Dishonesty under scrutiny - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article dans une revue Journal of the Economic Science Association Année : 2015

Dishonesty under scrutiny

Résumé

We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Dishonesty under scrutiny.pdf ( 816.44 Ko ) Télécharger
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01137676, version 1 (03-06-2015)

Identifiants

Citer

Jeroen van de Ven, Marie Claire Villeval. Dishonesty under scrutiny. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2015, 1 (1), pp. 86-99. ⟨10.1007/s40881-015-0002-6⟩. ⟨halshs-01137676⟩
266 Consultations
268 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus