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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2015

Bargaining through Approval

Résumé

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01168675 , version 1 (26-06-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01168675 , version 1

Citer

Matias Nunez, Jean-François Laslier. Bargaining through Approval. 2015. ⟨halshs-01168675⟩
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