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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2015

Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences

Résumé

In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01226803, version 1 (10-11-2015)
halshs-01226803, version 2 (05-01-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01226803 , version 2

Citer

Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Doghmi, Abdelmonaim Tlidi. Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences. 2015. ⟨halshs-01226803v2⟩
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