The Knowledge Account of Assertion and Moore's Paradox about Knowledge - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2007

The Knowledge Account of Assertion and Moore's Paradox about Knowledge

Résumé

Although they endorse slightly different versions of the so-called "knowledge account of assertion", Williamson and DeRose both agree that it can help us account for "Moore's paradox about knowledge''. My purpose in this paper is not to deny this. It is to argue that when it gets to explaining the paradox, DeRose's version seems to fare better than Williamson's in one respect: contrary to the latter, the former leads to two conflicting ways of accounting for the very same phenomenon, namely for the contradiction that purportedly underlies the paradox.

Domaines

Philosophie
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
KAA_MPK.pdf ( 10.91 Ko ) Télécharger
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00113478, version 1 (13-11-2006)
halshs-00113478, version 2 (11-12-2006)
halshs-00113478, version 3 (04-04-2007)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00113478 , version 3

Citer

Franck Lihoreau. The Knowledge Account of Assertion and Moore's Paradox about Knowledge. 2007. ⟨halshs-00113478v3⟩
103 Consultations
57 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus