Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
In their efforts to affect regulations, firms have developed specific strategies to exploit scientific uncertainty. They have manufactured doubt by hiring and funding dissenting scientists, by producing and publicizing favorable scientific findings and by generally concealing their involvement in biased research. We propose a new model to study the interplay between scientific uncertainty, firms' miscommunication and public policies. The government is benevolent but populist, and maximizes social welfare as perceived by citizens. The industry can produce costly reports showing that its activity is not harmful. Citizens are unaware of the industry's miscommunication. We first characterize the industry's optimal miscommunication policy. The industry notably ceases miscommunicating abruptly when scientists' belief reaches a critical threshold. We identify a natural condition under which miscommunication is stronger under a tax on emissions than under command and control. We then analyze research funding. A populist government may support research to enable firms to falsely reassure citizens. Establishing an independent research agency helps limit the welfare losses induced by populist policies.
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Titre |
|
Auteur(s)
|
Yann Bramoullé
1
, Caroline Orset Orset
2, 3, 4
1
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales UMR7316 ( 99539 )
;
-
Aix Marseille Université UMR7316 ( 198056 )
;
-
École Centrale de Marseille UMR7316 ( 300415 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7316 ( 441569 )
2
Université Paris-Saclay
( 419361 )
- Bâtiment Bréguet, 3 Rue Joliot Curie 2e ét, 91190 Gif-sur-Yvette
- France
3
ECO-PUB -
Economie Publique
( 135760 )
- F-78850 Thiverval-Grignon
- France
-
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique UMR0210 ( 92114 )
;
-
AgroParisTech ( 148117 )
4
INRA -
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
( 92114 )
- France
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Volume |
90
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
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Page/Identifiant |
119-133
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
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Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Date de publication |
2018-07
|
Date de publication électronique |
2018-05-22
|
URL éditeur |
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069617303273
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Classification |
ACL-1
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
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Indexation contrôlée |
-
politique publique
-
incertitude
-
entreprise
-
financement de la recherche
|
Mots-clés |
en
Research Funding, Populist Policies, Scientific Uncertainty, Environmental Policy Instruments
|
DOI |
10.1016/j.jeem.2018.04.010 |
ProdINRA |
427789 |
UT key WOS |
000441854200007 |