Cooperation and free riding with moral cost - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Chapitre D'ouvrage Advances in Cognitive Economics, Proceedings of International Conference on Cognitive Economics (ICCE), Année : 2005

Cooperation and free riding with moral cost

Denis Phan

Résumé

We study social organizations with
possible coexistence at equilibrium of
cooperating individuals and pure consumers
(free-riders). We investigate this polymorphic
equilibrium using a game-theoretic approach and
a statistical physics analysis of a simple model.
The agents face a binary decision problem:
whether to contribute or not to the public good,
through the maximization of an additive utility
that has two competing terms, a fixed cost for
cooperating and an idiosyncratic moral cost for
free-riding proportional to the fraction of
cooperators. We study the equilibria regimes of
this model. We show that there is a fraction of
expected cooperators below which cooperation
fails to emerge. Besides the homogeneous stable
equilibria (everybody cooperates or everybody
free-rides), it exists a solution in which
cooperators coexist with free-riders. This
polymorphic equilibrium is a consequence of the
heterogeneous (idiosyncratic) perceptions of the
social reproval by the different individuals. We
provide analytic results in the case of a simple
distribution of the idiosyncratic moral weights,
and discuss them on the basis of concepts of
game theory.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

halshs-00105849 , version 1 (12-10-2006)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00105849 , version 1

Citer

Denis Phan. Cooperation and free riding with moral cost. Kokinov Boicho. Advances in Cognitive Economics, Proceedings of International Conference on Cognitive Economics (ICCE),, NBU Press, pp.294-304, 2005. ⟨halshs-00105849⟩
39 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More