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Migration, rural development, poverty and food security: a comparative perspective

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Migration, rural development, poverty and food security: a comparative perspective

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Executive summary

The Commonwealth Foundation, in collaboration with the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development and in consultation with other international and research bodies, such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Oxford Department of International Development, and the International Migration Institute (IMI), is engaged in developing pragmatic strategies, aimed at maximizing the benefits of cross-border migration for the pro-poor development of Commonwealth states. In this context, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in collaboration with the Commonwealth Foundation and the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development, is initiating country case studies. The present report is based on a comparison between seven country studies (India, Jamaica, Kenya, Sri Lanka, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga and Jamaica). The central question of this work is: *in what ways and to what extent can migration be an instrument to combat rural underdevelopment, poverty and food insecurity in rural areas?*

The case studies provide mixed evidence regarding the development potential of migration in rural areas. The various forms of remittances have a positive impact on the productivity of migrant households' farms. The introduction of new production techniques can also have beneficial spill-over effects on non-migrants' farming. However, there is no evidence of a substantial improvement of agriculture at the regional or national level in the countries investigated. **Migration on its own cannot support an agricultural development strategy.**

Migration improves household food security. Remittances are largely used for daily consumption, especially in poor households. However, in the absence of a specific study, it is not possible to give a quantitative assessment of the improvement of food consumption induced by the reception of remittances. Nor is it possible to draw any conclusion regarding non-migrant households.

Finally, **there is ample evidence that migration alleviates poverty**, even for non-migrant households. In the countries benefiting from temporary migration schemes recruiting low skilled farmers, migration directly benefits rural areas. However, in other countries, the migrants tend to come from wealthier urban areas. In consequence, migration has limited effects on rural poverty.

The report proposes the establishment of an institutional framework and the design of pragmatic actions to be taken to tackle obstacles to rural development. These recommendations are broken down at the international, national and local levels with a view to delineating a coherent 'policy chain' in the Commonwealth:

At the Commonwealth level, the creation of the Commonwealth Office for Migration and Development would provide a platform where issues of migration and development could be discussed. It will provide technical and evidence-based guidance to member states.

At the member state level, migration should be mainstreamed in the development agenda of public authorities and civil society organizations by enhancing internal transfers, supporting

migrant entrepreneurship abroad, easing integration in receiving countries, channelling investment in rural areas.

At the local level, synergies between migrant organizations, local authorities and civil society will be created by promoting co-funding schemes for public infrastructure and the poverty of women.

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Introduction and background to the study

The growing importance of migration and remittances is changing the socio-economic scenario of the agro-rural sector. Remittances reached \$414 billion in 2010,¹ around 40 percent² of which was directed towards rural areas. Labour movement and remittance in-flows for family support and other purposes are affecting agricultural production. Climatic hazards, parasites, disease and food price volatility are a constant threat to farmers' revenues. Migration has always been a means to offset the irregularities of households' incomes. At the same time, the loss of human capital and labour may negatively affect farm production. Migration has therefore ambiguous consequences for rural development; it may be a factor in and/or an obstacle to poverty alleviation.

The Commonwealth is one of the major migration arenas. As reported by the Interim Report for the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development (Gamlen 2010), the Commonwealth contains around 45 million international migrants – around one-fifth of the global total. Currently 52 percent of Commonwealth *emigrant* stock (and 49 percent of *immigrant* stock) go to (or come from) elsewhere in the Commonwealth. But the Commonwealth also includes some of the most food-insecure countries in the world. Among the top 20 most food-insecure countries, five are Commonwealth members.³

Despite evidence of the development potential of migration, this aspect has not been sufficiently taken into account by practitioners. All too often, development strategies do not take migration into account and if they do, it is to address it as a problem to be solved rather than as an instrument to be used (Black, Hilker et al. 2004; Bakewell 2007). The aim of this report is therefore to propose a series of recommendations for the creation of an enabling environment for investing remittances in the agro-rural sector, within the Commonwealth. The central question of this work is: *in what ways and to what extent can migration be an instrument to combat rural underdevelopment, poverty and food insecurity in rural areas?*

The Commonwealth Foundation, in collaboration with the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development and in consultation with other international and research bodies; such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Oxford Department of International Development, and the International Migration Institute (IMI), is engaged in developing pragmatic strategies, aimed at maximizing the benefits of cross-border migration for the pro-poor development of Commonwealth states. In this context, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in collaboration with the Commonwealth Foundation and the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development, is initiating country case studies. The country studies themselves are based on secondary sources, interviews with public and civil society officials and data analysis (see Appendix 1). The present report is based on a comparison between seven country studies (India, Jamaica, Kenya, Sri Lanka, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga and Jamaica). It also draws on the findings of an eighth case-study on Bangladesh, which, although focusing on migration and rural development, follows distinct terms of reference.

The report is divided into four sections. The introductory part consists of a brief overview of the seven case studies. The second part provides an overview of the main obstacles to rural development and food security in the investigated countries. The third part inventories the possible ways in which migration can respond to the challenges faced by rural economy. The final section of the report is based on the material provided by the case-study reports and existing best practices inside and outside the Commonwealth. It presents a series of recommendations to improve the benefits of migration for rural populations, and dampen the negative effects.

1. Food security, migration and rural development

Overview of the case studies

India

With 1.2 billion inhabitants, India forms 60 percent of the Commonwealth population. It is also the main source country of Commonwealth migration. It is the origin country of the second largest diaspora in the world, with 11.36 million⁴ 'non-resident Indians' (see Appendix 2). Within the country, three groups of sending areas can be distinguished:

- The 'old core' includes the states of Punjab and Gujarat. It is linked with the UK and former British colonial countries (North America, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Burma, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa). This migration was initiated prior to the Second World War during the British 'Raj' and continues under the form of family reunification and white-collar/student migration.
- The 'new core' states display a migration pattern oriented towards Western countries. Emigrants are mostly white-collar workers such as engineers, doctors, and health professionals. The flows gained momentum in the late 1990s during the so-called internet boom. The 'new core' states include Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.
- The 'labour core', oriented towards Gulf states and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia, is composed of Kerala, Tamilnadu, Bihar, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. Flows of low-skilled workers, predominantly male, started during the oil boom in the 1970s. Gulf countries now host the largest overseas Indian populations, with United Arab Emirates topping the list at 1.3 million.⁵

India is the top beneficiary of financial remittances in the world (\$55 billion in 2010⁶). The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was created in 2005 in order to implement a multi-faceted Diaspora policy. Migration is acknowledged by state authorities as a major economic and political asset.

From an economic point of view, India has been regarded by the World Bank as a 'transforming country'⁷. Although agriculture plays a lesser part in the overall economy than in the past (it

provides 18 percent of the GDP added value⁸), large pockets of rural poverty remain: 30 percent of the rural population lives below the national poverty line.⁹ Since the 'Green Revolution' in the mid 1960s (an agricultural development plan meant to achieve Indian food self-sufficiency), the country has developed a modern farm sector. Two 'granary states' produce half of the food consumed in the country: Punjab and Haryana. Top cultivated crops include wheat, rice, pulses and oil seeds. However, apart from a dynamic sector headed by a class of capitalist entrepreneurs, the majority of Indian peasantry is made up of small farmers living on subsistence, rain-fed agriculture. Farming still provides a livelihood to 60 percent of the population.

The bimodal feature of the Indian rural economy has spurred large flows of seasonal migration from poor to granary states. Punjab has 1.75 million non-resident workers out of a total population of 24.3 million.¹⁰

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka's agriculture has widely benefited from sustained public investments during the last 50 years, Tea, rice and cereals being the main crops produced. In consequence, the country enjoys sufficient food availability and low dependence toward food import (24 percent of the food consumed in the country in 2010 was imported). Likewise the share of the population under the poverty line is relatively low (8.9 percent in 2010). Sri Lanka presents the characteristics of an economy in transition with a declining contribution of agriculture to the overall GDP (11.9 percent in 2010). Despite these encouraging trends, the situation with respect to poverty and food security remains uncertain. 85 percent of the poor reside in rural areas (p.25) and nearly one third of the adult population is classified as undernourished (p.26). Moreover, the agricultural strategy of the state is reaching its limits. The overall agricultural productivity stagnates and remains low. If the situation remains as such, the production will not be able to meet the national requirements in the coming years. The main obstacle to agricultural development lays in its extreme bi-modality. The tiny (less than 0.25 acres) and small holdings account for 99.8 percent of the total holding. At the other end, 6600 farms with an average size of 58.3 ha share 20 percent of the land. The vast majority of the farmers do not have the capacity to improve the yield and even to make a livelihood out their work.

The migration history of Sri Lanka presents strong parallels with the Indian case. Rooted in the colonial history, there are long established Sri Lankan communities residing in Commonwealth countries and the USA. However, since the nineties, over nine emigrants out of ten leave to the Middle East, men as low skilled workers and women as care and domestic workers. Students and highly-skilled emigrants tend to favour European and North American destinations. The 250 000 Sri Lankans abroad contribute 8 percent of the GDP through remittances and investments.

Kenya

Owing to a large variety of climates and topology, Kenya has developed a diversified agriculture. It enjoys a highly profitable, export-oriented sector (it is a leading producer of tea and coffee, as well as the third-leading exporter of horticultural crops, such as cabbages, onions and mangoes), and a large subsistence agricultural sector, in which most smallholders own plots of less than one hectare. As in the Indian case, modern Kenyan agriculture is concentrated in a few areas (mostly in the Western, Rift Valley and Central regions).

