Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment which used various evaluation scales, conducted during the first round of the 2012 French presidential election. Invitations to participate in the study were extended to around 5,000 voters in three cities, and the experiment attracted 2,340 participants. Basing our argument on the ranks, relative scores, and grade profiles of candidates, we show that the two-round system favors "exclusive" candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor "inclusive" candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the official, two-round voting rule.
Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election
Résumé
en
Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment which used various evaluation scales, conducted during the first round of the 2012 French presidential election. Invitations to participate in the study were extended to around 5,000 voters in three cities, and the experiment attracted 2,340 participants. Basing our argument on the ranks, relative scores, and grade profiles of candidates, we show that the two-round system favors "exclusive" candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor "inclusive" candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the official, two-round voting rule.
1
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
École normale supérieure de Lyon ( 6818 )
;
Université Lumière - Lyon 2 ( 33804 )
;
Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 ( 194495 )
;
Université de Lyon ( 301088 )
;
Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne ( 300284 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR5824 ( 441569 )
2
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
Université de Caen Normandie ( 7127 )
;
Normandie Université ( 455934 )
;
Université de Rennes ( 105160 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR6211 ( 441569 )
3
BETA -
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 93745 )
- Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy Cedex
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex
- France
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique UMR1443 ( 92114 )
;
Université de Strasbourg ( 199013 )
;
Université de Lorraine ( 413289 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7522 ( 441569 )
4
PREG-CRG -
Pole de recherche en économie et gestion
( 21109 )
- Route de Saclay 91128 Palaiseau cedex
- France
École polytechnique ( 300340 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7176 ( 441569 )
Audience
Non spécifiée
Langue du document
Anglais
Vulgarisation
Non
Comité de lecture
Oui
Date de publication électronique
2013-12-03
Licence
Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification
Nom de la revue
Electoral Studies
(ISSN : 0261-3794)
Publié par Elsevier
Revue non référencée dans Sherpa-Romeo
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments
D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Domaine(s)
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Science politique
Mots-clés
en
Voting, In Situ Experiment, Evaluative Voting, Approval Voting, Two-round system