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Article dans une revue Economic Theory Année : 2013

The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting

Résumé

We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters' preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates' scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed.
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Dates et versions

hal-00917101, version 1 (11-12-2013)

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Matias Nunez. The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting. Economic Theory, 2013, pp.0938-2259. ⟨10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x⟩. ⟨hal-00917101⟩
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