses which cover the effects of the macro-level indicators separately.⁶ As macro-level indicators we chose the ones which correlated most strongly with political trust (see Table 5.5) and include the national rates of unemployment, GDP per capita, the Human Development Index 2002, the Quality of Democracy Index in a country, the aggregate level of social trust as well as a typology of welfare state arrangements (see also the third section).⁷

We start out our multilevel analyses with a so-called empty model which assesses whether macro-level characteristics or, in other words, country-specific features contribute to the prediction of trust in political institutions (Table 5.6). The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) indicates how much of the model's variance is explained by the contextual level in percentage. Scrutinizing the empty model of trust in political institutions reveals that country-specific characteristics, indeed, account for 11 per cent of the variance and therefore need to be taken into account in order to understand the foundations of trust.

Table 5.6 Macro- and micro-level effects on trust in political institutions

Predictors	Empty model	Individual level	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept
<i>Fixed effects</i>								
Constant	4.21***	4.24***	4.26***	4.25***	4.26***	4.25***	4.25***	4.25***
Social trust index	-	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***	0.59***
Life satisfaction	-	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***
Church attendance	-	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***
Political interest	-	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***
Rate of unemployment	-	-	-0.18*	-	-	-	-	-
GDP	-	-	-	0.21**	-	-	-	-
HDI 2002	-	-	-	-	0.15	-	-	-
Quality of Democracy Index 2006	-	-	-	-	-	0.17	-	-
Aggregate social trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.11	-
<i>Welfare state arrangements^a</i>								
Post-communist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.25*
Liberal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.19
Conservative	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.13
Southern European	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.03
<i>Random effects</i>								
Individual level	Var. comp. 3.80***	Var. comp. 3.21***	Var. comp. 3.21***	Var. comp. 3.21***	Var. comp. 3.21***	Var. comp. 3.21***	Var. comp. 3.21***	Var. comp. 3.21***
Context level	0.45**	0.21**	0.18**	0.16**	0.19**	0.19**	0.21**	0.18**
Intraclass correlation in %	11	6	5	5	6	6	6	5
Prop. of expl. variance at level 1 in %	-	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Prop. of expl. variance at level 2 in %	-	-	14	24	10	10	0	14
N	111,558	110,416	110,416	110,416	110,416	110,416	110,416	110,416

Notes

MLA, pooled by countries and waves; a – reference category is universal welfare state; results are based on weighted data; all independent variables are z-standardized, bs reported, percentages rounded; * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.

In a next step, we only include individual-level determinants into our multi-level model. The selection of predictors is based on those independent variables which turned out to be the most influential for either of the two dependent variables presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Subjective evaluations of system performance, however, are not included at this analytical level but are now replaced by *observable* and objectively measured system performance indicators. Accordingly, we include social trust, life satisfaction, church attendance and political interest as individual-level predictors.

As can be observed, applying multilevel analysis provides results which are more substantial than linear regression analyses which cannot account simultaneously for individual and context-specific influence. According to the expectations, social trust and life satisfaction remain strong promoters of trust in political institutions. What is more, amongst the individual-level determinants social trust is unequivocally the strongest predictor. Church attendance and political interest also continue to unfold significant effects. All in all, 16 per cent of the model variance at the individual level is explained by these indicators and the ICC decreases by five percentage points.

In the next column of the multi-level-analysis model we add the macro-level indicator of national unemployment rates to the analysis. While the coefficients of the individual-level variables remain literally unaffected by this model extension, lower rates of unemployment exert some additional significant impact on trust in political institutions. Accordingly, 14 per cent of the model variance at the macro level can be attributed to national unemployment rates. Yet, another significant and positive effect on trust in political institutions results from higher GDP per capita. Including this macro-level indicator into MLA leads to an explained variance at the macro level of 24 per cent. By contrast, not the Human Development or the Quality of Democracy Index or the aggregated level of social trust contribute significantly to the explanation of this trust dimension. Two of these three indicators, however, explain 10 per cent of the model variance at the macro level. Scrutinizing the impact of different types of welfare state arrangements, on the other hand, reveals the relevance of institutional arrangements for the formation of trust in political institutions. In this example, the reference category is universal welfare state arrangements which are characteristic of Scandinavian countries. While all welfare state arrangements affect trust negatively, only those being effective in post-communist societies significantly decrease trust in political institutions. Comparing the effects of macro-level indicators across all MLA models shows that welfare state arrangements in post-communist societies unfold the strongest influence. Furthermore, 10 per cent of explained variance at the macro level can be attributed to this welfare state typology.

Turning to the explanation of trust in regulative institutions reveals a partly different pattern (Table 5.7). Although the empty model also suggests that relevant predictors of trust in regulative institutions are located at the macro level, the corresponding ICC attains 20 per cent and exceeds the ICC of the first empty model presented in Table 5.6 by far. In the second column of the MLA model,

Table 5.7 Macro- and micro-level effects on trust in regulative institutions

Predictors	Empty model	Individual level	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept	Random intercept
<i>Fixed effects</i>								
Constant	5.55***	5.58***	5.61***	5.60***	5.64***	5.63***	5.62***	5.63***
Social trust index	-	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***
Life satisfaction	-	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***
Church attendance	-	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***
Political interest	-	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
Rate of unemployment	-	-	-0.23	-	-	-	-	-
GDP	-	-	-	0.40**	-	-	-	-
HDI 2002	-	-	-	-	0.51***	-	-	-
Quality of Democracy Index 2006	-	-	-	-	-	0.51***	-	-
Aggregate social trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.43**	-
<i>Welfare state arrangements^a</i>								
Post-communist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.66***
Liberal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.25
Conservative	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.19
Southern European	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.18
<i>Random effects</i>								
Individual level	Var. comp. 4.34***	Var. comp. 3.81***	Var. comp. 3.81***	Var. comp. 3.81***	Var. comp. 3.81***	Var. comp. 3.81***	Var. comp. 3.81***	Var. comp. 3.81***
Context level	1.10**	0.59**	0.55**	0.40**	0.30**	0.33**	0.42***	0.29*
Intraclass correlation in %	20	13	13	10	7	8	10	7
Prop. of expl. variance at level 1 in %	-	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Prop. of expl. variance at level 2 in %	-	-	7	32	49	44	29	51
<i>N</i>	111,822	110,682	110,682	110,682	110,682	110,682	110,682	110,682

Notes

MLA, pooled by countries and waves; a - reference category is universal welfare state; results are based on weighted data; all independent variables are z-standardized, bs reported, percentages rounded; * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.

we find yet another confirmation of the influence of the individual-level determinants. Once again, social trust turns out to be the strongest predictor followed by life satisfaction. In addition, the latter affects trust in regulative institutions more strongly than trust in political institutions. Not surprisingly, political interest is a less important determinant of trust in regulative than in political institutions but still significantly related to this dependent variable. Church attendance, by contrast, doesn't reveal any difference with the corresponding coefficient depicted in Table 5.6. Overall, these individual-level indicators account for 12 per cent of the explained variance at the micro level; slightly less than the one revealed in the MLA model of trust in political institutions.

Scrutinizing the relevance of national unemployment rates, however, falls short of the expectations. Although higher unemployment rates are negatively related to trust in regulative institutions, the corresponding coefficient does not attain statistical significance. Accordingly, this predictor accounts only for 7 per cent of explained variance at the macro level. Higher GDP per capita, by contrast, positively and significantly affects this trust dimension and exceeds the corresponding coefficient for trust in political institutions by far. Its importance is also reflected by an explained macro-level variance of more than 30 per cent. Even more effective than GDP per capita are higher rates on the Human Development and on the Quality of Democracy Index as is substantiated by the coefficients and the explained variances. Interestingly, these unequivocal results clearly contrast the findings identified for trust in political institutions where both indicators are weak and insignificant. The same is valid for the aggregate measure of social trust. While it does not affect trust in political institutions, it contributes significantly to the strengthening of trust in regulative ones. An explained variance at the macro level of 29 per cent underlines its relevance. Finally, introducing the typology of welfare state arrangements brings about the most considerable increase in explained variance. As we observe, living under welfare state conditions of post-communist societies affects trust in regulative institutions the most negatively. All other welfare state arrangements are also negatively related to this trust dimension but attain no statistical significance.

As a comparison of the findings presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 underlines, micro- and macro-level socio-structural indicators are meaningfully related to both dimensions of political trust. Despite this common ground, significant differences do exist. Interestingly, trust in political institutions is much less affected by macro-level indicators than is trust in regulative ones. In particular, the insignificance of the Quality of Democracy Index comes as a surprise. The effects of the individual-level determinants on our two trust dimensions, however, do not differ distinctly from each other. But as the comparison of explained variances at the micro and macro level reveals the individual-level predictors are either not very strong or/and lag far behind the relevance of macro-level determinants.

Conclusion and outlook

This chapter started out with the assumption that one important ingredient for democracies to flourish was a solid foundation of political trust. Citizens who would be trustful of their political institutions and actors would also be more likely to engage in politics, obey by the laws and express general system support. Any trends of decline in political trust should, therefore, raise general concerns. Moreover, the search for the sources of trust in political institutions, so the arguments say, would need further elaborations. This study took up this general appeal and shifted the analytical focus to the relevance of socio-structural indicators for political trust formation. It was generally assumed that effects of socio-structural characteristics on political trust should be distinguished along two levels of analysis. On the macro level, advanced degrees of modernization, low levels of social inequality, just, transparent and efficient state institutions, and high aggregate levels of social trust should go along with stronger political support. On the individual level, by contrast, individuals who enjoy greater resources and experience fewer restrictions should also be politically more trustful.

With analytical tools, such as multilevel analyses, contextual prerequisites of political trust can easily be identified without neglecting the concomitant impact of individual factors. In addition, this analytical instrument allows for the extension of other already established explanatory models.

Besides the prime focus on the impact of socio-structural characteristics on political trust, the three available waves of the European Social Survey also allowed scrutiny of its development over time and distribution across countries.

Despite an apparent established common wisdom, the decline of political trust is *not* a general European-wide phenomenon. Even though the four year time span covered by the three ESS waves is certainly too short to detect any reliable trends, we observed steep decreases in some countries and noteworthy increases in others. Nevertheless, this study also confirmed some well-established findings. First, a twofold distinction of types of political trust seems to be appropriate. Police and legal systems represent more or less neutral, i.e. regulative, institutions which generally receive the highest approval rates. Parliaments, politicians and political parties, by contrast, are no impartial institutions but engage in processes of interest mediation and are, on average, perceived as less trustworthy political agents.

Second, we discerned similar country patterns which had already been identified in numerous studies before. Political trust is the most pronounced in Scandinavian countries. Other established democracies take on a middle range position. Political trust in Southern European countries, on the other hand, reveals in part considerable deficiencies. Only post-communist countries perform even worse. In many of these countries, political trust ranges disturbingly low.

With regard to our assumptions about the relevance of socio-structural indicators for the strengthening of political trust we were both confirmed and refuted. As it turned out, the outlined contextual characteristics do matter for political

trust. However, people clearly distinguish between those institutions which engage in interest representation and political decision-making processes, on one hand, and those which are meant to be impartial agents, on the other. The latter enjoys credibility and trust if a society is democratic, rich, modernized and disposed of high levels of social trust and little vertical inequality. By contrast, an individual's disposition of resources as was conceptualized here in terms of different micro-level measures of horizontal and vertical social inequality relates only marginally to the willingness to put trust in political or regulative institutions alike. This finding is particularly valid if we also account for the influence of indicators of political orientations. Only socially trustful people stand out in this regard.

The considerable context-dependency of political trust turns it into a relational concept. As we mentioned earlier, the functioning and stability of democratic systems strongly depend on political support through political trust. But where democratic political institutions and actors perform poorly or social cohesion is endangered citizens react sensitively and respond to these developments by withdrawing their political support. From this perspective, declining political trust can be interpreted as a premonition which brings about the opportunity to identify possible aberrations and confront them. The empirical findings presented here certainly support efforts of a more focused quest for underlying causes at the institutional level.

Appendix

Dependent variables

Trust in political institutions: additive index of four political trust questions (parliament, politicians, political parties (from 2004 onwards), European Parliament) divided by the number of valid answers: 0 lowest to 10 highest
 Trust in regulative institutions: additive index of two political trust questions (legal system, police) divided by the number of valid answers: 0 lowest to 10 highest

Micro-level socio-structural indicators

Level of education: 0 lowest to 6 highest level (original coding)
 Number of household members: 1 to 7
 Feeling about household income: 1 very difficult to 4 very comfortably
 Ever unemployed for more than three months: 0 no, 1 yes
 Belonging to ethnic minority: 0 no, 1 yes
 Member of discriminated group: 0 no, 1 yes
 Citizen of country: 0 no, 1 yes
 Social trust index: additive index of three social trust questions (trustworthy, fair and helpful) divided by the number of valid answers: 0 lowest to 10 highest
 How often socially meet with people: 1 never to 7 every day

Meso-level socio-structural indicator

Size of domicile: 1 big city to 5 farm (original coding)

Political orientations

Political interest: 1 not at all to 4 very much

Internal political efficacy: additive index of politics too complicated and making mind up about political issues divided by the number of valid answers: 1 low to 5 high

Government is responsible for equality: 1 disagree strongly to 5 agree strongly

Church attendance: 0 every day to 1 never

Individually perceived system performance

Satisfaction with economy, educational and health care system in one's country: 0 completely dissatisfied to 10 completely satisfied

Macro-level socio-structural indicators

National unemployment rates in per cent (2002)

Gross Domestic Product per capita in US\$ (2002)

Gini Index (income inequality): 0 perfect equality to 100 perfect inequality

Human Development Index 2002: 0 low achievement to 1 highest achievement

Ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization: range from 0 high fractionalization to 1 no fractionalization

Share of Roman Catholics and Protestants among population in per cent (mid-year 2000)

Aggregate social trust index: aggregated additive index of three social trust questions (trustworthy, fair and helpful) by country divided by the number of valid answers: 0 lowest to 10 highest

The assignment of countries to welfare regimes is as follows: Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden are assigned to the universal welfare regime; Austria, Belgium, France, East and West Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland to the conservative welfare regime; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine to the post-communist countries with restricted financial resources; Ireland and the United Kingdom to the liberal welfare regime; and Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal to the Southern European welfare states with strong familial bonds. These assignments are also corroborated by recent findings by Oliver Nüchter and his team from IWA/K of the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main (still to be published) which correspond to the abundant literature in this field of research (see also Kumlin 2004).

