Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French
Imagination
Lahouari Addi
Professeur à l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lyon
In Carl Brown, Franco Arabs Encounters,
American University of Beirut, 1996
Sommaire
Texte intégral
To
understand how Algeria appears to the French Imagination, we must call on
history, for relationships between the two nations go far back in time. Two
relatively stable images of Algeria persisted in France from 1830 to 1962. The
first, held by the metropolitan French for whom Algeria was a faraway exotic
colony, was nurtured by stories, personal reports, military correspondence and
travel, describing either a hostile country, enemy populations, an inhuman
climate and geography, or else a quaint Version of indigenous daily life,
elements of fantasy, camels, the desert... The second image, forged by French
settlers, posited irreducible adversaries, their hostility nurtured by the
opposition of Islam to any French presence.
We shall
focus on this second image because from it flows the colonial discourse and the
rhetoric of colonialism—and their self-fulfilling quality—which the colonial
lobby used to pressure Paris on questions of Algerian policy. For internal
coherence, colonialist rhetoric had to create a complete mythological system in
which France, land of human freedoms and rights, a European and Christian
power, had the moral duty to enlighten peoples in decline, populations whose
customs and beliefs had enslaved them. The words "civilization" and
"mission" recur obsessively in the language of publicists and
statesmen throughout the nineteenth Century.
France's
colonial past goes back as far as Richelieu, who first founded a colonial
empire, including Acadia, the St. Lawrence estuary, the Antilles and Guyana, as
well as the entrepôts along the west coast of Africa. After 1660, Colbert
continued Richelieu's work, adding to die territory already annexed in Canada,
occupying the Mississippi all the way to the Gulf of Mexico, und opening
entrepôts in India.
In France
not everyone was convinced of the value of such an empire; many believed that
defending and administering such territories cost more than they could earn. Anticolonialist
public opinion was already fairly strong before the Revolution of 1789. Some in
authority argued that migration to these new lands tended to depopulate France
and weaken her in the face of European rivals. The strength of the anticolonial
party is explained at least in part, historians say, by the ties that the
French have to their native soil and by their reluctance to travel or migrate
to uncivilized and distant lands.
In both
1713 and 1760, economic difficulties led France to surrender important parts of
her empire to Britain. By 1814, French overseas possessions had dwindled in
essence to Reunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, part of Guyana, and one entrepôt in
Senegal.[1]
After
Trafalgar (1805) French leadership recognized that their principal European
rival had gained control of the seas as well. On the basis of Information that
Britain intended to seize Algiers, Charles X decided to conquer the Algerian
coasts to avoid France's entrapment by her principal European enemy. The
reasons for the French conquest thus must be sought in her rivalry with
Britain, ever seeking possessions on which to base political and economic
power. By 1830 Britain already had an important empire and her navy was showing
the British flag in oceans far from home.
By the
beginning of the nineteenth Century, nationalist chauvinism had weakened the
anticolonialist party and the idea of reconstituting the colonial empire was
welcomed in various political, military, commercial and intellectual circles. Illustrating
this change in climate, a week after the Algerian expedition, is the remark in
the Paris daily Le Constitutionnel (11 July 1830): "The seizure of
Algiers begins a new era for world civilization. If we are able to exploit it,
part of Africa in a few years will be blessed with a hard-working population,
like America, and the Mediterranean will no longer be a mere lake."
The
capture of Algiers took place in a European context, one in which France had
lost her military power. Algeria would serve to strengthen the feeling of
national pride and make up for the loss of Empire. Ejected from North America
by Great Britain, absent from Latin America, France was seeking a colonial
empire to remake her image and to reaffirm her power in Europe. Describing
Algeria in a tourist guide book at the end of the Century, one author wrote:
"Losing America, we have regained Africa, to which Algeria is the
gateway."
It was
thus in the context of rivalry with Britain that the decision was reached to
seize Algiers, not as a promising commercial venture but as part of a strategy
of rebuilding the political power of France against European adversaries. Contemporary
supporters of the move, whether in Parliament or the press, rarely evoked the
economic factor. This suggests that the causes of colonization must be sought
elsewhere than in economic realities. Obviously the colonies brought wealth to
various social groups and minorities abroad and in Europe, and these became
powerful pressure groups, defending their interests in public institutions and
in the press. Yet even these pressure groups, in their attempt to influence
public opinion on national colonial policy, refer only rarely to economic
factors. And when they do they limit themselves to pointing out that colonies
contribute to the material prosperity of the mother-country by providing raw
materials and agricultural products at competitive prices, forgetting to
mention that, whatever their price, such products when purchased by mainland
consumers are subsidized by the nation and compete unfairly with local
production.
