Comparative law applied to public contracts usually concentrates more
on the tendering process than on performance issues. This Article focuses
on the latter: it deals with cases in which performance of public contracts
in the United States and France leads to litigation. The Article's objectives
are threefold: fi rst, to synthesize the fi ndings of an empirical analysis of the
sources and nature of performance issues that lead to litigation before administrative
courts (namely, the General Services Board of Contract Appeals
and the Cours administratives d'Appel and the Conseil d'État); second, to
provide an analysis of the way in which American and French administrative
judges tackle and decide contract cases; and third, to broaden the perspective
in order to provide a more comprehensive comparative analysis of the legal
context in which regulation, case law, and the styles of administrative judges'
reasoning affect the treatment of additional costs and contract equilibrium
issues in both countries.