Despite its agricultural potential, the country suffers from endemic poverty. According to the World Bank taxonomy, Kenya is an agriculture-based economy. Its GDP growth is highly dependent on the agricultural sector (28 percent of its added value) and the majority of the population lives under the poverty line (53 percent). According to the FAO, half of the population is food-insecure and one-third is 'undernourished' (see Figure 1).

The migration profile of Kenya is equally complex. The Kenyan case-study report synthesizes four distinct patterns of internal migration: migration to resettlement areas in the wake of post-election violence; nomadism of pastoral groups in Northern Kenya; seasonal migration to cash-crop areas; and rural–urban migration. International movements comprise cross-border mobility to and from neighbouring countries (Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia), refugees fleeing political unrests (mostly from South-Central Somalia) and inter-continental migration to the USA, Canada, the UK and Germany. The latter includes semi- and high-skilled workers leaving the country either for studies or due to the political instability in the country. Finally, intra-African migration flows are oriented to Congo, Ivory Coast and Rwanda.

Zambia

Combining high levels of poverty, food insecurity, agriculture-dependence and urban brain drain, Zambia's profile is relatively similar to Kenya's. The agricultural sector contributes to 18 percent of the country's GDP and 67 percent of its employment. 76 percent are subsistence farmers owning 2 ha plots or less. They grow cereals (maize, sorghum, millet...) and tubers. Medium and large scale farmers focus on cash crop (maize, sugar, cotton, tobacco, flowers, coffee...) and enjoy a commercial viability. The poverty gap between rural and urban areas has been widening during the past decade. 80 percent of the rural population lives under the poverty line. Food security is worsening even if the quantity of food produced is, in theory, sufficient to meet the needs of the population. Poor distribution of food supplies and recurrent droughts produce large pockets of food insecurity.

A strong but poorly documented domestic migration is reported. In contrast, international migration remains low. There are 186 000 Zambians living abroad (1.4 percent of the total population). The main destination countries include neighbouring countries (Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe), Commonwealth countries (the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and the US. Most are semi to highly skilled workers. 42 percent are said to have a master level degree. The country displays high level of brain drain in the health sector, especially among nurses.

The Island states: Tonga, Jamaica and St Vincent and the Grenadines

Three Island states investigated present roughly the same profile. The three countries do not display any major food-security issue, other than obesity, due to unbalanced diet. Seventy percent of people live in rural areas and have agriculture as a primary source of income. Agriculture employs 20 percent of the labour force in Jamaica and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Agriculture is almost exclusively comprised of family subsistence farming. 75 percent of farms in St Vincent and the Grenadines and Jamaica are 2 ha or less. The sector is divided between an export-oriented production (banana in St Vincent and the Grenadines, squash pumpkin in Tonga, sugar and banana in Jamaica) and crop production geared toward the domestic market. By and large, the food production does not suffice to cover the needs of the population but massive imports compensate for the lack of food produced on the islands. Finally, the Island countries remain highly sensitive to recurrent climatic hazards (hurricanes, tidal waves...). In 1961–1963, a series of cyclones devastated Vava’u and Ha’apai and induced the mass displacement of families to the main island, Nuku’alofa. More recently, in 2007 and 2008, two hurricanes severely affected the Jamaican agriculture production.

The vast majority of the population does not rely on agriculture as the unique source of income, and a large number of households benefit from cash transfers provided by international migrants. The Tongan economy is among the most dependent on international migration in the world; it receives the equivalent of 40 percent of its GDP¹¹ in the form of remittances. In St Vincent and the Grenadines, remittances account for 22.1 percent of household incomes. The situation is roughly the same in Jamaica (p.26-27). Migration to the US and Commonwealth countries prevail. The migration pattern is increasingly dominated by seasonal flows to Australia’s and New Zealand’s (for Tonga), USA’s and Canada’s (for Jamaica and St Vincent and the Grenadines) agricultural areas. For this reason rural areas in Island states tend to be more connected to international flows than in other case studies.

2. The obstacles to rural development and food security

The agriculture and poverty nexus in emerging countries

1940s–1990s: the productivity approach


During the decades after independence, a majority of Southern countries neglected rural development. It was only in the wake of outbreaks of famine that governments took up this issue. Until the 1990s, rural development strategies were focused on the growth of a modern sector through recourse to fertilizers, improved seeding, irrigation and mechanization. For example, the so-called ‘Green Revolution’ initiated in the mid 1960s in India was conducive to the doubling of food-grain production in thirty years.

But this approach resulted in the formation of a dual system, with a small class of agricultural entrepreneurs and a vast majority of smallholders practising subsistence farming. Smallholding in Southern countries is a legacy of the colonial and pre-colonial agricultural systems and a consequence of the absence of land reform after independence. The roots of rural underdevelopment are primarily a political economy issue. This situation has further deteriorated in the past decades due to the division of plots through inheritance and the lack of new arable lands. The average size of a smallholding in India went down to 1.06 hectares in 2003, from 2.6 in 1960 (Sahai, Singh et al. 2011). The Indian case illustrates a process of dualisation of agriculture which is observed in the other case-studies. The share of smallholders with less than 2 ha land varies from 99 percent in Sri Lanka to 75 percent in St Vincent and the Grenadines. Landless households are among the groups the most vulnerable to poverty. The investigated countries combine a class of top capitalist landowners provided with a plethora of investment incentives and subsidised inputs, and pre-capitalist forms of subsistence farming. Subsistence agriculture is poorly diversified and sensitive to climate variations. In the absence of adequate irrigation and inputs, many crops do not reach their potential. The rain-fed subsistence farming of smallholders is insufficient to secure a living. Rural households in the agricultural or non-farm sector generally combine farming with two other sources of income: labour and migration.

1990s onwards: liberalization of agriculture and the consequence of adjustment policies


In the 1990s, a new approach to rural development was implemented. A liberalization strategy; frequently under the aegis of structural adjustment plans, dismantled protectionist regulations, exposed farmers to international competitors and markets, deregulated investment, and replaced state funding and planning bodies with private institutions. This led states to pullout from local development. This market-centred approach seems to have reached a plateau. Although food production has been on the rise during the last two decades, the level of undernourishment in the investigated countries stagnates or even increases. The Island states (Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Tonga) have been more successful in tackling food insecurity but only thanks to massive import of food from abroad (see Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1: Food production index (100=1999-2001)



Source: World Bank, World Development Index, 2011

Figure 2: Prevalence of undernourishment in the total population (percent)



Source: FAOSTAT 2011 (no data available for Tonga)

Private investment does not offset the withdrawal of state commitments. In India, the Growth Capital Formation in agriculture and allied activities has been stagnating at 14 percent of the sector GDP since the mid 2000s¹² (Sahai, Singh et al. 2011: 15). The weakness of private investments is all the more problematic given that farmers' indebtedness is on the rise, resulting in a surge of suicides among farmers, who are increasingly under pressure from credit

institutions. The effects of decreasing state investments are equally felt on public infrastructure.

Besides the limits of the market approach implemented since the late 1990s, a new challenge to rural development has come to the fore with global warming. In over-exploited areas, poor water management, soil erosion, declining soil fertility and land degradation put a strain on food production. An estimated 172.18 million ha¹³ of land is no longer fit for agriculture due to environmental degradation in India. Soil erosion is the first cause of land degradation (107.13 million ha). The loss of 25 percent of Kenya's forest areas during the past 15 years and non-regulated water pumping have been conducive to a drying up Kenya's 12 major rivers and lakes.

The challenge of climate change is particularly acute in vulnerable areas, such as arid lands. In Zambia, it is estimated that the variable climate reduces the country's rate of growth by 0.4 percent (Kapunda 2011: 14). In Kenya, a large proportion of deprived populations are concentrated in semi-desert areas. In the pastoralist Northern Kenya, 80–95 percent of the population lives under the poverty line. These areas are particularly sensitive to climate change due to the increasing irregularity of water fall. At the same time, they potentially represent a large source of arable land. The arid and semi-arid lands (ASALS) that represent over 84 percent of Kenya's total land mass are highly under-utilized, due to lack of irrigation. The use of this land could potentially alleviate further farming of over-exploited land.

Finally, island states are more likely to suffer from cyclones. The frequency of cyclones is on the rise due to climate change, induced by water warming. A series of cyclones in the mid 1960s occurred at the onset of large internal and international migration outflows in Tonga. Likewise, two cyclones devastated Jamaican coasts in 2005 and 2007. This affected the food production of the island. According to the case-study report, some Jamaicans have renounced farm activities because of the difficulties caused by climatic conditions.

Today, although the farm economy remains an economic mainstay for Southern countries, gains in productivity have been reduced by structural deficits. Wages and farm income levels do not suffice to warrant a decent living. In parallel, the non-farm sector is still too narrow to provide an alternative income in rural areas. Migration is often the only option for those who can afford it. The following sections focus on five specific structural 'deficits' that can be tackled with a better management of migration and remittances. These are: financial resources and safety nets deficit; knowledge deficit; public infrastructures deficit; market chains deficit; and migration-induced deficits.

Financial resources deficit

The consequences of the lack of financial resources for food security are obvious. But undernourishment is not only an effect, but a cause of poverty. The lack of healthy diet affects the social and economic life of people, and possibly subsequent generations as well.

