Article Dans Une Revue Economics Letters Année : 2000

The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company

Pierre-Henri Morand

Résumé

We study the role of security-voting structure when a government wants to privatize a company. Our results show that the one share–one vote structure is optimal for allocating control rights to the most efficient pretender. However, this structure is not always optimal for maximizing the sale’s revenue.

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halshs-01309050 , version 1 (28-04-2016)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01309050 , version 1

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Christian At, Pierre-Henri Morand. The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company. Economics Letters, 2000, 68 (3), pp.287-292. ⟨halshs-01309050⟩

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