When the
anticolonialists, reminding national leaders of all this, maintained that
colonies cost more than they brought in commercially, colonial proponents
advanced new counterarguments: national prestige, France's grandeur, the
diffusion of French language, civilization and ideals. In the Chamber of Deputies,
the great liberal Lamartine responded thus to those who doubted the rightness
of the total occupation of Algeria:
What? Nations have nothing more to do than add
up columns of figures? Have we descended to such a degree of social materialism
that arithmetic alone shall preside over the councils of the Chamber and the
government and alone determine the resolutions of this noble nation? If gold
has its weight, then do not politics, national honor, the disinterested
protection of the weak, humanity—do they not also have theirs? Are we then to
abandon these waters to their pirates?... (3 May 1834).
This
concern for the colonial vocation of France came not only from politicians and
publicists of the Right. Leftist figures as well, developing early socialist
ideas, echoed these thoughts, calling on the government to make France a beacon
among nations in propagating Western civilization by occupying and
administering backward countries. Victor Considerant, a politician
representative of the Democratic Socialists, wrote in this regard: "As for
ourselves, we have long urged France to take up again, with grandeur, its
civilizing mission, and we call upon Europe to organize in a fraternal way its
work of expansion and civilization in the unlettered and barbarian countries.[2]
The
colonial discourse was not built solely around economic interests but turned on
Symbols mined deep in the imagination and in the general culture of the
ordinary citizen of metropolitan France. Concerning Algeria, the colonialist
rhetoric forged myths evoking national pride, the glory of belonging to French
civilization, the humanism of Western culture, the superiority of Christianity
over Islam, etc. Colonialist rhetoric constructed an ethnocentric set of myths
claiming that autochthonous populations have no culture, no civilization. Colonization,
rather than being the domination of one country by another, was an extension of
civilization to regions inhabited by primitive or semi-primitive peoples who
ultimately will get great advantages from being colonized. For example, the
Dictionnaire politique by Garnier Pages describes colonization as "The
most praiseworthy form of conquest, the most direct means of propagating
civilization."
The first
of the founding myths is that which presented the conquest as a response to the
Dey's discourteous slapping of the French consul with his fly-whisk. Charles X
undertook to cleanse French honor after the Dey refused to proffer official
apologies. Historians of colonization note even so that the seizure of Algiers
was not unanimously supported by France's political class: to justify the act,
a campaign was launched to influence public opinion and demonstrate the
necessity for military action. Some historians believe indeed that the seizure
was dictated by domestic politics. But even the beginnings of the conquest of
Algiers could not stave off the disturbances of July 1830 and the fall of
Charles X.
The famous 1827 "fly-whisk incident."
The second
justifying myth was France's duty to end the activities of the principal
Barbary State whose fleet was despoiling European ships and selling their human
cargo in the slave markets of Algiers and Tunis. France thus took upon itself
the duty of securing the Mediterranean for all of Europe, and this only a
decade after the military defeat of the Empire and the death of Napoleon. It is
significant that a French parliamentary figure in the 1980s, himself a former
colonial administrator, was still drawing on the rhetoric of 1830 to explain
the conquest:
Just before the Revolution of July 1830 drove
him from the throne, Charles X launched the Algerian expedition and seized this
pirate lair. Manifestly, he lacked the willpower to stay. The essential purpose
of the enterprise was to avenge an outrage to France and to end Barbary piracy,
securing navigation in the Mediterranean. Charles's successors, Louis-Philippe,
the Second Republic, the Second Empire, were led by a chain of circumstances
into occupying a land that is not even a country. France conquered Algeria
without intending to.[3]
Colonial
rhetoric often gave a third justification for the conquest: the need to
liberate the Algerians from Turkish domination. This myth is an aftermath of
the Enlightenment and the idea that France has the right and duty to free any
people suffering from foreign oppression. But this myth was short-lived,
falling victim to the fact that local populations received French troops not as
liberators but as hostile forces. The further the French advanced into Algeria,
the more the tribes increasead their resistance.
