Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
Gaëtan Fournier
(1, 2)
,
Marco Scarsini
(3)
Gaëtan Fournier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1313471
- IdHAL : gaetan-fournier
- IdRef : 258701110
Résumé
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost borne by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in terms of the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost) and the Price of Stability (i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost). We show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are bounded by two and one, respectively.
Format du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost borne by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in terms of the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost) and the Price of Stability (i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost). We show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are bounded by two and one, respectively.
|
Titre |
en
Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
|
Auteur(s) |
Gaëtan Fournier
1, 2
, Marco Scarsini
3
1
IAST -
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
( 506116 )
- 1, esplanade de l'Université
31080 Toulouse Cedex 06
- France
2
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
3
Engineering and System Design Pillar
( 252687 )
- 20 Dover Drive, Singapore 138682
- Singapour
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Volume |
44
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2019-02
|
Numéro |
1
|
URL éditeur |
https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/moor.2017.0921
|
Page/Identifiant |
212-235
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
DOI | 10.1287/moor.2017.0921 |
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