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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2014

Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Résumé

I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other.

Dates et versions

halshs-01109156 , version 1 (24-01-2015)

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Marie Laclau. Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 87, pp.136-160. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009⟩. ⟨halshs-01109156⟩
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