The myth
of liberation did not endure as part of colonialist rhetoric. Of course it was
never intended for indigenous populations, but aimed at metropolitan France,
where the Algerians virtually disappear behind generic formulations—they are
barbarians, savages, backward peoples, fanatics. The rhetoric was designed for
Europeans. For the metropolitan French, the idea was to elicit the political
and material support implicit in the idea of extending a civilization; for the
colonizers, in was to ease any guilt about expropriating the land they
exploited, or about the violence which they either caused or observed.
The myth
of liberation having lost much of its credibility, the colonial discourse fed
on the religious imagery inherited from the Crusades. In this vision, Islam was
seen as a permanent danger for Christianity and Europe. The image of the
Saracen burning harvests, killing men and kidnapping women, was kept alive in
order to assert that the conquest of Algeria was a factor in the security of
Europe and Christendom, haunted by the Turkish peril. Held at bay in Eastern
Europe by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this peril might well awaken in the
south and threaten the western Mediterranean. The occupation of Algeria
protected Europe from an Islam perceived as an enemy of reason and humanism. A
publicist in 1841 wrote: "The final days of the Islamic movement have
come; our century is doubtless destined to watch it leave the shores of Europe,
not only of that old Europe which it once invaded and so long threatened, but
of that new and greater Europe which has grown up wherever the former Europe
has borne the Cross. Attacked from all sides, the Crescent is breaking up and
fading away.[4]
The native
populations were accused of religious fanaticism, of waging holy war at the
call of holy men and marabouts. The colonialist rhetoric denied to the
colonized any right to revolt or resist. If the native rebelled, it was because
of his fanaticism, his opposition to European humanism and rationality. André
Servier, an ideologue at the turn of the Century, saw it this way. "All
these revolts have the same roots: some ambitious or neurotic man, out of his
own predispositions, fanaticizes other members of his faith and turns them
against the infidel.,. [they are] outbursts of mystic madness, sudden
explosions of fanaticism, storms which explode unexpectedly, out of a clear
sky, yet which because of their improvised nature do not last.[5]
The
colonial discourse, needing to justify repression and violence, devalued the
Muslim and the Arab, who was presented as a liar, a thief, as lazy and
fatalistic. He respected only force and strength, he feared God only because he
saw him as an omnipresent and supernatural power whose role is to punish. Thus,
Captain Richard, head of the Arab Bureau in Ténès in the 1850s, asserted:
"The Arab professes an exaggerated respect for the power which subjugates
him, and as soon as he believes he has been conquered, there is no adulation,
no servile bowing and scraping which he fails to lavish on his conqueror."[6]
Finally,
the colonialist rhetoric had a religious dimension, despite its apparent
secular character. It referred obsessively to a destructive Islam and a
civilizing Christianity. The Muslim was a nomad taking no imerest in stable
goods and real estate; he lived as a predator, he degraded the environment. His
nomadic way of life gave him no cause to invest in work, he was the very
opposite of the Christian who was sedentarized, a builder of villages centered
around the Church. The colon invested in the earth, to which he gave value
through his work and his sweat, planting trees, fertilizing and watering dry
lands, instaling irrigation-systems and so forth. The difference between these
two ways of life, in the colonial rhetoric, lay in religion.
The myth
of the mission civilisatrice has two sources, religious and lay,
extending back to the eighteenth Century. It was the philosophers of the
Enlightenment who took a paradox from Montaigne and talked about assimilating
the Noble Savage to Western culture. Civilizing "Man in Nature" in
faraway and exotic places was a lay Version of the Christian missionary
mandate, long practiced by France's Jesuits as an unofficial arm of French
diplomacy. "After the second half of the eighteenth Century,"
Charles-Robert Ageron has observed, "philosophers and philanthropists
understood themselves to be taking up the missionary torch of Christian
evangelism, carrying it out far better by laicizing it. The idea was to
civilize natural man without bringing him to the Christian religion. The
civilizing mission—the phrase is borrowed from the language of Enlightenment
and remained until our own time that of Freemasonry as well—became the Central
theme of colonial France from 1789 forward. The Great Nation had been given the
double mandate of education and revolution: its role was to liberate peoples
and propagate Enlightenment."[7]
The myth
of the French civilizing mission depicted pre-colonial Algeria as a country
populated not so much by savages, as the eighteenth Century described them, but
by fanatical barbarians. The myth can be fitted into the earlier antireligious
views of Voltaire. With no means of communication, without cities, with a
deforested landscape, Algeria would suffer at the hands of bellicose tribes
obedient only to chiefs whose religiosity would be no different from the
bigotry against which Voltaire launched his famous formula "ecrasez
l'infâme."
