Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations
Résumé
Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. We show that three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation between nonprofits: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraising efforts are strategic complements/substitutes, and (iii) whether deviation from the agreements is by an individual or by a group of nonprofits. We analyze how the interaction of these three features induces (or not) the stability of Pareto-optimal full coordination in fundraising.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations
|
Résumé |
en
Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. We show that three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation between nonprofits: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraising efforts are strategic complements/substitutes, and (iii) whether deviation from the agreements is by an individual or by a group of nonprofits. We analyze how the interaction of these three features induces (or not) the stability of Pareto-optimal full coordination in fundraising.
|
Auteur(s) |
Gani Aldashev
1
, Marini Marco
2
, Thierry Verdier
3, 4, 5
1
CRED -
Centre de recherche en économie du développement
( 410992 )
- Belgique
2
UNIROMA -
Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]
( 229915 )
- Piazzale Aldo Moro 5, 00185 Roma
- Italie
3
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
4
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2014-09
|
Volume |
117
|
Page/Identifiant |
182–200
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Financement |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Endogenous coalition formation, Non-distribution constraint, Coordination, Charitable giving, Nonprofits
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.009 |
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