The limited access to financial resources is an impediment for agriculture production for two reasons. Financial resources, it goes without saying, provide the possibility to purchase

improved inputs, and equipments. But a stable and sufficient access to financial resources is also a pre-requisite as it provides a safety net against the risks inherent to any investment. Investing - the loss of resources in the hope of future gains - is only possible with a sense of security and confidence. Investment and safety nets are therefore the two facets standing behind the provision of financial resources.

Labour, migration and agriculture are the three main sources of income in rural areas. In addition, three types of credit institutions exist: micro-credit institutions, money lenders and banks. Efforts have been made to formalise credit access through improved banking systems. In India, the share of institutional lending reached a peak in the early 1990s (66 percent in 1991, against 7.3 percent in 1961) but has shrunk since then (61 percent in 2002). The privatization of the banking system in the 1980s was conducive to a rise in interest rates and a demand for excessive loan collateral. A large micro-finance sector emerged to address the needs of low-income clients, but this remains insufficient and poor farmers are increasingly having recourse to informal money lenders despite higher interest rates. Still in India, the role of money lenders went up from 17.5 percent in 1991 to 26.8 percent in 2002. In this context of an imperfect credit market, migration is often the sole recourse to access financial resources.

Knowledge deficit

Two distinct and complementary forms of knowledge are important: human capital and information.

The move towards a modern agriculture implies the acquisition of a practical knowledge in agricultural techniques, processing and commercialization. School enrolment is at its lowest in rural areas. In addition, the disengagement of public bodies from research and development of agricultural technologies is an additional impediment to the betterment of agricultural productivity. But enhancing human capital is not solely a condition for farming improvement. It also opens wider access to other forms of employment in the non-farm economy, in urban areas or abroad. Knowledge is therefore a key component for the improvement of rural livelihoods in general and not only for agricultural production. Knowledge access is of particular importance for smallholders and landless peasants who could not make a livelihood out of farming.

The lack of information about market opportunities and available employment is also pointed out by the authors of the case studies. Besides human capital, access to information is also crucial. The Internet and portable communication are a means to overcome the isolation of rural communities.

Public infrastructures deficit

Transport

Transport is critical for the marketing of agricultural goods. Access to urban markets, airports and harbours hinges on the availability of adequate transport systems. In India, investments in rural roads contributed about 25 percent of the growth in agricultural output in the 1970s (World_Bank 2007: 53). Despite the high return on such investment, this sector is, more often than not, neglected by state authorities. The report on Tonga provides illustration of this: *'some rural roads have become impassable even during the dry weather. In all outer islands, Vava'u, Ha'apai and 'Eua, some roads are accessible only by four-wheel drive vehicles and only during dry periods, whereas other roads, in wet or dry seasons are reserved only for tractors'* (Taufatofua 2011: 23).

Other public infrastructures

Health and education are primarily a question of infrastructure. The lack of school buildings, health centres and staff contribute to the isolation of communities and maintain pockets of poverty.

The provision of cheap and reliable power is a factor in rural development. For example, electricity improves the storage capacity of farms. Decentralised production systems such as solar or wind energy could enable the provision of electricity to the most remote areas and therefore the development of a more sophisticated economy.

Market chains deficit

Food security is not necessarily related to a deficit in food production. For example, there were adequate stocks of maize in key producing areas of the North Rift Valley, but pastoralists and small-scale farmers in the ASAL areas faced severe food shortages due to drought in parts of 2010. In Zambia, the food gap (i.e. the differential between food availability and requirement) is relatively low but food supplies are very badly distributed. The same observation was made by Amartya Sen in his analysis of the famine in Bengal (Sen 1981). Inadequate transport infrastructure and market deficiencies are responsible for inefficiencies in food distribution. The absence of competition between intermediaries encourages high transaction costs and speculative behaviours.

By and large, functional market chains are crucial conditions for the emergence of profitable agriculture which would respond to the increasing demand for diversified products in expanding economies. The case studies unveil the lack of storage, high cost of transport and the lack of farmer bargaining power at the national and international levels. The lack of adequate administrative coordination is another issue highlighted by the research. The Tongan case exemplifies this problem:

'Policies for marketing of agricultural commodities and provision of market information are functions of Tonga Trade under the Ministry of Labour Commerce and Industries. Production, quarantine protocols and quarantine are mandated to the Ministry of Agriculture, while actual

overseas marketing of produce is largely managed by the private sector. Close cooperation between these bodies is essential for the successful trade of commodities. Farmers who produce the goods are usually suspicious of traders and traders are rarely supported by government. Market information is rarely available or obsolete, and agricultural and quarantine advice on many occasions has been wrong and costly. Unfortunately, the poor farmer in most cases is the last to get paid and is often left holding the ball at the end of the queue.' (Taufatofua 2011: 22)

Migration-induced deficits: brawn/brain drain and family break-ups

Migration is not only a major source of income in rural areas. It can also be, under certain conditions, an impediment to development. Three aspects are examined here: brawn drain or the loss of workforce, brain drain, and the negative impacts on families.

Brawn drain: the loss of workforce

At the household level, the departure of a family member negatively affects those who cannot replace her/him either by extra work or by hiring a worker. This seems to be particularly the case for rural–urban or rural–rural migrations which yield lower financial returns than international migration. When balancing the costs of departure and establishment in town with the revenues obtained in the form of financial or social remittances, Kenyan rural–urban migration constitutes a net loss for origin communities which therefore further constrains agricultural revenue and spurs more migration (Oucho 1996).

Certain forms of international mobility can also be detrimental for local productive systems. This is amply exemplified by the literature. For example, the lesser utilisation of land is conducive to land degradation as shown by a study in Morocco (De Haas and De Mas 1997). In Sri Lanka, migrant households tend to rely almost exclusively on remittances and give up their income generating activity (Samaratunga, Jayaweera et al. 2011: 38). The same was found in the Malian region of Kayes (Azam and Gubert 2006). In Bangladesh, it was observed that 42.5 percent migrant household do not have any agriculture worker and therefore depend entirely on hired labour for farming or lease out their land (Hossain 2011: 15). This induces an upward pressure on local wages of workers (idem: 21).

An inadequate Temporary Migrant Workers Programmes (TMWP) can be responsible for the loss of valuable workforce in sending areas. This issue is, for example, highlighted by the case of the Tonga Islands. Tongan workers migrating to New Zealand under the aegis of the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme stay abroad during the seven months of the agricultural peak season in New Zealand. After seven months overseas, migrants return to their homeland for around five months, which does not leave enough time for farming activities (Taufatofua 2011: 12).

Brain drain and its consequences on rural areas

Highly skilled workers are usually of urban background. But brain drain has also important ripple effects on rural areas. Rural areas in some Southern countries suffer from a lack of health personnel. Zambia is, among the case studies of this research, the most affected by brain drain. The legislation liberalizing the health sector was conducive to the deterioration of the working conditions in the public sector. It resulted in massive transfer of personnel either to the urban private sector or abroad (Kapunda 2011: 18). Likewise, in Kenya, it is estimated that as many as 20 Kenyan doctors are leaving the country every month for better positions elsewhere (Schinn 2002). Medical staff departures accrue to students registered in overseas universities who will not return after obtaining their degree. Finally, medical staff who stay in the country tend to establish themselves in urban settings where practising is more remunerative. The lack of infrastructure and communication means, and the insolvency of rural populations deter them from working in rural areas. Brain drain is therefore not solely a problem of international migration management, but also of internal distribution of qualified personnel.

Interviews with public officials in Jamaica highlight another aspect of the brain drain's consequences on rural development: there is a lack of skilled professionals working in public administration, which, in turn, affects the elaboration and implementation of adequate policies.

Family disruptions and gender roles

Migration also affects rural households as women often become the head of the household while the man is away. This has consequences on income spending patterns. Women tend to spend more money on food, education and health, or to put money aside in bank accounts. In contrast, because of their unequal access to social and economic assets, women are less prone to engage in productive investment than men. This is particularly the case in countries where farming is a male responsibility and women cannot own land (Taufatofua 2011: 17). Spouses of migrants face difficulty to engage in another income generating activity as they have to look after their children (Samaratunga, Jayaweera et al. 2011: 38). This issue is all the more problematic due to the fact that in some areas farming is the primary (and often only) source of livelihood. This is the case for 70 percent of Kenyan women (African_Migration_and_Development_Policy_Centre 2011).

Finally, some authors highlight the disruptive consequences of the departure of one (or both) parents for the stability of families (Taufatofua 2011). Cases of family break-up and infidelity are regularly reported. Older people are isolated as their children work far away. Extended family supporting systems may not work effectively in the absence of the family head.


3. The contribution of migration to rural development, poverty alleviation and food security

Impacts on household poverty and food security

Remittances: a safety net for rural households

Financial transfers are the main form of contribution of migrants to the improvement of the livelihood of those left behind. Along with farming and labour, they constitute one of the main sources of income of rural households. In Kenya, together with salaried work, they form 21 percent of rural revenue.¹⁴ Seventy-four percent of rural households receive cash transfers,¹⁵ and among them 14 percent are regular receivers of overseas remittances.¹⁶ In Tonga, RSE participating households increase their income by 30 percent (McKenzie and Gibson 2010). In Sri Lanka, remittances account for nearly half of migrant households' income (up to 80 percent for the poorer households) (Samaratunga, Jayaweera et al. 2011: 36). Similar outcomes are found in Bangladesh (IOM 2009). Migration can be regarded as a safety net for rural households. Remittances tend to be resilient to economic shocks. As shown in Figure 3, remittance flows to the investigated countries were only mildly affected by the 2009 economic downturn and display a surge immediately after.