This
negative vision of the Algerian people was deliberately exaggerated so as to
stress the need for French assistance to the new colony, now become a new
France built by the blood and sweat of its soldier-workers. The Mitidja was
literally wrenched out of the swamps, former breeding grounds for malaria and
dysentery, and cleared of the thousands of dwarf-palms which overran it. Reclaiming
this land, the colonist labored with his rifle slung over his shoulder, ready
to fight off Arab bandits who prowled the area or to protect himself from wild
animals infesting the region.
In a
hostile environment, faced with the animosity of the Arabs, the colon,
armed only with the spirit of self-sacrifice, his love of the land, and his
faith in progress, overcame all obstacles to cultivate, plant, drill weits, dig
Irrigation ditches, lay out roads, and build the houses which, taken together, became
villages. The schools and the dispensaries of these many villages brought
benefits to the children of those Arabs who renounced nomadism and banditry and
who came to learn from the colon how to hoe, to plant, to plow, to
reap the benefits of the progress to which he could now accede, thanks to the
generosity of France.
The French
civilizing mission consisted in leading out of their childhood those
populations which had only known the life of barbarism. Thanks to France, these
people were enabled to discover the virtue of work, to quit nomadic life, to
build solid houses and to associate with the colonists, and these were all part
of their honestly-earned wages. In a few decades, Algeria became a prosperous
country, its ports stacked with agricultural and mineral products destined for
European markets, with an important road and rail network, major cities, modern
agriculture. Peace reigned over the entire country, and the Muslim populations
took advantage of this peace to lift their spiritual and moral sights, to
educate their children in the respect for others' property and in the love of
hard work. Muslim women, though still attached to their religion, learned
enough Hygiene to bestow its benefits on their children, which led of course to
an unexpected demographic growth, showing in itself the benefits of
colonization for Muslim populations.
The other
strong myth present in the colonial discourse is that of the ethnic diversity
of the Algerian people. This myth served to show that there was no homogeneous
society around which to build a nation and constitute a State.
It is
interesting to see how this myth divided up the autochthonous population. Social
divisions between urban and rural elements and between sedentarized and nomadic
peoples were considered structural ethnic divisions inherited from some distant
past. On occasion, ethnic singularity was attributed to dwellers in a city:
thus the "Bisknis," those living in Biskra, are distinct from other
categories of the population, listed neither as Arabs, Moors or Berbers. Let us
examine this colonial classification of the Algerians.
First,
there are the Berbers, the first occupants of the country. Resisting the Arab
invasion, losing their chiefs, Kusayla and the Kahina, in the struggle, they
took refuge in the mountainous areas where they were able to preserve their
language and customs. The Muslim invader, in control of the plains, failed to
Arabize the mountainous regions occupied by the Kabyles (the Djurdjura) and the
Chaouis (the Aures).
Next come
the Moors, city-dwellers working either as artisans or tradesmen, the
descendants of the Muslims expelled from Spain. Then the kulughlis, the result
of intermarriage between Turks and Moors, who live in the cities and are close
to the Moors whose lifestyle they share. The Arabs are next, living in tents
and organized in tribal units. They are nomads, disinclined to sedentary
agricultural activity.
Finally
there are two other minorities: the blacks, former slaves brought from central
Africa, and the Jews, whose language and way of life are those of the Moors. Other
classifications add the Mozabites, sometimes lumped with the sedentary Berbers
living in the desert, sometimes with sedentarized Arabs.