Macro-level political indicators

Effective number of electoral parties (1996–2000), ranging from 2.64 to 10.29

Consensus vs majoritarian political systems: 0 majoritarian, 1 one dimension consensus/majoritarian, 2 consensus

Age of democracy in years since 1919

Corruption Perception Index (2004): 0 highly corrupt to 10 highly clean

Quality of Democracy Index, Economist Intelligence Unit: 1 completely undemocratic to 10 highly democratic

Notes

- 1 I'm particularly grateful to Joy Aselmann, Benjamin Kratz and Stefan Salewski, students of my undergraduate seminar on political trust in Western societies with whom I discussed my empirical results presented here and who gave helpful comments. Likewise, I'm indebted to Oscar W. Gabriel and Silke Keil for helpful advice on earlier drafts of this chapter.
- 2 The author conducted corresponding correlation analyses but the results are not presented here.
- 3 The seventh question item measures trust in the United Nations but will not be analysed in the following. The question item 'political parties' was not included in the first wave of the ESS.
- 4 This differentiation was also corroborated by principal component analyses with varimax rotation in most countries. Results are not presented here. For the operationalization of the two political trust variables see Appendix.
- 5 The correlation coefficients resulting from these analyses are not presented here but can be provided on request.
- 6 The seventh MLA model reflects the so-called empty model and the eighth model encompasses individual-level indicators only.
- 7 We drop longevity of democracy and the CPI because both indicators correlate highly with the Quality of Democracy Index which is included in the subsequent analyses. We also drop denominational percentage shares in a society because they overlap with the typology of welfare state regimes.

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6 Affluence, inequality and satisfaction with democracy¹

Armin Schäfer

Democracy after the great U-turn

Not too long ago, Muller (1988) found a mutually beneficial relationship between democracy and egalitarian income distribution. Countries that had been ruled democratically for a long time tended to be more egalitarian; and more equality, in turn, stabilized democracy. However, the data he used covered in large part the third quarter of the twentieth century – a period that has been characterized as the 'golden age' (Hobsbawm 1995). During this time, most industrial democracies grew not only more affluent but also became more egalitarian (Judt 2007: chs 10–11). However, since the late 1970s and early 1980s, this trend towards equality has been reversed. First in Anglo-Saxon, then in other advanced democracies, incomes began to grow apart (Atkinson/Piketty 2007; Brandolini/Smeeding 2008). According to the OECD, most member countries have witnessed an increase in inequality between the mid-1980s and today (OECD 2008). In light of these developments, Alderson and Nielsen (2002) speak of the 'great U-turn' of income inequality.

For the same period, studies show an erosion of support for core institutions of democracy such as parliaments, government, parties and politicians (Dalton 2004). In parallel to the reversal in income distribution, a U-turn in turnout in parliamentary elections took place. Until the mid-1970s, turnout was rising in most advanced democracies. Since then, however, it has been declining in a majority of countries (IDEA 2004). Low turnout is 'taken to be the most common symptom of democratic ill health', as Norris (2002: 6) notes. Given the coincidence of rising inequality and signs of democratic disaffection, we can ask whether and how these are linked. In this chapter, we follow up on recent studies that demonstrate a negative impact of income inequality on satisfaction with democracy. To do so, this chapter inquires which factors explain differences in satisfaction with the way democracy works in 25 European countries in the mid-2000s.


The second section discusses what the dependent variable measures. How content people are with the way democracy works in their country does not denote agreement or disagreement with the principle of democratic rule. Rather, it measures the level of support for the way a democratic regime works

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Changing Inequalities and Societal Impacts in Rich Countries: Thirty Countries' Experiences

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Germany

Rising Inequality and the Transformation of Rhine Capitalism

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[–] Abstract and Keywords

Germany has displayed a remarkably stable distribution of household net incomes except for the period 2000–2006 when inequality rapidly increased, both at the bottom and the top of the distribution. The rise of income disparities can be attributed to rising unemployment rates, growing inequality in market returns returns, and changing tax legislations. In a short-term perspective, the rise of income inequality was associated with increasing material deprivation, lower happiness, and less mobility out of poverty. In the long run, however, trends in these social indicators do not parallel the development of

income inequality over the past two decades. Political behavioural and attitudinal patterns during the past ten years, which saw lower turnout rates, less trust in other people and political institutions as well as stronger opposing views towards immigrants, particularly amongst the least educated, are more in line with inequality trends.

Keywords: income inequality, unemployment, tax legislation, deprivation, happiness, voter turnout, Germany, social impacts, immigrants, poverty

1. Introduction¹

IN the 1980s, Germany consisted of two separate states with different economic systems: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a member of NATO with a population of almost 62 million; and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a member of the Warsaw Pact with a population of about 17 million. In the following, we only deal with the FRG during the 1980s and with both the East (the former GDR and West Berlin) and the West (the rest) after reunification—which occurred on 3 October 1990.

The economic system of the FRG during the 1980s can be described as a corporatist variant of capitalism, referred to as Rhine capitalism. It has two distinctive traits. The first is cooperative industrial relations, both at the firm level—with work councils and co-determination in large firms—and at the national level—with comprehensive industry-wide wage agreements struck between employer representatives and trade unions. The second is a highly developed social security system of the Bismarckian variety, strongly relying on the equivalence principle, and strongly determined by the work history and family circumstances of the insured. In conditions close to full employment, as they prevailed **(p.272)** in Germany during the three decades after World War II, Rhine capitalism was successful in providing insurance against income shocks and restraining long-term income disparities.

Since reunification, the German economic system has undergone far-reaching changes, involving the hybridization of the corporatist model inherited from pre-reunification FRG with elements that are borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon world of capitalism: de-unionization; privatizations; minimum wages in some sectors; a kind of earned income tax credit; declining public pensions; subsidization of private retirement savings; and a stronger emphasis on shareholder value. As we will show in this chapter, this transformation has come with a substantial increase in income inequality that came to the fore during the first half of the last decade. At the same time, political disenchantment, social intolerance and demands for redistributive policies have become more common.

The FRG of the 1980s was one of the most affluent and egalitarian countries in the world. Average income was higher in West Germany than in France or in the Netherlands and only the Scandinavian countries exhibited a more even income distribution. The integration in 1990 of the GDR into the political structure of the more affluent FRG implied that reunified Germany was starting with a lower level of per-capita GDP than West Germany had in 1990. Still, at the beginning of the 1990s, reunified Germany had a higher level of per capita GDP in current prices than France and the Netherlands. Reunification also produced an immediate effect on income inequality: on the one hand, the population

of West Germany was merged with a poorer population, which tended to increase inequality; on the other hand, that poorer population had more evenly distributed incomes, which tended to reduce inequality. As a result, just after reunification, Germany still exhibited an income distribution that was quite egalitarian by international comparison.

After reunification, the macro-economic performance of Germany has been on the whole rather poor until about 2006. German GDP growth has been low, not only as compared with former decades but also by international standards. In terms of GDP per capita in current prices, reunified Germany has been surpassed by Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and it has been caught by France. The disposable income of private households, except for some growth years in the second half of the 1990s, has stagnated most of the time. In real terms, median household equivalent net income in 2008 was only 5 per cent higher than in 1991.²

A high unemployment rate accompanied slow economic growth in the fifteen years that followed reunification. The unemployment rate, measured according to the official German definition, increased from 7.3 per cent in 1991 to 13 per cent in 2005.³ Since then, however, unemployment has substantially declined and reached again the level it had at the time of reunification.

The number of working people in 2005 was about the same as it was in 1991. After 2005, employment grew rapidly. In 2010, there were about 1.6 million working people more compared to 2005,⁴ employment in Germany has thus increased by about 4 per cent from 1991 to 2010. However, since average work hours per employed person have substantially decreased, **(p.273)** total working hours have actually declined by 4 per cent from 1991 to 2010. The evolution of employment was very different for the employees and the self-employed: while the number of employees increased by only 2 per cent, the number of self-employed persons increased by more than 25 per cent. Moreover, the labour market underwent a dualization process, entailing the rise of a large segment of badly-paid and unstable jobs, most of them in the service sector.

Labour's share in German national income declined between 1991 and 2010 from 71 per cent to 66.3 per cent, the bulk of the decline occurring in the period 2000–2007. Correspondingly, entrepreneurial and property income increased. In real terms, employees' compensation increased very modestly between 1991 and 2010. Average gross hourly wages increased in real terms during the 1990s, as employees in the regions of the former GDR reduced the pay gap that separated them from their counterparts in the West. Since 2000, average real hourly wages have stagnated in Germany.

The structure of aggregate demand has changed significantly since the beginning of the 2000s: while consumption and investment, both private and public, have stagnated, the current account has thrived. Since 2004, a trade surplus of the order of 5 to 6 per cent of GDP has been common for Germany. The share of German production that is sold abroad almost doubled during the last two decades: exports represent now about 50

per cent of GDP, while they represented only about 26 per cent of GDP in 1991.

The share of GDP obtained from services has increased, while the shares of agriculture and manufacturing have declined. However, as compared to other countries, the relative decline of manufacturing has been less pronounced in Germany and its share of GDP is high by international standards. Manufacturing is directly responsible for about one quarter of all jobs in Germany, for most of the exports and for Germany's current account surplus. German manufacturers often specialize in high-technology productions, invest heavily in R&D and benefit from a wide range of government programmes to support scientific research and innovation. Large companies act as multinational enterprises with substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) across the entire globe. Most value added in German manufacturing comes, however, from small and medium-size enterprises. They are often deeply rooted in the territory where they produce and, at the same time, have successfully outsourced part of their production to producers in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Typically, industrial relations in manufacturing firms are peaceful and characterized by a cooperative attitude. In large companies, co-determination is mandated by law. The strong performance of German manufacturing relies upon institutions that favour the rise and durability of a network of long-term relationships based on mutual trust. In particular, the banking sector is characterized by the strong presence of local public and mutual savings banks that support the expansion strategies of small and medium-size enterprises. Furthermore, German manufacturers benefit from a dual system of education that combines schooling with vocational training in firms. This system has proven to be an effective way to foster human capital investment, limit youth unemployment and provide firms with the skilled workforce they need in order to be internationally competitive in post-fordist high-tech industry.

Globalization has affected Germany also in terms of the composition of its resident population. Over the last fifty years, the share of foreigners living in Germany has strongly increased, starting from a very low level. Today, the Turks are the largest group of resident foreign population, its large size going back to the policy of actively recruiting **(p.274)** 'guest-workers' in the 1960s. Many immigrants were also recruited from Southern Europe, in particular Italy and Yugoslavia. Contrary to official expectations, most 'guest-workers' did not return to their countries but stayed to live in Germany and started their own families. German integration policy began relatively late and has not been very successful yet. After the demise of the Soviet empire, there has also been a large inflow of people from Eastern Europe, in particular ethnic Germans.

A main policy concern during the last two decades has been the convergence of living standards and productivity in the regions of the former GDR to those in West Germany. Starting from less than half of the West German level in 1991, real GDP per employed person in the East has increased to about 80 per cent of the West German level in 2009; the strongest increase took place in the first half of the 1990s. The average gross monthly wage of full-time employees in the East was just 46.5 per cent of the corresponding wage in the West in 1991. Five years later, the East-West ratio had already climbed to 73.2 per

cent. In 2009, it amounted to 76.5 per cent. Convergence was on its way also with respect to average household disposable income: the East-West ratio increased from 59.2 per cent in 1991 to 78.3 per cent in 2008.

Where convergence has failed is with respect to employment. Over time, the unemployment rate in the East has remained at roughly twice the level of the West. The atrophy of Eastern employment as compared to employment in the West is matched by its worse demographic evolution. From 1990 to 2008, the population living in the East declined by 11.7 per cent, while the population of the West grew by 6.5 per cent. The decline of the population in the East went along with a massive increase in the average age of its resident population.⁵ This was due to a dramatic decrease of fertility, an increase of longevity, and large outflows of young migrants, especially women.

