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Autre Publication Scientifique Année : 2015

Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

Résumé

This paper studies rationalizability in a linear asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with a unique Nash equilibrium. It shows that mergers favors uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome. When requires uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome maximization of consumers' surplus may involve a symmetric oligopoly with few firms. We interpret uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome as favoring a dampening of strategic ‘coordination’ uncertainty. An illustration to the merger between Delta Air Lines and Northwest shows that a reallocation of 1% of market share from a small carrier to a larger one has implied a lower production volatility over time, yielding a 1.5% decrease in the coefficient of variation of number of passengers.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00975002 , version 1 (07-04-2014)
halshs-00975002 , version 2 (30-10-2015)
halshs-00975002 , version 3 (11-12-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00975002 , version 3

Citer

Gabriel Desgranges, Stéphane Gauthier. Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly. 2015. ⟨halshs-00975002v3⟩
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