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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2015

Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market

Résumé

In most societies, the social practice of paying dowry tends to decline and sometimes to disappear. In contrast, a system of marriages negotiated between families continues to exist in India; a marriage squeeze and a real dowry inflation are observed throughout the country. This paper brings a nice application of methods used in the classical matching markets: existence of stable outcomes and a minimum equilibrium dowry, coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes. We further discuss strategic questions and address issues comparative statics when a marriage squeeze yields in the Indian marriage market.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01180569, version 1 (27-07-2015)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01180569 , version 1

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Raïssa-Juvette Samba, Rhonya Adli. Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market. 2015. ⟨halshs-01180569⟩
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