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Article dans une revue Journal of Labor Economics Année : 2011

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Résumé

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally study the robustness of the ratchet effect to the introduction of ex post competition for principals or agents. While we do observe substantial and significant ratchet effects in the baseline (no competition) case of our model, we find that ratchet behavior is nearly eliminated by labor-market competition ; interestingly this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor principals or agents.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00333590, version 1 (23-10-2008)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00333590 , version 1

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Gary Charness, Peter Kuhn, Marie Claire Villeval. Competition and the Ratchet Effect. Journal of Labor Economics, 2011, 29 (3), pp. 513-547. ⟨halshs-00333590⟩
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