Figure 3: Remittance growth index (2001=100)



Source: Remittances data inflows, World Bank, 2011. 2010: estimates. No data available for Zambia in 2001 and 2002.

Impact on absolute and relative poverty


Authors of the case studies agree that remittances do alleviate poverty in absolute terms. However, migration is also likely to increase the income differential between households and therefore to increase relative poverty. In Jamaica, the population receiving remittances is part of the two higher income quintiles (Thomas-Hope 2011: 34). In Kenya and Zambia, international migrants are primarily of urban, relatively affluent background. Migration is a selective process

(it affects particular groups of people and areas within a population). Due to the higher costs of travel and settlement, overseas emigrants tend to come from wealthier households and wealthier areas. Poorer households tend to opt for rural– rural or rural–urban migration and therefore receive lower remittance flows. International migration is therefore likely to increase income differentials between internal, international and non-migrant households. It contrasts with internal migration which often induces transfer of wealth from more affluent to poorer households (Kapunda 2011: 34). This is less so in Island states where the regulatory framework of temporary migration schemes enables rural and poorer populations to benefit from international employment and remittances.

International migration tends to wealthier households on the short run. But the economic activity induced by migrants’ relatives consumption and investments may have positive spill over effects over time. This is accounted for in Bangladesh, where the purchasing power of migrants has a positive impact on rural employment. Migration has contributed to the creation of shops and has benefited the construction sector and agriculture services (Hossain 2011: 23).

Channel of remittances

Figure 4: channels of international remittances (percent)



Sources: Zambia: (Diaspora_Liaison_Office 2011); Jamaica: (Thomas-Hope 2011: 25); Tonga: (Taufatofua 2011: 15); Kenya: (Bendixen_and_Amandi_International 2010)

Money transfer organisations and Banking channels are the most commonly used means of remitting. Money transfer organisations such as Western Union and Money Gram prevail in countries where the banking system remains insufficiently established in receiving areas and comparatively expensive. But transaction costs are not the sole factor determining the choice of migrants. Accessibility in departing and receiving areas and the quality of transfer (swiftness and security) are also to be taken into account. India, Sri Lanka and, to a lesser extent, Kenya, enjoy a banking system, which respond to migrants’ needs. Telegraphic banking transfers

(SWIFT) are privileged remittances channels in South Asian countries. They account for 53% of remittances to India (Sahai, Singh et al. 2011: 32). Indian and Sri Lankan banks have developed a widespread network of branches at home and abroad. For example, the People's Bank employs 400 agents in 105 countries (Samaratunga, Jayaweera et al. 2011: 45). However, banks remain insufficiently present in rural areas. As a consequence, rural population have mostly recourse to informal cash transfers. It is estimated that 45 percent of remittance inflows to Sri Lanka in the mid nineties were taking informal channels. Accessibility, along with costs, is therefore a crucial issue.

The informal remittance systems include 'Hawala' (where a sender will pay the money to an individual, who then communicates the message to his agent in the location where the receiver is and instructs his agent to pay the receiver. This system of money transfer works mainly by trust). Other informal systems include travellers and bus companies (Buencamino and Gorbunov 2002). Although decreasing, informal channels remain a widespread mode of remitting, especially between areas densely connected by migration flows due to its low cost and outreach.

The use of remittances and their impact on food security and households' poverty

The money received by migrant households is primarily used for daily consumption, and among other things, for food purchase. In Kenya, between 13 and 14 percent of remittances are spent on food (World_Bank 2006) and up to 36 percent in Bangladesh (Murshid, Iqbal et al. 2002). Remittances therefore contribute to ensuring the food security of migrant households. This seems to particularly true in less economically favoured areas. In Sri Lanka, interviews with recipient household members in reveal that the outcomes of remittances on the quantity and quality of food intakes are more significant in poorer rural areas and insignificant in urbanised areas (Samaratunga, Jayaweera et al. 2011: section 7.3). Furthermore, migration seems to favour the adoption of bad food consumption habits, the so-called "junk food". However, more research needs to be undertaken on this. This issue is still widely neglected by students of migration who mainly focus on development and poverty impacts. Unfortunately, the implications of money transfers on food security have received insufficient scrutiny.

Children's education and health is, after consumption, the sector that has benefited most from remittances in the case studies. They widely serve to cover schooling fees and health services. The migratory revenue is reported to improve the drop-out rate and health indicators (Mansuri 2007; IOM 2009).

Next to consumption, a large part of remittances is geared towards various forms of investment. The building/maintaining of a house is, by far, the most frequent investment endeavour. The share of remittances spent in housing reaches 25 percent in Sri Lanka (p.41), 11 percent in Tonga (p.15), between 10 and 30 percent in Bangladesh (p.5), 8 percent in Kenya (p.30). The investment behaviour of migrants in farming is analysed in greater detail in the following section.

Data on savings are available for India, Bangladesh and Jamaica only. Although hoarding has been criticised as being a non-productive use, putting money in a savings account may have important macro-economic effects (see below).

Finally, the reports highlight the relative importance of social expenses beyond the family itself such as religious and non-religious donations, marriages, and burials. For example, spending in this category is very high in the Tonga Islands where donations to the church are of particular importance in community life.

Impacts on agriculture and economy

Impact on labour force, wages and land prices

No case-study point to any sizeable influence of migration on labour markets and land use in rural areas. In India and Kenya, in capital-rich/labour-poor areas (cash-crop and granary areas such as Punjab or Western areas), emigration has been offset by the recruitment of workers from other parts of India. Punjab attracted internal immigrants in order to fill the void left by those who departed the country. Most seasonal workers come from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In Jamaica and St Vincent, the departures are proportionally very small and have no impact on the agricultural sector. Farming on smallholdings does not require a large workforce and emigrants are usually replaced by other family members (the spouse). Only cash-crop areas attract seasonal workers from other parts of the island. In Sri Lanka and Tonga, migration seems to have a more negative impact insofar as women do not replace their husband leaving the household, and live on remittances. The same is observed in Bangladesh, but, unlike in Sri Lanka and Tonga, migrant households hire labour to work on the farm or lease the land to poorer households. This system is reported to have prevented the decline of agricultural production in sending areas (Hossain 2011: 23).

Wages and land prices do not seem to be affected by emigration in the investigated countries. The wage levels are more likely to be affected by increased labour demand than by the reduced availability of labour induced by migration. Bangladesh is an exception. An overall shift of workers to nonfarm sectors is observed. In investigated areas, migration reinforces a situation of labour shortage and contributes to increase local wage rate (Hossain 2011: 21). As for land prices, the only reported example is the one of speculation on land in urban areas in Kenya and Zambia. Migrants tend to acquire land primarily for the building of house and not for productive investment purposes.

Factors explaining the propensity to invest

Two categories of investors can be distinguished: the migrant households can use a part of the monies received from migration to invest, or the migrants themselves can chose to dedicate a part of their savings to an investment back home. As shown above, the investment behaviour of households is the result of a trade-off between their immediate needs and their longer-term

projects. The available safety nets households possess determine their propensity to engage in more or less risky operations. Migrants' propensity to invest is spurred either by the wish to provide for the needs of their relatives back home (also called altruistic behaviour by students of remittances) or by the prospect of substantial benefits, should they return or not (interest-driven investments).

Investments are spurred by the prospect of diversifying income sources and the need to overcome labour shortages incurred by emigration. As mentioned above, productive investments hinge on the nature of migration, whether internal or international. Households that receive remittances from abroad are more inclined to invest than domestic migration households are. In Kenya, the data provided by a World Bank study (2011) indicate that investment absorbs the lion's share of international money transfers (42.7 percent¹⁷). This includes the rent, construction or refurbishment of a house (3.05 percent, 6.9 percent and 4.2 percent), car/truck expenses (3.05 percent), land purchase (7.7 percent), farm improvement (1.35 percent), business investment (6.15 percent) and investment (12.4 percent). The World Bank study breaks the data down according to the place of provenance of remittances. It clearly shows that the farther the migration, the larger the share dedicated to investment (and subsequently, the smaller to consumption). 24.2 percent of intercontinental remittances are used for investment, against 0.6 percent for intra-continental remittances (from other African countries) and 4.7 percent for domestic remittances. This is in line with the idea that the poorer households, who tend to opt for internal destinations, tend to use remittances for their immediate needs. But there is also evidence that internal migrants are more prone to invest in farming than international migrants who favour investments in urban areas. This propensity is observed in Zambia (p.28) and Kenya (p.30).

TWMP migration is less exposed to selective effects. For example, in Tonga, households benefiting from the New Zealander RSE programme tend to be larger and poorer than the average. Remittances are therefore less geared towards investment, which is not a priority for deprived people. The prevalence of poorer households in this scheme is accounted for by the mode of selection of emigrants. This selection is operated by local Tongan community leaders according to their socio-economic position, rather than according to their skills (Taufatofua 2011: 15 and 25).

