Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty
Nobuyuki Hanaki
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 970714
Nicolas Jacquemet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12676
- IdHAL : nicolas-jacquemet
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5056-9225
- IdRef : 103289860
Stéphane Luchini
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742445
- IdHAL : stephane-luchini
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2721-0529
- IdRef : 059505621
Adam Zylbersztejn
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 172015
- IdHAL : adam-zylbersztejn
- ORCID : 0000-0001-6987-3190
- IdRef : 148483631
Résumé
How is one's cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 × 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
How is one's cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 × 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.
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Titre |
en
Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty
|
Auteur(s) |
Nobuyuki Hanaki
1
, Nicolas Jacquemet
2, 3
, Stéphane Luchini
4
, Adam Zylbersztejn
5
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
4
GREQAM -
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
( 199934 )
- Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02
- France
5
GATE -
Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique
( 785 )
- 93 chemin des Mouilles 69130 ECULLY
- France
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Date de publication |
2016
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Date de production/écriture |
2015-10
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
URL éditeur |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-015-9525-9
|
Page/Identifiant |
101-121
|
Volume |
81
|
Numéro |
1
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
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Collaboration/Projet |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Robot, Bounded rationality, Strategic uncertainty, Experiment
|
DOI | 10.1007/s11238-015-9525-9 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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