Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms
1
IZA -
Institute for the study of labor
2 OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
3 IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor
4 LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine
5 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 LADYSS - Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces
7 UPCité - Université Paris Cité
2 OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
3 IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor
4 LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine
5 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 LADYSS - Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces
7 UPCité - Université Paris Cité
Eve Caroli
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 991183
François Fontaine
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 743179
- IdHAL : francois-fontaine
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7408-5129
- IdRef : 059350687
Antoine Reberioux
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 176659
- IdHAL : antoine-reberioux
- ORCID : 0000-0003-1246-0605
- IdRef : 074763466
Résumé
We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.
Format du dépôt | Fichier |
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Type de dépôt | Pré-publication, Document de travail (working paper) |
Titre |
en
Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms
|
Résumé |
en
We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.
|
Auteur(s) |
Andrea Bassanini
1, 2
, Eve Caroli
3, 4
, François Fontaine
5, 3
, Antoine Reberioux
6, 7
1
IZA -
Institute for the study of labor
( 33852 )
- IZA Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9 D-53113 Bonn Germany
- Allemagne
2
OCDE -
Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
( 310903 )
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
2, rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16
- France
3
IZA -
Institute for the Study of Labor
( 142142 )
- Allemagne
4
LEDa -
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine
( 559342 )
- Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny - 75775 PARIS Cedex 16
- France
5
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
LADYSS -
Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces
( 1004856 )
- Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense Bâtiment T 200 avenue de la République 92001 Nanterre cedex
- France
7
UPCité -
Université Paris Cité
( 557826 )
- 85 boulevard Saint-Germain
75006 Paris
- France
|
Titre de la collection |
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
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Public visé |
Scientifique
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Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
fr
Social pressure, Employment contracts, Adjustment costs, CEO reputation
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Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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