Integration in host countries is a factor likely to affect both investment and remittances (Hugo 2011: 15). A body of work investigating the consequences of migrant incorporation and length of stay on development shows that, in the short run, economic and legal stability tends to facilitate transnational engagements of expatriates and therefore investments in agriculture (Portes, Guarnizo et al. 2002; Mazzucato 2008). However, in the longer run (a decade or more), the amounts of remittances sent by emigrants tends to decrease (Lee 2007).

The last (and foremost) key factor affecting agricultural investment is the profitability of farming. For example, in Tonga, the share of remittances invested in farm improvement is higher on the 'Eua Island (19 percent) than on the remote Island of Vava'u. 'Eua's proximity and easy access to Nuku'alofa markets (the main island of the country) account for this higher propensity to invest (Taufatofua 2011: 8). In Bangladesh, the lack of profitability is cited by

farmers as the main impediment to agricultural investment (30 percent of total respondents), before the lack of workforce and input problems (Hossain 2011: 24). The lesser propensity to invest among Indians and Sri Lankans or in St Vincent might also be linked to the lack of profitability of the sector, which is burdened by the smallness of plots. More investigations are required to account for the investment patterns in agricultural activities compared to other activities. So far, existing studies have not attempted to understand the propensity to invest in the different economic sectors.

Farm investments in the investigated countries

By and large, farm investment absorbs only a tiny share of migrants' investments and remittances. The different case-studies provide ample evidence of this low interest in agricultural activities. For example, the improvement of farms attracts 2.3 percent of intercontinental remittances in Kenya and only between 10 and 120 US\$ per month in St Vincent. Likewise, less than 1 percent of remittance recipient households use the received money to purchase agricultural land.

However, rural remittance recipient households tend to display better equipment than non migrant households. They have more widely recourse to farm inputs (seeds and fertilizers), and farm storage facilities and post-harvest equipment. Remittances are also used for mechanization (tractors, feed choppers, tube-wells). For example, 20.8 percent of migrant households possess water pumps, against 12.4 percent of non migrant ones (Samaratunga, Jayaweera et al. 2011: 40). During the Green Revolution in India, diaspora members supported the acquisition of nearly 2000 tractors and tube wells thanks to government incentives. They support the shift to modern farming such as 'zero grazing' forms of livestock and horticulture and the development of non-farm activities. Areas of agricultural services and food processing have also attracted migrants. In Jamaica, some seasonal emigrants have used the skills and farming techniques learnt abroad to improve their activity. In Bangladesh, where land purchase and farm investment still attracts a fair amount of migrants' investments, farm revenue is significantly higher for migrant than for non migrant households.

This suggests that migrant households' farms benefit from higher investments and better inputs. Migration can substantially improve the productivity of farms in departure areas. However, despite their importance at the micro-level, investments of migrants in the rural economy remain too limited to have sizeable effects on the agricultural production at large. The Island states enjoy temporary workers schemes that directly affect the rural economy. They are also the states for which the food production growth has been the lowest during the last decade (see figure 1). By and large, the reports do not show any evidence of a positive correlation between migration and food production growth.

The non-financial impacts: entrepreneurship, collective remittances and social remittances

Entrepreneurship

Migrants' entrepreneurship is an area which has received less attention than remittances. An example of successful partnerships between farmers and expatriate entrepreneurs illustrates the development potential of entrepreneurship. This example is provided by a study on Morocco carried out by the International Migration Institute. It reviews a rose essence distillery: *'this enterprise was set up by two brothers, one chemistry engineer based in France and the other brother based in Morocco, where he manages the distillery. The roses are grown by local farmers, and then they are collected and distilled into an essence. Approximately fifty percent of the product is sent to France where the migrant brother utilises the rose essence to manufacture various cosmetic products, which are sold on mainly regional markets, or to sell it to big cosmetics companies.'* (Lacroix, de Haas et al. 2010: 9).

Migrant entrepreneurs can actively promote food export to overseas markets. But migrant communities can also support demand-led exports. The demand for traditional food crops (cassava and yams) among Tongans abroad (especially in New Zealand) has boosted exports. This market is growing and other Tongan communities in USA and Australia offer an opportunity to increase further food-crop exports (Rogers and Morrison 2010). This shows that migrant entrepreneurship can be an asset to improve overseas market chains and exports.

Collective remittances

Collective remittances are development projects undertaken by groups of migrants for the benefit of their area of origin. Overseas Tongans, especially in the USA, form hometown associations, church groups, kava¹⁸ groups, and alumni groups that turn out to be particularly active in homeland development. They raise funds for public infrastructure improvement, such as village water systems, street lighting or church buildings. Data on collective remittances are non-existent. They represent only a small portion of the total amount of remittances yet they directly address development issues identified by the population.¹⁹

India is a major beneficiary of large collective remittance flows from abroad. Hometown networks, caste associations and affluent philanthropists are the main supporters of development initiatives. For example, a survey in 477 villages of Punjab shows that NRI (non-resident Indians) transfers into religious and social development projects amount to \$4.5 million (Dusenbery and Tatla 2010: 111). Schools and health centres, sewing systems and street embellishment are the main types of collective investment carried out by overseas groups. Similar endeavours are reported in Sri Lanka and Tonga.

A characteristic of collective remittances is that they often trigger a dialogue in beneficiary villages on development needs, mediated by the local elite or a village association. Development projects have an impact on civil society, sometimes giving a better voice to women. Furthermore, collective remittances may have positive outcomes on local

employment. Rural workers may find jobs in places of worship, schools, associations, health centres which benefit from migrants' donations.

Collective remitting is, however, not a universal pattern. Collective involvement in development projects is to be found among groups that maintain a strong community and associative life in the host country. Such a pattern is seemingly unseen among Kenyans abroad. The weakness of the associative field can be offset by the philanthropic activities of wealthy individuals or by individual donations in the wake of environmental hazards (earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding). An example is given by the report on Zambia (p.28). In 2009, Zambians from Namibia donated 10 000 rands to support flood victims.

Social remittances

Social remittances are defined as the ideas, skills, symbols and sociological patterns that are brought back by migrants from their place of destination (Levitt 1999). Compared to financial transfers and investment, social remittances have received far less scrutiny. Impacts on women are the most visible aspects of social remittances when migration imports new forms of gender relations. There is no evidence that such phenomenon affects food security. More research on this issue is required to investigate the impacts of social remittances on food security. Beyond the gender aspects, migration conveys new agricultural techniques and entrepreneurial behaviours, thus contributing to tackling the knowledge deficit in rural areas. For example, in Jamaica, *“farm workers had also been reported to have been exposed to the use of green-house and hydroponics technology to grow crops, as well as the use certain types of equipment. The findings from interviews and focus group participants supported the view that migration improved the techniques used in farming and ultimately the productivity of farmers.”* (Thomas-Hope 2011: 31).


But social remittances also affect deeper social structures of rural communities by importing marriage patterns, housing and temporal social rhythms. For example, temporary migration schemes have introduced a new annual calendar harnessed to the agricultural calendar of destination countries which differs from the traditional calendar organised around traditional agriculture and religious practices (Taufatofua 2011). Likewise, migrants tend to build conspicuous houses with fences, an architectural style which bears the mark of individualism.

Finally, migrant households generally have better access to the Internet, television and telephone equipment. They therefore benefit from better information, particularly on employment and market opportunities

Synthesis of the findings

Migration and remittances have direct and indirect effects on rural development. Figure 5 gives an overview of the connections that exist between the different forms of transfers and development obstacles of rural economy.

Figure 5: Migration impacts on rural development



The case studies provide mixed evidence regarding the development potential of migration in rural areas. The various forms of remittances have a positive impact on the productivity of migrant households' farms. The introduction of new production techniques can also have beneficial spill-over effects on non-migrants' farming (Jamaica). However, the reception of remittances can also lead households to abandon farming, especially when women who stay do not have the possibility (or knowledge) to replace the husband who left (Sri Lanka). In addition, there is no evidence of a substantial improvement of agriculture at the regional or national level in the countries investigated. **Migration on its own cannot support an agricultural development strategy.**

Migration improves household food security. Remittances are largely used for daily consumption, especially in poor households. In the absence of a specific study, it is not possible to give a quantitative assessment of the improvement of food consumption induced by the reception of remittances. Nor is it possible to draw any conclusion regarding non-migrant households.

Finally, authors of case-study reports agree that migration alleviates poverty, even for non-migrant households. In the countries benefiting from temporary migration schemes recruiting low skilled workers in rural areas migration directly benefits rural populations. This is less true in countries where the migrants tend to come from wealthier urban areas. Furthermore, spill-over effects on non-migrant households may be limited. The Jamaican case clearly shows that selectivity effects widen the poverty gap between migrant and non-migrant households.

4. Unleashing the development potential of migration

Migration and development policies have mainly been focused on migration management, brain drain, diaspora engagement, migrants' rights and remittance-enhancement. Rural development remains an area neglected by stakeholders. Despite the vast amount of research dedicated to the phenomenon, and despite the ongoing debate it has spurred among policy makers, only a handful of large migration and rural development policies have been implemented. Often quoted in Northern countries, the French-Spanish-Italian codevelopment policies (Lacroix 2009) and the IOM "Migration for Development in Africa" (MIDA) programmes, and, in Southern countries the Mexican *tres por uno* and the Moroccan Programme d'Électrification Rurale Global Généralisé (PERG) are cited. Besides these examples, there is, of course a plethora of small programmes that never managed to enrol more than few tens or a few hundreds of expatriates.²⁰ It is also worth mentioning the NAFTA policy, which was promoted as a 'development instead of migration' policy, ultimately turned out to be a 'migration-inducing' policy, as 12 million undocumented Mexicans now reside in the USA.

