Do remittances lead to a public moral hazard in developing countries? An empirical investigation - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Access content directly
Journal Articles The Journal of Development Studies Year : 2012

Do remittances lead to a public moral hazard in developing countries? An empirical investigation

Abstract

This paper tests the hypothesis that in a context of 'bad governance', remittance inflows strongly reduce public spending on education and health in receiving countries; a phenomenon called the 'public moral hazard problem'. Using a large sample of 86 developing countries over the period 1996-2007, and after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, the results suggest a negative impact of remittances on public spending on education and health, when governance is bad in remittance-dependent economies.
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Dates and versions

hal-00807100 , version 1 (03-04-2013)

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Christian Hubert Ebeke. Do remittances lead to a public moral hazard in developing countries? An empirical investigation. The Journal of Development Studies, 2012, 48 (8), pp.1. ⟨10.1080/00220388.2011.615918⟩. ⟨hal-00807100⟩
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