Optimal use of communication resources - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Article Dans Une Revue Econometrica Année : 2006

Optimal use of communication resources

Résumé

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

Dates et versions

halshs-00754118 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

Identifiants

Citer

Olivier Gossner, Pénélope Hernández, Abraham Neyman. Optimal use of communication resources. Econometrica, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00754118⟩
170 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

More