Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions
Charles Figuieres
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 921529
David Masclet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 177109
- IdHAL : david-masclet
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4670-6247
- IdRef : 068930097
Marc Willinger
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170514
- IdHAL : marc-willinger
- ORCID : 0000-0001-5880-3453
- IdRef : 029203651
Résumé
We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people's moral motivation is "weak." Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic "moral ideal." We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents leads to the decline of the average contribution over time. The model is compatible with persistence of overcontributions, variability of contributions (across and within individuals), the "restart effect" and the observation that the decay in contributions is slower in longer games. Furthermore, it offers a rationale for conditional cooperation.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people's moral motivation is "weak." Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic "moral ideal." We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents leads to the decline of the average contribution over time. The model is compatible with persistence of overcontributions, variability of contributions (across and within individuals), the "restart effect" and the observation that the decay in contributions is slower in longer games. Furthermore, it offers a rationale for conditional cooperation.
|
Titre |
en
Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions
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Auteur(s) |
Charles Figuieres
1
, David Masclet
2
, Marc Willinger
1, 3
1
LAMETA -
Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 2583 )
- Avenue Raymond Dugrand-CS79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2
- France
2
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
3
IUF -
Institut universitaire de France
( 56663 )
- Maison des Universités 103 Boulevard Saint-Michel 75005 Paris
- France
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Nom de la revue |
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2013
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Volume |
15
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Numéro |
5
|
Page/Identifiant |
745-772
|
Localisation géographique du document |
UMR 1135 UMR INRA / CNRS / ENSAM / Univ. Montpellier 1 / MontpellierSupAgro : Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, Centre de recherche de Montpellier, 34060 MONTPELLIER CEDEX 1, FRA
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Public visé |
Scientifique
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Public Good, contribution, game thoery, conditional cooperation
|
DOI | 10.1111/jpet.12036 |
ProdINRA | 46420 |
UT key WOS | 000323198700005 |
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