Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
Lefebvre Mathieu
(1)
,
Pierre Pestieau
(2, 3, 4, 5)
,
Arno Riedl
(6, 7, 8, 9)
,
Marie Claire Villeval
(7, 10)
1
LAMETA -
Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
2 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
3 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
4 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 PSE - Paris School of Economics
6 CESifo
7 IZA
8 Netspar
9 The Maastricht University School of Business and Economics
10 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
2 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
3 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
4 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 PSE - Paris School of Economics
6 CESifo
7 IZA
8 Netspar
9 The Maastricht University School of Business and Economics
10 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
Arno Riedl
- Fonction : Auteur
Marie Claire Villeval
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 596
- IdHAL : marie-claire-villeval
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8578-5449
- IdRef : 029244730
Résumé
We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
|
Résumé |
en
We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries.
|
Auteur(s) |
Lefebvre Mathieu
1
, Pierre Pestieau
2, 3, 4, 5
, Arno Riedl
6, 7, 8, 9
, Marie Claire Villeval
7, 10
1
LAMETA -
Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 2583 )
- Avenue Raymond Dugrand-CS79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2
- France
2
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
3
CORE -
Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
( 48233 )
- 34, Voie du Roman Pays B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
- Belgique
4
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
CESifo
( 113029 )
- Munich
- Royaume-Uni
7
IZA
( 151475 )
- Bonn
- Allemagne
8
Netspar
( 351368 )
-
- France
9
The Maastricht University School of Business and Economics
( 164415 )
- P.O. Box 616 6200 MD Maastricht The Netherlands
- Pays-Bas
10
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2015-06
|
Volume |
22
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
401-425
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Tax evasion, Social interactions, Peer effects, Cross-country comparisons, Experiments
|
DOI | 10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z |
ProdINRA | 312621 |
UT key WOS | 000353396600003 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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