The macroeconomic governance of the European Monetary Union: A Keynesian perspective
Résumé
Extending Asensio's closed-economy framework (2005a,b) to a monetary union, we show that the
principles of governance which emanate from the so called "New Consensus in Macroeconomics"
(NCM), and therefore have been designed for presumed stationary regimes, may cause severe
dysfunctions, such as depressive macroeconomic policies and unemployment traps, in non-ergodic
regimes. The Keynesian approach, on the other hand, pleads in favour of important changes in the
current governance of the eurozone. First, since the European Central Bank can not repress distributive
inflationary pressures without having non-temporary depressive effects on aggregate demand and
employment, authorities should recognize that the best way for controlling this type of inflation rests
on a consensual distribution of income. Second, authorities should abandon any "optimal rule"
designed in order to stabilize the economy near to an imaginary "natural" trend. Keynesian uncertainty
rather suggests a gradual and pragmatic approach to macroeconomic policy. From this perspective, we
show that the European Monetary Union could take advantage of the complementarity between the
common monetary policy and the national budgetary and fiscal instruments.
principles of governance which emanate from the so called "New Consensus in Macroeconomics"
(NCM), and therefore have been designed for presumed stationary regimes, may cause severe
dysfunctions, such as depressive macroeconomic policies and unemployment traps, in non-ergodic
regimes. The Keynesian approach, on the other hand, pleads in favour of important changes in the
current governance of the eurozone. First, since the European Central Bank can not repress distributive
inflationary pressures without having non-temporary depressive effects on aggregate demand and
employment, authorities should recognize that the best way for controlling this type of inflation rests
on a consensual distribution of income. Second, authorities should abandon any "optimal rule"
designed in order to stabilize the economy near to an imaginary "natural" trend. Keynesian uncertainty
rather suggests a gradual and pragmatic approach to macroeconomic policy. From this perspective, we
show that the European Monetary Union could take advantage of the complementarity between the
common monetary policy and the national budgetary and fiscal instruments.
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...