2. Income Inequality

German income inequality was rather stable during the 1980s. After reunification, the inequality of market incomes and the inequality of earnings at the bottom of the distribution began to increase. The increase of inequality at the level of primary incomes accelerated in the years 2000–2005 and that inequality stayed roughly constant afterwards. By contrast, the distribution of disposable income did not become significantly more unequal during the 1990s. Inequality of disposable income, poverty, and income concentration at the top of the distribution rapidly grew in the years from 2000 to 2005 and has stood at that higher level since.

Inequality among Households

Household income is a key determinant of the standard of living. In order to take household size and composition into account, we make multi-member household income equivalent (**p.275**) to one-person household income using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The evolution of household income inequality in Germany since 1983 is depicted in Figure 12.1. It shows the Gini coefficients for the distributions of net and gross income, separately in the West and the East of Germany. The evolution of the Gini coefficients for Germany as a whole is very similar to the evolution for West Germany.

Figure 12.1 shows that the Gini coefficient of the cross-sectional distribution of net household income in West Germany was slightly less than 0.25 in the early 1980s and about the same level of inequality prevailed at the end of the century. After 1999, inequality rapidly grew over six years, reached a level of about 0.28 and approximately stayed at that higher level afterwards. In contrast to net incomes, gross incomes are computed before taxes and public transfers and those incomes had already become more unequal during the 1990s. It is apparent from Figure 12.1 that the tax transfer system substantially reduces cross-sectional income inequality in Germany.

The evolution of income inequality in the East has been similar to the one in West Germany, albeit less stable. In particular, the rise in inequality of gross income was more pronounced in the East. In terms of inequality levels, there is a striking difference between the two regions: gross incomes are distributed more unequally in the East but, thanks to general governmental redistribution, net incomes are distributed more evenly

there. However, during the last few years inequality has become more similar in the two regions.




Figure 12.1 Gini coefficients of income distributions for East and West Germany

Source: SOEP, own calculations; annual incomes, with frequency weights.

(p.276) The growth of income inequality has affected both households with relatively high incomes and households with relatively low incomes, as indicated by increasing 90/50 and 50/10 percentile ratios.

The evolution of poverty rates has been similar to the evolution of the Gini coefficient. After taxes and transfers, the poverty rate—with the poverty line at 60 per cent of the median net equivalent household income—exhibited no distinguishable trend until the end of the century. The poverty rate rapidly increased during the first half of the 2000s and then hardly changed in the second half.

Among groups, lone mothers and the unemployed often live in poverty. More than half of all households headed by an unemployed person or by a lone mother receive incomes below the poverty line. Especially for the unemployed, the decade of the 2000s substantially increased their poverty risk: it rose from about 41 per cent to more than 56 per cent. Also households headed by a person without a licence from an advanced secondary school (*Abitur*) or by someone younger than thirty are subject to a severe poverty risk. That risk moderately increased for both groups during the 2000s. Households living in the East face a greater poverty risk than the rest of the population and that difference has increased during the 2000s. This is a contrast with the 1990s, a decade during which the poverty rates in the East and in the West were converging. The incidence of poverty over the last decade was rather stable in the case of foreigners—defined as individuals who were not born in Germany, independently of their ethnic origin. Perhaps surprisingly, in Germany neither blue-collar workers nor the elderly

exhibit a poverty rate that substantially differs from that of the overall population.

Unfortunately, the SOEP data contains too few households with very high incomes to accurately portray the very top of the income distribution. Bach *et al.* (2013) have merged individual tax returns data from administrative data with the SOEP. Their income concept is household income after taxes and transfers; in contrast to the previous analysis, they do not use an equivalence scale. They show that the share of total income received by households in the top percentile grew from 6.78 per cent in 1992 to 7.91 per cent in 2005. It is noteworthy that the income increase in the top percentile was very unequal, with the very top of the distribution increasing its incomes at a much faster pace than the rest.

In contrast to the U.S., top managers represent in Germany a relatively minor fraction of the very top of the income distribution. The overwhelming majority of the economic elite of Germany—defined as the top 0.001 per cent fractile—consists of individuals whose main income sources are business activity and financial capital (Bach *et al.*, 2009). In line with this finding, the increase in income concentration in Germany has been paralleled by a decline in labour's share of national income.

An important aspect of the rise of inequality after reunification is the increasing role of the self-employed. Income from self-employment is distributed more unequally than income from dependent employment and the share of the self-employed in the workforce has strongly increased during the last two decades.

Because of data problems, the analysis of German wealth distribution has been hitherto subject to severe limits. However, some interesting facts can be established. First, the ratio of household net wealth to household yearly income is about 3.5 in Germany and that ratio has been increasing over the last three decades. Second, wealth is distributed more unequally than income, and wealth inequality has increased between 2002 and 2007. Third, households in the East own substantially less wealth than households in the West. The inter-regional (**p.277**) wealth gap is substantially more pronounced than the inter-regional disparity in income levels: household wealth in East Germany is only about 40 per cent of household wealth in West Germany. Fourth, wealth is more unequally distributed in East Germany than in West Germany. As wealth produces income, this contributes to explain why market incomes are distributed more unequally in the East than in the West. Also, in the case of wealth, there is a tendency for the Gini coefficients in the two regions to converge.

Labour Market Inequality

Because of its large relative size, labour income is a major direct determinant of income inequality. The picture of the evolution of labour income inequality in Germany over the last three decades is complex. Using social security records, Dustmann *et al.* (2009) find that cross-sectional wage inequality was already increasing in West Germany in the 1980s, but only in the top half of the distribution. They also find that in the early 1990s inequality started to rise for the entire wage distribution. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS),

Fuchs-Schündeln *et al.* (2010) confirm the rise of wage inequality in West Germany after reunification, the upward trend of inequality being mainly driven by an increase in inequality after the year 2000. By contrast, they find that inequality did not noticeably increase during the 1980s. Also using the SOEP data, Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) find that inequality of wages for prime-age male employees was stable in West Germany between 1984 and 1994 and increased thereafter. In the period of increasing inequality they find a significant positive gap between high-tenure and low-tenure workers in terms of respective wage growth rates. They suggest that the adjustment of wages to worsening labour market conditions mainly concerned entrants into the labour market. For all workers in West Germany, they find that real wage growth at the tenth percentile has been slightly negative since the mid 1990s. Becker (2006) uses the SOEP to compare 1998 and 2003 in terms of inequality of hourly wages. She finds that workers without a full-time job suffered from wage stagnation and that overall inequality increased, with a low-pay sector already developing before the labour-market reforms of the Hartz legislation. By contrast, 'within group' wage inequality did not change significantly between 1998 and 2003.

Bach *et al.* (2009) investigate the distribution of individual market incomes for the entire adult population living in Germany. Market income includes, along with wage income, income from self-employment and from capital. They find a steady increase of the Gini coefficient in the period from 1992 to 2003, from 0.616 to 0.652.

Two remarkable developments in earnings inequality occurred over the last two decades. First, a very rapid decline of earnings inequality at the bottom of the distribution took place just in the wake of reunification. This was mainly due to a partial catching up of wages in the regions of the former GDR. Those wages started from a low level and were raised in a few years to levels close to three-quarters of comparable West German wages. Second, there was a substantial increase in earnings inequality at the bottom of the distribution during the first decade of this century.

Unemployment has been a major crux for the German economy during the last three decades. The unemployment rate trended upwards in Germany until 2005 and started declining afterwards. After reunification, the level of unemployment has systematically been much **(p.278)** higher in East Germany. The incidence of unemployment has been especially high for the individuals with low educational attainment.

The rise of unemployment in West Germany from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s is usually attributed to the institutional rigidity of its labour market, which resisted a downward wage adjustment in spite of competitive pressure resulting from globalization and skill-biased technological change. The rise of unemployment is therefore seen as the price for keeping a low level of wage dispersion—the counter-example being the US, where in the same period the unemployment rate was kept under control at the price of increased wage dispersion.

The exceptionally high unemployment rates in the region of the former GDR mirror several factors, most prominently: mistakes in economic policy that led to accelerated de-

industrialization;⁶ the absence of an entrepreneurial class with a network of long-standing relationships; an excessive wage push during the years when Eastern Europe was experiencing an economic breakdown; and a dramatic fall in public employment.⁷

The pool of the unemployed is heterogeneous. Along with people that remain unemployed for a short duration and then find a new job, there is a group of long-term unemployed people. These are often older persons and persons with serious health problems who cannot work longer than a few hours. Since the Hartz reforms, there has existed a large group of people who at the same time have an official job and receive transfers under the same programme as the one for the unemployed. It is estimated that, as of today, about 1.3 million people combine low market wages with such public transfers.

The German labour market shares a secular trend with all other advanced economies: the rising participation of women. The female activity rate has steadily increased over the last three decades and is approaching the rather stable activity rate of men. Part-time employment is much more common among women (45.8 per cent) than among men (9.2 per cent). Overall, the share of workers in part-time employment has increased in Germany from 14 per cent in 1991 to 26.5 per cent in 2009. Some of that increase occurred because of a shortage of full-time jobs. According to EU-LFS, in 2011 some 17.1 per cent of those individuals would have preferred full-time work. SOEP data indicates that the gap between the desired number of working hours and the actual number of hours worked by part-time employees has increased since the second half of the 1990s (Holst and Seifert, 2012). In terms of overall female labour-market participation, Germany takes a middle position among OECD countries.

Labour market inequality is intertwined with the decline of both trade unions and collective bargaining. Trade unions used to play a key role in the wage formation process in the FRG. Industrial relations were characterized by industry-level wage negotiations, typically led by the metal working industry. This system has been weakened after reunification when in many cases firm-level bargaining replaced industry-level bargaining, and opening clauses in collective agreements allowed for plant-level derogation. The unionization rate, which was about 36 per cent at reunification, has steadily declined to about half that level. **(p.279)** Furthermore, especially in East Germany, many firms have begun to set their wages unilaterally, without any formal agreement with unions or worker representatives.

Another major institutional change has been the rise of fixed-term employment contracts. The share of employees in temporary jobs has risen from about 10 per cent to almost 15 per cent today in the last fifteen years. Temporary workers typically receive low wages and face a high unemployment risk.

Why has Inequality Grown?

In Germany, income inequality was rather stable during the 1980s. After reunification, the inequality of market incomes and the inequality of earnings at the bottom of the distribution began to increase. The increase of inequality at the level of primary incomes

accelerated in the years 2000–2005 and inequality stayed roughly constant afterwards. By contrast with primary incomes, post-fisc incomes did not become significantly more unequal during the 1990s. Inequality of net income rapidly grew in the years from 2000 to 2005 and stood at that higher level afterwards.

There are three prominent features of the evolution of German inequality that need an explanation:

1. The rise in the inequality of primary incomes since reunification
2. The stability of the distribution of net incomes during the 1990s, despite the above element
3. The rise of overall inequality in 2000–2005.

The rise of inequality of primary incomes since reunification. To a substantial extent, the long-run rise of inequality in the distribution of market incomes in Germany mirrors the growing numbers of the unemployed and pensioners, i.e. individuals with zero or very low market incomes, in the overall population.

In Germany, the earnings distribution and the wage distribution showed a slight increase in inequality after the economic downturn of 1992–1993. This mainly occurred through a relative worsening of the pay received by the new entrants into the labour market (Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007; Fuchs-Schündeln *et al.*, 2010). The main drivers behind those changes were: skill-biased technological change in the upper half of the distribution; immigration shocks from Eastern Europe; and the decline of unions in the lower half of the distribution (Dustmann *et al.*, 2010). It is likely that large privatizations and the outsourcing of low-skill tasks by the public sector contributed to the growth of a low-wage sector in Germany.

The long-run rise of inequality in equivalent gross household income was also due to compositional effects, in particular the increased share of pensioner households and the reduced average household size. Between 1991 and 2008, the population of Germany increased by 2.6 per cent, while the number of one-person households increased by 33.2 per cent. According to Peichl *et al.* (2012), the increased inequality of gross household incomes is strongly related to changes in household structure that have occurred in Germany during that period.

The stability of the distribution of net incomes during the 1990s. The redistributive performance of the German tax transfer system strengthened in the 1990s, as the distribution (p.280) of post-fisc income changed little, despite an increasingly unequal distribution of pre-fisc income. The generosity of unemployment benefits remained relatively high during the 1990s. With respect to old age pensions, the retirees were still benefiting from the reforms introduced in the late 1970s. That expansion was characterized by relatively high replacement rates and generous early retirement provisions (Bönke *et al.*, 2010). Pensioner households in the East benefited from having work histories with no unemployment spells and a high labour-market participation of women.

In the years 1996–98, the burden of personal income tax was reduced for low-income households (Corneo, 2005a). The average income tax rate for individuals with low income fell substantially as compared to 1995, which helped to offset zero or even negative real wage growth in the lowest quartile of the distribution. Furthermore, there were strong increases in the child benefit, starting in 1996, that reduced the poverty risk for families with children.

The rise of inequality in 2000–2005. The impressive acceleration of the rise in inequality after 1999 occurred during a period of weak economic growth and high unemployment levels. To a great extent, the rise of inequality was caused by the poor performance of the German labour market. Growing unemployment mainly hit low-skilled workers and exerted a downward pressure on their wages, especially in the case of new entrants into the labour market. In a context of vanishing union power, of firms rejecting industry-wide wage agreements, and of increasingly privatized public services, there were few institutional barriers to resist such a pressure. After 2003, the Hartz-reforms are likely to have contributed to put even more pressure on the low-skilled and to foster low-pay employment. As a result, wage and earnings inequality at the bottom of the distribution increased.