To our knowledge, no comparative evaluation of these different schemes has been done. Individual evaluations are also lacking. The work of Natasha Iskander comparing the Mexican and Moroccan policies concludes that any successful migration and development policy takes time to be designed (it took three decades in both cases), and goes through a long consultation process with migrant organizations, local authorities and development stakeholders (Iskander 2010). As already mentioned, migration is a global phenomenon with local effects. The 'best practice' approach of ready-made policies is of limited interest when the conditions, and therefore the policy effects, vary. Arguably, the establishment of a consultation framework with different stakeholders at different levels is the pre-requisite to the implementation of up-and-running policies. **Diasporas are a 'democratic frontier'**. There should be a drive to acknowledge emigrants as fully fledged political subjects, within the framework of a broader revitalization of democracy in sending and receiving countries. In effect, the recognition of the political status of migrants cannot be unhooked from a rights-based, anti-discrimination approach in both Southern and Northern societies.

The second phase of migration and development policies consists of the expansion and implementation of schemes meant to maximize the benefits of migration and minimise its negative effects. The GMG document 'Mainstreaming migration into development planning' (Global_Migration_Group 2010) defines a process of implementation of a migration and development programme in six steps: analysis of the situation; definition of aims and

objectives; action planning; finance planning and search for funding; implementation; monitoring and evaluation.

The following recommendations are an effort to encapsulate both aspects; namely the establishment of an institutional framework and the design of pragmatic actions to be taken to tackle obstacles to rural development. These recommendations are broken down at the international, national and local levels with a view to delineating a coherent 'policy chain' in the Commonwealth. Finally, this section pinpoints four areas in which there is an obvious lack of knowledge and in which more research should be undertaken.

At the international level

The Commonwealth Office for Migration and Development (COMD)

The Commonwealth Organization is one of the largest organizations gathering sending and receiving countries of the same migration systems. It potentially constitutes a multilateral platform of encounter and discussion where stakeholders can give exposure to their needs with regards to migration and development processes. In particular, the Commonwealth Organization is potentially a place where an alternative outlook on migration can be voiced, more in line with the development needs of Southern countries, as opposed to the security concerns of receiving countries.

In 2009, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting communiqué addressed the issue of migration, agriculture and food security. On migration, it acknowledged its role in 'development and the flourishing of human prospects', and highlighted the need for enhanced cooperation 'in managing mixed migratory flows and addressing protection needs'. On food security, the communiqué called for 'increased investment in sustainable agriculture, rural development and natural resource management'. It also endorsed innovative practices and a multi-dimensional approach to 'sustainable agriculture and food security'. Member states agreed to strive to ensure that 'food, agriculture, trade and overall trade policies' fostered food security. The leaders endorsed the 'L'Aquille Joint Statement on Global Food Security' and the development of a Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security (GPAFS).

The Commonwealth Organization has a dense institutional framework, including the Commonwealth Foundation (CF), the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC), The Youth Programme (CYP), the Local Government Forum (CCGF), the Business Council (CBC), and the Parliamentary Association (CPA). They give exposure to the political, business and civil society actors of the area. However, although the Commonwealth Foundation has approached migrant organizations in the recent past, there is no specific representation of actors engaged in migration issues.

The creation of the Commonwealth Office for Migration and Development would provide a platform where issues of migration and development could be discussed. The board of the COMD would include policy makers of sending and receiving countries and representatives of migrant and pro-migrant associations. Its aims are three-fold:

- To provide technical and evidence-based guidance for the formulation of migration and development policies: the COMD would build up a database of existing research and best practices likely to inform current debates; it would also work as an intermediary body between migration and development experts and public and private stakeholders.
- To provide a space for discussion between sending and receiving countries and diaspora organizations.
- To set up an agenda on migration and development issues. The Ramphal Commission report on Commonwealth migration (Gamlen 2010) points to four key issues:
 - Build migration management capacity through the training of experts and the improvement of migration-related data;
 - Streamline migration policies: current migration schemes are too often disconnected from the development needs of sending countries and from migrants' rights and fail to address brain drain issues;
 - Help migrants share their success by facilitating remittances and supporting diaspora initiatives in the development field;
 - Enhance international cooperation over migration by offering a Commonwealth voice in the Global Migration Governance Forums.

This endeavour at the Commonwealth level would create an enabling environment at the international level likely to spur and provide guidance to a debate, and policies meant to boost the development impacts of migration. In particular, COMD could support the introduction of best practices in temporary workers agreements (Hugo 2011: 41). However, this action, although necessary, turns out to be insufficient and must be complemented by national- and local-level measures.

At the national level

Mainstreaming migration in the development agenda of public authorities and civil society organizations

The different case studies highlight the absence of an account of migration in national development policies. For example, in India, *'there is no specific policy linking immigrants to food/agriculture production'* (Sahai, Singh et al. 2011: 48). In Tonga, *'the National Strategic Planning Framework makes no specific reference to remittances and migration is mentioned only once as a demographic factor in its current 5-10 year strategic development policy started in 2009'* (Taufatofua 2011: 19). In Kenya, *'PRSP²¹, although it is light on actual policy prescriptions, clearly has a negative view, stating that "traditional systems (of social protection) are disappearing due to the break-down of the extended family system, migration, economic hardships and poverty"'* (African_Migration_and_Development_Policy_Centre 2011: 36). This lack of account is also (even more surprisingly) true for international organizations. For example, the FAO food policy in Tonga Island does not mention migration. The 2008 World Development Report on agriculture (World Bank 2007), although acknowledging the crucial role of internal and international mobility in rural development, does not refer to migration and

remittances in its recommendations. Finally, the role of migration is often neglected by civil society organizations. In particular, this issue is absent from farmers' organizations' agenda.²²

As a consequence, existing institutional frameworks dealing with migration issues at the national level (if in place) are generally disconnected from the administrations in charge of development strategies. Policies aiming to foster the development impacts of migration are all too often disconnected from development strategies. A misleading approach disconnecting migrant remittances from wider development plans is the Mexican *tres por uno*. Although this scheme was successful in enhancing collective remittances in Mexico, it generates an unbalanced development dynamic, supporting non-priority projects (town embellishment), redundant equipment (excess of schools or health equipment in some areas, absence in others) and non-sustainable enterprises (Lacroix, de Haas et al. 2010). The same problems are observed in Punjab with a multiplication of health centres handed to the private sector due to short-view development plans. In the light of the present research, it is argued that a new approach must be invented based on the incorporation of migration and remittances into development agendas. For example, remittances are a source of funding, along with formal and informal credit sources and not a separate phenomenon.

In order to overcome this disconnection, states should enlarge their capacity at two distinct levels: the creation of dedicated institutions should tackle migration-related issues, such as migrant rights, and migration management, while migration and development issues should be part of the agendas of institutions in charge of development strategies. In this perspective, public officials, policy makers and leaders of civil society organizations should be given training on the development potential of migration. **Conversely, bridges between diaspora organizations, migration experts and rural development stakeholders should be forged through joint programmes.**

Recommendations for specific policies at the national level

Internal transfers

There is still limited insight into the development impacts of internal transfers. Internal migration, due to the limited financial return it yields, seems more likely to keep the rural population in a state of dependence on urban areas. Measures should be taken to improve the working conditions of migrants in urban areas and lower the costs of transfers. Mobile-phone transfers tried out in Kenya could be transposed into other national contexts. Banks and mobile-phone money transfer agents should make their services more complementary.

International market chains: linking agriculture and migrant entrepreneurship

The development of export agriculture is often out of reach for farmers, especially for smallholders who neither have the capacity nor the knowledge to develop overseas business strategies. Migrant entrepreneurs could be the missing link between farmers and overseas

markets. As exemplified by the Tongan case, the demand for local agricultural products in the migrant communities and beyond opens up trading possibilities. Consular authorities or dedicated overseas chambers of commerce in settlement countries should provide a support to migrants willing to establish joint ventures with local farmers.

Integration for development

Behind the so-called ‘win-win-win’ strategy hailed by international organizations, there is a deliberate focus on temporary workers migration schemes that, all too often, neglect not only the development needs of sending countries, but also the rights of migrants. And for a number of migrants, these schemes, when they are the only way to move overseas, restrict the freedom to settle for a longer period. In fact, in receiving countries, TWMPs are becoming the mainstay of a ‘circulation-instead-of-integration’ approach, whereas integration schemes are dismantled. But there is now a body of evidence that integration can be instrumental for homeland development. As they gain economic and legal stability, expatriates are more prone to engage in transnational business activities. **Integration policies are therefore a central aspect of successful diaspora engagement policies.** Several European cities such as Paris, Milan or Barcelona have carried out co-funding schemes of homeland development projects, which aim to build up partnerships between immigrant organizations and volunteer organizations in the host and origin localities.

Integration is often perceived as a ‘Northern’ issue. However, rural–urban, transit and South–South migration also pose integration problems for migrants, which constrain the development potential of human mobility. Opening a debate on migrant integration, migrants’ rights and remittances in Southern countries should be foster a mutual understanding between migrants and stakeholders.

