A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Article Dans Une Revue Economic Theory Bulletin Année : 2013

A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes

Résumé

The classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only slightly weaker than the original one but allows a much more transparent proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00976923 , version 1 (10-04-2014)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00976923 , version 1

Citer

Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch. A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes. Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, pp.189-199. ⟨halshs-00976923⟩
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