This time, the German tax transfer system did not generate the progressive effects that would have stabilized the distribution of post-fisc incomes. With regard to transfers, current pensioners continued to benefit from relatively generous arrangements stipulated in the past, and their poverty risk hardly changed. By contrast, the poverty risk of the unemployed increased substantially—as one would expect from the substantial increase in earnings inequality even without any change occurring in unemployment benefits. In fact, the Hartz-reforms are likely to have contributed to a higher poverty rate among the unemployed. The increased incidence of poverty among the unemployed in 2000–2005 can also be related to the high unemployment rates that prevailed in Germany from the mid 1990s. In contrast to those who were unemployed in the mid 1990s, the people who were unemployed during the early 2000s had often already been unemployed for a long period and were thus entitled to lower benefits.

Turning to the German tax system, during 2000–2005 it actually became less progressive, especially as a consequence of the income tax reform enacted in various steps by the government of Chancellor Schröder (Social-Democrats and Green Party) from 1998 to 2005 (Corneo, 2005b). The substantial reduction of the top marginal tax rate, along with cuts in corporate taxation and lasting effects from the demise of the personal wealth tax in 1996/7, contributed altogether to increasing the concentration of net income at the top of the distribution. Tax policy is likely to have also spurred the increase in gross incomes at the top of the distribution, e.g. by encouraging top managers to demand pay increases. Fabbri and Marin (2012) document a massive increase in CEO pay in Germany, especially in 2005 and 2006, just after a substantial cut in the top marginal rate of income tax and consistently with theories of compensation bargaining.

(p.281) Using a decomposition analysis, Biewen and Juhasz (2012) have attempted to quantify the strength of various potential drivers of inequality in Germany from 2000 to

2006. They find that the main drivers were rising unemployment, rising inequality in market returns, and changes in the tax system. Each one of those three factors is found to account for about one quarter of the overall increase in inequality of disposable equivalent household income in Germany in that period.


3. The Impact of Inequality on Social Indicators

Rising income inequality in the early 2000s went along with an increase in poverty rates, at least for some sub-groups of the population. These monetarily defined measures may find their consequences in changing living conditions, in worsening health conditions, in a lack of social interaction, and in an eroding subjective well being. However, these consequences are not deterministic. Some indicators of daily life experiences and conduct may be immune to moderate changes in income inequality; other indicators may be affected after a considerable delay. This section provides a description of the development of social indicators and relates it to income inequality.

Material Deprivation

Households with significant income losses may be able to maintain their material living standard for a certain amount of time by exploiting existing resources, for example using an existing car or TV. Hence, we would expect a gradual increase in material deprivation as a consequence of growing income inequality and unemployment. Using SOEP data from 2001–12.2007, we find an increase in material deprivation for the entire observation period (Figure 12.2).⁸ The level of material deprivation is higher in East than in West Germany, and the increase is more pronounced in East than in West Germany as well. Andreß (2006) shows that the amount of material deprivation parallels the development of unemployment rates, with a strong increase in material deprivation after the turn of the century. In the most recent years, material deprivation has been declining (Engels *et al.*, forthcoming). Thus, material deprivation seems to correlate more with developments in unemployment rates than with income inequality.

The increase in material deprivation varied across social groups. Households with tertiary educated members hardly experienced an increase in material deprivation. Households without academic degrees have been increasingly confronted with cuts in the standard of **(p.282)**



living. For poor people, the rate of materially deprived poor households jumped from about 30 per cent to 40 per cent. The remarkable increase for this group suggests that poor households increasingly suffer from their financial situation.

Social Interactions

Growing inequality and poverty rates may result in forms of social deprivation as well. People could be less willing, less inclined or less able to see other people and interact with them on a daily base. Using data from the SOEP, the ISG research institute (forthcoming) summarizes the frequency of contacts with friends, relatives and neighbours. On average, **(p.283)** between 21.5 and 23.6 per cent of the population do not have contacts with their peers at least once a month. For the first decade of the 2000s, there is no clear trend in these numbers. We find somewhat higher rates of social exclusion for poor people and for less-educated people. The higher numbers for less privileged people raise questions about the capacity of our society to avoid alienation for these groups.

Subjective Well Being

In contrast to the previous social indicators, measures of subjective well being are more prone to react instantaneously to changes in income inequality. The SOEP data provide measures of an individual's satisfaction with life in general, with her or his health and with household income. The long-term trends of these measures exhibit some fluctuations between 1995 and 2009 (Figure 12.3). For the time period between 2000 and 2005—the period of growing income inequality—we find a decline in life satisfaction, health

satisfaction and income satisfaction. However, the variation in these satisfaction measures before and after the rise of income inequality does not speak to a systematic correlation of income inequality and satisfaction.

On average, people in West Germany are more satisfied with aspects of their life than people in East Germany. The difference is about 0.3 and 0.8 points on an 11-point-scale. People with secondary or primary education are less satisfied with their situations than tertiary educated people. Again, a stark contrast exists between poor people and non-poor people. The average difference between these groups ranges between 0.4 points for health and 2.2 points for income satisfaction. Poor people show little tendency for health satisfaction, especially not at the beginning of the millennium. Life satisfaction, however, declined in the first years of the 2000s. Even more pronounced is the development of income satisfaction during that time. Income satisfaction plummeted for this group by about 0.8 points. The drop after 2003, in particular, suggests that this development may be related to the newly introduced labour market reforms and the reforms in social assistance (see Section 5).


Social Mobility

An increase in cross-sectional inequality may be less damaging to the social fabric if it is accompanied by increased mobility. Using SOEP data, Goebel *et al.* (2011) present income dynamics out of income quintiles within a 4-year period. As shown in Figure 12.4, about 66.5 per cent of people from the highest income quintile in 1985 remained in this quintile at least until 1988. Likewise, about 57.3 per cent of the people from the lowest income quintile in 1985 remained in this quintile at least until 1988. The trends over time show remarkable stability for people in the highest quintile. The finding for the bottom of the distribution is markedly different. After 2000, the proportion of people who were not able to leave low-income conditions rose to 65.2 per cent. Thus, the rise in cross-sectional inequality in Germany was not accompanied by more income mobility but rather by an increased difficulty in escaping poverty.⁹

(p.284)

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


Overall, we find little support for correlations between income inequality dynamics and the development of social indicators. For material deprivation and social interactions, there is little evidence of concomitant trends. For life, health and income satisfaction, we find trendless fluctuation in the long run. However, we do find short-term trends of declining satisfaction that parallel the increase in income inequality in the early 2000s. The most prominent findings concern the poor. Material deprivation rises for the poor and the increase in cross-sectional poverty rates at the beginning of the millennium is not matched by an increased likelihood of climbing up the income ladder.

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4. Political and Cultural Impacts

Income inequality poses a challenge to social cohesion and political stability. High levels of inequality induce corruption, social distrust, bad governance, and weak political support (Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Rothstein, 2011; Uslaner, 2008, 2011). The latter is a prerequisite upon which the legitimacy of democratic regimes depends. Aspects of social cohesion and institutional settings are intrinsically related to the fabric of social structures. Individual political attitudes are not only shaped by personal experiences but by collective socio-tropic perceptions (Kumlin, 2004). These perceptions relate to macro-level phenomena such as economic performance, unemployment and income inequality.¹⁰ Notwithstanding, some economic theory or philosophical schools of thought would argue in favour of inequality, pointing either to its function as an economic incentive or to the rightfulness of benefiting from one's own endowments (Roemer, 2011).

The following analysis mainly focuses on behavioural and attitudinal trends in East and West Germany during the previous ten years, the period of time covering the most pronounced increase in inequality.

(p.286) Voting

As the official statistical data on voting depict, turnout in German national elections was high throughout the first three decades after the Second World War and reached its peak at the beginning of the 1980s, with a turnout of nearly 90 per cent at the national election in 1983 (Figure 12.5).¹¹ Since then, a steady decline in turnout has set in, resulting in a difference in turnouts of nearly twenty percentage points from 1983 to the most recent national election in 2009. The process of German unification does not appear to account for this pronounced downward trend. In both parts of the country, turnout during the most recent national election was at an all-time low, although East Germans have consistently had lower turnout rates than West Germans in preceding elections. Taking the trends of the last twenty years into consideration, the drop in the percentage share of voters which occurred during the most recent election in 2009 is particularly

striking.

An investigation of the five waves of the European Social Survey data (ESS, 2002 to 2010) substantiates the notion of diverging voting behaviour between East and West German citizens. Differentiating by educational degree reveals for both regions that turnout rates of people with a tertiary educational degree have been the highest and most stable over the first decade of the 21st century. While turnout rates for citizens with primary schooling have been lowest and fluctuating over time, the initially high turnout rates of citizens with secondary schooling have declined since 2002. Overall, a widening participatory gap between citizens with tertiary education and citizens with primary and secondary schooling can clearly be discerned.




Figure 12.5 Voting in national elections, in %

Source: Federal Statistical Office; Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2009a, 2009b.

(p.287) Trust in Others and Political Institutions

We investigate the trends of political trust using data from the German General Survey (ALLBUS), which covers the period between 1984 and 2008. The empirical results are complemented by the five waves of the ESS.

As shown by ALLBUS, trust in the legal system has been remarkably stable over time with the exception of a decline in the course of the 1980s. The comparison between the former GDR and FRG discloses a pronounced perceptual divide. While nearly fifty per cent of West Germans steadily express trust in the legal system, East Germans are somewhat less inclined to do so.

Inspecting trust attitudes by educational level based on ESS data reveals for both parts of the country a significant decrease amongst people with the lowest educational achievement. The same holds true for secondary degree holders, albeit to a lesser extent. Tertiary education degree holders experience an outstanding boost in trust in the legal system—in particular in the eastern part of the country. Rising levels of inequality, which disproportionately affect lower and middle class households, could be related to these remarkable developments.

Trust in the German national parliament (*Bundestag*) has been expressed by less than one third of the German population since the beginning of the 1990s, according to data drawn from ALLBUS. The East/West comparison reveals another significant perceptual divide. While a little less than a third of West Germans express trust in the German Bundestag, less than one fifth of East German citizens share the same trustful attitude. In addition, as the West German cross-educational-level analysis of ESS data suggests, the three categories maintain observable 'between group' differences, with the primary education degree holders as the least trustful citizens (Figures 12.6 and 12.7). For East Germany, a particularly sharp drop in trust can be observed for the least educated with only approximately one tenth




Figure 12.6 Trust in parliament, West Germany, by education
Source: ESS (also Figures 12.7–12.11).

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


Figure 12.7 Trust in parliament, East Germany, by education

of citizens expressing a trustful attitude. Citizens with a tertiary education degree contrast this consistent trend of declining trust levels. Considering potential sources of this disturbing development, increasing levels of inequality could provide one part of the explanation.

Turning to Germans' levels of social trust, the ESS data depict how levels and trends of social trust differ across educational degrees (Figures 12.8 and 12.9). In both regions, tertiary degree holders are the most trustful. In addition, East Germans with tertiary

degrees experience the highest percentage share increase over time resulting in a remarkable cross-educational 'trust gap'. A similar diagnosis also applies to West German citizens despite different underlying trends. While people with tertiary schooling, by and large, maintain their high percentage shares of trust, secondary and primary degree holders become increasingly distrustful over time. A concomitant development with rising levels of inequality could be one potential explanatory factor.

Political Values and Legitimacy

With regard to attitudes of social tolerance, a quite small percentage share of Germans *strongly* opposes immigration of people of different race according to the five surveys of the ESS.¹² Apart from some fluctuations in 2004 and 2006, only a slight increase amongst the entire German adult population can be observed. However, this increasing trend in 2004, and high levels in 2006 coincide with patterns of increasing inequality accompanied by pessimistic (p.289)




Figure 12.8 Social trust, West Germany, by education





Figure 12.9 Social trust, East Germany, by education

prospects for the unemployed. The observable decrease from 2008 onwards with concomitant decreasing unemployment rates could represent another indicator of this inter-relatedness. The comparison between East and West Germans depicts societal attitudinal differences. While in both parts of the country noteworthy fluctuations can be discerned, only East Germans tend to reject immigrants of different race in 2010 more than they did a decade before.

(p.290)



From a cross-educational-level perspective, remarkable differences between educational categories emerge in both parts of the country (Figures 12.10 and 12.11). In West Germany, a considerable gap exists between citizens with primary education who have rising levels of dismissive attitudes, and the two other educational categories that have declining levels of strongly opposing views. A slightly different pattern prevails in East Germany, where a remarkable gap exists between citizens with primary and secondary education, depicting increasing levels over time, on the one hand, and citizens with tertiary education with decreasing shares of strongly opposing views, on the other. Rising levels of inequality and high rates of unemployment, which disproportionately affect lower and middle class households could be related to these developments.

Values about Social Policy and Welfare State

In line with increasing levels of inequality in Germany, the percentage share of Germans who *strongly* believe that income differences are too large in their country has doubled from 1987 to 2009, as data derived from different waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) indicate (Figure 12.12). Nevertheless, there is no steadily increasing trend but considerably fluctuating shares of corresponding responses. The same holds true for the East/West German comparison: in both parts of the country, there are strongly fluctuating percentage shares of strong believers in the presence of too large income differences which ultimately result in a remarkable increase after a time period of more than fifteen years. Particularly noteworthy is another strong perceptual difference between East and West Germans, which varies from twenty to thirty percentage points.