Channelling investment to rural areas

An IOM survey of Zambians expatriate shows that 45% of emigrants willing to invest in Zambia wish to do so in agriculture (Kapunda 2011: 31). In practice, the level of investment of migrants in rural areas is nearly insignificant. This example shows the sheer contrast between emigrants’ prospects and behaviours. Adequate measures should aim at encouraging emigrants to engage in productive investments. Incentives should be put in place in order to lower the risks of investing and give guidance to migrants in the rural economy. Loans to finance a business, loans or mortgages to buy, or build a home, and specific bank accounts can be ad-hoc instruments to finance investment initiatives in rural areas.

However, as shown by the present report, the primary incentive for investing is the expected profitability of farming. Incentives alone are insufficient and should be harnessed to a wider rural development strategy tackling development obstacles.

At the local level

Creating synergies between migrant organizations, local authorities and civil society

The deficit of public infrastructure, whether due to the lack of public investment or caused by environmental hazards, is a major impediment for the development of rural economies. Migrants can contribute to the building of roads, health centres, electrification, schools, nurseries or community centres through the collective mobilization of diaspora organizations. Studies of existing experiences have highlighted several problems faced by migrant organizations: the lack of technical expertise and financial means, the lack of capacity to enforce decisions at a distance, and the lack of long-term management plans. In addition, as pointed out above, the projects undertaken do not always meet the priority needs of local populations as migrants sometimes privilege visible and prestigious endeavours.

A better coordination between migrants, civil society organizations and local authorities should not only improve the implementation of the projects but would also raise awareness on the development needs of local populations. There is often a lack of development strategies and an inventory of needs at the local level.

An example of best practice is given by the Moroccan government through the PERG “Programme d’Electrification Rural Global”. The programme is a co-funding scheme of village electrification projects in which the state provide half of the money and technical assistance, while the rest of the amount is funded by a village association. Emigrants (in cities or overseas) generally take on the bulk of the villagers’ share. The programme presents several advantages: the support is limited to specific projects which meet the priority needs of the population (other schemes support water systems and road projects); the state keeps a supervisory role in order to avoid redundant projects at the regional level; and the scheme supports the emergence of a local civil society.

For this reason, the success of diaspora engagement and infrastructure development policies must be harnessed to a **decentralization policy** which grants freedom of association and ensures a local democracy dynamic.

This approach could be used to implement co-funding schemes aiming to improve irrigation systems, school and health equipment, water systems or to build up community centres or roads.

Empowering women

As highlighted by the different case studies, women are often at the forefront of poverty issues. Measures should be taken to enlarge the possibility for them to use remittances, to grant them better access to economic assets and to help them participate in development strategies at the local level.

In India, the reservation of seats for women in local councils has helped better target public investments to gender-specific needs.

In Morocco, community centres and village halls built by migrants implement programme of education for women and help them to develop income generating activities.

Prospects for future research

The research has highlighted several areas where more research is needed to improve and implement evidence-based policies.

- *Migration and food security*: although there is wealth of research on migrant remittances, none has investigated the relationships between their use at the domestic level and food security. Evidence shows that a large part is spent on the purchase of food. This aspect has been neglected as it was assessed as non-productive and as a sign of economic dependence on cash transfers. To what extent does migration improve the food security of rural populations? To what extent do the benefits of remittances spill over to non-migrants' households?
- *Internal migration and development*: there is a growing body of evidence that international migration is supportive of a development dynamic at the local level. The benefits of internal migration are less obvious, as internal mobility yields lower financial returns. Does internal migration maintain rural areas in a state of economic dependence? Is it instrumental or detrimental for agricultural growth and poverty?
- *Impacts of migrant philanthropy and social remittances on rural development*: much has been written on financial remittances. There is, however, a lack of understanding of the role of non-material and collective remittances. For example, there is a lack of knowledge on the linkages which might exist between the impacts of migration on gender role and food consumption in migrant households.
- *Towards a comprehensive vision of migration and development*: the impact of migration on development is generally assessed through the monies and investments of migrants. In other words, the measure of these impacts takes into account what is brought back by migrants. Arguably, a fairer vision of the real effects of migration should subtract from these inputs what is taken away by migrants, namely the financial capital used to cover the travel and settlement expenses, the labour force, and tuition expenses to enhance their human capital.

Appendix 1: Terms of reference of country studies

Terms of Reference

Country Studies on Migration and Development

TCP/INT/3302 (D)- Support to the Commonwealth Secretariat for the preparation of strategies for maximizing the benefits of migration and remittances for pro-poor sustainable development and food security

I. Background and purpose

The growing importance of migration and remittances is changing the socio-economic scenario of the agro-rural sector in most developing countries. In particular, labour movement and corresponding changes in relative wages due to migration, and remittance in-flows for family support and other purposes are affecting agricultural production, the relative competitiveness of agriculture, as well as social safety net issues which are critical components of pro-poor sustainable food security, poverty reduction, agriculture and rural development strategies.

The Commonwealth Foundation, whose members include countries which are a significant source of both in-flow and out-flow of migrants and remittances, in collaboration with the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development and in consultation with other international and research bodies, such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Oxford Department of International Development, and the International Migration Institute (IMI), is engaged in developing pragmatic strategies, aimed at maximizing the benefits of cross-border migration for the pro-poor development of Commonwealth states. In this context, FAO, in collaboration with the Commonwealth Foundation and the Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development is initiating country case studies, which will form the basis for the pragmatic strategies for the creation of ‘an enabling environment’ for the investment of remittances in the agro-rural sector, maximizing the positive impact and minimizing the negative impact of migration and remittances on pro-poor development within the Commonwealth.

II. Scope of the country case studies

The case studies will focus on generating adequate data, analysis and information necessary for a sound pro-poor development strategy for the member countries of the Commonwealth. In particular, it will have the following four components and Annexes of all the data used for the case studies:

A. A general overview of migration in the country and within the Commonwealth and its associated socio-economic characteristics related to agriculture, food security and rural development (20-30 pages)

The review and analysis will focus on:

A.1 Summary description of the countries' institutional and socio-economic relationship within the Commonwealth, along with trading pattern and special treaties/privileges and concessions within the Commonwealth and/or with one or more countries within the Commonwealth.

A2. Summary description of the country's poverty and food security situation, along with socio-economic characteristics of the poor. Describe:

A.2.1. the agriculture profile: what types of crop and of agriculture (traditional/modern, subsistence/export)?

A.2.2. the food security and poverty situation: what are the main factors of poverty and food deficit? What are the main obstacles impeding the development of agriculture (political situation, environmental problems, lack of access to funding)?

A3. A general overview of international migration from the country (within the Commonwealth, in neighbouring countries, other destinations):

A.3.1. What is the profile of the migrants (age, sex, origin, destination, education, sector/type of employment)?

A.3.2. What type of migration: describe briefly the migration history of the main departure areas. What are the main types of migration (e.g. seasonal, or longer term)?

A4. A synthesis of how migration and remittances are affecting the socio-economic indicators of development, particularly poverty, food security, agricultural production and productivity, gender, equity and overall employment opportunities for the youth.

A.4.1. Remittances

- *The general picture*: volume of remittances sent to the country, what percentage of the GDP? What evolution since the last decade?
- *Channels of remittances*: How the families left behind receive remittances: informally, via a bank, money transfer companies; what is the cost incurred by the use of the respective channels?

A.4.2. Household livelihood

- *The use of remittances*: How are remittances used (consumed/invested?); what is the relative share of the main uses of remittances (consumption, investment, etc.), and is there a difference in their use, depending whether a male or a female retains control over remittances; to what extent do women use remittances to improve their access to land and to income-generating activities?
- *The share of remittances in the household income*: what are the different sources of household income (salaried activities, agriculture, institutional or traditional micro-finance, bank loan)? To be based on available documentation.

A.4.3. Impact of remittances on agriculture and environment

- *Quantitative impact*: do remittances and migration have an overall negative (abandonment of land, lack of workforce, etc.) or positive (investment, increase of productivity) impact on agriculture?
- *Qualitative impact*: does migration affect agricultural techniques (modernization, introduction of new material/crop)? Are there differences in agricultural production and productivity between the families with and without migrants? How do migration and remittances affect land use, land prices, land tenure and access to land e.g. by purchase, rental, formalization of customary titles? As regards land use, it will be relevant to clarify: How land acquired by migrants is used, including acquisition for speculation, agrarian land for commercial purposes, etc.

- *Workforce and migration:* How do the families losing labour through migration cope with the loss? Do they resort to hired labour and/or substitute labour with increased mechanization (purchased through remittances)? If households resort to labour, does it induce internal immigration flows and from where? To be based on available documentation.
- *Impact on environment:* A summary description, based on existing research, of whether migration is related to environmental change (erosion of abandoned land, scarcity/pollution of water resources due to excess exploitation of wells, improvement of ecological resources, etc.).

A.4.4. Impact on poverty

- Is migration affecting rural wages, prices, and what are the problems encountered by farmers due to migration?
- Are there differences in the level of poverty and food security across families with migrants and without migrants? If so, is it due to the remittances or other factors associated with migration, i.e. migration-related skill enhancement through knowledge gained and access to information?

B. A general overview of national agricultural, rural development and food security policies, and policies referring to migration (if any) (5-10 pages)

B1. Describe if and how international migration is taken into account in government strategies including in the agricultural sector, rural development, including rural employment policies and programmes (also looking at ILO Decent Work Country Programmes), identify government's objectives regarding migration as expressed in plans and policy papers. Mention agreements, if any, between Commonwealth governments regarding migration.

