Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2005

Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation

Abstract

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces con°icting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the delegation relationship. The experimental evidence supports the delegation effect. This, in turn, could account for the deterrence effect of wage on corruption even in the absence of detection.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
0506.pdf (323.62 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

halshs-00180044 , version 1 (17-10-2007)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-00180044 , version 1

Cite

Nicolas Jacquemet. Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation. 2005. ⟨halshs-00180044⟩
296 View
484 Download

Share

More