Breaking down these attitudes by levels of educational attainment reveals the strongest increases in percentage shares for citizens with primary and secondary educational degrees (p.291)




Figure 12.11 Don't allow different race, East Germany, by education




Figure 12.12 Differences in income too large, strongly agree, ISSP

in both parts of the country. East German citizens with a tertiary education degree, by contrast, are the only group category with decreasing shares of strong affirmative respondents.

According to ISSP data, hardly one fifth of the (West) German population in 1987 strongly agreed with the government's responsibility to reduce income differences (Figure 12.13). Despite some fluctuations over time, the corresponding percentage share of citizens rose to approximately **(p.292)**




Figure 12.13 Government's responsibility to reduce differences, strongly agree, ISSP

thirty per cent in 2009. The East/West comparison, however, stresses the persisting intra-societal divide. From the outset of the unification process, East Germans attributed a significantly greater role to the federal government in reducing income differences than West Germans did.

Turning to the interrelatedness between educational degree and one's assessment of government's responsibility in West Germany, the ISSP data reveals upward trends during the period of the strongest increase in inequality for all three categories. As expected, people with the lowest educational attainment, and the potentially highest risk of being dependent on redistributive policies, have twice the probability of strongly agreeing with this statement than people holding the highest educational degree. East Germans, by contrast, follow a slightly different pattern. Citizens holding tertiary education degrees appear to be the least affected by the encompassing upward trends. As a result, the corresponding attitudinal gap between the lowest and middle-range educational degree holders and people with the highest level of schooling is increasingly widening.

5. The Role of Policy

The Hartz Reforms

The Hartz-reforms of the labour market were introduced by the second Schröder government in four steps from 2003 to 2005 and mainly followed the approach of 'negative activation', with benefit cuts for the unemployed and a tightening of the sanction regime. They also included fiscal inducements for small jobs and self-employment, a deregulation of temporary work and a re-organization of the public agencies in charge of the unemployed.

(p.293) In 2003, the Hartz I and Hartz II laws were passed. In particular, they involved: a tightening of the obligation to work for transfer recipients (obligation to take up a job even if it differs from own profession); the establishment of agencies to place people in temporary employment and deregulation of temporary employment; the broadening of minor employment by means of social security exemptions (Mini- and Midi-Job schemes, a kind of earned income tax credit); a financial support for mini entrepreneurs (so called 'Me Inc.').

The Hartz III law of 2004 further tightened the sanction regime for the unemployed and created distinctive public offices of job search for the unemployed (*Jobcentre*) that concentrated tasks previously dispersed across various institutions. Another law in the same year reduced the maximum duration of unemployment benefits. The duration for which a dismissed worker can receive unemployment benefits reduced remarkably for almost all age groups. Also the time period a person has to have been employed, subject to social security contributions, in order to gain a right to unemployment benefits, was raised: from a minimum of six months to twelve months. Several of these measures either presented formal constitutional deficiencies or produced politically unacceptable results so that they had to be amended or abolished altogether. In part, this also applies to the final and most prominent piece of the labour-market reforms, the Hartz IV reform.

In 2005, with registered unemployment approaching the 5 million bar, the Hartz IV reform was introduced. Prior to that law, the benefit system consisted of three layers: unemployment insurance; unemployment assistance; and social assistance. The second layer implied that unemployed individuals received means-tested earnings-related unemployment assistance after the exhaustion of unemployment-insurance benefits. The duration of unemployment assistance was basically indefinite. Hartz IV abolished unemployment assistance and basically substituted it with social assistance.¹³ Those who would have received unemployment assistance in the old system had now to apply for the new, means-tested, unemployment benefit II (*Arbeitslosengeld II*).¹⁴ In most cases, the resulting transfer income is significantly lower than in the previous system. However, the new system entails stronger incentives for transfer recipients to supplement the transfer by taking up some work, although the implicit marginal tax rates on the earnings after the threshold of disregard remain high.

Overall, the Hartz reforms entailed a significant rejuvenation of active labour market policy in Germany. In terms of participants, the most successful programme has been the public job creation II scheme (*1-Euro-Jobs*). That programme is mainly targeted at long-term unemployed people who receive means-tested social assistance. In order to re-integrate them into the labour market, they must accept to work for non-profit employers under some conditions. The Federal Employment Agency pays them a small amount, which is not credited against their social assistance.

The consequences of the Hartz legislation for labour market outcomes and income inequality are not yet entirely understood. There is a consensus that they have contributed to the substantial increase in so-called atypical employment (e.g., marginal part-time work partially exempted from social security contributions). By 2011, only two thirds of employees in Germany were subject to social security contributions and, hence, eligible for **(p.294)** unemployment benefits (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2011). Marginal part-time work is now a major form of employment in the retail, cleaning, and the hospitality sectors. It is likely that the Hartz reforms contributed to increasing the labour supply of low-skilled workers. In turn, that increase in supply is bound to exert a downward pressure on the wages of the low-skilled. Benefit abuse is thought to have become less frequent, while bureaucratic load, heavy controls and legal disputes before the courts have increased. The official unemployment rate has substantially decreased in the wake of the Hartz reforms.

Tax Policy

During the last two decades, German tax policy has often been framed in terms of reaction to mounting international tax competition. The corporate tax rate stood at 56 per cent in the 1980s in the FRG. It was subsequently reduced in several steps, especially during the years of the Schröder government. Since 2008, the corporate tax rate in Germany has been merely 15 per cent.

Corporations, especially banks, strongly benefited from the total abolition of capital gains

taxes on the sales of large share blocks, decided on by the Schröder government in 2000. This occurred at a time when the German company network centred around major banks was already eroding. The exemption of capital gains from taxation accelerated its dissolution, which in turn led top management to assign higher priority to shareholder value. Companies carefully exploited the timing of the tax reform to first deduct capital losses from their tax liabilities and then realize tax-free capital gains. The fiscal losses to the public budget were severe.

Germany had a personal wealth tax until 1996, which, in that year, generated a revenue equivalent to about €4.6 Billion. That tax was declared unconstitutional by the federal constitutional court because different kinds of wealth were being treated too differently. Since 1997, the personal wealth tax has not been levied.

The inheritance tax is a long-standing element of the German tax system. Some items of the bequeathed estate benefit from special exemptions and evaluation methods that lead to a severe erosion of the tax base. This holds true in particular for business wealth, which is almost tax-exempted.

Personal capital income was taxed until 2008 within the progressive tax on personal income. Since 2009 this has no longer been the case, as a kind of dual system of taxation has been introduced. Incomes from interests, dividends, and financial capital gains are now subject to a 25 per cent flat-rate withholding tax and are exempted from personal income tax. By contrast, the top marginal tax rate on remaining personal incomes is 45 per cent. Both taxes entail an additional solidarity surcharge of 5.5 per cent of the tax liability, which enhances the progressivity of taxation.

While regressive tax reforms were often blamed on international tax competition, the German government did not generate much international cooperation to fight tax evasion and avoidance. In contrast to other countries, Germany steadily refuses to provide bank information automatically to foreign tax authorities, if the recipient of interest income is a foreigner.

(p.295) Table 12.1 displays the effect of the income tax reform of the Schröder governments from 1998 to 2005 on the real net incomes of single taxpayers, as calculated from the evolution of statutory tax rates. It shows that for the bulk of taxpayers, the reform directly increased real net incomes by roughly five per cent. The income gains were much higher for taxpayers in the top percentile of the income distribution. By way of an example, somebody with an annual taxable income of €500, 000 experienced a net income increase of about twenty per cent.

The reform of 1998–2005 also affected the tax basis of the income tax. While the decrease of effective average tax rates has been across the board, it has been especially pronounced for households with very high incomes. By way of an example, the average tax rate for the top 0.001 per cent group dropped from 43 per cent in 1998 to 31 per cent in 2005 (Bach *et al.*, 2013).

Taxes and transfers substantially reduce cross-sectional income inequality in Germany: the Gini coefficient is reduced by roughly 40 per cent when one shifts from the distribution of gross income to the distribution of net income—see Figure 12.1. The inequality-reducing impact of the tax transfer system increased during the second half of the 1990s, whereas it became slightly weaker during the 1980s and the 2000s. The success of policy in combating inequality during the second part of the 1990s is partly due to two measures that were implemented in 1996: a substantial increase in the basic allowance for the personal income tax and a substantial increase in child benefit. Both measures had been called for by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Table 12.1 Effect of the income tax reform 1998–2005

Taxable income	Real net income growth
10, 000	4.94
20, 000	5.27
30, 000	4.77
40, 000	4.34
50, 000	4.44
60, 000	5.15
70, 000	6.78
80, 000	8.36
90, 000	9.65
100, 000	10.72
200, 000	16.41
300, 000	18.43
400, 000	19.69
500, 000	20.4
1, 000, 000	21.87

Source: Corneo (2005b).

(p.296) 6. Conclusions

In terms of cross-sectional income inequality, the FRG of today is quite different from the FRG of the 1980s. In the 1980s, the FRG was one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. Inequality of pre-fisc incomes began to rise after the economic downturn of 1992–1993, and kept growing until the mid 2000s. The distribution of post-fisc income changed little during the 1990s. In the period 2000–2005 it became substantially more unequal and the level of inequality did not significantly change in the subsequent period. This overall tendency for inequality to grow was paralleled by a mutation of the German socio-economic compact: its traditional corporatist model imported a number of elements from the Anglo-Saxon one, giving rise to an original hybrid model. By international comparison,

Germany still has a relatively egalitarian income distribution, but during the 2000s inequality has mounted more rapidly than in most other OECD countries.

In the 1980s, the pressure exerted by globalization and skill-biased technological change did not lead to significantly more wage inequality in Germany but rather to increased unemployment. Thanks to the short-lived post-reunification boom, inequality did not rise in the first few years after reunification. In the sequel, equality-preserving institutions like trade unions, industry-level bargaining, regulated labour markets and public ownership were to decline irreversibly, allowing for a gradual increase of wage dispersion. The adjustment of the earnings distribution left core workers relatively unaffected and mainly hit entrants to the labour market. In that respect, the workforce in East Germany constituted a huge group of entrants. Since reunification, collective wage agreements have covered a substantially smaller share of the workforce there than in the West. Since about the mid 1990s, market incomes have been distributed more unequally in the East than in the West of Germany.

Reunification and the worldwide demise of 'real existing socialism' also implied a changed tone in the political discourse, which became more receptive to free market ideology. However, in the first years after reunification, no far-reaching neoliberal reforms could be introduced despite a centre-right government. Meanwhile, additional factors were making the distribution of market incomes in Germany more unequal. At the bottom of the distribution, a large inflow of migrants from Eastern Europe into the German labour market put pressure on the wages of low- and medium-skilled workers. At the top of the distribution, the rise of shareholder value, financial markets, and markets for superstars drove an increase in income concentration. Changes in the age structure of the population and the erosion of traditional family arrangements further contributed to generate a more unequal distribution of market incomes.

The resilience of equality in terms of post-fisc income during the 1990s—despite increased pre-fisc inequality—can be traced to the delayed effects of social policy measures, e.g. generous rules for computing pension benefits. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court repeatedly exhorted the government to adjust the tax transfer system so as to guarantee that the disposable income of individuals did not fall short of a minimum threshold. The subsequent hikes in child benefit and in the basic allowance of personal income tax contributed to combat inequality.

The government launched two main waves of reforms: a tax reform starting in 1998 and the Hartz legislation for the labour market in 2003–2005. Empirical studies indicate that the **(p.297)** tax reforms strengthened the rise of inequality but the evidence on the effect of the labour market reforms is less clear-cut. In perspective, the pension reform of 2001, which significantly reduced future pension rights, is likely to increase inequality.

Growing income inequality has not gone unnoticed by Germans. Most noticeably, people at the poorer end of the income distribution face increasing difficulties in overcoming their precarious situation. They experience more material deprivation and social exclusion. For the main part of the population, however, social indicators fluctuate over

time without any systematic correlation with trends in income inequality. Political disenchantment, social intolerance and demands for redistributive policies, however, show a concomitant trend to the rise of inequality. East Germans' and less educated people's attitudes seem to be especially affected by these developments. In sum, the repercussions of rising levels of income inequality seem to have already impaired citizens' relationship with the democratic state.

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Notes:

(1) This chapter is based on the corresponding GINI German country report which encompasses a multitude of further in-depth analyses and can be downloaded at www.gini-research.org/CR-Germany.

(2) Own calculation based on German SOEP data. Unless stated otherwise, all statistical facts mentioned in this chapter appear in publications of the German Federal Statistical Office.

(3) Unemployment measured according to the harmonized OECD definition is lower, but its evolution is similar.

(4) The entire employment growth occurred in the service sector.

(5) For Germany as a whole, the median age of the resident population increased from 36.4 years in 1980 to the current 44.3 years.

(6) In the East, employment in manufacturing dropped between 1991 and 1993 by 60 per cent and kept declining until 1997. The public agency in charge of privatizing the former GDR firms (*Treuhandanstalt*) operated until the end of 1994, and then bequeathed the German government a financial loss of about 240 billion German Marks.