B2. Describe issues/changes in policies and institutions for land reclamation and titling and, if any, specific rules/privileges granted to migrants for purchase and/or access to land.

B3. Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and action plans: (i) to what extent can they address the challenges and issues related to migration (in order to identify actions and gaps in existing policies); (ii) what is the impact of migration policies on agriculture and on sectoral development, including food security concerns; (iii) analysis of government attention

and efforts, referring to migration policies in terms of planning documents, budgetary allocations, foreseen reforms.

C. *Review of actors in the domain of migration and food security (5 pages)*

C1. Review and analysis of the institutions/organizations, public, private institutions, NGOs/CSOs, as well agricultural or non-agricultural bank/financial/credit institutions, involved in the provision of services to migrants, including transfers and use of remittances. The review should assess their relative role and overview of costs and regulations. In particular:

- Who are the main actors, including potential ones, in the area of migration? Are those participating in decision-making processes related to agriculture and food security involved? Who are the main agents for change within the government and institutions with regards to migration and food security? What is the degree of involvement of such entities (including private sector, civil society, NGOs, farmers' associations and cooperatives, as well as women's groups in rural areas) in the problems and opportunities created by migration in the agricultural sector?
- Review of public and private institutions, agricultural credit institutions, associations of migrants, regional and local governments involved or potentially involved in the provision of services to migrants, transfers of remittances, overview of costs and regulations in view of their involvement in co-development¹ projects.
- Review of existing associations of migrant workers in the agricultural sector and in rural areas. Identify the possible role of these associations in social dialogue and development in the communities of origin.
- Identify existing programmes, if any, in the area of investment of migrants' remittances (co-development schemes). How they can contribute to government policies in the area of migration?

¹ In co-development projects, migrants invest their remittances in productive activities and may receive matching funds from local/central governments, banks, private sector and foundations in the host country as well as matching resources from ad hoc funds created in their country of origin where they decide to invest. As an example, the *Tres por Uno* programme in Mexico foresees that for each US\$ sent by Mexicans living abroad the Federal, State and Municipal authorities add one US\$ each. Co-development entails the improvement of social conditions both in source countries and countries of residence. Hence, co-development projects can contribute to the development of the countries of origin of migrants while at the same time promoting their socio-economic inclusion in the territories of destination. Thus in the study the consultant should look for best practices or existing initiatives. Or, if there are no examples, which actors could be undertaking/supporting such types of projects.

D. Recommendations for more effective policy interventions (5 pages)

This last section should draw on main findings from the previous ones and suggest policy recommendations:

D1. Provide recommendations for a pro-poor development strategy, within the framework of the country's socio-economic relationship with the member countries of the Commonwealth through, among others:

- Recommendations concerning sectors deserving more attention in terms of government policies, reform, research, programme/project development with a view to maximizing remittances investments for food security, agricultural and rural development, and, to the extent possible, climate change mitigation and adaptation.
- Recommendations on the possibilities to increase youths' engagement in agricultural activities, to reduce migration through coordination of policies and programmes in the agricultural sector with labour and employment policies.
- Recommendations to support livelihood strategies of migrants' households ensuring that non-migrant households are not left behind, including the need for more collaboration among Ministries of Agriculture and Labour.
- Suggest solutions regarding challenges and opportunities posed by seasonal international migration, particularly within the Commonwealth, also ensuring that seasonal workers are provided access to decent work and to safe and efficient remittance transfer mechanisms.
- Which type of co-development projects, in which migrants are actively involved, could be supported by governments and development agencies? For example, individual projects or communal/collective projects focusing on infrastructure and land conservation/improvement which can have positive spill-over effects also on non-migrant households and on the environment at community/regional level.
- Identification of institutional and financial mechanisms that could be used in co-development projects (e.g. rural credit associations of migrant and non-migrant households).
- Identification of government programmes/initiatives that could be supported by development partners, including FAO.

Duration: 4 months (deadline: 25 May). Two one page progress reports will be submitted on 25 March and 25 April.

Pacific:	Samoa and the Solomon Islands
Caribbean:	Guyana and Jamaica
Africa:	Kenya and Zambia
Asia:	India and Sri Lanka


Methodology

- The report must follow the structure outlined by the terms of reference and keep the same headlines.
- Indicative length of the study: 40-50 pages (92-25,000 words) plus a 1 page Executive Summary focusing on recommendations.
- Sources of information: A comprehensive country literature review will have to be complemented with interviews to main stakeholders – government, social partners, civil society and research community. To the extent possible, limited focus group discussions with migrants' household could be organized but, in any case, qualitative interviews with stakeholders (government, research, diaspora and farmers' associations, rural credit institutions, under section C) will have to be organized. Text Boxes may be inserted in the relevant sections. Quantitative information: (international sources, national sources); it has to be from the most recent and reliable sources, etc. The report should also include text boxes with examples related to each section.
- Statistical Annexes: time series (last 10 years) referring to: external and internal migration outflows, remittances, private investment in agriculture (foreign and domestic, main sectors), public investment; export, land. FAO has already prepared country briefs which will be of help.
- List the different dataset which exist in the country on agriculture, food security and migration (national and thematic census, academic surveys, etc.)

Appendix 2: Maps of the case studies

Map 1: Map of India


Migration, food security and agriculture in India



Thomas Lacroix, 2011
 Source: NSFM 2011, MOIA,
 Annual report 2011, IFPRI, 2009
 Global Migration Database, Sussex SCMR, v4


Map 2: Map of Kenya

Migration, rural development and food security in Kenya




Map 3: Map of Tonga Islands

Migration, rural development and food security in Tonga Islands



Thomas Lacroix, 2011. Source: Tonga report, FAO, 2011, Global Migrant Origin Database v4, Sussex SCMR

Map 4: Map of Jamaica




Thomas Lacroix, 2011

Sources: FAO Stat 2011, Global Migrant Origin Database v4


Map 5: Map of Sri Lanka

Migration, food security and rural development in Sri Lanka



Map 6: Map of St Vincent and the Grenadines


Migration, food security and rural development in St Vincent and the Grenadines



Thomas Lacroix, 2011
 Sources: Global Migrant Database v4; Poverty headcount: Living Conditions in St Vincent and the Grenadines, 2008, vol.1

Map 7: Map of Zambia

Migration, food security and rural development in Zambia



Thomas Lacroix, 2011
 Sources: Poverty: Central Statistical Office, 2006;
 Migration: Global Migrant Origin Database v.4; Agriculture: FAOSTAT, 2011

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¹ UN factbook, 2011

² Figure quoted by de Vasconcelos, P. (2010). Remittances as a Rural Development Tool. African remittances programme. World_Bank. Nairobi: 22.

³ Sierra Leone (6), Zambia (15), Bangladesh (16), India (17), Rwanda (20). Source: Global Hunger Index, FAOSTAT, 2011.

⁴ World Bank Fact book, 2011

⁵ Annual Report 2010-2011, Ministry of overseas Indian Affairs, GOI , New Delhi

⁶ World Bank Fact book, 2011

⁷ In the 2008 World development report, World Bank experts defined three types of rural worlds according to the share of agriculture in aggregate growth over the past 15 years, and the current share of total poverty in rural areas, using the \$2-a-day poverty line: the agriculture-based countries in which agriculture counts for a large proportion of the GDP growth (30 percent in average) and where poor people concentrate in rural areas (70 percent); the transforming countries which undergo an economic transition toward nonfarm sectors. Agriculture is no longer a spearheading source of economic growth (7 percent in average) but poverty remains

disproportionately rural (82 percent); the urbanised countries for which agriculture is a small component of the overall economy (5 percent of the average growth) and rural poverty declines (45 percent).

⁸ World Development report 2008, World Bank

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The Census Report, India, 2001

¹¹ World Bank Fact book, 2011

¹² Paralleling the cuts in investments, subsidies in fertilizers, irrigation and power have sharply increased (by five times in India since 1991 (IFPRI, 2007: 2). In addition to be detrimental to a capital accumulation approach subsidies in food and inputs are largely absorbed by corruption.

¹³ Source: CWC, 2004, www.cwc.mic.in (India report: 56)

¹⁴ Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development (2009): Rural Incomes, Inequality and Poverty Dynamics in Kenya. WPS 30/2008

¹⁵ Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005/06 conducted by the Ministry of Planning and National Development

¹⁶ http://www.africanremittances.org/conferences_content/presentations/Kenya-ES.pdf

¹⁷ This figure and the following ones aggregate remittances from within and from outside Africa

¹⁸ The Kava is a soft traditional narcotic

¹⁹ A thorough analysis of Latin American collective remittance from the US is provided by Orozco, M. (2003). Hometown associations and their present and future partnerships: new development opportunities? Washington D.C., US Agency for International Development, Interamerican Dialogue: 58.

²⁰ One of the most comprehensive and up to date listing can be found in the third part of "Global_Migration_Group (2010). Mainstreaming migration into development planning. A handbook for policy-makers and practitioners, Global Migration Group: 152.

²¹ Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

²² The root cause of this situation might dwell in the disconnection between migration studies and development studies in academia de Haan, A. (2006). Migration in the Development Studies Literature: Has It Come Out of Its Marginality?, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) 28.