Socio-ethnic
diversity then is the source of Algeria's permanent instability: Berbers oppose
Moors and Arabs, who are themselves divided into tribes in a perpetual state of
war. Over time, however, the classification was reduced to the Berber-Arab
division, which gave rise to the myth of the Kabyle. In the 1840s two writers
already saw the question in these terms: "The Kabyle people, partly
Germanic in origin, after having known Christianity, did not completely change
under their new religion. They accepted the Qur'an, but they did not embrace
it.. In contrast to the universal results of the Islamic faith elsewhere, we
discover in the Kabyle an obedience to the sacred law of work, a
near-rehabilitation of women, and a number of customs which breathe the spirit
of equality, of Christian commiseration..." [8]
The Kabyle
myth, whose origins go back well before 1830, was carefully nurtured to show
that Algeria was not Arab and that the truly indigenous population, the
Kabyles, were only superficially Muslim. Abbe Raynal, in 1826, stressed Kabyle
exceptionalism, depicting a sedentarized mountain people, fierce lovers of
freedom, Nordic in origin and only superficially Muslim.[9] Having been in contact with
Roman civilization, traces of which might be seen in the functioning of their
villages, the Kabyles would be predisposed to Western rationality, which would
facilitate their assimilation to the French nation and perhaps even their
conversion to Christianity.[10] Similarly the colonists,
irritated by Napoleon IIII's policy of preventing them from expropriating the
lands of the plains tribes, imagined a republican and secular Berber nation in
response to Napoleon III's dream of an Arab kingdom.
It is true
that the Kabyles, living in the mountains and thus owning no great land areas,
did little to impede the extension of agricultural colonialism. But this did
not stop them from participating in the 1871 revolt led by al-Muqrani, no more
than it protected them from becoming the victims of French expropriations. Still
the Kabyle myth has been hardy enough to survive Algerian independence—with the
rise of political Islam in the 1980s the French media continue to present Kabylia
as a democratic bastion of secular thought.
The myths
of colonialism indirectly gave rise to a mirror-image mythology, developed by
the nationalist movement and, in Algeria, coloring the political ideology of
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). In point of fact, the representation of the
Algerian in the colonialist rhetoric clearly overstressed the religious factor,
to such a point that in the reactive response religion became the principal
political identification. The nationalist movement, born as a reaction to
colonial rhetoric, thus claimed Islam as its identifying factor and used it as
a mobillizing resource.
The
Association of Algerian Ulama (AUMA), created in 1930 by Shaykh 'Abd
al-Hamid Ben Badis, took as its goal the refutation of colonialist discourse
regarding Islam and the Arabic language. In carrying out this mandate, the AUMA
spelled out an ideology that finally imposed itself on all factions of the
Rationalist movement. The National Liberation Front (FLN) itself adopted the
national ideology worked out by the Ulama, to which it added at the
beginning of independence a Marxist economic rhetoric, only to throw it aside a
few years later.
The
nationalist doctrine, fabricated by the Ulama and adopted by the FLN,
then set loose an Islamic dynamic in the eighties which follows almost
obsessively the very colonialist rhetoric which it aims to refute—and for which
Francophone intellectuals are accused of being the spokesmen.
Notes
[1] See Yves Benot, Diderot, de 1'Athéisme à l'Anti-colonialisme (Paris, 1972); and La Révolution française et la fin des colonies (Paris, 1989).
[2] La Democratie pacifique, 2 January 1848.
[3] R. Dronne, Vie et mort d'un Empire (Paris, 1988) p. 30.
[4] Louis Veuillot, Les Frangais en Algérie (Paris, 1841).
[5] Cited in P. Lucas and J. C. Vatin, eds,, L'Algerie des Anthropologues (Paris, 1973) pp. 151-152
[6] Ibid., f. 117
[7] France coloniale ou parti colonial? (Paris, 1978) p. 62.
[8] Colonel Dumas and Captain Fabar, as cited in Charles-Robert Ageron, L'Algérie algérienne de Napoléon III à de Gaulle (Paris, 1980) p. 38
[9] Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans l'Afrique septentrionale (Paris, 1826)
[10] In an interview which caused a considerable stir in 1887 (Le Temps, 17 March) Monseigneur Lavigerie criticized the colonial authorities for impeding the missionaries in carrying out their work: "If we had not been interfered with," he charged, "Kabylia would now be Christian."