(7) From 1991 to 2009, the public administration narrowly defined lost about half of its staff in the East.

(8) The index of material deprivation is based on eleven items: possession of a colour TV; phone; car; replacement of old furniture; good condition of the residential building; good neighbourhood; ability to paying rent/mortgage on time; to put money aside for emergencies; to go on vacation once a year for one week; to invite friends to dinner at least once a month; and the ability to eat a hot meal with meat, fish or poultry at least every other day. Households are considered to be materially deprived if at least four of those items are not affordable.

(9) Bartels and Bönke (2013) have studied income volatility, taking the changes over time in the composition of the SOEP into account. While they do find an increase in earnings volatility at the bottom of the distribution, they do not find much change in the volatility of net household income.

(10) These arguments are derived from Castillo and Zmerli (2012).

(11) In order to better present the expected relationship between inequality and political involvement, most of the subsequent GINI scales on the secondary y-axis are depicted in reversed manner.

(12) The question wording in the ESS reads: 'How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most of Germany's people?' (The previous and related question wording was: 'Now, using this card, to what extent do you think Germany should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most of Germany's people to come and live here?')

(13) There is however a supplementary temporary benefit for up to two years after transiting from unemployment benefits into social assistance.

(14) Currently, about 70 per cent of the unemployed receive that benefit.



(12)

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Income inequality, distributive fairness and political trust in Latin America



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ABSTRACT

In the wake of rising levels of income inequality during the past two decades, widespread concerns emerged about the social and political consequences of the widening gap between the poor and the rich that can be observed in many established democracies. Several empirical studies substantiate the link between macro-level income inequality and political attitudes and behavior, pointing at its broad and negative implications for political equality. Accordingly, these implications are expected to be accentuated in contexts of high inequality, as is the case in Latin America. Despite these general concerns about the consequences of income inequality, few studies have accounted for the importance of individual perceptions of distributive fairness in regard to trust in political institutions. Even less is known about the extent to which distributive fairness perceptions co-vary with objective indicators of inequality. Moreover, the research in this area has traditionally focused on OECD countries, which have lower indexes of inequality than the rest of the world. This study aims at filling this gap by focusing on the relevance of distributive fairness perceptions and macro-level inequality for political trust and on how these two levels interact in Latin American countries. The analyses are based on the Latinobarometer survey 2011, which consists of 18 countries. Multilevel estimations suggest that both dimensions of inequality are negatively associated with political trust but that higher levels of macro-level inequality attenuate rather than increase the strength of the negative association between distributive fairness perceptions and political trust.

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1. Introduction

Income inequality and its far-reaching political, economic and social implications have increasingly been gaining importance on national and international political agendas alike (McCall and Percheski, 2010; OECD, 2008, 2012). While the causes of income inequality can be manifold as they mainly revolve around increasing gaps in market and capital income, weakening redistributive effectiveness of taxation policies and in-kind benefits, changing household structures or less effective employment protection legislation and processes of globalization, there is widespread agreement on income inequality's disturbing challenges to social cohesion and political stability (Nolan et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). Apart from its effects on social mobility, life expectancy or happiness (Delhey and Kohler, 2011; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010), high levels of income inequality impact a broad range of values, attitudes and behavior that are related to social distrust, less solidarity,

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corruption, bad governance, or weakening political support (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Coburn, 2000; Cozzolino, 2011; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008; Hartner-Tiefenthaler et al., 2012; Horn, 2011; Karakoc, 2013; Lim and Sander, 2013; Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Oh, 2012; Park and Subramanian, 2012; Paskov and Dewilde, 2012; Pryor, 2012; Rothstein, 2011; Tyler et al., 1985; Uslaner, 2008, 2011). As an impediment to political equality, economic inequality may also weaken the very foundation of democratic societies (Oh, 2012).

Among the myriad of indicators presumably affected by economic inequality, political trust has recently attracted particular attention given its pivotal role in the stability and legitimacy of democratic regimes (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Uslaner, 2011). Generally, legitimacy for democratic systems and their leaders emanates from effective rule of law, separation of powers, and the pursuit of the common good, as well as from trustworthy, transparent, fair, accountable and responsive institutions and actors. Under these conditions, citizens are particularly willing to respect the law, adhere to norms of good citizenship, and become more interested in politics, more co-operative and more involved in civic affairs (Putnam, 1993). As a consequence and to the extent that political institutions and actors are indeed held accountable by the public for a fair distribution of resources in society, political trust may also be highly susceptible to large or increasing income gaps. Despite the alleged universality of its far-reaching implications, a broad range of recent comparative empirical research has either focused on advanced industrial societies where levels of inequality are rather modest or on transitional countries such as Central and Eastern European states that have been exposed to remarkably increasing levels of economic inequality over the past two decades (Lancee and van de Werfhorst, 2011, 2012; Solt, 2008; Uslaner, 2011; van de Werfhorst et al., 2012). While empirical evidence suggests consistent negative consequences of rapidly increasing levels of income inequality in countries of transition, comparative analyses of advanced industrial societies provide rather inconclusive results.

By contrast, individual perceptions and negative evaluations of income inequality, which have been shifting lately to the forefront of scientific trust research, appear to exert a strong and direct impact on political support and legitimacy irrespective of an individual's socioeconomic background (Jost and Major, 2001; Kluegel et al., 1995; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Kumlin, 2004; Loveless and Whitefield, 2011; Tyler, 1997, 2006). Although it is increasingly becoming evident that individual perceptions of inequality fail to accurately reflect trends of income inequality at the country level (Aalberg, 2003; Malahy et al., 2009), tensions and conflicts within societies arise when inequalities are perceived as illegitimate, unfair or unjust (Noll and Roberts, 2003). Accordingly, the corroding influence of income inequality on democratic legitimacy unfolds itself through multiple layers.

To advance this evolving strand of research, the present study focuses on Latin America, the region with the enduringly highest inequality indicators worldwide and where the impact of inequality on political trust acquires an additional relevance given the antecedents of authoritarian and military regimes during the last century. Its objectives are thus twofold: on the one hand, to analyze the extent to which macro-level inequality is associated with political trust in Latin America, and on the other, to study whether and how socio-psychological processes related to individual perceptions of distributive fairness play a role in the association between income inequality and political trust. To this end, we pursue the following research questions: To what extent is macro-level income inequality associated with political trust in Latin American societies? Which roles do individual perceptions of distributive fairness play in analyzing trust in political institutions? Does the strength of the association between the perception of distributive fairness and political trust vary according to the countries' levels of income inequality? Finally, to what extent does individual social status moderate the association between distributive fairness perceptions and political trust?

This study draws on the Latinobarometer survey data from 2011 encompassing 18 Latin American countries and macro-level indicators of income inequality, quality of democracy and economic well-being. Embedded in a multilevel research design, the study investigates the complex interrelationships between objectively measurable income inequality and subjective perceptions of a fair societal income distribution and political trust.

In the subsequent sections, we will first lay out the conceptual framework of political trust and its empirical antecedents with a particular focus on the relevance of objectively measurable levels of income inequality and individual distributive fairness perceptions. We then describe the institutional causes of more recent trends of income inequality in Latin America and subsequently derive and discuss our hypotheses. The following empirical section investigates the macro–micro linkage between the two dimensions of income inequality and their influence on political trust. Concomitantly, we will also test whether the associations between inequality and political trust still hold when measures of democratic and economic performance as well as individual social status are taken into account. The concluding section offers a brief summary of the main empirical insights and discusses major implications.

2. Political trust and income inequality

2.1. Conceptual framework and empirical foundations of political trust

The notion of political trust and its legitimizing and stabilizing function are closely related to David Easton's concept of political and system support (1965). Considering nation-states as political systems, system support is defined as individual orientations toward the nation-state, its institutions and actors upon which its legitimacy ultimately rests. More generally, Easton distinguishes between three distinct layers of the political system: the nation, the state, and incumbent authorities

that can be endowed with deviating levels of positive support or acceptance (Easton, 1965; Norris, 2011, 23). As an extension of the original Eastonian concept of system support, Norris puts forward the concept of political support, which she conceives “as a multidimensional phenomenon ranging on a continuum from the most diffuse to the most specific levels” (2011, 24).

Following Easton’s and Norris’ general framework, the indicator of political support chosen for this study taps the most specific components, such as trust in incumbent officeholders and confidence in political institutions, which we define here as political trust. Political trust serves as a conceptual device that “has been designed as a middle-range indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity” (Zmerli et al., 2007, 41).

Generally, the investigation of the origins of political trust mainly draws on two explanatory approaches. The first approach reflects a top-down perspective aiming at the relevance of institutional performance for the formation of political trust. According to this strand of arguments, the perceived trustworthiness of political institutions and actors is, by and large, a function of their ability to provide citizens with a political and economic environment that guarantees political rights and civil liberties; lives up to ethical, fair, just and transparent standards; and ensures economic prosperity for substantial parts of society (Mishler and Rose, 2005; Zmerli et al., 2007).

The nature of the second strand of arguments reveals a bottom-up approach, claiming that the erosion or even the complete absence of social capital or a lack of social cohesion leads to a severe downgrading of political trust (Mishler and Rose, 2005; Newton, 2006; Newton and Norris, 2000; Zmerli and Newton, 2008). In this sense, economic inequality represents a key element to take into account in regard to political trust.

2.2. Income inequality and political trust

Perceived from a broader perspective, however, matters of social cohesion and institutional performance are intrinsically related to the fabric of any given society. For instance, where distribution of resources is biased or, in other words, inequality prevails, social cohesion is assumed to be affected as well. According to Uslaner, income inequality entails a number of ramifications. It leads to lower social trust, “which in turn results in more corruption, and then to even more inequality” (Uslaner, 2008, 176, cited in Uslaner, 2011, 142). Most importantly, though, this vicious circle weakens political trust as well (Uslaner, 2008, 178). On the individual level, the underlying mechanisms are assumed to impinge on ordinary people’s sense of system fairness, autonomy and optimism for the future, which “undermine the moral dictates of treating your neighbors honestly (...)” (Uslaner, 2011, 143). Above all, inequality ultimately results in “distorting the key institutions of fairness in society (...)” (Uslaner, 2011, 143).

Rothstein describes similar interrelationships, culminating in his diagnosis of a *social trap*. As economic and social equality are required to build social trust and the latter is considered to be an important ingredient in a more egalitarian society, the prevalence of distrust results in more distrust. “In societies with high levels of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) policies in place for increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of different backgrounds” (2011, 154; insertion in original). Social trust and equality, however, are key prerequisites of a trustworthy and high-quality government (2011, 153).

In fact, a number of comparative studies of this emerging field of research corroborate that high levels of income inequality negatively affect social trust, solidarity, co-operation, civic engagement, social mobility and cohesion, educational attainment, and people’s state of health, happiness and life expectancy (Bjørnskov, 2012; Coburn, 2000; Cozzolino, 2011; Fuller-Thomson and Gadalla, 2008; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008; Neville, 2012; Oishi et al., 2011; Oshio and Kobayashi, 2010; Park and Subramanian, 2012; Paskov and Dewilde, 2012; Pryor, 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; but see also Fairbrother & Martin (2013) for deviating results based on a time-series analysis in the U.S.). Less empirical consistency exists, however, with regard to political outcomes. In particular, comparative studies based on European data and geared toward political attitudes and behavior provide ambiguous, at times even contradicting empirical evidence about the impact of macro-level inequality (Lancee and van de Werfhorst, 2012; Stockemer and Scruggs, 2012; van de Werfhorst et al., 2012; but see also Anderson and Singer, 2008; Hartner-Tiefenthaler et al., 2012; Horn, 2011; Oh, 2012; Schlozman et al., 2012).

To some extent, these inconsistent results presumably empirically reflect the rival theories of the political consequences of economic inequality. While the *resource theory* postulates an increasing division between the “haves” and the “have-nots”, which implies tendencies of segregation and a continuous relative material deprivation of the latter and results in depressed political involvement of the “have-nots”, *conflict theory* assumes that as income inequality increases, conflicts of interest gain in importance as well, which ultimately provides fertile ground for political articulation of different sorts (Karakoc, 2013, 200f.). In fact, empirical studies show that income inequality affects different societal strata in different ways depending on their level of risk aversion or socio-economic vulnerability (Fraile and Pardo-Prado, 2013). According to Anderson and Singer (2008), for example, citizens leaning toward the leftist side of the political spectrum are more sensitive to economic inequality and therefore tend to be more politically distrustful when issues of inequality dominate the political agenda. As for policy preferences, however, socio-economic status does not diminish stronger preferences for redistribution in more unequal countries, a pattern that is prevalent in European societies (Tóth and Keller, 2011, 46). In this regard, in general terms, the first hypothesis of this study is that income inequality is related to lower levels of political trust. However, the level of this association could vary with the extent to which inequality is perceived as unfair, as described next.

