Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2014

Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Résumé

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

Dates et versions

halshs-00943301 , version 1 (07-02-2014)

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Citer

Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux, Richard Holden. Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty. Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 83, pp.284-290. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011⟩. ⟨halshs-00943301⟩
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