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Journal articles Econometrica Year : 1985

The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets

Abstract

We study two-sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability.
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Dates and versions

halshs-00670994, version 1 (16-02-2012)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00670994 , version 1

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Gabrielle Demange, David Gale. The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets. Econometrica, 1985, 53 (4), pp.873-888. ⟨halshs-00670994⟩
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