2.3. Perceptions of distributive fairness and political trust

In contrast to the ambiguous evidence regarding macro-level inequality and political trust, strikingly consistent empirical support exists with regard to its negative association with *individual* perceptions and evaluations of income inequality, which parallels Uslaner's argument about the severe implications of an individually perceived distortion of key institutions of fairness in society (2011, 143). To the extent to which an individual perceives the societal distribution of income as unfair, her political involvement may be affected as well. In fact, individuals are then *less* inclined to develop political and social trust, to comply with rules and norms, or to become politically active. This relationship also holds when individuals' self-interests or material risk propensity are taken into account (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Bartels, 2008; Kaltenthaler et al., 2008; Kumlin, 2004; Loveless and Whitefield, 2011; Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Tverdova, 2012; Whitefield and Loveless, 2013). Although only a limited number of comparative studies make explicit reference, they basically empirically confirm Tom Tyler's encompassing theoretical work on the concept and meaning of distributive justice (Tyler, 1997, 2006; Tyler et al., 1985).¹ Investigating the causes for political discontent, he shifts the theoretical and empirical focus away from outcome-based arguments and replaces them with psychological reasoning. In line with his arguments, distributive fairness relates to perceptions of "violations in principles of fairness in the allocation of outcomes" (Tyler et al., 1985, 702) and is conceived as an expression of deservingness within the body of relative deprivation theory.

Whether subjective perceptions of inequality are indeed an *accurate* reflection of income distribution at the societal level, however, is still a contested matter of debate. By contrast, in a multi-faceted manner, individuals' perceptions of societal income distribution may loosely cohere socio-economically (Aalberg, 2003; Malahy et al., 2009; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006; Sachweh, 2012; Wegener, 1987). The latter assessment also lends itself to a psychological model that contends that values held by individuals influence how they cognitively perceive the world (Aalberg, 2003, 111; Hochschild, 2001). As stated by Headey: "what ought to be largely influences perceptions of what is, rather than vice versa. Perceptions of justice determine perceptions of fact" (Headey, 1991, 593; see also Loveless and Whitefield, 2011). Moreover, individual perceptions of how fair income is distributed on the macro level (macro-justice) are intimately related to a person's perception of the fairness of her own economic standing (micro-justice). According to Wegener (1987), perceptions of inequality (micro-justice) do systematically deviate from objective inequality for psychological reasons. For instance, "low status respondents inflate their own position and the positions above their own are lowered, thus decreasing the distance from those at the top – and the perceived level of inequality" (Aalberg, 2003, 90).

Sachweh and Olafsdottir (2012) corroborate empirically that not only do citizens' perceptions of levels of inequality differ systematically across countries but they also express differences in the extent of *preferred* levels of inequality. Generally, societies with *higher* levels of inequality are also more in favor of more unequal income distributions (2012: 160). In accordance with the *adjustment hypothesis*, which postulates that "the public will adjust their values in accordance with the development of society" (Aalberg, 2003, 12), these findings suggest that there is an accommodation effect with the levels of inequality one is used to (Aalberg, 2003). However, it is these adjusted perceptions that eventually trigger political involvement.

Generally, notions of distributive justice are based on three different principles: equity, equality and meeting the basic needs of everybody (Forsé, 2009, 100).² This complexity is also reflected within individuals as they largely do not hold consistent attitudes toward inequality but are "torn between different and partly conflicting values and principles (...)" (Sachweh, 2012, 424). While all three are legitimate and complimentary criteria, societies as well as individuals of different socio-economic backgrounds may vary according to the importance they assign to these three principles (Kulin and Svallfors, 2013; Mau and Wrobel, 2006, 384f; Noll and Roberts, 2003; Svallfors, 2007, 2012; van der Toorn et al., 2010). According to empirical evidence, social relations and polity, for example, are mostly based on egalitarian norms, while differentiating norms prevail in the economic realm (Sachweh, 2012, 424). By and large, however, people draw on a "shared normative repertoire" of perceptions and judgments of inequality instead of "class-specific moral economies of inequality" (Sachweh, 2012, 437). This assessment is further substantiated by Sachweh's and Olafsdottir's cross-country study, which suggests "that aspirations towards greater equality do not seem to be closely related to the patterns of privilege and disadvantage set up (or induced) by the welfare state" (2012: 161; parenthesis in original). Instead, it shows that higher socio-economic status can either be unrelated or even favorable to more demands for equality.

In sum, we are confronted with a strongly mixed empirical pattern: objective measures of income inequality depict rather inconsistent associations with political attitudes and behavior, while individual perceptions of unfair income distributions consistently involve negative associations. Furthermore, and in accordance with the adjustment hypothesis, higher objective levels of inequality could *diminish* rather than exacerbate the strength of relationship between subjective perceptions of inequality and political trust. Finally, the moderating influence of an individual's social status on the implications of perceptions of distributive fairness could be in contrast to common assumptions about the relevance of self-interest but needs to be further investigated.

¹ His contribution also extends to the notion of procedural justice, which is not the prime concern of our study.

² Some theoretical accounts distinguish a fourth dimension, i.e., utility or efficiency (Aalberg, 2003; Michelbach et al., 2003).

2.4. Income inequality in Latin America

Latin America holds the sad record of being the most unequal region in the world. Notwithstanding, in particular throughout the first half of the 20th century, several attempts were made to implement policies to counter these distributional imbalances. Sustained success, however, was rather limited. Because of the implications of the economic crises in the 1980s and structural adjustment programs, the 1980s and 1990s have been characterized by a *regressive bias* in policy making (Hoffman and Centeno, 2003). The combined effect of fiscal adjustment, wage cuts and unemployment necessarily led to the deterioration of public social institutions that were put under financial strain. The reforms were applied in key areas such as health, pensions and education, as proposed in the World Bank 1990 report on poverty in which social services and benefits are consequently defined as private goods that should obey market forces, which is believed to distribute resources efficiently (Laurell, 2000). As a result of these reforms that dismantled the redistributive role of the state in Latin American countries (Rudra, 2002) – starting in Chile in the early 1980s – inequality indicators such as the Gini index increased steadily in those countries that adopted neoliberal policies (Coburn, 2000; Kenworthy, 1999; Laurell, 2000), overall keeping Latin America as the region with the highest economic inequality worldwide, as illustrated in the following table.

As depicted in Table 1, not only is the Latin American income distribution the most unequal in the world, but it has been that way at least since the 1960s (Berry, 1997; De Ferranti et al., 2003; Portes and Canak, 1981). What appears remarkable is that the high inequality has not reversed significantly during the economic recovery and democratic consolidation since 1990. Notwithstanding, a number of Latin American countries saw slightly diminishing albeit not consistent downward trends of inequality since the mid-1990s, which contrast with developments in most OECD countries, where income inequality has steadily been on the rise over the last 30 years (Castillo and Zmerli, 2012). The persistently high concentration of income in Latin America has been associated with a disintegration of public life, producing high crime rates in most Latin American cities, as well as the erosion of the middle class (Cornia, 2014; Hoffman, 2003; Lopez and Perry, 2008).

2.5. Model of analysis and hypotheses

Based on theoretical arguments and empirical evidence outlined above, our general hypothesis is that objective indicators of economic inequality and subjective perceptions and evaluations of income inequality are *negatively* associated with political trust. The subsequent hypotheses can be divided into two sub-sections. H1, H2 and H3 are informed by a large body of theoretical and empirical studies. By contrast, H4 and H5 are based on a more limited number of studies and are therefore rather explorative in nature.

A first specific hypothesis is that the high levels of income inequality as a contextual-level variable and characteristic of Latin American societies is associated with political trust in its own right, even when controlling for the effects of economic performance measures such as GDP per capita or system performance measures such as the quality of democracy as measured by the Freedom House and Polity IV indices (H1).

Second, subjective perceptions and evaluations of the fairness of income distribution are related to political trust: those who evaluate the income distribution as more unfair will exhibit *less* political trust (H2).

Third, satisfaction with the economy, as a proxy for individual performance satisfaction, and higher subjective social status will be positively associated with political trust (H3).

In explorative terms, we are interested in analyzing the interaction between objective and subjective inequality (i.e., perceptions of distributive fairness) with regard to political trust. In accordance with the adjustment hypothesis outlined above, we expect that in societies with higher levels of inequality, the evaluation of the income distribution as unfair will exhibit a weaker association with political trust than in societies with lower levels of inequality (H4).

Furthermore, we also pay attention to an interaction at the micro level, namely between perceptions of distributive fairness and subjective social status. In line with Sachweh's (2012) and Sachweh and Olafsdottir's (2012) instructive empirical findings, we hypothesize that for those with a lower subjective social status, perceptions of the income distribution as unfair will be more weakly associated with political trust than for those of higher strata of social status (H5).

The hypotheses are summarized in Fig. 1, which represents our model of analysis:


On the right-hand side of Fig. 1, political trust as the dependent variable is depicted. At the country level, our main interest is income inequality, where we contrast the association of this distributive measure with economic performance as GDP per capita and quality of democracy. At the individual level, we focus our attention on the perceived fairness of income distribution, which is compared with the potential role of other subjective measures such as the perception of economic performance and subjective social status. Moreover, on the individual level, we test if and to what extent the association between perceptions of distributive fairness and political trust varies with the perceived individual social status. Finally, we analyze the interaction between macro-level income inequality and the subjective evaluation of a fair income distribution. Both interactions are depicted as dotted lines. To avoid biased results due to omitted variables, we also control for social trust as a co-variate for which we expect a strong and positive association with political trust (not depicted in Fig. 1).

Table 1

Average Gini coefficients by regions and decades. Source: Deiningner and Squire (1996), for the 1960s to the 1990s. The 2000s decade is taken from Ortiz and Cummins (2011).

Region	Gini coefficients				
	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s ^a
Latin America and the Caribbean	53.2	49.1	49.8	49.3	48.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	49.9	48.2	43.4	47.0	46.1
Middle East and North Africa	41.4	41.9	40.5	38.0	39.2
East Asia and the Pacific	37.4	39.9	38.7	38.1	40.0
South Asia	36.2	34.0	35.0	32.0	
Industrial countries	35.0	34.8	33.2	33.8	30.8
Eastern Europe	25.1	24.6	25.0	29.0	35.4

^a In this last column, some regions do not exactly match the previous categories of Deiningner and Squire (1996): East Asia and the Pacific together with South Asia correspond to Asia, and Eastern Europe includes Central Asia.

**Fig. 1.** Model of analysis.

3. Data, variables and methods

3.1. Data

The hypotheses were addressed using the *Latinobarometer* database. Latinobarometer is a public opinion project that from 1995 onwards has collected data in most Latin American countries and Spain, with samples of approximately 1200 cases per country. Each year, the study collects approximately 19000 face-to-face interviews of the adult population, representing more than 400 million Latin American inhabitants (www.latinobarometro.org). Parts of the survey's questions are replicated each year, and parts of them appear only in some years. The estimated error bias of the survey in the participating countries is about 3% on average.

For the analysis, we used the Latinobarometer survey conducted in 2011. This dataset contains 20204 cases. We excluded Spain as a non-Latin American country from the analysis, for which the final number of countries reaches 18: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

3.2. Variables

Table 2 presents the operationalization of the dependent variable in this study. For political trust, we built a mean index based on four items measuring confidence in four institutions.

Table 2

Dependent variable. Source: Latinobarometer 2011, own calculations based on weighted data.

Variable	Description	Values	Mean	SD
Political trust index	Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following groups, institutions or persons mentioned on the list: a lot, some, a little or no confidence?	1. No confidence at all 2. Little confidence 3. Some confidence 4. A lot of confidence (Coding reversed for analyses)	2.09	0.70
	Government National congress/parliament Judiciary Political parties	Cronbach's alpha = 0.80		

The independent variables consisted of the two levels under analytical scrutiny (Table 3). The individual level variables covered the individual evaluation of distributive fairness, perception of economic performance, subjective social status and social trust. These variables were centered on the grand mean for the multilevel analyses. It is important to note, however, that while we continue to refer to the term “distributive fairness”, higher values of this variable depict perceptions of more unfair income distributions. We also considered age, gender and educational level as control variables in the estimation.

The country-level predictors included the Gini index as a proxy of income inequality, based on the equivalized income as calculated by the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean for 2011 – SEDLAC 2012. Two other macro variables were obtained from the Quality of Government Institute dataset (Teorell et al., 2013): per capita Gross Domestic Product weighted for PPP and the Freedom House/Polity IV democratic index. The construction of this index is detailed as follows: “[S]cale ranges from 0–10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0–10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0–10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts” (Teorell et al., 2011, p. 46; insertions and references in original).

3.3. Methods

Models were estimated in a multilevel framework, considering individuals nested in countries that constitute the second-level units. This type of model is appropriate when working with nested data structures, as in the case of data to be analyzed in which there are both individual and contextual variables (Hox and Roberts, 2011). The estimation therefore takes into account a new source of variability attributed to the country, which implies a more accurate estimation of the standard errors. The analyses were performed with the statistical packages xtmixed and multilevel tools of Stata 12 (Möhring and Schmidt, 2012).

4. Empirical findings

4.1. Descriptive and correlational evidence

The analysis in this section begins with some descriptive measures followed by the results of the multilevel estimation. At first, we inspect our indicator of political trust in Latin American societies.

As observed in Fig. 2, there is variability between countries regarding the mean levels of political trust, with Venezuela and Uruguay as the countries with the highest trust in institutions, whereas Guatemala, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Honduras display the lowest trust levels. Each of these 18 Latin American countries faces a state of political *mistrust*.

