Committing to transparency to resist corruption
Frédéric Koessler
(1, 2)
,
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
(1, 2)
Frédéric Koessler
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 740979
- IdHAL : frederickoessler
- ORCID : 0000-0001-7707-4217
- IdRef : 059897775
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1284421
- IdHAL : ariane-lambert-mogiliansky
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4065-2049
- IdRef : 219670277
Résumé
This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Committing to transparency to resist corruption
|
Résumé |
en
This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.
|
Auteur(s) |
Frédéric Koessler
1, 2
, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
1, 2
1
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2013-01
|
Volume |
100
|
Page/Identifiant |
117-126
|
Numéro |
1
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Voir aussi |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Commitment, Bribery, Competitive procedures, Transparency
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.08.006 |
ProdINRA | 316561 |
UT key WOS | 000311014000009 |
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