To what extent are these scores related to subjective and objective indicators of economic distribution? Figs. 2 and 3 depict the association of political trust with the Gini index and perceptions of distributive fairness, respectively. In both cases, the relationship shows a negative tendency: as objective inequality and the perception of an unfair income distribution increase, political trust decreases. It is also relevant to notice the Gini levels in Fig. 2, indicating that Latin American societies continue to be exposed to comparatively high levels of income inequality. While the Gini average of OECD countries attained a value of 0.31 in the late 2000s, Latin American countries range between 0.40 and 0.55 with only one exception of a less unequal income distribution in Venezuela.³ A final graph (Fig. 4) depicts the association between perceptions of distributive fairness and economic inequality. As expected, countries with higher inequality show on average a stronger evaluation of the distribution as unfair. Nevertheless, it is also relevant to notice that, as argued before, the link between objective and subjective inequality is far from being straightforward, and societies with large inequality are not always the ones with the higher perception of (un)fairness.

³ For the OECD average, see <http://www.oecd.org/>.

Table 3
Independent variables.^a

Variable	Description	Mean	SD
Level 1			
Perception of distributive fairness	<i>How fair do you think the income distribution is in [country]?</i> 1. Very fair 2. Fair 3. Unfair 4. Very unfair	3.02	0.72
Perception of economic performance	<i>In general, how would you describe the country's present economic situation?</i> 1. Very bad 2. Bad 3. Average 4. Good 5. Very good	2.75	0.92
Subjective social status	<i>Imagine a staircase with 10 steps, in which on the first step are located the poorest and on the 10th step, the richest. Where would you put yourself on this staircase?</i> 1 (poorest) to 10 (richest)	4.60	1.98
Social trust	<i>Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?</i> 1. One can trust most people 0. One can never be too careful when dealing with others	0.23 (%)	–
Educational level	1. University level 0. Other (lower) educational level	0.10 (%)	
Sex	1. Female 0. Male	0.50 (%)	
Age	In years	40.04	16.43
Level 2			
Gini index	Estimate of Gini from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean – SEDLAC (income inequality index), where 0 = no inequality, 1 = extreme inequality (2011)	0.46	0.05
GDP per capita	World development indicators – Country GDP per capita weighted for PPP, in thousands (2011)	8511.73	3547.14
Freedom House/ Imputed Polity IV	Quality of democracy. Scale ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic.	7.52	1.72

^a Variables centered on their grand means for the multilevel analyses.




Fig. 2. Income inequality (Gini index) and political trust in Latin American countries.

4.2. Multilevel models

Table 4 presents the results of the multilevel estimations. The intraclass correlation for the null model (without predictors and not presented here) is 0.07, which corresponds to the amount of variance of political trust that can be attributed to the level 2 unit, meaning that 7% of the variance is determined by country-specific characteristics. Model 1 includes perceptions of distributive fairness that, in accordance with H2, reveal that those who evaluate the income distribution as more unfair




Fig. 3. Perceptions of distributive fairness and political trust in Latin American countries.

tend to distrust political institutions. We also analyzed this variable as a categorical predictor to test for non-linear effects, but these results also suggested a negative association as levels of distributive fairness increased (“very fair” = reference category; “fair” $b = -0.08, p = 0.29$; “unfair” $b = -.45, p < 0.01$; “very unfair” $b = -.64, p < 0.01$). The continuous version of the variable was kept for the following models as this makes interactions more parsimonious. Model 2 adds the other individual level predictors. In accordance with H3, this model shows that those with a more positive perception of the economic performance, with a higher subjective social status and more social trust display higher scores of political trust. The results of post-estimation contrasts show that distributive fairness is more strongly associated with political trust when compared to subjective social status ($\chi^2_{(1, N = 18,419)} = 100.48, p < .01$) and to social trust ($\chi^2_{(1, N = 18,419)} = 90.5, p < .01$), whereas no significant differences exist with the association between perceptions of economic performance and political trust ($\chi^2_{(1, N = 18,419)} = 2.29, p = .13$). Therefore, distributive fairness and perception of economic performance are both strongly associated with political trust. Assessing the strength of the relationships between education, age and gender and political trust, however, reveals no noteworthy result. Country-level variables are included in Model 3, where the only significant association is displayed by the Gini index in the expected direction according to H1: individuals from countries with larger income inequality tend to show, on average, lower levels of political trust. Surprisingly, objective economic performance and quality of democracy do not concomitantly exhibit significant associations with political trust. Models 4, 5 and 6 test for the relevance of interactions. In Model 4, the interaction tested is at the individual level between distributive fairness and subjective social status and confirms H5. The negative sign of the coefficient means that the association between distributive fairness and political trust is stronger (i.e., more negative) in individuals with *higher* subjective social status, as also observed in the analysis of the predictive marginal effects in Fig. 5. This means that fairness perceptions seem to matter more for those with higher subjective status in assessing the trustworthiness of political institutions, while overall, individuals who evaluate the income distribution as unfair tend to trust less irrespectively of their subjective status. We tested this interaction in Model 5 with the variables centered on their group means, to assess whether this effect is also significant when attending to how contexts affect individual attitudes by removing the




Fig. 4. Perceptions of distributive fairness and income inequality (Gini index) in Latin American countries.

Table 4
Multilevel models of political trust.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Level 1</i>						
Perception of distributive fairness	−0.26** (10.34)	−0.17** (10.44)	−0.17** (10.48)	−0.17** (11.56)	−0.17** (10.30)	−0.17** (12.36)
Perception of economic performance		0.19** (12.43)	0.19** (12.44)	0.19** (12.61)	0.19** (12.49)	0.19** (12.70)
Subjective social status		0.02** (4.12)	0.02** (4.11)	0.02** (4.01)	0.02** (4.00)	0.02** (4.05)
Social trust		0.16** (5.66)	0.16** (5.67)	0.16** (5.56)	0.16** (5.58)	0.15** (5.56)
Education (university)		0.01 (0.25)	0.01 (0.23)	0.01 (0.25)	0.01 (0.24)	0.01 (0.26)
Sex		0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Age		0.00 (0.24)	0.00 (0.23)	0.00 (0.12)	0.00 (0.16)	0.00 (0.06)
Distributive fairness × Subjective social status				−0.02** (3.29)	−0.01 (1.81)	
<i>Level 2</i>						
Gini index			−0.01* (2.42)	−0.01* (2.43)	−0.02* (2.43)	−0.02* (2.46)
GDP per capita			0.00 (0.79)	0.00 (0.83)	0.00 (1.06)	0.00 (0.83)
Freedom House/Polity IV			−0.00 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.16)	0.01 (0.24)
Distributive fairness × Gini index						0.01** (2.71)
Constant	2.09** (56.10)	2.05** (68.23)	2.06** (17.63)	2.06** (17.73)	2.05** (11.72)	2.04** (12.15)
Between level variance	0.02** (10.37)	0.01** (11.93)	0.01** (12.51)	0.01** (12.36)	0.02** (14.77)	0.00** (15.79)
Individual level variance	0.42** (27.20)	0.38** (31.91)	0.38** (31.91)	0.38** (31.97)	0.38** (31.96)	0.38** (31.92)
Random slopes variance						0.02** (14.67)
Deviance	−18121.41	−17302.84	−17299.57	−17277.76	−17300.33	−17252.55
df	1.0	7.0	10.0	11.0	11.0	11.0

Restricted maximum likelihood estimation, unstandardized coefficients. Z-values in parenthesis. Variables centered on their grand means. Distributive fairness centered on its group mean in Models 5 and 6 (cross-level interaction model). Listwise deletion, $N = 18,419$.

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

between-cluster variation from the predictor variables (Paccagnella, 2006; Enders and Tofghi, 2007). As we observe, the interaction is no longer significant at the 95% level, although when relaxing this standard, it is at the 90% level of significance. However, more important than arguing about the significance level, what we observe here is that part of the significant interaction of the grand-mean-centered variables (Model 4) is related to country differences. We tested this assumption by removing macro-level predictors from Model 4, and actually, when excluding the Gini index, the interaction based on the group-mean-centered variables is significant again ($b = -.12$, $Z = -3.19$, $p < 0.01$). Therefore, the interaction is mostly related to the between-level variance, meaning that in countries with a lower average of subjective social status, the average perception of distributive fairness is less strongly associated with political trust. Nevertheless, these findings must be taken with caution given the small number of level-two cases. Turning now to Model 6, the interaction between objective and subjective income distribution aims at testing the micro-macro associations between inequality and political trust. In this interaction, the individual level variables are still centered on their group means to remove the between-level variance from them. The positive coefficient of the interaction term tells us that the association between the perceived unfair income distribution and political trust tends to be less negative in countries with higher inequality. The predictive marginal effects plot substantiates this assumption and supports H4 (Fig. 6). As a result, the negative relationship between distributive fairness perceptions and political trust is stronger in societies with lower levels of income inequality. In short, perceptions of an unfair distribution of income are accompanied by lower levels of political trust as inequality decreases.

To obtain information about the level-two outliers, we used the Stata package Multilevel tools (Möhring and Schmidt, 2012). We obtained an estimate for Cooks' D for every country, which describes the influence that the exclusion of a single level-two unit has on the estimated model parameters. The country with the largest outlier indicator was Venezuela (Cooks' $D = 2.66$). Nevertheless, the decision to exclude a country is not trivial in this context, mostly because there are few level-two




Fig. 5. Predictive margins of the interaction between distributive fairness and subjective social status on political trust.




Fig. 7. Country-predicted random effects of distributive fairness on political trust.

units. Still, we re-estimated the models excluding Venezuela and the parameter estimates did not change considerably at level 1, although at level 2, the coefficient of the Gini index was smaller ($b = -0.01, t = -1.81, p = 0.07$).

Another aspect to take into account is whether the association between distributive fairness and political trust holds across countries. To test this, we made a prediction of the random effects based on the multilevel estimation, which allows calculating intercepts and slopes by country. The result of this estimation is presented in Fig. 7. As observed, for all countries, the association is negative, although there are some variations represented in the figure by the two extreme cases: Venezuela, where distributive fairness is most strongly related to political trust (according to the country slopes), and Guatemala with the weaker but still significant coefficient ($t = -3.34, p < 0.01$). As these countries respectively have the highest and lowest averages of political trust (Fig. 2), it is possible to note that the perception of distributive fairness covaries more strongly with political trust in societies with lower levels of inequality and higher aggregate levels of political trust.

5. Conclusion

In light of increasing empirical evidence about the wide-ranging political, societal and individual implications of income inequality and Latin America as the region with the highest levels of inequality worldwide, this study aimed at unraveling whether macro-level inequality or subjective perceptions of distributive fairness matter more for political support and




Fig. 6. Predictive margins of the interaction between distributive fairness and income inequality on political trust.

whether the association between perceptions of fairness and political trust is conditioned by the extent of country-specific objective inequality. In two respects, this study provided remarkable findings. However, first and in accordance with previous results, we found that income inequality matters for democratic legitimacy, as it is negatively related to citizens' willingness to trust political institutions and actors. Basically, income inequality comes into effect via two different pathways: the objectively measured and subjectively perceived dimensions of inequality. Clearly, high levels of income inequality at the country level are associated with political *mistrust*. Moreover, individual perceptions of distributive fairness in society exhibit a strong association with political trust. As a consequence, we infer that democratic regimes are held accountable by their citizens for the prevailing extent of inequality in a country. As the first innovative contribution, this study suggests, however, that *higher* levels of macro-level inequality weaken this apparent link of accountability. At this point, we can only speculate about the underlying mechanisms. Whether people adjust to high levels of inequality or whether these findings result from low status respondents who inflate their own position at the expense of higher positions could provide valuable cues. Another explanation points to the relevance of the loosening of the bond between citizens and the state under conditions of high income inequality. Economic inequality is commonly interrelated not only with corruption and bad government but also with culturally entrenched and shared norms of free trade, liberalization, unrestricted markets and the principle of equity. It is thus conceivable that citizens blame themselves rather than any other institution for their disadvantaged position in the societal hierarchy.

Moreover, subjective social status matters as well. When citizens' self-ratings on the income ladder are high, political trust is enhanced. As a second major finding, however, we provide evidence that when the interaction effect with distributive fairness is taken into account, higher subjective social status even strengthens the negative association between political trust and perceptions of *unfair* income distributions. Apparently, regime legitimacy is broadly based on the perceived distributive fairness in society irrespective of the individual fulfillment of material needs. Quite the contrary: those who believe that they are better off are even more affected by their sociotropic perceptions. Once again, this finding suggests that the "have-nots" might tend to blame themselves for their disadvantaged societal position rather than to hold political institutions accountable.

In sum, the extent to which a state allows the income gap to widen in society is directly associated with its legitimacy. Particularly in times of economic crises, austerity measures and cuts in social spending may further accentuate increasing levels of income inequality and thus destabilize political processes. Although the direct linkage between the objective income distribution and political trust seems to be rather modest, our identified micro–macro linkage suggests that much of its association is moderated through individual perceptions of distributive fairness, particularly in societies with *lower* levels of inequality. These findings certainly do not support assumptions based on the conflict theory outlined above. However, ultimately, income inequality continues to be of major importance for citizens' political belief systems, even or rather in particular, in times of narrowing income gaps, as Latin American societies tell us. Whether this micro–macro linkage also holds for less unequal democratic societies or societies experiencing increasing income gaps in the wake of democratic transitions will need to be addressed in future research. However, the empirical evidence suggests that perceptions of distributive fairness might be even more strongly associated with one's support of the political system.

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